Opinion
CV 03-1385-AS.
October 26, 2004
ORDER
Plaintiffs Marvin Holiday and Troy Ramsey are state prisoners at the Multnomah County Detention Center (MCDC) and are Muslim. In October 2003, they filed a pro se Complaint against Multnomah County Sheriff Bernard Giusto and Chaplain Thomas Duncan. Plaintiffs allege their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated. Plaintiffs aver that defendants (1) failed to hire a Muslim chaplain, (2) interfered with plaintiffs' right to pray, (3) failed to provide plaintiffs with a Halal meal and religious reading material in a timely fashion, and (4) failed to become certified as a Halal diet provider, or in the alternative, to provide plaintiffs with packaged Halal or Kosher meals.
In his Findings and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Ashmanskas recommended that plaintiff's claims that (1) MCDC has not hired a full-time paid Muslim chaplin, and (2) MCDC has not obtained certification as a Halal meal provider or, alternatively, provided plaintiffs with packaged Halal or Kosher meals, should be dismissed without prejudice because plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The Magistrate Judge further recommended that defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted in part with respect to (1) plaintiffs' claims arising from the delays in processing their religious diets and materials requests, and (2) plaintiffs' personal capacity claims against both defendants based on alleged interference with their prayer activities. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the motion be denied in part with respect to plaintiffs' official capacity claim against defendant Giusto. Defendants filed objections to the Findings and Recommendation and the case was referred to this court on September 30, 2004.
The matter is now before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). When either party objects to a Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation on a dispositive motion, the district court makes a de novo determination of the Magistrate Judge's report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Commodore Bus. Mach., Inc., 656 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 1981). As noted above, Magistrate Judge Ashmanskas recommended that some of plaintiffs' claims be dismissed and that defendants' motion be denied in part. Accordingly, the court has reviewed the Magistrate Judge's decision de novo. For the reasons stated below, the court adopts the Magistrate's Findings and Recommendation in its entirety.
BACKGROUND
On September 16, 2003, Deputy Harrison allegedly told plaintiff Ramsey that, per instructions from Sergeant Lindstrom, plaintiff and other Muslim prisoners were prohibited from praying together. Plaintiff Ramsey filed a grievance and Sergeant Lindstrom responded that she never stated that Muslim prisoners were not allowed to pray together, but clarified that they are not allowed to lead prayer groups. MCDC Chaplain Stelle stated that Multnomah County jails have a uniform policy prohibiting prisoners from leading one another in prayer services, regardless of their faith.
On September 18, 2003, plaintiff Holiday filed a grievance complaining that an officer had denied Muslim prisoners the ability to gather for religious services. An MCDC official responded that group worshiping was against policy and that prisoners may worship alone. Plaintiff Ramsey contends that he has witnessed Christian prisoners praying together on at least two occasions and that defendant Duncan was aware of this practice.
On September 22, 2003, Deputy Hon allegedly interrupted plaintiff Ramsey's morning prayer by kicking and shaking his cell door and demanding that he remove the towel he had hung from his bunk. Plaintiff filed a grievance with defendant Giusto. Plaintiffs subsequently initiated this Complaint.
Defendant Giusto is the Sheriff for Multnomah County and the policymaker for all operations of the Multnomah County Sheriff's Office. See Aff. Bernard Giusto at ¶ 1.
Plaintiffs allege that defendants violated their rights when correctional officers interfered with their prayer activities. Based on these allegations, the Magistrate Judge reviewed the MCDC's group prayer policy and concluded that it is ambiguous and that some prison officials invoke the policy only against prisoners leading other prisoners in prayer, while other officials invoke a sweeping prohibition against all forms of group prayer. Construing the allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the Magistrate Judge determined that a reasonable jury could find that MCDC's ambiguous prayer policy was a motivating factor behind the disparate treatment of Muslim and Christian prisoners, and that the disparate treatment deprived plaintiffs of a reasonable opportunity to practice their religion as compared to the Christian inmates. The Findings and Recommendation concluded that plaintiffs had failed to present evidence of personal wrongdoing on the part of either defendant, but determined that plaintiffs had presented a prima facie "official capacity" claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant Giusto.
DISCUSSION
Defendants contend that (1) plaintiffs failed to plead a Section 1983 claim, and (2) that by permitting the official capacity claim to survive, the Magistrate Judge imposed respondeat superior liability on the County.
This court recognizes, as did Magistrate Judge Ashmanskas, that courts are duty-bound to construe pro se complaints, pleadings, and motions with extreme liberality and afford the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001); Christensen v. CIR, 786 F.2d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1986). This is of particular importance when the plaintiff alleges that his or her civil rights were violated. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 757 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
A suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is essentially a suit against the official's office. Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). In that respect, such a suit is treated no differently than a suit under Section 1983. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). Section 1983 imposes liability upon any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of a federally protected right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 also imposes liability upon municipalities for constitutional deprivations resulting from actions taken pursuant to a government policy, practice, or custom. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv.'s, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
To make out a cause of action under Section 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). The doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to suits under Section 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-94 (explaining the rationale behind the Court declining to impose respondeat superior liability in Section 1983 actions against municipalities).
Defendants contend that plaintiffs are unable to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under Section 1983 because plaintiffs' Complaint does not specifically aver that their alleged constitutional injury resulted from actions taken pursuant to County policy, practice, or custom. However, the Complaint alleges that an officer prohibited plaintiffs from praying, and makes other allegations that Muslim prisoners were treated differently than Christian prisoners. Plaintiffs' subsequent pro se filings allege that several correctional officers interfered with their prayer activities. They assert that: (1) Deputy Harrison told plaintiffs that plaintiffs were prohibited from praying together; (2) Sergeant Lindstrand informed plaintiffs that they were not allowed to lead prayer groups; (3) Chaplain Stelle stated that Multnomah County jails have a policy prohibiting prisoners from leading other prisoners in pray services; (4) Christian prisoners were allowed to pray collectively but Muslim prisoners were not; and (5) Deputy Hon interrupted plaintiff Ramsey's morning prayer by kicking and shaking his cell door and demanding that he remove the towel he had hung from his bunk. Construing plaintiffs' Complaint and their subsequent briefings liberally, plaintiffs have pled violations under Section 1983.
Defendants also object to the Magistrate Judge's denial of summary judgment regarding defendant Giusto. The Magistrate Judge concluded that defendants failed to show an absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to plaintiffs' prayer interference claim.
Construing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, this court agrees that genuine factual issues remain as to whether defendants had a policy, practice, or custom that unlawfully infringed upon plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Although defendants take issue with plaintiffs' failure to include the correctional officers who allegedly stopped them from praying as named defendants, plaintiffs did identify Chaplain Duncan, who allegedly witnessed the disparate treatment, and Sheriff Giusto, who is the policymaker for the Sheriff's Office.
A reasonable jury could find that the MCDC, through defendants Giusto and Duncan, had a policy, practice, or custom to treat Muslim and Christian prisoners differently. A reasonable jury could also conclude that such a policy, practice, or custom was a motivating force behind the disparate treatment and that the treatment deprived plaintiffs of a reasonable opportunity to practice their religion, as is enjoyed by the Christian prisoners.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Magistrate Judge Ashmanskas' Findings and Recommendation (Doc. #55) is ADOPTED in its entirety. Plaintiffs' claims that MCDC has not hired a full-time paid Muslim chaplain and has failed to obtain certification as a Halal meal provider or otherwise provide plaintiffs with Halal or Kosher meals are DISMISSED without prejudice because plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #29) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is granted as it pertains to plaintiffs' claims arising from the delays in processing plaintiffs' religious diet and materials requests, and as it pertains to their personal capacity claims against both defendants. Defendants' motion is denied insofar as it pertains to plaintiffs' official capacity claim against defendant Giusto.
IT IS SO ORDERED.