Opinion
C.A. Nos. 93C-02-033, 93C-05-015.
Date Submitted: April 7, 1995.
Date Decided: May 3, 1995.
Mr. Robert C. Wolhar, Jr., Esquire, Wolhar Gill, P.A., Georgetown, Delaware.
Mr. Norman C. Barnett, Esquire, Schab Barnett, P.A., Georgetown, Delaware.
Dear Counsel:
Currently before the Court is a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, a motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Lori Fink in response to the complaint of plaintiff Beverly Hondros, Guardian Ad Litem and Next Friend for Melissa Brown. Following is the Court's decision thereon.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 23, 1991, Melissa Brown ("Brown") sustained injuries in a four-car automobile accident. Brown, then nine years old, was a passenger in an automobile driven by defendant Lori Fink ("Fink"), her foster mother. The accident occurred when defendant Daniel Morton ("Morton") negligently collided into the rear of Fink's vehicle. Fink was waiting to make a left-hand turn into a driveway. This impact caused Fink's vehicle to cross the center line and crash into another vehicle driven by Rabecka J. Passwaters. Several individuals sustained injuries in the accident, and one child was killed. In February 1993, Brown, through her natural mother and next friend. Beverly Hondros. filed suit against Daniel Morton and Lori Fink seeking damages for her injuries. Brown alleged claims against Fink based on negligent operation of a motor vehicle, negligent failure to carry personal injury protection insurance on her vehicle, and negligent failure to restrain a minor in a seat belt.
In May 1993, Commercial Union Insurance Company ("Commercial Union"), Morton's insurer, filed an interpleader action and tendered its policy limits for Morton to the Court. In its interpleader action. Commercial Union named Brown, Fink, Rabecka and James, Passwaters, Jonathan Fink and Allison Fink as defendants. Brown then filed a crossclaim in this suit alleging the same claims against Fink as she alleged in her earlier suit.
On December 2, 1993, this Court decided Commercial Union's interpleader action. After hearing testimony as to each claimant's damages, the Court divided Morton's $300,000 policy limit between all the claimants. As to Brown's claims against Morton, the Court awarded her damages in the amount of $17,052.80. The Court did not, however, rule on Brown's claims against Fink. An order confirming Brown's award was signed on December 13, 1993, and was later amended to include interest on January 11, 1994. No party appealed this decision. Brown's award was paid on February 25, 1994 to Beverly Hondros, who was authorized to act as guardian ad litem for Brown.
The claims against defendant Lori Fink are still pending. On May 10, 1994, Fink filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
Standard for Summary Judgment
Because matters outside the pleadings have been introduced, this motion will be considered a Motion for Summary Judgment under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56. Summary judgment may be granted only when no material issues of fact exist, and the moving party bears the burden of establishing the non-existence of material issues of fact. Moore v. Sizemore, Del. Supr., 405 A.2d 679, 680 (1979). Once the moving party meets its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish the existence of material issues of fact. Id. at 681. Where the moving party produces an affidavit or other evidence sufficient under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56 in support of its motion and the burden shifts, then the non-moving party may not rest on its own pleadings, but must provide evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(e);Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If, after discovery, the non-moving party cannot make a sufficient showing of the existence of an essential element of his or her case, then summary judgment must be granted. Burkhart v. Davies, Del. Supr., 602 A.2d 56, 59 (1991), cert. den., 112 S. Ct. 1946 (1992); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra. If, however, material issues of fact exist or if the Court determines that it does not have sufficient facts to enable it to apply the law to the facts before it, then summary judgment is inappropriate. Ebersole v. Lowengrub, Del, Supr., 180 A.2d 467. 470 (1962).
In her motion, Fink makes three arguments. First, she asserts that the claim for failure to have Melissa Brown restrained in a seat belt is not a claim upon which relief can be granted. She also argues that the claim for the failure of Fink to have personal injury protection coverage pursuant to 21 Del. C. § 2118 is not a claim upon which relief can be granted. Finally, she contends, assuming arguendo Fink was a tort-feasor under either of these two theories, that plaintiff still is not entitled to any relief from Fink because plaintiff's damages have been fully satisfied by a joint tort-feasor.
The Court will first address the issue of whether the claim is barred because it has already been satisfied by a joint tort-feasor. Fink argues that even if a valid tort claim existed against her, summary judgment is appropriate because Brown's full damages have been satisfied by the award made by Morton and his insurer in theCommercial Union case. Brown counters that the award did not represent a full measure of her damages or, alternatively, that even if the award was a full measure of damages, her claim of negligent failure to insure is still viable under the collateral source rule.
Commercial Union's Payment Represents Brown's Full Damages
It is well established that joint liability may exist where the independent acts of two parties produce a single and indivisible result. Leishman v. Brady, Del. Super., 3 A.2d 118 (1939). Although under the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act, a release of one joint tort-feasor will not necessarily discharge another joint tort-feasor, it will reduce the injured person's claim against the other tort-feasor in the amount of consideration paid for the release. Raughley v. Delaware Coach Co., Del. Super., 91 A.2d 245, 247 (1952). Since Delaware law does not provide for double recovery from a joint tort-feasor, it would follow that a claimant could not recover additional damages from a joint tort-feasor if his or her damages have already been fully compensated. In Yarrington v. Thornburg, Del. Super., 208 A.2d 60 (1965), for example, the Superior Court concluded that where an injured person is wholly or partially indemnified for hospital or medical expenses by one joint tort-feasor who is liable with others for such damages, other joint tort-feasors are entitled to credit for payments so made. Thus, the injured party is not entitled to recover the same medical expenses from other joint tort-feasors.
10 Del. C. § 6304(a) provides in relevant part:
A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasor unless the release so provides; but reduces the claim against the other tort-feasor in the amount of the consideration paid for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid.
In the case currently before this Court, since plaintiff contends that Fink and Morton are jointly and severally liable for her damages caused by the accident, Fink would be entitled to offset any claim against her by the amount paid by Morton's insurer in satisfaction of his liability. Furthermore, if the amount paid by Morton represented a full measure of Brown's damages, such payment would effectively release Fink from all liability because no damages would remain.
In light of the foregoing, the Court must now turn to the question of whether any damages remain. Brown, along with the other claimants with suits pending against Morton, voluntarily participated in a non-jury inquisition to determine damages in the Commercial Union case. This Court heard testimony from all interested parties as to their damages, including medical bills, pain and suffering, etc. In its decision in this matter, the Court stated:
Each of you had a tragedy in your lives, and I hope you all understand that as sympathetic and compassionate as the Court can be, I cannot make things better. . . . I am going to enter a finding at this point in time for three of the plaintiffs [Melissa Brown, Allison Fink, and John A. Fink] and indemnification as a full award of the damages due them.
With respect to Brown's damages, the Court continued:
As to Melissa Brown, I am satisfied that regardless when her mother took her to the hospital or Dr. DeShuttle [sic], Dr. DeShuttle [sic] did discover a problem and that problem has been treated and there is no evidence that [it] [sic] is not a remaining obligation. I have taken that into consideration, I have taken her youth into consideration, and I am awarding her $17,052.80 . . . As to the argument Mr. Wolhar [counsel for Brown and Hondros] was making, my determination, Mr. Wolhar, is that that is the full award.
This $17,052.80 figure represented medical bills of $6051.86; legal fees of $5,752.03; and an additional sum of $5,081.01. The settlement relieved Morton of all liability with respect to this accident.
Since the Court weighed all of the evidence of Brown's damages prior to making any award and intended for said award to serve "as a full award of the damages due," Brown is unable, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, to relitigate the issue of what damages are due her as a result of the accident. See, e.g.,Winkler v. Balentine, Del. Supr., 254 A.2d 849, 851 (1969) ("[B]y virtue of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a party is estopped from relitigating the issue again in a subsequent case.")
Therefore, because Brown cannot relitigate the amount of her damages and she has already collected the full amount of damages awarded by the Court, any cause of action in which Brown claims that Fink and Morton are joint tort-feasors is no longer a claim upon which any further relief may be granted. The only claim that Fink asserts solely against Fink is Fink's failure to insure her vehicle pursuant to 21 Del. C. § 2118. This claim will be discussed separately hereunder. With respect to all of the other claims arising from of the accident, however, summary judgment is appropriate in favor of Fink.
Collateral Source Rule
As discussed above, it is not necessary for this Court to address all of plaintiff's individual claims because most were satisfied by Morton. The Court will, however, address plaintiff's claim that Fink is liable for Brown's medical damages because she negligently failed to insure her vehicle pursuant to 21 Del. C. § 2118. Brown does not contend that Fink and Morton were joint tort-feasors in this claim.
Under the "collateral source rule," Brown argues that she may collect damages incurred due to Fink's failure to purchase personal injury protection insurance. She alleges that she would not have otherwise incurred medical expenses had Fink purchased insurance. The collateral source rule provides that a tort-feasor has no right to mitigation of damages because of compensation received by the injured person from an independent source unrelated to the tort-feasor. Thornton v. Carroll, D. Del., 490 F. Supp. 455 (1980).
Brown cites to Medical Center of Delaware, Inc. v. Mullins, Del. Supr., 637 A.2d 6 (1994) for authority in this claim. In that case, the Supreme Court concluded that under the collateral source doctrine adopted by courts in Delaware, a tort-feasor is not entitled to have its judgment reduced by the amount claimant received from another tort-feasor unless the two were joint tort-feasors. The plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice action against the medical center and the treating physician. The doctor settled with the claimant in a pretrial settlement. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the claimants against the Medical Center. Moreover, the jury determined that the doctor had no liability. On appeal, the Court was asked to determine whether the Medical Center was entitled to a credit for the amount paid by the doctor in their settlement. The Court found that since the doctor was not liable as a joint tort-feasor in the case, the Center was not entitled to any credit from his settlement. The Court stated that "[t]he credit provided for in the Delaware Uniform Contribution Law is applicable exclusively to `joint tort-feasors.'"Medical Center of Delaware, Inc. v. Mullins, 637 A.2d at 8.
Failure to Insure is not Negligence Per Se
Under the collateral source rule, if Fink is negligent per se in that she failed to insure her vehicle pursuant to 21 Del. C. § 2118, she would not be entitled to any credit for the amount paid by Morton. Brown argues in her answering brief that "Fink's damages are apportionable as to the medical expenses incurred by Plaintiff. Defendants Fink and Morton did not act in concerted action and there was no common intent, the damages are divisible as to medical expenses." In short, Brown asserts that as a proximate result of Fink's failure to insure her vehicle, she caused Brown to incur unnecessary medical expenses that normally would have been covered by personal injury protection benefits.
Negligence per se exists when a defendant violates a statute that is designed to protect a class of persons, which includes the plaintiff, against a type of harm that will occur as a result of its violation and an injury occurs. Crawford v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., Del. Super., 563 A.2d 1066 (1986). In order to sustain an action based on negligence per se, plaintiff must show a causal connection between such statutory violation and the injury alleged.Wright v. Moffitt, Del. Supr., 437 A.2d 554 (1981). Moreover, the plaintiff must be a member of a class of persons for whose protection or benefit statute was enacted. Id.
First, Brown's argument that Fink's failure to insure her vehicle was a proximate cause of Brown's medical bills is unpersuasive. The causal connection is too remote. The collision, not Fink's failure to insure her vehicle, caused Brown to incur medical expenses. Additionally, although Fink did violate the statute requiring that her vehicle be insured, the Legislature did not design the statute to protect third parties against medical damages that occur as a result of a violation of this statute. The statute serves to require prompt payment of medical expenses and loss of wages and then to prohibit recipients from attempting to recover compensation for medical expenses from alleged tort-feasors in automobile negligence actions. International Underwriters, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Del., Inc., Del. Supr., 449 A.2d 197 (1982). Thus, the practical effect of the statute is to enable a person who has been injured in an automobile accident to receive the economic benefit of immediate payment from a PIP insurance carrier without awaiting protracted litigation.Crum Forster Ins. Group v. Wright, Del. Supr., 634 A.2d 373 (1993). In the case sub judice, Brown has already been compensated for her medical expenses by Morton. Therefore, permitting Brown to recover additional compensation for her damages at this point does not achieve the legislative intent of the statute to provide injured parties immediate coverage for medical expenses.
What Brown ignores is that she would not have been able to present the claim for medical expenses pursuant to 21 Del. C. at the inquisition had a PIP carrier for Fink already paid same. Since, however, the medical expenses were not paid by a PIP carrier, the Court included the medical expenses in the inquisition award.
In conclusion, because Brown did not demonstrate that Fink's violation of the statute requiring her to carry insurance on her vehicle constituted negligence per se, this Court concludes that it is not a claim upon which relief may be granted, and, consequently, summary judgment is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment in favor of defendant Fink is hereby granted with respect to all outstanding claims.IT IS SO ORDERED.
oc: Prothonotary's Office cc: Richard W. Pell, Esquire Nicholas H. Rodriguez, Esquire Gary A. Myers, Esquire John E. Henriksen, Esquire