Summary
In Hollinshead v. Wood, 84 N. J. Eq. 492, 94 A. 618, 619, the Court of Errors and Appeals said: "The fundamental rule applicable to such a situation has been stated to be that courts, both of law and equity, will construe words according to their strict and primary acceptation, unless from their immediate context, or from the intention of the parties apparent on the face of the instrument, the words appear to have been used in a different sense, or unless, in their strict sense, they are incapable of being carried into effect."
Summary of this case from Higgins v. MispethOpinion
07-10-1914
William D. Lippincott and E. Lawrence Dudley, both of Camden, for complainant. William P. Kelly, of Camden, and Thomas B. Hall, of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.
Bill by Edward B. Hollinshead, as executor of the will of Joseph C. Hollinshead, deceased, against Mary B. Wood and others for the construction of the will. Decree for complainant.
William D. Lippincott and E. Lawrence Dudley, both of Camden, for complainant. William P. Kelly, of Camden, and Thomas B. Hall, of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.
BACKES, V. C. By the second paragraph of the will, Joseph C. Hollinshead, deceased, provided as follows:
"I give, devise, and bequeath unto my daughter Mary Wood, absolutely, all bonds and mortgages covering real estate, which I may possess at the time of my decease; also money which may be on deposit in bank to my credit at that time."
Among his personal effects the deceased left bonds secured by mortgages conveying individual tracts of land; also four bonds of the Camden and Suburban Railway Company, secured by a mortgage made to a trustee upon all of the property, real and personal, of the company; two trust certificates of the Philadelphia Electric Company, and one trust certificate of the Electric and People's Traction Company. The bonds and certificates were each of the par value of $1,000, and the latter were secured by deposits of corporate capital stock held by trustees.
The question for determination is whether the four bonds and three certificates werebequeathed by the second paragraph of the will. The four bonds of the Camden Company, which were a part of a larger issue, being secured by a mortgage on realty, are embraced within the definition and meaning of "all bonds and mortgages covering real estate which I may possess at the time of my decease," as employed by the testator. The circumstance that the mortgage was made to a trustee to secure the entire issue of bonds is immaterial. The testator was pro tanto the beneficial owner and possessor. The fact that the mortgage covered personalty, as well as real property, is of no moment. There is nothing to indicate that the testator intended to limit the bequest to "mortgages covering real estate" exclusively. Hammell v. Swan, 61 N. J. Eq. (16 Dick.) 179, 47 Atl. 801.
The three trustee's certificates are not bonds within the broadest sense of that word, nor are they secured by "mortgage covering real estate," and hence are not included in the bequest.
A decree will be advised in accordance with these views.