Opinion
21-1862
12-20-2023
PHILLIP A. HOLDEN, a/k/a Abdul- Rahim Muslim, Appellant v. ATTORNEY GENERAL NEW JERSEY; WARDEN ESSEX COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
James Figorski Bina M. Peltz Clare P. Pozos Dechert LLP Chase Hanson [ARGUED] University of Pennsylvania Counsel for Appellant Lucille M. Rosano [ARGUED] Essex County Office of Prosecutor Essex County Veterans Courthouse Counsel for Appellees
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
Argued November 15, 2023
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. No. 2-19-cv-00401) District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler
James Figorski Bina M. Peltz Clare P. Pozos Dechert LLP
Chase Hanson [ARGUED] University of Pennsylvania
Counsel for Appellant
Lucille M. Rosano [ARGUED] Essex County Office of Prosecutor Essex County Veterans Courthouse Counsel for Appellees
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, MATEY and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
OPINION [*]
MATEY, CIRCUIT JUDGE.
Phillip Holden challenges the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and the dismissal of his motion for reconsideration. Because the District Court erred in dismissing Holden's motion for reconsideration, we will vacate and remand for further consideration.
We thank the court-appointed counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant for their able assistance.
I.
Holden was convicted of murdering a woman in Newark, New Jersey. After exhausting review in the state courts, Holden petitioned under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by 1) failing to investigate Raijah Scott, a man who was arrested with the gun used in the Newark shooting (but eight months after the shooting took place), and 2) failing to introduce evidence about Scott's physical appearance (suggesting, Holden argues, that Scott was the shooter). In a December 1, 2020 decision, the District Court denied Holden's petition.
As well as attempted murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, unlawful possession of a handgun, and possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose.
In a pro se submission dated December 17, 2020 but docketed on January 4, 2021, Holden filed a new motion that he labeled a Rule 60(b) motion raising allegedly newly discovered evidence-reports showing that, when arrested, Scott wore attire that matched that of the shooter (again eight months after the shooting took place)-that Holden argued could aid his petition. Construing the motion under Rule 60(b), the District Court dismissed the motion in a January 8, 2021 order, concluding that Holden's motion was an unauthorized second or successive petition barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Holden now appeals.
Although the parties disagree which Civil Rule should govern, we conclude the District Court erred in dismissing the motion as a second or successive petition regardless of how it is construed.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254(a). In a pro se submission dated April 2, 2021 but docketed on April 29, 2021, Holden filed a notice appealing the District Court's December 1, 2020 order denying his petition and noting that he filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 60(b). On May 4, 2021, the Clerk's Office notified Holden that his appeal may be dismissed as untimely, and in response, Holden sent a letter to the District Court, dated May 5, 2021, claiming to have never received the District Court's January 8, 2021 order denying his motion. A panel of this Court remanded Holden's case. The panel construed Holden's May 5, 2021 letter "as both a notice of appeal from the order denying reconsideration and a timely motion to reopen the time to appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6)." App. 1018. On remand, the District Court granted Holden's request to reopen his time to appeal under Rule 4(a)(6). So, Holden's appeal is timely, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the dismissal of a habeas petition on jurisdictional grounds de novo. Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir. 2012).
II.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) bars "second or successive" habeas petitions, absent exceptional circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). We have defined a "second or successive petition" as one "filed after 'the petitioner has expended the "one full opportunity to seek collateral review" that AEDPA ensures.'" United States v. Santarelli, 929 F.3d 95, 104-05 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 413 (3d Cir. 2011)). A petitioner does not expend his "one full opportunity to seek collateral review" until "after the petitioner has exhausted all of h[is] appellate remedies with respect to h[is] initial habeas petition or after the time for appeal has expired." Id. at 104-05; see also United States v. Folk, 954 F.3d 597, 609 (3d Cir. 2020) (stating same rule).
An approach we adopted from the Second Circuit's decision in Ching v. United States, 298 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2002) (Sotomayor, J.) (applying Johnson v. United States, 196 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 1999)).
Holden moved for reconsideration before he exhausted his appeal. Although he had not yet filed a notice of appeal of the denial of his habeas petition, his time to appeal this decision had not expired when the District Court dismissed Holden's motion for reconsideration. Because submitting the motion tolled Holden's time to appeal the District Court's denial of his habeas petition, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A), Holden had not exhausted his appellate remedies and thus had not expended his "one full opportunity to seek collateral review." See Santarelli, 929 F.3d at 104-05. The District Court erred in dismissing the motion as second or successive.
Although docketed on January 4, 2021, Holden's motion for reconsideration is deemed filed on December 17, 2020 because he mailed the pro se motion from prison and we date the filing "on the date that he executed" the document. Baker v. United States, 670 F.3d 448, 451 n.2 (3d Cir. 2012).
The time to appeal is tolled regardless of under which Rule Holden's motion arises. Compare Fed. R. App. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv) (providing that time to appeal runs from entry of order disposing of Rule 59 motion to alter or amend judgment), with Fed. R.
* * *
For these reasons, we will vacate the District Court's January 8, 2021 order and remand for it to consider the merits of Holden's December 17, 2020 motion. In light of our disposition, at this time we will not consider the merits of the denial of Holden's initial petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
App. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi) (providing that time to appeal runs from entry of order disposing of Rule 60 motion if motion filed within 28 days of judgment).
[*] This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent.