Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-2288 (JBS).
Filed: May 26, 2004
Eric Hines, #401342/146993-B, Kintock 3, Newark, New Jersey, Plaintiff pro se.
Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, By: Nicole Schreiner, DAG, R.J. Hughes Justice Complex, Trenton, New Jersey, Attorney for State Defendants.
OPINION
This matter comes before the Court on the motion for summary judgment on behalf of Defendants Devon Brown, William T. McCargo, David Blaker, Stephen Iwasko, Anthony Primiani, Carla Shabazz, Kevin McHugh, and Rodderick Robertson (hereinafter "State Defendants"). The principal issue presented is whether the plaintiff, who was paroled into a halfway house under contract with the Department of Corrections for a portion of his term of incarceration, had a liberty interest in being provided with employment as part of his placement. For the reasons discussed herein, State Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted.
This motion was filed on behalf of the "State Defendants" identified above. The remaining Defendants, Deborah Rhode, Mike Oliver and John Clancey, are not parties to the present motion for summary judgment filed by the State Defendants.
BACKGROUND
Eric Hines is a former New Jersey State inmate who was released from custody on November 1, 2003 upon completion of his sentence for unlawful possession of a weapon, possession, use or being under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance and three counts of burglary. Prior to his release, Plaintiff was being supervised on parole in a Halfway Back Program at Kintock House in Newark, New Jersey.
Halfway Back Programs are residential treatment facilities operated by non-profit provider agencies under contract with the New Jersey State Parole Board. The programs were developed and designed to provide a highly supervised environment, which will concentrate treatment services in the area of offenders' highest needs. Offenders are assigned to the program as a special condition for continuation on parole or as a condition of release on parole. Length of participation, which may be a maximum of 180 days, is determined by the resident's progress in the program.
In preparation for his parole hearing, a Parole Board hearing officer conducted a review of Plaintiff's file and an interview, during which time Plaintiff admitted to the use of controlled dangerous substances, including marijuana, cocaine and alcohol. Notably, the crimes for which Plaintiff was convicted occurred while he was under the influence of marijuana, and Plaintiff admitted to engaging in criminal activity to support his addiction. The hearing officer further noted that Plaintiff completed just one Alcoholics Anonymous program while incarcerated for almost three years.
On August 22, 2002, the Parole Board provided Plaintiff with notice of his parole release to a Halfway Back Program with the following special condition of his parole:
random urine monitoring, random alcohol monitoring, no alcohol use while on parole, attempt to gain and maintain steady employment. If not working participate in vocational training/educational program curfew to be imposed by District Parole Supervisor, Alternative Sanctions Program (ASP).
(Chiesa Affidavit, Ex. D).
Plaintiff subsequently requested information from the Parole Board regarding his participation in the Halfway Back Program. On October 1, 2002, the Parole Board responded to Plaintiff's request for information regarding the Halfway Back programs. Specifically, in a letter from the Board, Program Development Specialist Anthony Primiani informed Plaintiff of the intent of the program.
Halfway Back Programs are residential treatment facilities operated by non-profit provider agencies under contract with the New Jersey State Parole Board. The programs were developed and designed to provide a highly supervised environment, which will concentrate treatment services in the area of offenders' highest needs. Offenders shall be assigned to the program as a special condition for continuation on parole or as a condition of release on parole. Length of participation, which may be a maximum of 180 days, shall be determined by the resident's progress in the program.
(Chiesa Affidavit, Ex. E). On October 29, 2002, the Parole Board again responded to Plaintiff's request for information concerning the Halfway Back Program. (Chiesa Affidavit, Ex. F).
On December 4, 2002, Plaintiff's Notice of Release was amended to reflect a parole date of January 23, 2003, to the Bo Robinson Halfway Back Program for 90 to 180 days and a notation that "[d]ischarge from program is contingent upon approved residence and/or employment." (Chiesa Affidavit, Ex. G).
On February 8, 2003, Plaintiff voluntarily terminated his participation in the Bo Robinson Halfway Back Program by signing a statement that the program was not appropriate to his treatment needs. (Chiesa Affidavit, Ex. H). The Parole Board subsequently issued a parole warrant for his return to custody based on the violation of one of the conditions of his parole by failing to complete the program and he was returned to custody on February 10, 2003. (Chiesa Affidavit, Ex. I).
On April 9, 2003, a Parole Board hearing officer conducted a parole violation hearing at Mercer County Jail after Hines was arrested on a parole warrant. (Chiesa Affidavit, Ex. I K). The hearing officer found that there was clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff failed to successfully complete the Halfway Back Program at the Bo Robinson Training Center as evidenced by his discharge from the program. (Chiesa Affidavit, Ex. J). Specifically, the hearing officer found that Plaintiff requested to leave the program on February 8, 2003. (Chiesa Affidavit, Ex. J). Plaintiff claimed that he left the program because the program "falsely advertised" the availability of parolees to participate in a work release program while at the Training Center. (Chiesa Affidavit, Ex. J).
On May 7, 2003, a two-member panel of the Parole Board concurred with the opinion of the hearing officer that Plaintiff violated the conditions of his parole by failing to participate in inpatient drug counseling. It did not, however revoke his parole. (Chiesa Affidavit, Ex. K). The Board decided to keep Plaintiff on parole and assigned him to a Halfway Back House Program at Kintock House with the special condition that he successfully complete the program. (Chiesa Affidavit, Ex. K). While at Kintock, Plaintiff participated in their work release program and was employed at Options in Elizabeth, New Jersey. (Schreiner Affidavit, Ex. 1).
After his assignment to Kintock, Plaintiff again requested information about the Halfway Back Program. (Chiesa Affidavit, Ex. L). On May 27, 2003, the Parole Board again responded to Plaintiff's request for information regarding the Halfway Back programs. (Chiesa Affidavit, Ex. L).
On July 21, 2003, Hines filed a complaint against Defendants Brown, McCargo, Blaker, Iwasko, Primiani, Clancey, Shabazz, McHugh, Oliver, Rhode and Robertson alleging that his constitutional rights were violated when he was denied employment at the program and was not provided with the criteria or rules and regulations governing the Bo Robinson Training Center. Hines seeks punitive and compensatory damages and a "prohibitory injunction." (Compl. ¶ 7).
Hines' Complaint was served upon Devon Brown, Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, William T. McCargo, Former Acting Chairman of the New Jersey State Parole Board, Parole Board members David Blaker and Stephen Iwasko, Kevin McHugh, Director of Community Programs of the Parole Board, Anthony Primiani, Administrator of Community Programs, Carla Shabazz, Former Chief of Community Programs, John Clancey, CEO of Bo Robinson Center, Mike Oliver, Director of Bo Robinson, and Deborah Rhode, Supervisor at Bo Robinson, on or about August 15, 2003. Defendants Brown, McCargo, Blaker, Iwasko, Primiani, Shabazz, McHugh, and Robertson filed for a Clerk's Extension on August 26, 2003. Defendants then filed a motion for an extension of time on September 15, 2003. On November 1, 2003, Hines was released from custody upon completion of his sentence at the Kintock Group that began on June 10, 2003. The instant motion for summary judgment was filed by the State Defendants on November 17, 2003, to which there is no opposition by Plaintiff.
DISCUSSION
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the materials of record "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable rule of law. Id. Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. Id.
In deciding whether there is a disputed issue of material fact, the court must view the evidence in favor of the non-moving party by extending any reasonable favorable inference to that party; in other words, "[T]he nonmoving party's evidence `is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party's] favor.'" Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255). The threshold inquiry is whether there are "any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250; Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 329-30 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
The moving party always bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, regardless of which party ultimately would have the burden of persuasion at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 706 (3d Cir. 1989),cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023 (1990). However, where the nonmoving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, as Plaintiff does in the present case, "the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325.
The non-moving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of" its pleading in order to show the existence of a genuine issue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Plaintiff must do more than rely only "upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions." Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1985),cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010 (1985) (citation omitted); see Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50. Thus, if the plaintiff's evidence is a mere scintilla or is "not significantly probative," the court may grant summary judgment. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
Constitutional Right to Employment
Plaintiff brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that his constitutional rights were violated when he was paroled to a program that did not offer employment for parolees. Plaintiff also complains that despite his requests to Parole Board Members and employees at Bo Halfway Back House, he did not receive a copy of the rules or regulations for the program. Plaintiff's arguments are without merit.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a deprivation of a right "secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States" resulting from the conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Paratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 525 (1981). This secured right or protected liberty interest can arise either from the Due Process Clause or from a state statute or regulation which creates this liberty interest with "language of an unmistakably mandatory character." C.P.M. v. D'Ilio, 916 F. Supp. 415, 421 (D.N.J. 1996). The determination as to whether a state rule creates a protected liberty interest turns on whether it places substantive limitations on official discretion. See Stephany v. Wagner, 835 F.2d 497, 500 (3d. Cir. 1987) (citing Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983)). An inmate must demonstrate that there are particularized standards or criteria which guide the State officials.Stephany, 835 F.2d at 500 (citing Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 467 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring)). "If the decisionmaker is not `required to base its decisions on objective and defined criteria,' but instead `can deny the requested relief for any constitutionally permissible reason or for no reason at all,' the State has not created a constitutionally protected liberty interest." Stephany, 835 F.2d at 500 (quoting Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 466-467).
It is well established that prisoners do not have a right to employment under the United States Constitution. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (deprivation of employment does not violate the Eighth Amendment); James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 630 (3d Cir. 1989) (prisoners have no property interest in any job under the Fourteenth Amendment). Neither the United States Constitution nor the New Jersey Constitution provide Plaintiff with a constitutional right to employment because the State has not created a constitutionally protected liberty interest. White v. Fauver, 219 N.J. Super. 170, 179 (App.Div. 1987); Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996, 1004 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (no inherent liberty interest creating right to enter work release program), cert. denied sub nom., Anderson v. Winsett, 449 U.S. 1093 (1981); James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 629 (3d Cir. 1989) (prison job assignments not a liberty interest), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 870 (1989). To possess a protected right, an inmate must have a legitimate claim of entitlement, not just a unilateral expectation. Id. at 179-80.See also, Johnson v. Fauver, 559 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 (D.N.J. 1983) (holding that inmates in general do not have a right to the opportunity to work). Furthermore, New Jersey statutes and administrative code do not create a protected liberty interest or right to employment for Plaintiff while he was at Bo Robinson Halfway House.
In granting parole, the Parole Board may set conditions for an inmate on parole. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59; N.J.A.C. 10A:71-6.4. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59,
Each adult parolee shall at all times remain in the legal custody of the Commissioner of Corrections and under the supervision of the State Parole Board. . . . [N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(a); N.J.A.C. 10A: 71-6.1.]
[B]ased on prior history of the parolee . . . the member or board panel certifying parole release pursuant to . . . [N.J.S.A.] 30:4-123.55 may impose any other specific conditions of parole deemed reasonable in order to reduce the likelihood of recurrence of criminal or delinquent behavior. [N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(b); N.J.A.C. 10A: 71-6.4(e).]
The appropriate board panel may parole an inmate to any residential facility funded in whole or part by the State if the inmate would not otherwise be released pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53] without such placement. [N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(d).]
As a Special Condition of Plaintiff's parole, the Board ordered Hines to participate in a Halfway Back Program. Based on a review of his record, including his convictions for burglary, armed burglary, possession of a controlled dangerous substance, and unlawful possession of a weapon, the Board Panel determined that Hines was an appropriate candidate for a treatment program in a Halfway Back Program. As such, the Panel imposed a Special Condition of his parole that Hines complete a treatment program before continuing with his parole. The Halfway Back programs are residential treatment facilities operated by non-profit provider agencies under contract with the New Jersey State Parole Board. (Affidavit of Kevin McHugh at ¶ 4). The programs were developed and designed to provide a highly supervised environment, which will concentrate treatment services in the area of offenders' highest needs. (Affidavit of Kevin McHugh at ¶ 5). Offenders are assigned to the program as a special condition for continuation on parole or as a condition of release on parole. (Affidavit of Kevin McHugh at ¶ 6). Length of participation in the program, which may be a maximum of 180 days, is determined by the resident's progress in the program. (Affidavit of Kevin McHugh at ¶ 7). The Halfway Back Programs utilized by Community Programs are divided into three distinct categories of custody and/or supervision. (Affidavit of Kevin McHugh at ¶ 8). They range from minimum to medium and maximum custody/supervision. (Affidavit of Kevin McHugh at ¶ 9). The Bo Robinson Facility has been the maximum level facility since March 1999, with absolutely no furlough/work release or pass component. (Affidavit of Kevin McHugh at ¶ 10). Failure to complete the program could lead to the revocation of Hines' parole pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A: 71-7.1 which provides that whenever the parole officer has probable cause to believe that a parolee has seriously or persistently violated the conditions of parole, revocation proceedings may be commenced. Hines may either decline to be paroled with the conditions or accept the Board's Special Conditions and be released on parole in the Halfway Back Program because he could not work. It is clear that Hines accepted the opportunity to be released on parole with the Special Conditions as set forth. Although the Notice of Release noted that plaintiff's "[d]ischarge from program is contingent upon approved residence and/or employment," this did not create a requirement that Plaintiff engage in employment while a participant in the program. In fact, the Bo Robinson Training Center to which plaintiff was assigned does not offer employment to parolees. (Affidavit of Kevin McHugh at ¶ 10).
In addition, it is not crucial to plaintiff's rehabilitation that he obtain employment while on parole to the program. The Parole Board contracts with an independent organization to fund Plaintiff's treatment and room and board for the duration of his rehabilitation. (Affidavit of Kevin McHugh at ¶ 4). Thus, his necessities are paid. After completion of the program, plaintiff may seek employment subject to the remaining conditions of his parole. The Board is not obligated to provide him with employment, nor is it necessarily offered at the treatment facility to which the parolee has been assigned. (Affidavit of Kevin McHugh at ¶ 13 and ¶ 14). After successfully completing the initial program, a parolee may be transferred to a Halfway Back Program that offers employment. The Parole Board, however, does not set the conditions of the program; rather, the program administrators with whom the Board contracts set the conditions for the parolees who participate in the program. (Affidavit of Kevin McHugh at ¶ 13).
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(d), the Parole Board has the authority to require Plaintiff to complete a program at a halfway house as a condition of continuation of his parole. Nothing in the statute sets forth any language, mandatory or otherwise, requiring the participants in the program to be provided employment.
However, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(e) states that "[p]arole officers shall provide assistance to the parolee in obtaining employment, education or vocational training . . ." N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(e). Construing section (e), courts have held that parolees have a protected right in legitimate employment. Doe v. Fauver, 3 F. Supp. 2d 485, 489 (D.N.J. 1997); CPM v. D'Ilio, 916 F.Supp. 415, 421 (1996). These courts reasoned that the provision's language was of a mandatory character sufficient to create a protected interest for parolees. See Fauver, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 489; CPM, 916 F. Supp. at 421. However, these cases are not controlling here as they can be distinguished. In both cases, the plaintiffs were on full parole maintaining their own residences and providing for their financial needs through employment. See Fauver, 3 F. Supp. at 487; CPM, 916 F. Supp. at 416. The plaintiffs in both cases had already gained employment and were seeking to prevent notification to their employers of their conviction and parole status. Fauver, 3 F. Supp. at 487; CPM, 916 F. Supp. at 417. Plaintiff in the instant case was assigned to a halfway house to obtain drug and alcohol treatment as a condition of his release and his parole could be revoked for failure to complete the program. The program at Bo Robinson subjected him to significant restrictions on his activities, random drug and alcohol screening, curfews, etc. Plaintiffs' conditions of confinement did not include "many of the core values of unqualified liberty" given to parolees and thus he was essentially still an inmate under confinement while a resident at Bo Robinson. See Asquith v. Volunteers of America, 1 F. Supp. 2d 405 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding that plaintiff in a work release program was an inmate and not a parolee and had no protected liberty interest to enter into a work release program or to continue participation in the program). As previously stated, inmates do not have a constitutional right to employment. Moreover, "[p]risoners under confinement do not have inherent liberty interests in particular modes, places or features of confinement or custody." Id. at 410 (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983)). Thus, the Plaintiff in this case does not have a protected liberty interest in entering a halfway house that provides employment. The Parole Board placed Plaintiff at Bo Robinson to treat his issues with drugs and alcohol. As discussed previously, Plaintiff did not require employment because the program, including room and board, was funded completely by the State.
Based on the foregoing analysis, Plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest in obtaining employment, nor a claim against the defendants for failing to provide him with employment opportunities.
Qualified Immunity
State Defendants assert that Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Government officials who perform discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from suits brought against them for damages under section 1983 "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 826 (3d Cir. 1997). The analysis turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action assessed in light of the clearly established law at the time the action was taken. Andserson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). The plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the defendant's conduct violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right. Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997); then the defendant bears the burden of proving that "a reasonable public official would not know that [the] specific conduct violated clearly established rights,"id.; Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 121 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 636-37).
The Court should determine whether the Defendants violated a clearly established constitutional right by analyzing whether the facts "viewed in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show that the [Defendants'] conduct violated a constitutional right." Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 277 (3d Cir. 2002), Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786 (3d Cir. 2000). If a violation has been alleged, then the inquiry is whether the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct such that a reasonable individual would have known that the conduct was a violation of that right. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999). The "clearly established" part of the analysis requires a finding that a reasonable defendant would understand that the conduct in question was unlawful. Curley, 298 F.3d at 277. If the law did not put the official on notice that his conduct was clearly unlawful, then summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 195 (2001). Qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial, rather than a defense from liability. Id. at 194. If the plaintiff fails to make out a constitutional violation, the qualified immunity inquiry ends and the officer is entitled to immunity. Bennett v. Murphy, 274 F.3d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2002).
A. Employment
In the instant case, Plaintiff has failed to make out a constitutional violation. As discussed above, Plaintiff had no protected liberty interest or right to employment while he resided at Bo Robinson. Therefore, the inquiry on that claim ends there and State Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the employment claim. See id.
Furthermore, even if Plaintiff could establish the violation of a protected liberty interest as a parolee, rather than an inmate, Defendants would still prevail on the basis of qualified immunity. Presumably, countless inmates have been sent to Bo Robinson halfway to undergo treatment prior to parole or as a condition of continuing parole. Bo Robinson has been the maximum security facility for community programs since March of 1999 and has never offered furlough or work release for the residents. Based on these facts, the second element of a qualified immunity analysis could not be met. Given the existence of Bo Robinson since March of 1999 and its lack of employment programs during that whole time period, this Court finds that at the time Plaintiff was sent to Bo Robinson, a reasonable individual would not have known or believed that their conduct was a violation of Plaintiff's rights. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614 (1999). The "clearly established" prong requires a finding that a reasonable defendant would understand that the conduct in question was unlawful, and that is absent here.
B. Copy of Rules and Regulations
In response to Plaintiff's claim that he did not receive a copy of the rules or regulations governing the Halfway Back Programs, State Defendants argue that they had an objectively reasonable belief that the employees at the Halfway Back Programs would provide Plaintiff with the information requested regarding the rules and regulations. (Def. Br. at 14). The Halfway Back Programs are operated by independent non-profit provider agencies who contract with the New Jersey State Parole Board to provide services to parolees. (Def. Br. at 5). The employees at these residential programs are responsible for administering to the needs of the parolees and the director of the program is charged with developing the curriculum and programs. (Id. at 14; McHugh Affidavit). Under New Jersey Administrative Code, the staff at residential community programs is responsible for providing the residents with the rules and regulations of the program. See N.J.A.C. § 10A:20-4.19(a) (2004). The regulation states that "[t]he residential community program Director or designee shall conduct an orientation to the program and written rules and regulations shall be given to each inmate immediately following the inmate's arrival at the residential community program." N.J.A.C. § 10A:20-4.19(a). Thus, State Defendants were not responsible for providing Plaintiff with a copy of the rules for the program. Therefore, they cannot be charged with a violation of Plaintiff's rights as there was no clearly established law requiring State Defendants to provide the rules. No reasonable defendant in State Defendants' position would understand or believe that their conduct was unlawful.
Based on the foregoing analysis, State Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the employment claim and Plaintiff's claim that he did not receive a copy of the rules and regulations for Bo Robinson. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against State Defendants must be dismissed. Mootness of Plaintiff's Injunctive Relief Claim
In addition to failing to state a cognizable claim, Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief is moot. Parties who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of federal courts, for an injunction or otherwise, must satisfy the threshold requirement of Article III of the Constitution by alleging a live case or controversy. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983). Past exposure to allegedly illegal conduct does not show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief if it is unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-496 (1974). The United States Supreme Court has stated that jurisdiction may abate if a case becomes moot because there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur and interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979). "Mootness is a jurisdictional question because the Court `is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions'."North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 245 (1971) (quotingUnited States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116 (1920)).
Plaintiff requests injunctive relief. However, he has been released from custody upon completion of his sentence. An injunction would not address any remaining live controversy. Thus, Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief must be denied.
State Defendants' Additional Arguments
State Defendants argue that for Parole Board Members Blaker and Iwasko cannot be subject to suit because the doctrine of absolute immunity applies to them. Additionally, State Defendants make arguments regarding respondeat superior and lack of factual specificity of Plaintiff's section 1983 claims. Because this Court finds that all of the State Defendants are immune from suit based on qualified immunity, the Court need not address these additional arguments.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted and Plaintiff's claims against the State Defendants, Devon Brown, William McCargo, David Blaker, Stephen Iwasko, Anthony Primiani, Carla Shabazz, Kevin McHugh and Rodderick Robertson, are dismissed. The accompanying Order is entered.
ORDER
This matter having come before the Court upon the motion for summary judgment by Defendants Devon Brown, William McCargo, David Blaker, Stephen Iwasko, Anthony Primiani, Carla Shabazz, Kevin McHugh and Rodderick Robertson, pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P.; and this Court having considered all submissions of the parties; and for the reasons expressed in the Opinion of today's date; and for good cause shown;IT IS this 26th day of May 2004 hereby
ORDERED that these Defendants' motion for summary judgment [Docket Item No. 25-1] be, and hereby is, GRANTED in its entirety; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all of Plaintiff's claims against State Defendants, Devon Brown, William McCargo, David Blaker, Stephen Iwasko, Anthony Primiani, Carla Shabazz, Kevin McHugh and Rodderick Robertson, are therefore DISMISSED and his motion for injunctive relief is DENIED.