Opinion
Civil Action 22-552
06-08-2022
JOHN CHARLES HOUSER, Plaintiff, v. JULIEANE SWAIN, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Complaint be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
II. Report
A. Relevant Background
On April 13, 2022, Plaintiff John Charles Houser submitted what purported to be a civil rights complaint along with a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The sole defendant named in the caption was the “Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County, Pennsylvania” but the body of the complaint identified Julieane Edna Fry as the defendant. Because Plaintiff appeared to be raising issues about being wrongfully held in custody, it was unclear if he intended to pursue a prisoner civil rights case or a habeas corpus proceeding. In addition, he failed to include various forms that are required to initiate a proceeding. Therefore, an order was filed on April 18, 2022, directing him to proceed by filing either a prisoner civil rights case or a habeas corpus petition with the appropriate forms by May 16, 2022.
On May 5, 2022, Plaintiff submitted a new complaint. In that complaint, he names Julieane Swain, an assistant district attorney in Beaver County as the defendant both in the caption and body of the complaint. Plaintiff alleges that his rights under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are being violated. As described in his statement of claim, he alleges that ADA Swain “acted with deliberate indifference and wanton disregard for the facts that there was no evidence or victim testimony to corroborate the continued prosecution of plaintiff's criminal case.” (ECF No. 8-5.) He states that ADA Swain has violated his “8th Amendment right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment under the deliberate indifference clause and [his] 14th amendment rights to due process by the deliberate malicious abuse of process and prosecution in the illegal violation of [his] rights under Rule 600 ... and violation of the speedy trial rule along with [his] right to appear before the court on all proceedings.” Id. Plaintiff claims that the wrongful conduct commenced on July 16, 2021 and continues to the present time.
The original Complaint refers to her as “Julieane Edna Fry.” It appears that Ms. Fry is also known as Ms. Swain. She will be referred to herein as ADA Swain.
While the form used by Plaintiff is styled as a complaint for violation of civil rights, he again bases his claims on the length of his pretrial detention and requests as relief both “immediate release” as well as actual damages of $200,000 and punitive damages of $5 million. (ECF No. 8 at 5.)
Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) was granted on May 6, 2022. (ECF No. 6.)
B. Standard of Review
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (“PLRA”), courts are required to screen complaints at any time where, as is the case here, the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed IFP. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The PLRA provides in relevant part that:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that-
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal-
i. is frivolous or malicious;
ii. fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or
iii. seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Thus, the Court must initially screen Plaintiff's Complaint in order to determine if it should be dismissed at this time. As discussed below, a review of the allegations of the Complaint establishes that it should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
C. Analysis
1. Prosecutorial Immunity
Plaintiff has named a state prosecutor for her role in delaying his trial or not permitting him to be released from custody. Because his claims against the prosecutor all concern her conduct “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case,” absolute immunity bars these claims. See Johnson v. Koehler, 733 Fed.Appx. 583, 585 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976)). Even if Plaintiff could somehow overcome this obstacle, however, he has failed to state a claim, as discussed below.
2. Failure to State a Claim
Plaintiff's claims appear to be based solely on the fact that he was incarcerated and not tried within 180 days as required by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600. However, § 1983 applies to violations of federal rights, not the failure to follow state law procedures. “The simple fact that state law prescribes certain procedures does not mean that the procedures thereby acquire a federal constitutional dimension.” United States v. Jiles, 658 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 1981) (citation omitted). Thus, courts have held that the failure to comply with Rule 600 does not violate any constitutional guarantee. See Suber v. Kerestes, 2011 WL 500763, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2011).
Plaintiff also refers to what may be liberally characterized as state law claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process. However, these are claims that are available under Pennsylvania law and do not represent a § 1983 claim. In addition, a malicious prosecution claim requires that “the proceedings [have] terminated in favor of the plaintiff.” See Tomaskevitch v. Specialty Recs. Corp., 717 A.2d 30, 33 (Pa. Commw. 1998). Even if his allegations can be construed as a federal claim of malicious prosecution brought under the Fourth Amendment, a favorable termination of the proceedings is also required. See Thompson v. Clark, 142 S.Ct. 1332 (2022). As a review of the state court criminal docket sheet, a public record that is available online, confirms, there was not an outcome favorable to Plaintiff regarding his prosecution. Rather, on May 13, 2022, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to charges of strangulation and terroristic threats and was sentenced the same day to a term of incarceration for a minimum of six months and a maximum of twelve months and a period of probation of four years. Thus, there is no basis for a claim of malicious prosecution under state or federal law.
Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County at Criminal Docket Number CP-04-CR-0001305-2021.
Plaintiff also invokes the Fifth and Eighth Amendments as bases for his claims. These claims are also unavailing. The Fifth Amendment's due process clause applies to federal, not state, actors. See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002). And a cruel and unusual punishment claim under the Eighth Amendment does not arise until “after sentence and conviction.” Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392 n.6 (1989)). Thus, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief under either the Fifth or Eighth Amendment.
Finally, Plaintiff appears to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment's right to due process as a basis for his claims. However, a review of his state court criminal docket sheet reveals that on July 17, 2021, his bond was set at $12,500, and based on Plaintiff's allegations, it is assumed that he was unable to post bond. The court granted a motion to continue the trial filed by ADA Swain in January 2022, which moved his trial date to the March 2022 term. A public defender representing Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for Plaintiff's release on nominal bond pursuant to Rule 600 on February 10, 2022. The Court of Common Pleas granted the motion to release Plaintiff on a nominal bond of $1.00 and the docket reflects that Plaintiff posted bond on February 16, 2002. Thereafter, Plaintiff's attorney moved to continue the trial and the Court granted Plaintiff's motion, continuing the trial until the May 2022 term. On May 13, 2022, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to charges of strangulation and terroristic threats and the other charges against him were withdrawn. As mentioned previously, he was sentenced the same day to a term of incarceration followed by probation.
In summary, the public record indicates that both ADA Swain and Plaintiff appropriately utilized the relevant state court due process procedures regarding his pretrial detention. Thus, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 126 (1990) (a “constitutional violation actionable under § 1983 is not complete when the deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide due process.”)
The federal right to a speedy trial is governed by the Sixth Amendment, which Plaintiff does not cite. Nevertheless, even construing his Complaint broadly to assert a Sixth Amendment violation, it would be “waived by an unconditional and voluntary guilty plea.” Washington v. Sobina, 475 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
Finally, as noted above, while Plaintiff styles his action as a civil rights claim under § 1983, he seeks his “immediate release.” Relief of this nature is not available in a civil rights case. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (“a prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge ‘the fact or duration of his confinement.' He must seek federal habeas corpus relief (or appropriate state relief) instead.”) (citations omitted). In fact, Plaintiff has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court, see Houser v. Schouppe, Civ. A. No. 22-437. In that case, which was filed on March 14, 2022, he names as the respondent William Schouppe, Warden of the Beaver County Jail, and alleges that he is being held “in jail when the alleged victim no longer want to proceed with prosecution and violation of Rule 600.” This case, which is pending before Chief Magistrate Judge Eddy, is statistically closed because Plaintiff has neither submitted the $5.00 filing fee nor a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court need not resolve whether he can pursue a petition for writ of habeas corpus given the status of his criminal proceedings, but habeas corpus is the appropriate manner in which to seek release from custody.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Complaint be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
If Plaintiff wishes to challenge this Report and Recommendation, he must seek review by the district judge by filing objections by June 27, 2022. Failure to file timely objections will waive the right of appeal.