Opinion
Case No. CIV 99-0055-S-LMB
July 19, 1999
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
Currently pending before the Court are Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 4), Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Notice of Appearance (Docket No. 8), Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction Ancillary to Bivens Complaint (Docket No. 9), Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (Docket No. 20), Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 22), Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 24) and Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery (Docket No. 27).
Having carefully reviewed the record, and otherwise being fully advised, the Court enters the following Memorandum Decision and Order.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 20, 1997, John and Elaine Horejs met with Revenue Officer James Mason and Revenue Agent Nicoli Ferrell of the Internal Revenue Service in order to resolve issues relating to the applicability of federal tax laws to the Horejs. The meeting was recorded by a certified court report at the Horejs' request. During the meeting, Mason insisted that the Horejs complete a form 433-A, Collection Information Statement for Individuals. Mason indicated that if the form was not completed, he would initiate forced collection activities. The Horejs filled out the form during the August meeting and subsequently supplied additional information to Mason. Further, during the meeting, the Horejs were told that they should contact a private tax attorney for assistance and counseling relating to the disputed federal tax assessment.
On November 20, 1997, the Horejs filed a Complaint against Officer Mason in state court seeking recovery for his alleged conversion of personal property relating to the information contained on the form 433-A and subsequent additional information provided by the Horejs. The state court action was removed to federal court and on February 9, 1998 the action was dismissed, after the Internal Revenue Service returned the private documents and the Horejs had moved to withdraw the claims asserted against Mason and that they be dismissed without prejudice.
Thereafter, on February 8, 1999, Plaintiff John Horejs and Plaintiff Elaine Horejs filed the instant action against Defendant James Mason and Defendant Nicoli Ferrell. According to Plaintiffs, their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution were violated by Defendants when they were coerced into providing private financial information and they were denied an unbiased hearing regarding the disputed tax assessment and were denied the assistance of counsel during the August 20, 1997 meeting. Inasmuch as Plaintiffs alleged that federally guaranteed rights were violated by the Defendant federal officers, they have characterized the instant dispute as a Bivens action.
A Bivens action is much like a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but filed against federal rather than state defendants. Section 1983 creates a private right of action for violation of a plaintiffs constitutional rights under the color of state law. Although there is no similar statute creating a private right of action for constitutional violations under color of federal law, the Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) implied such a cause of action against federal employees or their agents directly from the Fourth Amendment. Similar causes of action have been implied from other constitutional provisions, all of which have been termed " Bivens" actions.
Defendants take the position that Plaintiffs' Complaint is without merit and have moved the Court to dismiss the instant action.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the claims asserted in Plaintiffs' Complaint. Subsequent to the filing of Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs moved the Court for leave to file an amended complaint. Accordingly, the Court will review Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend to determine the extent to which such leave should be granted prior to reviewing Defendants' motion to dismiss the existing Complaint.
A. Plaintiffs' Motion for Permission to Amend Complaint (Docket No. 11) and Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (Docket No. 20)
Plaintiffs move the Court for leave to file an amended complaint. Pursuant to the filing of an amended complaint, Plaintiffs seek to cure the failure to properly serve the Complaint upon all of the proper parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. Further, Plaintiffs seeks to amend the Complaint to more fully set forth the factual support for the claims asserted against Defendants and to delete Defendant unknown named insurer and/or bondholder of both Defendant Mason and Defendant Ferrell as a Defendant in the instant action. Additionally, Plaintiffs seek additional remedies, in addition to the prayer for relief asserted in the original Complaint relating to the return of property, removal of liens filed against them and that their status be permanently changed to reflect their status as non-taxpayers.
The Ninth Circuit has stated "on several occasions . . . that the 'Supreme Court has instructed the lower federal courts to heed carefully the command of Rule 15(a), F[ed].R.Civ.P., by freely granting leave to amend when justice so requires.'" DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Gabrielson v. Montgomery Ward Co., 785 F.2d 762, 765 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973))) (citations omitted). Thus "Rule 15's policy of favoring amendments to pleadings should be applied with 'extreme liberality.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Rosenberg Brothers Co. v. Arnold, 283 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1960) (per curiam))).
Further, the Ninth Circuit has held that "[t]his liberality in granting leave to amend is not dependent on whether the amendment will add causes of action or parties. It is, however, subject to the qualification that amendment of the complaint does not cause the opposing party undue prejudice, is not sought in bad faith, and does not constitute an exercise in futility." Leighton, 833 F.2d at 186 (citations omitted). Thus, "[f]our factors are commonly used to determine the propriety of a motion for leave to amend. These are: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment." Id. (citing Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1319 (9th Cir. 1984)); Howey, 481 F.2d at 1190. "These factors, however, are not of equal weight in that delay, by itself, is insufficient to justify denial of leave to amend." Leighton, 833 F.2d at 186 (citations omitted).
A review of the record indicates that Defendants were not served with a copy of Plaintiffs' first motion for leave to amend. Because the motion was not served upon Defendants and appears to have been filed on an ex parte basis without having complied with the requirements imposed by the District of Idaho Local Civil Rules regarding the general motion practice and ex parte orders, Plaintiffs' motion could have been denied due to procedural inadequacies. See D. Id. L. Civ. R. 7.1(b), (f); 7.2. However, in light of Plaintiffs' status as pro se litigants, the Court determined that Plaintiffs should be allowed to file a renewed motion for leave to amend which complies with all applicable Local Rules. On May 13, 1999, the Court entered an oral ruling at the hearing allowing Plaintiffs to file a second motion for leave to amend within ten days. See Minute Entry, ¶ 5 (Docket No. 19). Thereafter, on May 27, 1999, Plaintiffs filed a Second Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint.
Prior to the May 13, 1999 hearing, Defendants moved the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint. Subsequent to Plaintiffs' second request to amend the Complaint, Defendants have renewed their motion to dismiss and have opposed Plaintiffs' motion to amend based upon an assertion that allowing the proposed amended complaint to be filed would be futile because it would fail to overcome Defendants' objections to the maintenance of this instant action. Further, Defendants assert that inasmuch as Plaintiffs' motion to amend was untimely, the Court should deny the relief requested on that basis. Accordingly, the Court shall conduct a review of the substance of Plaintiffs' motions to amend and determine whether such leave should be granted.
As noted above, four factors are commonly reviewed in order to determine if leave to amend should be granted. In that regard, and after considering the existing record, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs' motions for leave to amend have not been made in bad faith, to cause undue delay or would prejudice Defendants' interests, leaving only the futility factor. However, in order to determine if the filing of the proposed amended complaint would constitute an exercise in futility in light of Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court shall review the substance of Defendants' motion and determine the extent to which Plaintiffs' original Complaint should be dismissed. Then, a review of the substance of the proposed amended pleading shall be made to determine if, to the extent the original Complaint should be dismissed, the proposed changes would survive Defendants' pending dispositive motion.
As will be discussed below, after conducting a review of Defendants' motion to dismiss and the factual allegations raised in Plaintiffs' Complaint, the Court has concluded that Plaintiffs will not be able to prove any set of facts in support of their claims and Defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted. Further, a review of Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend indicates that Plaintiffs seek to include factual assertions, not with respect to the alleged deprivation of federally guaranteed rights by Defendants during the August 20, 1997 meeting, but with respect to the ongoing disagreement with the IRS regarding the applicability of the federal tax code to them due to their status as non-taxpayers. The Court concludes that any such amendment alleging facts as contained in the moving papers would be futile and would not present facts which would support Plaintiffs' claims. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend is denied.
B. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket Nos. 4 22)
Defendants move the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 in that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction, based upon insufficiency of service of process and due to Plaintiffs' "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), (5) and (6). In this regard, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claim are in reality claims against the United States and as a result, the claims against them as individuals should be dismissed. According to Defendants, because Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the applicable service requirements imposed by Rule 4, the Court is without personal jurisdiction over unserved Defendants. Further, Defendants maintain that inasmuch as a Bivens action does not exist against federal officials arising from tax collection efforts, Plaintiffs have failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. Finally, even assuming that Plaintiffs may properly bring such an action to recover for the violation of federally guaranteed rights which were allegedly deprived as a result of tax collection efforts, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have failed to state a redressable violation of their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.
Plaintiffs oppose Defendants' motion to dismiss and assert that they have moved the Court for leave to amend their Complaint to cure service of process deficiencies. As a result, they maintain that jurisdictional requirements will be established if they are allowed to file and serve an amended complaint and that Defendants' motion to dismiss should be denied on that basis. To the extent that Defendants maintain that they have failed to alleged a redressable violation of their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, Plaintiffs point out that Defendants have unlawfully attempted to coerce them into changing their status as non-taxpayers into taxpayers without first providing evidence that federal income tax laws apply to them. They maintain that Defendants violated their federally protected rights, not in their efforts to collect asserted outstanding tax liabilities, but in attempting to coerce them into becoming taxpayers.
A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to properly state a claim for relief "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief" Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). "All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id. (quoting Western Reserve Oil Gas Co. v. New, 765 F.2d 1428, 1430 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056, 106 S.Ct. 795, 88 L.Ed.2d 773 (1986)). If documents are attached and submitted with the complaint, the reviewing court is not limited by the allegations contained in the complaint, but may consider the attached documents "in determining whether the plaintiff can prove any set of facts in support of the claim." Id. However, when material is attached to the complaint which refutes the factual allegations contained in the complaint, "the Court need not accept the allegations as being true." Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 625 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Ott v. Home Savings Loan Ass'n, 265 F.2d 643, 646 N. 1 (9th Cir. 1958)).
Accordingly, the Court shall review the factual allegations raised in Plaintiffs' Complaint as well as the attached documents to determine if Plaintiffs are able to prove any set of facts in support of their claim that Defendants violated their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights during the August 20, 1997 meeting. The Court shall construe the factual allegations in Plaintiffs' favor and accept them as true, as required by controlling rules of law, unless refuted by the material attached to Plaintiffs' Bivens Complaint.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights by coercing them to provide private information under threat that Defendants would seize private property if the information was not provided. Further, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by purposely misleading them into believing that they were required by law to provide the private information that Defendants requested. Additionally, according to Plaintiffs, their Fifth Amendment right to due process was violated when they were denied the assistance of counsel prior to providing the private information required in a 433-A "Collection Information Statement for Individuals." Plaintiffs also maintain that they were denied equal protection of the laws when Defendants asserted that they knew the law but were unable to direct Plaintiffs to specific statutory or regulatory provisions which provided that federal income laws applied to them. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that their due process rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment were violated when they were denied a fair and unbiased hearing prior to the assertion of penalties and enforcement actions were undertaken in relation to alleged tax deficiencies.
1. Fourth Amendment Violation
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated their Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable governmental searches and seizures when they were coerced into providing private financial information when they completed a 433-A form while at the August 20, 1997 meeting and when they submitted additional information at a later date. When a taxpayer consents to the production of private documents to the Internal Revenue Service for review, and the IRS' right to review the documents derives solely from the consent of the taxpayer, the taxpayer's federally guaranteed rights under the Fourth Amendment are not violated to the extent that the consent to produce the documents was not procured through governmental coercion. Mason v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426, 428 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Ward, 576 F.2d 243, 244 (9th Cir. 1978) (reasoning of Fifth Circuit in Mason v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426, adopted as law of 9th Circuit). Thus, a waiver of Fourth Amendment protections is consent "without coercion; and, to determine whether consent is free, the totality of circumstances surrounding the request for an agreement to the search must be examined." Mason, 557 F.2d at 428 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2051, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). Plaintiffs have alleged that they were coerced into providing the private information and documents given to Defendants. However, Plaintiffs have also submitted, as an attached document, a transcript of the August 20, 1997 meeting in which they maintain Defendants used coercive tactics to obtain the private information. Accordingly, the Court has reviewed the material to determine whether Plaintiffs are able to prove a set of facts which would establish that they were unlawfully coerced into providing private information.
A review of Plaintiffs' Complaint and attached documents indicates that Plaintiffs were told that if they did not provide the private information that Defendants wanted, an enforced collection action would be initiated to recover unpaid federal income taxes. As a result of the threat of an enforced collection action, Plaintiffs provided the requested private information. However, "it is not duress for the IRS to use or to notify the taxpayer that it intends to use all lawful means either to assess or collect a tax." United States v. Toyota of Visalia, 772 F. Supp. 481, 487 (D. E. D. Cal. 1991), aff'd, 988 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, to the extent that the threat of an enforced collection action was a legal means for Defendants to assess or collect unpaid federal taxes from Plaintiffs, the threat may not be construed as unlawful coercion invalidating their consent in providing the private material.
It is beyond question that the IRS has been provided authority to collect unpaid federal taxes by initiating a tax levy upon all property held by the individual. 26 U.S.C. § 6331; 26 C.F.R. § 601. 104 (c)(2). Inasmuch as Defendants were provided the legal means of instituting a levy against all property held by Plaintiffs in order to collect unpaid federal taxes, the threat that if private information was not released then such an action would be initiated does not constitute unlawful duress. Inasmuch as the allegations contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint do not provide support for a claim that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated because of Defendants' demand that they provide private documents and information, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim should be granted.
2. Fifth Amendment Violation
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated their rights as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, the right to assistance of counsel, equal protection of the law and the right to a fair and unbiased hearing prior to the assertion of penalties and enforcement actions.
The Court interprets Plaintiffs' claim that their Fifth Amendment due process rights were violated when they were denied the assistance of counsel prior to providing private information during the August 20, 1997 meeting as a claim that Defendants violated their right against self-incrimination when they were not warned of a right to counsel or to remain silent. Inasmuch as the Court is not limited to the factual allegations contained solely in Plaintiffs' Complaint, but may review the documents attached and incorporated into the Complaint, the Court notes that Plaintiffs were advised that they should seek assistance from counsel in order to determine whether federal tax laws applied to them. Further, the record indicates that after Plaintiffs were told that they had the option of either providing the private information requested or an enforcement action would be commenced, Plaintiffs requested that they have an opportunity to seek advice from an attorney. In response to Plaintiffs' request for additional time, Defendant Mason indicated that he would not give them any additional time, but that if they left the meeting, he would initiate the collection activity. Complaint, Ex. B, p. 25, ll. 10-19 (Docket No. 1).
The Fifth Amendment requires an Internal Revenue Service investigator to provide warnings indicating a right to counsel and to remain silent when the subject of an investigation is under custodial interrogation. United States v. Schmoker, 564 F.2d 289, 291 (9th Cir. 1977). Thus, a taxpayer is not entitled to Fifth Amendment warnings during an interrogation by IRS agents when the taxpayer is not in custody or otherwise deprived of freedom and the agents do not apply unlawful coercion or intimidation. See United States v. Ramantanin, 452 F.2d 670, 672 (4th Cir. 1971) (quoting United States v. Browney, 421 F.2d 48, 51 (4th Cir. 1970)).
A review of the record indicates that Plaintiffs were not in custody during the August 20, 1997 meeting with Defendants. The record reflects that the meeting "was initiated by Plaintiffs . . . in an attempt to resolve long-standing problems with the I.R.S." Complaint, p. 2, ¶ 1. Plaintiffs remained free to leave the meeting at any time. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment right to be warned of a right to counsel and to remain silent during a custodial interview was not implicated during the meeting and Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts that the denial of an asserted right to counsel at the August 20, 1997 meeting violated the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment claim based upon the denial of access to counsel should be denied.
In addition to claiming that their Fifth Amendment due process rights were denied because they were not provided access to an attorney during the August 20, 1997 meeting, Plaintiffs allege that the right to the equal protection of the laws was violated when Defendants were unable to direct Plaintiffs to the specific statutory or regulatory provisions which subjected them to federal tax laws.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. "The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is made applicable to the federal government through the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 89 n. 16 (8th Cir.) (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954)), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001, 101 S.Ct. 1709, 68 L.Ed.2d 203 (1980).
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been traditionally viewed as requiring the uniform treatment of similarly situated persons in relation to the governmental action questioned or challenged. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). Thus, the equal protection clause is not violated when all persons subject to the challenged federal action or statute are treated alike under similar circumstances and conditions with respect to the benefits conferred or the liabilities imposed. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 59 S.Ct. 379, 83 L.Ed. 441 (1939). Accordingly, in order to establish a violation of the equal protection clause, a plaintiff must establish that he or she was treated differently from other similarly situated individuals with respect to the governmental act, statute or regulation complained of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985).
Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants' inability to direct them to specific statutory and regulatory provisions evidencing their inclusion into the federal tax scheme violated the equal protection clause. Inasmuch as Defendants asserted lack of knowledge would apply to all persons similarly situated with Plaintiffs, the Court is of the opinion that such a claim should be dismissed. However, a review of the Complaint in its entirety indicates that Plaintiffs generally dispute the application of federal tax laws as well as Defendants' ability to enforce such provisions against them. Accordingly, the Court shall review Defendants' motion to dismiss in light of Plaintiffs' challenge to federal tax laws in general as well as Defendants' enforcement of those obligations.
After reviewing the factual allegations raised in Plaintiffs' Complaint, the Court concludes that no set of facts have been alleged, or under these circumstances, could a set of facts be alleged, to support a claim for the violation of the equal protection clause based upon the application of federal tax laws to Plaintiffs or based upon Defendants' enforcement of those laws. Plaintiffs have not alleged any factual assertion that they have been treated differently from any similarly situated person through the application of the federal tax code or Defendants' enforcement of those laws. Inasmuch as the allegations contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint are devoid of any factual assertions that could support an equal protection violation, Defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted.
Finally, Plaintiffs allege that their Fifth Amendment due process rights were violated when they were denied a fair and unbiased hearing prior to the assertion of penalties and a federal tax enforcement action was instituted. Defendants point out that Plaintiffs received the statutory notice of federal tax deficiency pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6212 and were aware of their option of petitioning the United States Tax Court for a determination of their tax liabilities, but simply chose not to pursue the option. Complaint, Ex. B, p. 47. Further, Defendants point out that based upon the procedures in place during the August 20, 1997 meeting, Plaintiffs were not entitled to an administrative hearing, pursuant to the existing administrative collection procedures, prior to the commencement of a forced collection action against their property. See 26 U.S.C. § 6331; 26 C.F.R. § 601. 104(c)(2); see also G.M Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977); United States v. Heck, 499 F.2d 778, 792-93 (9th Cir. 1974). Further, Defendants point out that Plaintiffs' due process rights have been adequately protected by the opportunity to petition a federal district court in regards to a post-levy tax refund suit which they may pursue to challenge any tax assessments made against them. Todd v. United States, 849 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988).
After reviewing the factual allegations raised in Plaintiffs' Complaint and attached exhibits, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are unable to prove any set of facts in support of their claim that their Fifth Amendment rights were violated by any asserted failure to provide an unbiased hearing prior to the assessment of federal taxes and the commencement of an enforcement proceeding. As a result, Defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted.
As noted above, Plaintiffs have moved the Court for leave to file an amended complaint. According to Plaintiffs the amended filing will cure deficiencies in the service of process that Defendants have objected to. Additionally, Plaintiffs seek to submit additional information which establishes "the long-term pattern of violation of rights of Plaintiffs by Defendants." Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint, p. 2, ¶ 4 (Docket No. 11). The long standing violation of Plaintiffs' rights relates to the ongoing dispute with the IRS regarding the applicability of the federal tax code to them as individuals and whether any federal tax assessment is valid against them because of their status as nontaxpayers. A review of the proposed First Amended Complaint submitted by Plaintiffs indicates that they do not seek to include additional factual allegations in support of their claims that Defendants violated federally guaranteed rights during the August 20, 1997 meeting, but rather to further chronicle their ongoing dispute on legal issues and status classification with the IRS. As a result, the Court is of the opinion that the proposed amendment would be futile and, as a result, should be denied. Inasmuch as the Court has concluded that Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to set forth factual support for the claims asserted, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.
C. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Notice of Appearance (Docket No. 8) and Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction Ancillary to Bivens Complaint (Docket No. 9)
Plaintiffs move the Court to strike the notice of appearance filed by the United States of America, by counsel, indicating appearance on behalf of the Defendant IRS employees and to enter injunctive relief to prevent the continued deprivation of federally guaranteed rights. Inasmuch as the Court has determined that Plaintiffs' Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Defendants' motion to dismiss, the instant motions are denied as moot.
D. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 24)
Plaintiffs move the Court to strike Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). However, after reviewing Plaintiffs' instant motion, the Court concludes that the relief requested by Plaintiffs is inappropriate and therefore, the instant motion is denied.
E. Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery (Docket No. 27)
Plaintiffs move the Court to require Defendants to provide the specific statute and implementing regulations which establish that Plaintiffs fall within the definition of
federal taxpayers within the Internal Revenue Code. As noted above, the Court has
determined that Defendants' motion to dismiss is appropriate. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' instant motion to compel is denied as moot.
III. ORDER
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 4) is GRANTED and this matter is dismissed in its entirety.
2. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Notice of Appearance (Docket No. 8) is DENIED.
3. Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction Ancillary to Bivens Complaint (Docket No. 9) is DENIED.
4. Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (Docket No. 20) is DENIED.
5. Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 22) is GRANTED.
6. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 24) is DENIED.
7. Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery (Docket No. 27) is DENIED AS MOOT.