Opinion
2023 CA 0429
12-14-2023
WALTER J. HORRELL, ET AL. v. JACK MARKS ALLTMONT, ET AL
Walter J. Horrell Covington, Louisiana Plaintiffs-Appellants Walter J. Horrell and Edna R. Horrell, In Proper Person Jeffrey D. Schoen Andrew J. Walker Covington, Louisiana Counsel for Defendants-Appellees Medstate, LLC and Don A. McMath
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY, STATE OF LOUISIANA NUMBER 2017-15086, DIVISION F HONORABLE VINCENT J. LOBELLO, JUDGE
Walter J. Horrell
Covington, Louisiana
Plaintiffs-Appellants
Walter J. Horrell and Edna R.
Horrell, In Proper Person
Jeffrey D. Schoen
Andrew J. Walker
Covington, Louisiana
Counsel for Defendants-Appellees
Medstate, LLC and Don A. McMath
BEFORE: GUIDRY, C.J., CHUTZ, AND LANIER, JJ.
CHUTZ, J.
Disposition: AFFIRMED.
Plaintiffs, Walter J. Horrell and Edna R. Horrell, appeal a district court judgment dismissing their claims against defendants, Medstate, LLC and Don A. McMath, on the grounds of res judicata. We affirm.
This matter involves a piece of immovable property located at Square 1807 of the New Covington Addition to the Town of Covington in St. Tammany Parish (the Property), which was the separate property of Walter's father, Edward A. Horrell, Sr., at the time of his death in New Orleans, Louisiana on July 9, 1993. Litigation related to the Property has been ongoing between the plaintiffs and relatives of Walter, their successors, and others for nearly thirty years. The matter has repeatedly been before this court, as well as the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, on numerous occasions. We adopt by reference the extensive detailed factual and procedural history of the litigation involving the Property set forth by this court in Horrell v. Barrios, 16-1547 (La.App. 1st Cir. 3/15/18), 2018 WL 1373653 (unpublished), writ denied, 18-0931 (La. 9/28/18), 253 So.3d 144 (Horrell I).
See e.g.. Horrell v. Barrios, 12-2054 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/26/13), 2013 WL 5435792 (unpublished); Horrell v. Barrios, 12-2055 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/26/13), 2013 WL 5435803 (unpublished); Horrell v. Matthews, 2010-1694 (La.App. 1st Cir. 5/6/11), 2011 WL 1941588 (unpublished), writ denied, 11-1848 (La. 11/4/11), 75 So.3d 925; Horrell v. Barrios, 09-2199 (La.App. 1st Cir. 7/21/10), 2010 WL 2844342 (unpublished); Matthews v, Horrell, 06-1973 (La.App. 1st Cir. 11/7/07), 977 So.2d 62; Horrell v. Matthews, 06-1838 (La.App. 1st Cir. 8/15/07), 2007 WL 2318134 (unpublished); Horrell v. Horrell, 99-1093 (La.App. 1st Cir. 10/6/00), 808 So.2d 363, wnt denied, 01-2546 (La. 12/7/01), 803 So.2d971; Succession of Horrell, 11-1577 (La.App. 4th Cir. 4/18/12), 89 So.3d 1267, writ denied. 12-1348 (La. 9/28/12), 98 So.3d 846; Succession of Horrell, 11-1574 (La.App. 4th Cir. 4/11/12), 102 So.3d 139; Succession of Horrell, 11-0194 (La.App. 4th Cir. 11/30/11), 79 So.3d 1162, writ denied, 12-0180 (La. 3/23/12), 85 So.3d 96; Succession of Horrell, 95-1598 (La.App. 4th Cir. 9/11/96), 680 So.2d 725, writ denied, 96-2841 (La. 1/31/97), 687 So.2d 403.
Pertinent to the instant appeal, the record reveals the plaintiffs filed an "Action for Damages, Possessory Actions, Relief by Ordinary Proceedings and Injunctive Relief' against Medstate and McMath (the defendants) on November 2, 2017. The plaintiffs also named as defendants Gaye H. Coffer, Marie Elise Lecour, Edward Horrell, Jr., and Michael J. Horrell, all siblings of Walter, as well as their alleged agents and attorneys in fact, Jack Marks Alltmont and Erin H. Schorr (collectively, the Coffer defendants). The plaintiffs alleged they corporeally possessed the Property prior to being evicted by the Coffer defendants on November 17, 2016. They further alleged a purported sale of the Property to Medstate occurred on December 16, 2016, and the sale was recorded in the St. Tammany Parish public records. McMath signed the act of sale as manager on behalf of Medstate, whose members according to the plaintiffs were comprised of McMath and Deborah McMath. The plaintiffs requested damages for wrongful eviction, recognition of their right to possess the Property, injunctive relief prohibiting interference with their right to possession, and the cancellation of the purported sale and erasure thereof from the public records.
Lisa C. Matthews, the provisional administratrix of the Succession of Edward A. Horrell, Sr., was also a named defendant. Ms. Matthews is not a party to the instant appeal.
On June 14, 2022, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims against them. The defendants argued the plaintiffs' action was barred by res judicata because they sought to relitigate issues concerning the Property that had previously be disposed of by final judgments in prior proceedings, which determined the plaintiffs had no possessory rights to the Property. The defendants further pointed out they had purchased the Property pursuant to a court order approving the sale. Following a hearing, the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit against the defendants, with prejudice. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing in five assignments of error that the district court incorrectly applied the law and erred in dismissing their suit against the defendants on the basis of res judicata.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT LAW
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted only if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). On appeal, appellate courts review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo under the same criteria governing the district court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Ritchey v. State Farm Mutual Automotive Insurance Company, 17-0233 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/15/17), 228 So.3d 272, 275.
The burden of proof rests with the mover. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). But if the moving party will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue before the court on the motion, the moving party's burden is satisfied by pointing out an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual evidence sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, the mover is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. arts. 966(D)(1); Yates v. Our Lady of the Angels Hospital, Inc., 19-0661 (La.App. 1st Cir. 2/20/20), 2020 WL 862167, at *2 (unpublished).
DISCUSSION
As noted, the defendants in this appeal were co-defendants with the Coffer defendants in the identical action filed by the plaintiffs on November 2, 2017. Prior to the defendants filing the motion for summary judgment at issue in this appeal, the Coffer defendants had filed their own motion for summary judgment on October 9, 2018, requesting the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims on the basis that those claims had been adjudicated between the parties in a prior action. Specifically, the Coffer defendants argued the plaintiffs' claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel based on a July 16, 2016 judgment of the 22nd Judicial District Court (the 22nd JDC Judgment) dismissing the plaintiffs' possessory action and holding the plaintiffs had no legal or equitable interest in the Property. Further, the 22nd JDC Judgment ordered the plaintiffs to vacate the Property within forty-eight hours. The Coffer defendants were named parties to the possessory action resulting in the 22nd JDC Judgment. The disposition of the Coffer's motion for summary judgment is significant to the instant appeal because they were co-defendants with Medstate and McMath in the same action and their motion for summary judgment rested on the same plea of res judicata as that of the defendants herein.
Therefore, because it involved many of the exact same issues pertinent to this appeal, we will examine the circumstances surrounding the motion for summary judgment filed by the Coffer defendants. Following a hearing, the district court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs' petition with respect to the Coffer defendants. On appeal, this court vacated the summary judgment on procedural grounds because the Coffer defendants had failed to submit any supporting evidence. See Horrell v. Alltmont, 19-0945 (La.App. 1st Cir. 7/31/20), 309 So.3d 754, 761-62 (Horrell II). On remand, the Coffer defendants refiled an identical motion for summary judgment. In support of their motion, they attached copies of the court orders, judgments, and opinions entered in the several matters related to the prior litigation. After a hearing, the district court once again granted the motion for summary judgment and entered judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' petition, with prejudice, as to the Coffer defendants. The plaintiffs appealed the judgment.
The appealed judgment stated the court granted the motion for summary judgment "filed by Jack M. Alltmont and others" without delineating the other parties. After the appeal was lodged, this court issued an interim order noting a possible deficiency in the judgment's decretal language. Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1918(A), the matter was remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of supplementing the record with a judgment specifying which defendants filed the motion for summary judgment and in whose favor the motion was granted. Thereafter, the record was supplemented with an amended judgment indicating the motion for summary judgment was filed by and granted in favor of the Coffer defendants.
In Horrell v. Alltmont, 21-0566 (La.App. 1st Cir. 12/22/21), 340 So.3d 909 (Horrell HI), this court affirmed the summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' petition against the Coffer defendants. In doing so, the Horrell HI court stated:
Based on our de novo review of the evidence submitted on the motion for summary judgment, we find that [the Coffer] defendants carried their burden of proof on the motion. Res judicata is governed by La. R.S. 13:4231, which provides, in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:
(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.
It is clear from the record that the prior final judgments of the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, this court, and the Louisiana Supreme Court held that plaintiffs have no ownership or possessory rights to the Property. Thus, plaintiffs' current action is barred as it has already been litigated and determined amongst the parties. Plaintiffs failed to come forward with any opposition evidence establishing that there is a genuine issue of material fact; therefore, we find no error in the district court's ruling. Accordingly, we conclude that summary judgment in favor of [the Coffer] defendants was appropriate.Horrell, 340 So.3d at 916.
The defendants herein filed their motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims against them after the 22nd JDC granted summary judgment in favor of the Coffer defendants. The defendants' motion was based on the same assertions successfully argued by the Coffer defendants in their motion for summary judgment, i.e., that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by res judicata because the issue of the plaintiffs' right to possession of the Property had previously been adjudicated by the 22nd JDC. Moreover, the defendants introduced the same exhibits the Coffer defendants had filed in support of their motion for summary judgment and which this court held in Horrell III were sufficient to sustain the Coffer defendants' plea of res judicata. These exhibits included certified copies of: (1) the April 19,2011 judgment of possession rendered in the Succession of Edward A. Horrell, Sr., by the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; (2) the opinion of the Louisiana Fourth Circuit affirming the Judgment of Possession (Succession of Horrell, 11-1574 (La.App. 4th Cir. 4/11/12), 102 So.3d 139); (3) the 22nd JDC Judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' prior possessory action; (4) the 22nd JDC's written reasons for judgment; (5) the opinion of this court in Horrell I affirming the 22nd JDC Judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' possessory action; (6) the Louisiana Supreme Court's writ denial relative to Horrell Z; (7) and the plaintiffs' petition in the instant matter.
An additional exhibit offered by the defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment, which was not offered by the Coffer defendants, was a copy of the December 16, 2016 sale of the Property to Medstate.
With respect to the requirements of res judicata under La. R.S. 13:4231, the defendants occupy the same position the Coffer defendants occupied in Horrell HI, with one significant distinction. Unlike the Coffer defendants, the defendants herein were not actual named parties to the prior litigation in which the 22nd JDC Judgment dismissed the plaintiffs' possessory action. Nevertheless, the defendants argue they should be considered parties to the prior possessory action as they are ayant causes since they are successors in title to the Coffer defendants, who were parties to the prior action. Under the doctrine of ayant cause, for purposes of res judicata, successors of the parties of record are considered parties to the demand when they acquire title after the institution of the original suit in which judgment is rendered. See Joseph v. Huntington Ingalls Inc., 18-02061 (La. 1/29/20), 347 So.3d 579, 58485, citing Quinette v. Delhommer, 247 La. 1121, 176 So.2d 399, 405 (1965).
In this case, the defendants are successors in title to several of the Coffer defendants since they purchased the interests of those defendants (Gaye H. Coffer, Marie Elise Lecour, Edward Horrell, Jr., and Michael J. Horrell) in the Property. Further, the sale of the Property occurred on December 16, 2016, subsequent to the plaintiffs' institution of the possessory action resulting in the 22nd JDC Judgment wherein the court held the plaintiffs had no legal or equitable interests in or possessoiy rights to the Property. As such, we agree with the defendants that they should be considered parties to the prior action resulting in the 22nd JDC Judgment as ayant causes to the Coffer defendants.
While the Property was purchased by Medstate only, with McMath acting therein only in a representative capacity, we find res judicata nevertheless also bars the plaintiffs' claims against McMath because he is a privy of Medstate. The identity of parties between the present and prior litigation required to sustain a plea of res judicata is not a physical identity of persons, but an identity of capacity or quality. Joseph, 347 So.3d at 584. Identity of parties is satisfied when a privy of one of the parties is involved. In its broadest sense, "privity" is the mutual or successive relationship to the same right of property, or such an identification in interest of one person with another as to represent the same legal right. La. R.S. 13:4231; Matter of Succession of Breen, 21-0806 (La.App. 1st Cir. 7/11/23), 370 So.3d 1114, 1127.
In this case, according to the plaintiffs, McMath is one of only two members of Medstate, he is jointly represented by the same counsel as Medstate, and he appeared in the act of sale of the Property solely in a representative capacity as Medstate's manager. These facts, particularly the fact that McMath has acted solely in a representative capacity on Medstate's behalf, show such a mutual identification of interest between Medstate and McMath as to represent the same legal right. Further, because we have concluded Medstate should be considered a party to the prior litigation as an ayant cause and McMath is a privy of Medstate, the requirement of an identity of parties is also satisfied with respect to McMath.
Further, in Horrell III, this court found the exhibits presented by the Coffer defendants - all of which were also presented by the defendants in the instant matter - were sufficient to sustain the plea of res judicata. Based on the prior rulings of the 22nd JDC, this court, and the Louisiana Supreme Court, this court held it was clear the plaintiffs had "no ownership or possessory rights to the Property" and, therefore, their action "was barred as it has already been litigated and determined amongst the parties." Horrell, 340 So.3d at 916. Because the issues concerning res judicata disposed of in Horrell III are the same as those in the instant appeal, the same evidence was presented in support of the summary judgments in both cases, and the plaintiffs have failed to come forward with any opposition evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact, we find the holding of Horrell III that the plaintiffs' current action is barred by res judicata is equally applicable in the instant appeal. Accordingly, for the reasons expressed by this court in Horrell III, we find the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The district court did not err in dismissing the plaintiffs' suit against the defendants on the grounds of res judicata.
We find no merit in the plaintiffs' contention that the district court erred in failing to recognize the defendants converted this possessory action into a petitory action for which the necessary elements were not established. The plaintiffs argue this matter was converted into a petitory action by the defendants asserting Medstate's title to the Property in their motion for summary judgment, as well as by attaching a copy of the sale as an exhibit to their motion. Because title or ownership is not at issue in a possessory action, no evidence of title or ownership to the immovable property is admissible therein except to prove: (1) the possession thereof by a party as owner; (2) the extent of the possession thereof by a party; or (3) the length of time in which a party and his ancestors in title have had possession thereof. La. C.C.P. art. 3661 (prior to amendment by 2023 La. Acts, No. 421, § 2). Except for these exceptions, under former La. C.C.P. art. 3657, when a defendant in a possessory action asserted title in himself, he thereby converted the suit into a petitory action and judicially confessed the plaintiffs possession.
Following its amendment by 2023 La. Acts, No. 421, § 2, La. C.C.P. art. 3657(B) now provides:
When the defendant in a possessory action asserts title in himself, in the alternative or otherwise, the defendant does not thereby convert the possessory action into a petitory action or judicially confess the possession of the plaintiff in the possessory action, but the defendant's assertions of title shall be considered in defense of the possessory action only for the purposes stated in Article 3661(B). [Emphasis added.]
In Horrell I, however, this court explained that more is required than an allegation of ownership to convert a possessory action into a petitory action. There must also be a prayer by the defendant for an adjudication of ownership, in the absence of which, the action is not converted. Horrell, 2018 WL 1373653, at *7. An examination of the defendants' motion for summary judgment clearly indicates the defendants did not raise ownership of the Property as an issue to be adjudicated by the 22nd JDC. Instead, they merely prayed for the plaintiffs' claims against them to be dismissed in their entirety, with prejudice. Accordingly, we find the plaintiffs' possessory action was not converted to a petitory action by the assertions made in the defendants' motion for summary judgment. See Horrell, 2018 WL 1373653, at *7-8.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we affirm the district court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Medstate, LLC. and Don A. McMath, dismissing, with prejudice, the suit of the plaintiffs, Walter J. Horrell and Edna R. Horrell, against these defendants. The plaintiffs are assessed with all appeal costs.
AFFIRMED.