Opinion
Civ. No. 98-2566 SECTION "N".
March 22, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are two motions: (1) defendant Jimmy W. Watkins' Motion for Summary Judgment; and (2) defendant C.J. Calamia Construction Company, Inc. ("Calamia") and Louisiana Gas Service Company's ("LGS") Motion for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, defendants' motions are DENIED.
LGS has since merged into Citizens Utilities Company.
A. BACKGROUND
This dispute arises out of an automobile accident on August 7, 1997, in Buras, Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. On that date, plaintiff Jonathan Houp was operating a 1997 Dodge Intrepid, traveling west on West Bray Street ("W. Bray"), Traffic on W. Bray is controlled by a stop sign. Houp approached the intersection of W. Bray and Louisiana Highway 23 ("L.A. 23"), a four lane divided highway with two northbound lanes and two southbound lanes. L.S. 23 is the favored thoroughfare. Houp maintains that as he approached the intersection, he came to a complete stop to check for oncoming traffic, but that his view of northbound traffic was obstructed by equipment and vehicles of defendants LGS and Calamia. As Houp reached the inner northbound lane, his vehicle was struck on the left side by a northbound 1994 Chevrolet pickup truck operated by defendant Jimmy Watkins and occupied by Ernest Murphy.
As a result of the collision, Houp alleges to have suffered multiple injuries. Houp filed suit against defendants Watkins, LGS and Calamia alleging claims of negligence. Defendants now move for Summary Judgment on all of plaintiff's claims.
B. LAW AND ANALYSIS I. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating an absence of evidence to support the non-movant's case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where, as here, the opposing party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need not submit evidentiary documents to properly support its motion, but need only point out the absence of evidence supporting the essential elements of the opposing party's case. See Saunders v. Michelin Tire Corp., 942 F.2d 299, 301 (5th Cir. 1991). To oppose a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must set forth specific facts to establish a genuine issue of material fact, and cannot merely rest on allegations and denials. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. A genuine issue of fact exists where the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en bauc) (per curiam). See also Superior Merchandise Co., Inc. v. M.G.I. Wholesale. Inc., 52 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1935 (E.D. La. 1999).
II. Elements of Plaintiff's Claims
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that defendants Calamia and LGS, were negligent in two respects: (1) "[p]arking . . . [their] vehicles along the side of [L.A. 23] in a manner which [they] knew or should have known would obstruct the vision of vehicular traffic and, more particularly, would obstruct petitioner's vision as he approached the highway from West Bray Street"; and (2) "[f]ailing to use reasonable care in the placement of [their] vehicle[s] and equipment in a manner so as not to block the view of northbound traffic for motorists approaching the intersection with West Bray Street." The Complaint also asserts that defendant Watkins was negligent in: traveling at an excessive rate of speed; failing to notice and/or slow his vehicle at an intersection where construction was being performed; failing to see what he should have seen; and failing to take evasive action to attempt to avoid a collision with plaintiff.
Louisiana has adopted a duty-risk analysis in order to determine whether liability exists under the facts of a particular case. See Boykin v. Louisiana Transit Co., 707 So.2d 1225, 1230-32 (La. 1998). Under this analysis, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard; (2) the defendant's conduct failed to conform to the specific standard; (3) the defendant's substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact or "but for" cause of plaintiff's injury; (4) the defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of plaintiff's injury; and (5) actual damages. See Id. "If the plaintiff fails to satisfy one of the elements of duty-risk, the defendant is not liable." Pitre v. Louisiana Tech Univ., 673 So.2d 585, 590 (La. 1996).
III. Duty of Motorists At Highway Intersections
Plaintiff's duty is set forth in Section 32:123 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, which imposes a duty on drivers stopped at intersections to yield to the preferential right of way. See id. Section 123 provides:
A. Preferential right of way at an intersection may be indicated by stop signs or yield signs.
B. Except when directed to proceed by a police officer or a traffic-control signal, every driver and operator of a vehicle approaching a stop intersection indicated by a stop sign shall stop before entering the cross walk on the near side at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering the intersection. After having stopped, the driver shall yield the right of way to all vehicles which have entered the intersection from another highway or which are approaching so closely on said highway as to constitute an immediate hazard.Id. (emphasis added). Under this Section, a driver who stops at a stop sign has discharged only part of his duty, and is further required to make certain that it is safe to proceed before he does so. See Coleman v. Rabon, 561 So.2d 897, 901 (La.Ct.App. 2d 1990); Continental Ins. Co. v. Duthu, 235 So.2d 182, 186 (La.Ct.App. 4th Cir. 1970); see also Follins v. Barrow, 354 So.2d 609, 611 (La.Ct.App. 1977) (stating that "[a] motorist entering an intersection has the duty to look for approaching traffic and not to enter the intersection when it is patently unsafe to do so.") (citation omitted); LeBlanc v. Fidelity Fire Cas. Ins. Co., 633 So.2d 891, 893 (La.Ct.App. 1st 1994) (same); Scott v. Behrman, 273 So.2d 661, 664 (La.Ct.App. 4th 1973) (holding that driver proceeding onto a favored street from a side street controlled by a stop sign, "into the path of a car 150 feet away on a 30 mph, right of way street" was a breach of the duty owed to motorists driving on superior streets to yield the right of way and not attempt to cross when it is hazardous to do so). Thus, plaintiff was required to come to a complete stop, appraise traffic, and make certain that the way was clear. See Tatum v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 643 So.2d 419, 422 (La.Ct.App. 3d 1994).
Further, a driver may be held contributorily negligent even in the instance where another party places a vehicle along the roadway, obstructing the driver's view. See Pate v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 147 So.2d 766, 771 (La.Ct.App. 1st 1962). In fact, a driver is required to exercise a greater degree of care before entering the intersection where she or he alleges that there was an obstruction along the roadway that impeded her or his vision of oncoming traffic. See Continental, 235 So.2d at 186 (stating driver owes duty of "a greater care when the intersection he enters is a blind one.") (citation omitted);Decker v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 247 So.2d 232, 234 (La.Ct.App. 4th 1971) (stating that "[t]o merely stop in obedience to a traffic sign and then proceed into the path of oncoming vehicles constitutes negligence. To look and not to see is equivalent to not looking at all.") (citation omitted);Follins, 354 So.2d at 611-12 (same); Emmco Ins. Co. v. Durio, 242 So.2d 99, 100 (La.Ct.App. 4th 1970) (determining that all motorists should abide by the standard of what they should have seen). The law requires that a driver affirmatively see that an obstructed intersection is clear before proceeding. See id. Further, the driver is charged with the duty of seeing "that which may be observed reasonably under the circumstances."Follins, 354 So.2d at 611. See also Walker v. McCartney, 700 So.2d 898, 902 (5th Cir. 1997).
According to the Louisiana Supreme Court, the duty of a motorist diving on a favored street is two-fold:
A motorist on a right of way street is entitled to assume that motorists on the unfavored street approaching a stop sign will obey the traffic signal and will stop, look and yield the right of way to traffic proceeding on the favored street. Of course, once a right of way motorist in the exercise of ordinary vigil[a]nce sees that another motorist has failed to yield the right of way, a new duty thereafter devolves on the right of way motorist to take reasonable steps to avoid an accident if there is enough time to afford him a reasonable opportunity to do so.Sanchez Fernandez v. General Motors Corp., 491 So.2d 633, 636 (La. 1986) (citations omitted). See also Tatum, 643 So.2d at 422-23 (holding same but also determining that driver on favored thoroughfare has duty of ordinary care toward drivers entering from side sweets); Coleman, 561 So.2d at 900 (stating driver entering an intersection from a preferential right of way owes a duty of ordinary care to other drivers entering same intersection from a nonpreferential right of way, even though he is entitled to assume a stop sign will be obeyed); Decker, 247 So.2d at 234 (asserting that motorist operating vehicle on a right of way street, with knowledge that the intersecting street is controlled by a stop sign, has a right to assume that drivers approaching from the less favored street will bring their vehicles to a complete stop before entering the intersection). The motorist entering a favored street is entitled, however, to assume that the vehicle traveling on the favored street will obey the speed limit. See Tatum, 643 So.2d at 423 (citation omitted).
IV. Duties of Motorists in the Case at Hand
Here, defendant Watkins argues that plaintiff cannot meet his burden of proof at trial that the defendant was negligent and thus at fault for the accident. Watkins asserts that Houp has no evidence to support the allegation that he was speeding. Watkins also relies on the report of an accident reconstructionist, which was prepared for defendants Calamia and LGS. Watkins contends that because the report concludes that Houp had an adequate view of oncoming traffic on L.A. 23, he cannot be liable for plaintiffs injuries.
See Report of Findings of Victor F. Summers, III, dated August 11, 1999.
Defendants Calamia and LGS contend that plaintiffs failure to exercise reasonable care before attempting to cross L.A. 23 was the sole cause of the accident. Defendants also point to the photograph of the accident scene in which there appears an abandoned truck on the east side of L.A. 23 south of W. Bray. Defendants deny ownership of the abandoned truck, and further claim that no construction vehicles were parked south of the intersection. To support their arguments, defendants retained an expert in accident reconstruction, who, based on the facts set forth by plaintiff regarding the location of the vehicles alongside L.A. 23, determined that "there was adequate sight distance" for plaintiff to avoid the collision with Watkins' vehicle. Defendants' expert also concluded that plaintiff could have taken other actions that would have given him an unobstructed view of both lanes of L.A. 23 before he entered into the intersection. Finally, defendants' expert report states that Watkins began to react and apply his breaks 192 feet south of the point of contact with Houp's vehicle. In sum, the expert concluded that the sole cause of the collision was plaintiffs failure to obey the intersection's stop sign, and properly assess and respond to Watkins' northbound vehicle. Defendants bring to the attention of the Court, photographs, police reports and depositions in support of their defense. They argue that even if plaintiffs version of the facts is accepted by the Court, indicating that Calamia vehicles were parked south of the intersection, the accident reconstructionist concluded that Houp had "more than adequate sight distance" to see and identify Watkins' approaching vehicle.
In response to Watkins' Motion, plaintiff asserts that defendant Watkins was negligent and failed to exercise ordinary care. According to plaintiffs deposition, Watkins was negligent in failing to take evasive action, exceeding the speed limit, and failing to lower his speed as he approached a blind intersection. Plaintiff also argues that he adhered to his duty to the defendant in coming to a complete stop and inching up once and then again before entering the intersection because his view of the intersection was obscured by an abandoned vehicle and two additional vehicles owned by defendant Calamia, which were all parked on the south side of the intersection.
It is alleged that defendant Calamia was performing work in the vicinity of the intersection at the time of the accident.
In response to Calamia and LGS's Motion, plaintiff contends that the accident reconstructionist's report is unreliable because it is more likely than not that the accident scene changed between the time of the accident and the time the expert visited the scene. Defendants reply that even if the accident scene changed, the evidence reveals that plaintiff breached his duty to refrain from entering the intersection with reasonable care. Further, plaintiff argues that a question of material fact exists as to whether Calamia's vehicles contributed to the collision by obstructing the views of both drivers. Plaintiff submitted the Police Report of State Trooper D to corroborate the information in his deposition that the additional vehicles were present on the side of L.A. 23. Plaintiff argues that Calamia failed to use reasonable care in placing its vehicle and equipment in such a manner that blocked the view of northbound traffic for motorists approaching the intersection at W. Bray. In support of his allegations, plaintiff also has submitted photographs of the crash scene, the parties' vehicles, and the vehicles on the side of L.A. 23. Defendant replies that regardless of whether Calamia vehicles were parked on the L.A. 23 shoulder, partially obstructing plaintiff's view, plaintiff violated a duty that is legally imposed in light of the partial obstruction, and this violation was the sole cause of the accident in question.
The Court finds that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there were construction vehicles parked on the shoulder of L.A. 23 and to what extent such vehicles obstructed the views of both drivers. The Police Report states: "This trooper would like to note that there were a number of vehicle [sic] parked off road on the shoulder that could have obscured the vision of the driver of vehicle #1. The vehicles were parked on the shoulder due to construction." Further, in its summary of the officer's interview of defendant Watkins, the Report states: "Watkins went on to state that there was [sic] a number of vehicles parked on the shoulder and off road to the right, before the intersection." While Calamia and LGS maintain that its vehicles were not parked south of the intersection, the evidence on this point remains in dispute, and thus summary judgment is not appropriate. The Court finds that plaintiff has also identified a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant Watkins was negligent in failing to satisfy' his duty to plaintiff. While the evidence indicates that Watkins was proceeding on a favored street and thus had the legal right to assume his right of way would be respected, there remains a question as to whether Watkins exercised ordinary care in light of the emergency situation created by the plaintiff. Moreover, there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff may be held contributorily negligent. Credibility issues are properly left for the jury's determination.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 21st day of March, 2000.