Opinion
No. 1314 C.D. 2011
06-01-2012
Alexander Hionis, General Partner t/a The A. Hionis Family Limited Partnership v. Concord Township, J's MVP Realty and Pio's Son Realty, LLC Appeal of: Concord Township
BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON
Concord Township (Township) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County (trial court), dated June 17, 2011, granting the motion for partial summary judgment of Alexander Hionis, General Partner t/a The A. Hionis Family Limited Partnership (Plaintiff). In doing so, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff on his claims for declaratory judgment and equitable estoppel and ordered the following:
a. Concord Township is directed to accept the offer of dedication of the 50' wide access and utility easement on which Golden Gate Drive is located and to accept Golden Gate Drive as a public road forthwith; or alternatively,
b. Concord Township shall take such action as may be required to acquire the aforesaid 50' wide access and utility easement on which Golden Gate Drive is located
and to accept Golden Gate Drive as a public road forthwith.(Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 479.) For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.
This Court decided a prior related appeal in this matter in Hionis v. Concord Township, 973 A.2d 1030 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (quashing Plaintiff's appeal from trial court order sustaining preliminary objections) (Hionis I).
In May 2005, Plaintiff submitted a preliminary land development plan to the Township, seeking to commercially develop a 5.17-acre parcel of real property (Hionis Property). The Hionis Property fronts Route 202 on its western boundary, but Plaintiff desires additional access through its eastern boundary via Applied Card Way, which connects to Route 1. A private road known as Golden Gate Drive connects the Hionis Property to Applied Card Way. Golden Gate Drive is situated on property owned by J's MVP Realty, L.P. (J's MVP).
On September 6, 2005, the Township granted Plaintiff final land development approval for the Hionis Property, subject to 10 conditions. Condition 4 provides:
4. The proposed road (to be known as "Golden Gate Drive") shall run from the Hionis [P]roperty to Applied Card Drive [sic] crossing the rear of the Crossroads Center and providing access and egress thereto and must be completed to the satisfaction of the Township Engineer prior to the issuance of any Certificates of Occupancy.(Id. at 33a.)
On January 23, 2008, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the trial court. Preliminary objections and this Court's decision in Hionis I eventually led to the filing of a second amended complaint, in which Plaintiff asserted, inter alia, claims for declaratory judgment and equitable estoppel. Plaintiff alleged, in essence, that the Township should be estopped from refusing to accept dedication of Golden Gate Drive as a public road or, in the absence of an offer of dedication, from refusing to take appropriate action against J's MVP to acquire Golden Gate Drive for public use, based upon representations made by Township representatives and prior land development plans approved by the Township for contiguous properties.
Plaintiff also asserted a claim for violation of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution against the Township only. (R.R. at 114a-15a.)
On March 30, 2011, while the Township had outstanding motions to compel discovery, Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff contended that he was entitled to judgment on his claim for equitable estoppel, and that his claim for equitable estoppel was dispositive of his claim for declaratory judgment. The Township filed a partial answer to Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on April 29, 2011, arguing, inter alia, that summary judgment was premature because of outstanding discovery. Specifically, the Township contended:
In addition, the Township disputed Plaintiff's claim for equitable estoppel, arguing that J's MVP never offered Golden Gate Drive for dedication, nor does J's MVP have a legal obligation to do so, and that Plaintiff's claims of reasonable reliance are unfounded. (R.R. at 447a-61a.) The Township also argued that the trial court lacked authority to compel the Township to accept dedication of Golden Gate Drive as a public road. (Id. at 456a-60a.)
I. Defendant, Concord Township, respectfully requests leave to file a Supplemental Answer to Plaintiff's Motion as Defendant has not yet received documents requested in discovery from Plaintiff and from Attorney Kenneth Kynett. Additionally, the depositions of Kenneth Kynett, Esquire, and Rocco Abessinio have not yet been conducted. There are also outstanding issues on discovery pending before the
Special Discovery Master. Pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1035.3(b), Defendant, Concord Township, respectfully requests leave to file an Amended Answer upon completion of the above-mentioned discovery which is necessary for a full and complete response to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment but files this Partial Response for the convenience of the Court.(Id. at 447a.) Without ruling on the Township's request for leave to file a supplemental answer upon receipt of outstanding discovery, and without oral argument, the trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on June 17, 2011. This appeal followed.
By order dated February 16, 2011, the trial court appointed a discovery master to resolve all discovery issues. (R.R. at 512a.)
On appeal, the Township argues, inter alia, that the trial court erred in granting Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment because there was outstanding discovery relevant to the issues raised in Plaintiff's motion. Specifically, the Township contends:
"Our scope of review on appeal from a grant of summary judgment is limited to a determination of whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. Summary judgment is a question of law based upon findings of fact." Wetzel v. City of Altoona, 618 A.2d 1219, 1221 n. 5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (citations omitted). "For courts to enter summary judgment, the record must demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists after an examination of the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party." Bacon v. City of Chester, 564 A.2d 276, 277 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989).
In addition, the Township argues that the trial court lacked authority to compel the Township to accept dedication of Golden Gate Drive as a private road. --------
The docket reflects the arduous nature of discovery in this matter, resulting in the appointment, on February 16, 2011, of a Special Master of Discovery. Plaintiff filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on March 30, 2011. The Township's Motion to Compel Production of certain letters was filed on January 28, 2011, but not
ruled upon until May 9, 2011, after the Township's response to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was due. The Township also filed, on June 6, 2011, a Motion to Compel Ken Kynett to produce previously subpoenaed documents, relevant to Plaintiff's alleged belief that the utility easement would be available as a public roadway for his retail development. Plaintiff's Answer to this Motion was filed nine (9) days after Summary Judgment was entered in Plaintiff's favor.(Township's Brief at 10 (citations omitted).) We agree that the trial court's grant of summary judgment was improper.
The discovery sought by the Township was directly relevant to the Township's claim that Plaintiff . . . was at all times aware that J's MVP had never offered to dedicate Golden Gate Drive.
Initially, we note that the trial court issued a 1925 opinion in response to the Township's appeal on December 16, 2011, conceding that it erred in granting Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. The trial court stated:
In detailed preparation of drafting the instant opinion the trial court believes that discovery was still pending and that there are issues of material fact required to be determined by the finder of fact; and that the granting of summary judgment was premature.(Id. at 521a.)
Accordingly, the trial court respectfully requests that its order granting summary judgment be reversed and the matter remanded.
"Summary judgment may be entered prior to the completion of discovery in matters where additional discovery would not aid in the establishment of any material fact. See Pa. R.C.P. No. 1035.2(1). Thus, the question is whether additional discovery would have aided in the establishment of any material fact." Manzetti v. Mercy Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 565 Pa. 471, 492, 776 A.2d 938, 950-51 (2001). The doctrine of equitable estoppel contains three elements: "1) misleading words, conduct, or silence by the party against whom the estoppel is asserted; 2) unambiguous proof of reasonable reliance upon the misrepresentation by the party asserting the estoppel; and 3) the lack of a duty to inquire on the party asserting the estoppel." Com. ex rel. Corbett v. Griffin, 596 Pa. 549, 567, 946 A.2d 668, 678 n.12 (2008).
Here, the discovery outstanding at the time the trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment was relevant to the elements of Plaintiff's claim for equitable estoppel; most notably, whether Plaintiff reasonably relied on the Township's alleged misrepresentations. This Court, therefore, agrees with the Township and the trial court that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
/s/_________
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 1st day of June, 2012, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, dated June 17, 2011, is hereby REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED.
/s/_________
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge