Opinion
No. 1345 C.D. 2012
04-19-2013
Rodney Hontz, Petitioner v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER
Rodney Hontz, pro se, petitions for review from the June 19, 2012 determination (June Determination) of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board), which upheld the Board's decision mailed April 13, 2012 (April Decision) that, on remand, denied Mr. Hontz credit for the 204 days he spent at the Wernersville Community Corrections Center (WCCC). The April Decision also reiterated that Mr. Hontz's new maximum date, after the revocation of his parole as a Technical and Convicted Parole Violator, was March 31, 2015. On appeal, Mr. Hontz argues that the Board erred: (1) in not crediting him for the time he spent at the WCCC and in a voluntary in-patient program at Keystone Rehabilitation Center (Keystone) pursuant to Cox v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 507 Pa. 614, 493 A.2d 680 (1985), because the conditions at those facilities were the equivalent of incarceration; and (2) in extending his maximum date beyond the statutory maximum of Mr. Hontz's original sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.
In Hontz v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 597 C.D. 2011, filed December 30, 2011) (Hontz I), this Court set forth Mr. Hontz's incarceration and parole history.
On November 25, 2002, Mr. Hontz pled guilty to, among other things, burglary and criminal trespass and was sentenced to serve four to ten years. (Sentence Status Summary Sheet at 1, R. at 1.) Thereafter, Mr. Hontz was released on parole on January 9, 2006. (Order to Release on Parole/Reparole, R. at 15.) The Board declared Mr. Hontz delinquent effective March 9, 2007, and he was arrested for violation of his parole on August 17, 2007. (Board Administrative Action, March 13, 2007, R. at 20; March[ 11, 2011] Determination [(March Determination)] at 1.) The Board recommitted Mr. Hontz to serve backtime as a technical parole violator (TPV) by decision mailed on February 22, 2008. (Notice of Board Decision at 1, February 22, 2008, R. 21.)
On February 9, 2009, the Board released Mr. Hontz on parole to the Wernersville Community Corrections Center (WCCC). (Order to Release on Parole/Reparole, R. 24-25.) Mr. Hontz's maximum date when he was released on parole was April 3, 2012. (Notice of Board Decision, February 22, 2008, R. 21.) While on parole, Mr. Hontz was arrested on new charges on March 16, 2010, and did not post bail. (Criminal Arrest and Disposition Report, March 19, 2010, R. at 30; Criminal Docket CP-06-CR-0001481-2010 (Criminal Docket) at 2, R. at 55.) The Board declared him delinquent on March 17, 2010, and issued a warrant to commit and detain Mr. Hontz on March 18, 2010.
(Administrative Action, March 17, 2010, R. at 28; Warrant to Commit and Detain, March 18, 2010, R. at 29.)
Mr. Hontz pled guilty to one of the new criminal charges on July 1, 2010, and was sentenced to a new term of imprisonment in a state correctional facility. (Criminal Docket at 3, R. at 56; Sentence Order, July 12, 2010, R. at 36-37.) The Board issued a Notice of Charges and Hearing as a prelude to revoking Mr. Hontz's parole. (Notice of Charges and Hearing, July 13, 2010, R. at 33.) On July 14, 2010, Mr. Hontz waived the revocation hearing, as well as his panel hearing and right to counsel. (Waivers of Revocation and Panel Hearings and Right to Representation, July 14, 2010, R. at 39-41.) The Board revoked Mr. Hontz's parole, recommitted him as a TPV to serve twelve months backtime, and recommitted him as a convicted parole violator (CPV) to serve six months backtime; the six and twelve months of backtime were to run concurrently for a total of twelve months. (Notice of Board Decision, April 8, 2010, R. at 34-35; Notice of Board Decision, September 21, 2010, R. at 65-66.) The Board then recalculated Mr. Hontz's maximum date as March 31, 2015, by taking 1149 days, the time remaining on Mr. Hontz's sentence at the time of his most recent parole, February 9, 2009, and adding 585 days for the "constructive parole time added" for his time on parole from January 9, 2006, through August 17, 2007 (his previous time on parole from which he was recommitted as a TPV), for a total backtime owed of 1734 days. (Order to Recommit, R. 63.) Adding 1734 days to July 1, 2010, the date Mr. Hontz was returned to custody to serve his original sentence, the Board recalculated a new maximum date of March 31, 2015. (Order to Recommit, R. 63.)
The Board sent the [September 10, 2010, decision (September Decision)] to Mr. Hontz at State Correctional Institution-Frackville (SCI Frackville). However, when the mailroom at SCI Frackville received the September Decision, Mr. Hontz was not there, but in Lehigh County Prison attending a civil trial. Mr. Hontz did not receive the September Decision until November 4, 2010, well after his thirty days to appeal had expired. (March Determination at 1.) On November 9, 2010, Mr. Hontz filed a grievance with the Department of Corrections (Department) based on the mailroom's failure to timely forward his mail, and received an initial response denying the grievance on November 16, 2010, which was upheld by the SCI Frackville's superintendent's office on November 29, 2010. (Official Inmate Grievance #342282, November 9, 2010, R. at 70; Initial Review Response, November 16, 2010, R. at 71; Response to Official
Inmate Grievance #342282, November 29, 2010, R. at 73.) On December 3, 2010, Mr. Hontz filed his Nunc Pro Tunc Application with the Board, which stated, inter alia, that: "[d]ue to the negligence of the SCI Frackville officials, petitioner failed to receive proper notice of the Board[']s [September D]ecision causing him to lose his appeal rights outside of 37 Pa[.] Code § 73"; he had filed a grievance against the prison officials for holding the September Decision, and he attached the grievance documents that he had received thus far; and "[t]here are substantial issues of arguable merit involved in this review, including, but not limited to, the denial of 42 Pa. C.S.[] § 9760, credit for time served." (Nunc Pro Tunc Application, R. at 67.) Accordingly, Mr. Hontz "respectfully requested that the [Board] grant [him] the right to an Administrative Review Nunc Pro Tunc." (Nunc Pro Tunc Application, R. at 67.) Mr. Hontz did not receive any response to his Nunc Pro Tunc Application.
Ultimately, Mr. Hontz prevailed in his grievance and received notice that SCI Frackville's facility manager had "spoken with representatives from [the Board, who] have agreed to reinstate your appeal rights. You must file your appeal by the close of business on January 28, 2011." (Facility Manager's Appeal Response, January 13, 2011, R. at 79.) Mr. Hontz then filed a "Request for Administrative Relief" dated January 21, 2011, in which he set forth his arguments for how the Board erred in recalculating his new maximum date. (Request for Administrative Relief, January 21, 2011, R. at 77.) In his request, Mr. Hontz asserted that he was entitled to credit for the time he spent at the WCCC following his parole on February 9, 2009, pursuant to Cox . . . . (Request for Administrative Relief, January 21, 2011, R. at 77.) He then filed an "Amended Request for Administrative Review" dated February 16, 2011, setting forth additional information and legal argument regarding why the Board erred in the September Decision. (Amended Request for Administrative Review, February 16, 2011, R. at 75.)
The Board issued its March Determination, indicating that it was in response to Mr. Hontz's Nunc Pro Tunc Application, which the Board received on December 7, 2010. (March Determination at 1.) The Board, acknowledging that the Department confirmed that Mr. Hontz had not received the September Decision until November 4, 2010, accepted the Nunc Pro Tunc Application as a timely petition for administrative review. (March Determination at 1.) However, the Board did not accept the January 21, 2011, and February 16, 2011,
Requests for Administrative Relief/Review received January 26, 2011, and February 23, 2011, respectively, because they were submitted more than thirty days after Mr. Hontz had received the September Decision. (March Determination at 1.) The Board then analyzed its recalculation of Mr. Hontz's new maximum date, without considering any of the allegations contained in the January 2011 "Request for Administrative Relief," i.e., that Mr. Hontz was entitled to credit for the time he stayed at the WCCC pursuant to Cox. The Board concluded, inter alia, that because Mr. Hontz was recommitted as a CPV, he forfeited the credit he previously had for the period from January 9, 2006, through August 17, 2007, under Houser v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 682 A.2d 1365 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). (March Determination at 1.) Additionally, the Board noted that Mr. Hontz was not entitled to any credit for the period he was incarcerated before July 1, 2010, the date he pled guilty to new criminal charges and was sentenced to a new term of imprisonment, because he was not incarcerated solely on the Board's detainer pursuant to Gaito v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 488 Pa. 397, 412 A.2d 568 (1980). (March Determination at 1-2.)Hontz I, slip op. 2-6. We held, in Hontz I, that the Board erred in not accepting Mr. Hontz's January 21, 2011 "Request for Administrative Relief" as his Petition for Administrative Review and by not addressing the issues raised therein. Id. at 11. Therefore, this Court vacated the Board's March Determination and remanded the matter to the Board to hold a hearing to address the issues Mr. Hontz raised in the January 21, 2011 "Request for Administrative Relief," i.e., whether he was entitled to credit for the time he spent at the WCCC. Id. at 13.
We agreed with the Board that the February 11, 2011 "Amended Request for Administrative Review" was not timely. Hontz I, slip op. at 11 n.5.
The Board assigned a hearing examiner, who held a hearing at which Mr. Hontz and a WCCC representative (Representative) testified. Mr. Hontz explained that the WCCC is operated by the Department and houses both pre-release inmates and parolees. (Hr'g Tr. at 12-13, R. Item 9.) According to Mr. Hontz, pre-release inmates and parolees are subject to the same rules, regulations, and routine searches. (Hr'g Tr. at 13-14.) Mr. Hontz stated that the WCCC uses certain Department forms for those who visit the WCCC. (Hr'g Tr. at 14.) He testified that residents are not permitted to hold money, can only leave for pre-approved appointments or activities, and are required to go through metal detectors upon re-entry into the WCCC. (Hr'g Tr. at 14.) Mr. Hontz stated that he did not feel that he was at liberty on parole while residing at the WCCC. (Hr'g Tr. at 17.) Representative, who worked at the WCCC when Mr. Hontz resided there, indicated that WCCC staff do not carry any weapons, there is no perimeter fence, no bars on the windows, and the doors are not locked from the outside. (Hr'g Tr. at 18, 20.) Representative testified that: residents can walk out of the facility and the staff are not authorized to restrain them; residents are permitted to leave unescorted for appointments, work, and leisure activities; Mr. Hontz left unescorted on numerous occasions; and parolee residents who leave and do not return are not charged with escape; instead, the WCCC notifies the Board that the parolee has left. (Hr'g Tr. at 18-20.)
Based on this testimony the Board, in its April Decision, found that the WCCC did not detain or refuse Mr. Hontz the right to depart the facility. (April Decision, Findings of Fact (FOF) ¶ 2.) Additionally, the Board found that the WCCC did not restrict Mr. Hontz's ability to leave because the doors were not locked, the WCCC staff would not restrain or detain its residents from leaving without authorization, and parolee residents would not be charged with escape if they left without authorization. (FOF ¶ 3.) Finally, the Board pointed out that Mr. Hontz left the WCCC on numerous unescorted trips. (FOF ¶ 3.) The Board concluded that the restrictions on Mr. Hontz's liberty while he resided at the WCCC were not the equivalent of incarceration and, therefore, Mr. Hontz was not entitled to credit pursuant to Cox, 507 Pa. at 620, 493 A.2d at 683. (April Decision, Conclusions of Law (COL) ¶¶ 2-3.) Accordingly, the Board denied Mr. Hontz's credit for the 204 days spent at the WCCC. (COL ¶ 4.)
Mr. Hontz filed a Petition for Administrative Review, in which he asserted that the Board erred in not granting him credit for his time at the WCCC and in not giving him credit for time he voluntarily spent at an in-patient program at Keystone from November 11, 2009 through December 3, 2009. (Petition for Administrative Review, April 24, 2012, ¶¶ 8-9, 10, 17-21, R. Item 11.) Mr. Hontz filed an Amended Petition for Administrative Review claiming additional errors because the Board did not credit him with the time he spent in good standing while on parole from January 9, 2006 to August 17, 2007 and because the Board exceeded his original maximum sentence when his maximum date was amended to March 31, 2015. (Amended Petition for Administrative Review, May 7, 2012, ¶¶ 26-29, 31, R. Item 11.) The Board issued the June Determination in which it found no error in the decision to deny Mr. Hontz credit for his time at the WCCC, and holding that the Board properly recalculated the maximum date based on Houser v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 682 A.2d 1365, 1368 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (stating "parolees . . . do not receive credit for time served while at liberty on parole in good standing prior to technical violations when recommitted as a convicted parole violators"). (June Determination.) Mr. Hontz now petitions this Court for review.
In reviewing the Board's Order, our review "is limited to determining whether the Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence, an error of law [was] committed, or whether any of the parolee's constitutional rights were violated." Andrews v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 516 A.2d 838, 841 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986).
On appeal, Mr. Hontz argues that the Board erred when it recomputed his maximum expiration date without giving him credit for the 204 days he spent at the WCCC and the 22 days he voluntarily spent at Keystone. Mr. Hontz contends that the specific characteristics of these facilities were restrictive enough to his liberty that he should be entitled to receive credit for the time spent therein. Mr. Hontz argues that Cox did not focus on the physical characteristics of the facility and on whether the parolees are permitted to leave the facilities unescorted and does not stand for the proposition that "a residential facility . . . ha[d] to be the equivalent of a regular prison" in order for credit to be given. (Hontz's Br. at 17.) Additionally, Mr. Hontz points out that the WCCC is the same community corrections center that was at issue in Torres v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 861 A.2d 394 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), and the parolee in that case was granted credit for the first forty-five days spent at the WCCC, which the parolee had established was a "black out period." Mr. Hontz contends that he should be at least entitled to credit for the first forty-five days at the WCCC. Mr. Hontz also argues that the circumstances surrounding his time at Keystone, where he successfully completed a voluntary in-patient treatment program, were sufficiently restrictive so as to justify the grant of 22 days credit towards his backtime. Mr. Hontz argues that his situation is like that in Commonwealth v. Conahan, 527 Pa. 199, 589 A.2d 1107 (1991), wherein the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's denial of credit for time the appellant voluntarily spent in an in-patient alcohol rehabilitation center.
Section 6138(a)(2) of the Prisons and Parole Code (Code) provides that a parolee who is recommitted as a CPV, as Mr. Hontz was here, "shall be reentered to serve the remainder of the term which the parolee would have been compelled to serve had the parole not been granted and, except as provided under paragraph (2.1) [(which is not applicable here)], shall be given no credit for the time at liberty on parole." 61 Pa. C.S. § 6138(a)(2) (emphasis added). Although the Code does not define "at liberty on parole," our Supreme Court in Cox, 507 Pa. at 619, 493 A.2d at 683, held that "at liberty" does not mean freedom from each and every type of confinement. Specifically, the Supreme Court explained:
Appellant did not enjoy the greater freedom of "street time" while at Eagleville[, an in-patient drug treatment program], but he was restricted from leaving Eagleville under the special condition arising out of his original sentence, a restriction of liberty presumably less onerous than constructive parole. We are therefore left with the need for a factual determination as to the nature of the Eagleville program and whether the restrictions on appellant's liberty there were the equivalent of incarceration entitling him to credit for the time spent in the program.Id. (emphasis added). The burden is on the parolee to establish that the specific characteristics of a program constitute restrictions on the parolee's liberty sufficient to warrant credit. Id. at 620, 493 A.2d at 683. Although Mr. Hontz is correct that the Supreme Court, in Cox, did not focus on the physical characteristics of the facility and on whether the parolees are permitted to leave the facilities unescorted, this was because there was no factual record developed in Cox and, therefore, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Board for the development of such a record. Id.
Since Cox, this Court has considered numerous claims of credit for time served in a community corrections center or group home. In Torres, this Court held that the parolee was entitled to credit for the first forty-five days spent at the WCCC because, during that time period, the parolee was not permitted to go anywhere outside the facility except to a weekly meeting to which he was escorted by a member of the WCCC staff. Torres, 861 A.2d at 399. We stated that "when the restrictions upon a parolee become such that they destroy any sense of being 'at liberty on parole' and, consequently, meet the Cox standard," such as the restrictions at issue in Torres, credit should be given. Id. at 401. We have consistently considered the following factors in determining whether a facility is sufficiently restrictive so as to be the equivalent of incarceration: (1) whether the facility is locked or secured; and (2) whether a parolee is able to leave the facility without being restrained or escorted. Meleski v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 931 A.2d 68, 73 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007); Figueroa v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 900 A.2d 949, 952-53 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (citing Detar v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 890 A.2d 27, 31 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006)). These matters are evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Torres, 861 A.2d at 397.
In Meleski, we concluded that the restrictions, which forbade the parolee from leaving the facility for a specified period of time, placed the parolee under 24-hour supervision during that time, and prevented the parolee from making required trips away from the facility without an escort, could not "reasonably be described as being at 'liberty on parole.'" Meleski, 931 A.2d at 72 (quoting Torres, 861 A.2d at 401). The parolee in Figueroa sought credit for the time he spent in a blackout period during which he could leave only with an escort. Although the parolee testified that the facility's doors were locked and he would be stopped if he attempted to leave unescorted, the manager of the facility contradicted that testimony, indicating that parolees were permitted to leave unescorted and that, even though the doors were locked, the facility's staff would not physically restrain parolees who desired to leave. In contrast to our conclusion in Meleski, we held in Figueroa that the parolee was not constructively incarcerated during the blackout period because the staff would not prevent the parolees from leaving, parolees were not charged with escape if they left the facility, and parolees were permitted to leave unescorted to attend to personal business. Figueroa, 900 A.2d at 952-53.
This matter is more like Figueroa than Meleski and Torres. Representative credibly testified that: (1) Mr. Hontz could, and did, leave the WCCC without an escort; (2) the WCCC did not have a fence, locked doors, and was not otherwise secured to prevent parolees from leaving the premises; and (3) Mr. Hontz acknowledged that he could leave the WCCC for various approved appointments and errands without an escort. (Hr'g Tr. at 14, 18-20, R. Item 9.) The fact that the WCCC houses both parolees and pre-release inmates does not, as Mr. Hontz asserts, support granting credit. This Court has differentiated, for credit purposes, between parolees and pre-release inmates explaining that the increased penalties for pre-release inmates, such as the fact that they are subject to an escape charge if they leave, renders the pre-release inmates subject to custodial confinement. Meehan v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 808 A.2d 313, 317-18 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). Finally, Mr. Hontz argues that he should be entitled to forty-five days credit for a blackout period pursuant to Torres; however, he presented no evidence that he was subject to the same conditions as the parolee in Torres. As we noted in that case, these evaluations are made based on the facts in a case-by-case evaluation, Torres, 861 A.2d at 397, and Mr. Hontz did not prove that he was subject to such a blackout period. Accordingly, Mr. Hontz did not establish that the conditions at the WCCC were sufficiently restrictive to his liberty to warrant the award of credit for the time he spent there.
Mr. Hontz also argues that a parolee does not have to be actually incarcerated in order for there to be the equivalent to incarceration under Cox. We recognized this in Torres, stating "[u]nder Cox, it is not necessary that restrictions on [a parolee's] liberty be identical to those that would exist at [a] SCI . . . to conclude that he was not at liberty on parole." Torres, 861 A.2d at 400. However, this Court explained that "ordinary restrictions such as those that attend many inpatient treatment programs are not so onerous as to require a credit" but that, when those restrictions "become such that they destroy any sense of being 'at liberty on parole,'" such as where a parolee is "forbidden generally to leave," "under 24-hour supervision," and "not permitted to make required trips outside the facility without an escort," credit is appropriate. Id. at 400-01 (emphasis added). Mr. Hontz did not establish that he was subject to the type of restrictions that would "destroy [his] sense of being 'at liberty on parole.'" Id. at 401.
We next address Mr. Hontz's claim for credit for the time he voluntarily spent in the in-patient treatment program at Keystone. The Board asserts that Mr. Hontz's claim is waived because he did not raise it before the Board. An issue that is not raised in an administrative appeal to the Board is waived and is not subject to this Court's review. Rule 1551(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa. R.A.P. 1551(a) (stating that, except in certain circumstances not at issue here, "[n]o question shall be heard or considered by the court which was not raised before the government unit"); Reavis v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 909 A.2d 28, 34, 36 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).
A review of Mr. Hontz's January 21, 2011 "Request for Administrative Relief," reveals that Mr. Hontz requested credit only for the time spent in the WCCC, (Request for Administrative Relief, January 21, 2011, S.R. Item 7), and Mr. Hontz only presented evidence on this issue during the remand hearing. He raised no other issue at the remand hearing. Since this issue was not raised before the Board, it is waived. Reavis, 909 A.2d at 34, 36. Even had the issue been raised, the Supreme Court's decision in Conahan does not mandate the grant of credit for time voluntarily spent in an in-patient treatment center. In that case, the Supreme Court considered whether a trial court abused its discretion in granting a defendant, who had a mandatory sentence for driving under the influence, credit for the time he spent while voluntarily admitted to an in-patient alcohol treatment facility. Conahan, 527 Pa. at 200, 589 A.2d at 1108. In interpreting the term "imprisonment," which the General Assembly did not define in the Vehicle Code, the Supreme Court looked to the common definition of the term, and concluded that the terms "imprisonment" and "custody" could include time spent in institutionalized rehabilitation and treatment programs. Id. at 202, 589 A.2d at 1109. However, the Supreme Court was clear that its "acceptance of this type of inpatient 'institutional rehabilitation' in no way entitles one . . . to a credit for such rehabilitative commitment as of right. Rather, it is only an express approval of credits for such commitment that the sentencing court in its discretion deems to be sufficient." Id. at 204, 589 A.2d at 1110 (emphasis in original). Thus, Conahan does not support Mr. Hontz's claim that he must be granted credit for the time he spent at Keystone.
This is the operative appeal document to the Board in this matter as it was Mr. Hontz's challenge to the Board's recalculation of his maximum date after he was recommitted as a CPV.
The Supreme Court considered the following definition:
The act of putting or confining a man in prison. The restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his powers of locomotion. It is not a necessary part of the definition that the confinement should be in a place usually appropriated to that purpose; it may be in a locality used only for the specific occasion; or it may take place without the actual application of any physical agencies of restraint (such as locks or bars), as by verbal compulsion and the display of available force. Every confinement of the person is an "imprisonment," whether it be in a prison, or in a private house, or even by forcibly detaining one in the public streets. Any unlawful exercise or show of force by which person is compelled to remain where he does not wish to be.
Finally, Mr. Hontz argues that the Board erred by extending his maximum date beyond the statutory maximum of Mr. Hontz's original sentence. However, as the Board points out in its brief, this Court already addressed this issue in Hontz I, wherein we held that Mr. Hontz waived the issue by failing to include it in his January 2011 "Request for Administrative Relief" to the Board. Hontz I, slip op. at 9 n.4. Moreover, we noted that even were the issue not waived:
the Board did not improperly extend his sentence, but simply declined to give him credit for the period of time he was at liberty on parole as permitted by Section 6138(a)(2) of the Prison and Parole Code, which states that if recommitted pursuant to this provision, a parolee "shall be reentered to serve the remainder of the term which the parolee would have been compelled to serve had the parole not been granted and shall be given no credit for the time at liberty on parole."
[Richards v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 20 A.3d 596,] . . . 598 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)](emphasis added). Thus, in ordering Mr. Hontz to serve backtime and extending his maximum date, the Board simply was taking into account the amount of time Mr. Hontz had remaining on the sentence imposed and required him to serve that sentence.
Id.
Accordingly, the Board's Order is affirmed.
/s/ _________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge ORDER
NOW, April 19, 2013, the Order of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole in the above-captioned matter is hereby AFFIRMED.
/s/ _________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
Conahan, 527 Pa. at 202, 589 A.2d at 1109 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979)).