Opinion
1:24-CV-0614 (AMN/ML)
07-25-2024
JAHEEM R. HILTS, Plaintiff, v. ELLIS HOSP.; A NURSE, name unknown at the moment at Ellis Hosp.; and SHANTANU BAGHEL, D.O. Doctor Provider at Ellis Hosp., Defendants.
JAHEEM R. HILTS Plaintiff, Pro Se
APPEARANCES:
JAHEEM R. HILTS Plaintiff, Pro Se
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
MIROSLAV LOVRIC, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Clerk has sent a complaint in the above captioned action together with an amended application to proceed in forma pauperis, filed by Jaheem R. Hilts (“Plaintiff”) to the Court for review. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 6.) For the reasons discussed below, I (1) grant Plaintiff's amended in forma pauperis application (Dkt. No. 6), and (2) recommend that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be dismissed with leave to amend.
I. INTRODUCTION
Construed as liberally as possible, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that his rights were violated by Defendants Ellis Hospital, a nurse, and Shantanu Baghel (collectively “Defendants”). (See generally Dkt. No. 1.)
The court must interpret pro se complaints to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. Soto v. Walker, 44 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).
The Complaint alleges that in January 2021, Plaintiff was “resting in a room in the E.R.” when he was told that he was “going to mental health for no reason.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff and an unnamed nurse discussed whether Plaintiff lived in Colorado then the nurse gave Plaintiff medication. (Id.)
The Complaint does not specify which hospital Plaintiff was in at the time but construing the Complaint liberally, the undersigned will presume that Plaintiff was at Defendant Ellis Hospital.
The Complaint alleges that on April 16, 2024, a doctor took advantage of Plaintiff and accused Plaintiff of talking about killing babies on social media. (Id.) The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was kept in the hospital and forced to take medication. (Id.)
Again, the Complaint fails to specify who the doctor involved was or allege any connection with Defendants.
Based on these factual allegations, the Complaint asserts one claim of excessive force against Defendants. (Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1 at 7.) As relief, Plaintiff seeks $20,000,000 in damages. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.)
Plaintiff also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Dkt. No. 6.)
II. PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
When a civil action is commenced in a federal district court, the statutory filing fee, currently set at $405, must ordinarily be paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court is authorized, however, to permit a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis status if a party “is unable to pay” the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After reviewing Plaintiff's amended in forma pauperis application (Dkt. No. 6), the Court finds that Plaintiff meets this standard. Therefore, Plaintiff's amended application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
The language of that section is ambiguous because it suggests an intent to limit availability of in forma pauperis status to prison inmates. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (authorizing the commencement of an action without prepayment of fees “by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses”). The courts have construed that section, however, as making in forma pauperis status available to any litigant who can meet the governing financial criteria. Hayes v. United States, 71 Fed.Cl. 366, 367 (Fed. Cl. 2006); Fridman v. City of N.Y., 195 F.Supp.2d 534, 536 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Plaintiff is reminded that, although his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted, he is still required to pay fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.
III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR INITIAL REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT
“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
In determining whether an action is frivolous, the court must consider whether the complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Dismissal of frivolous actions is appropriate to prevent abuses of court process as well as to discourage the waste of judicial resources. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Harkins v. Eldridge, 505 F.2d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 1974); see Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (a district court “may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee[.]”); see also Pflaum v. Town of Stuyvesant, Columbia Cnty., N.Y., 11-CV-0335, 2016 WL 865296, at *1, n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2016) (Suddaby, C.J.) (finding that the Court had the power to address and dismiss additional theories of the plaintiff's retaliation claim sua sponte because those theories were so lacking in arguable merit as to be frivolous).
Rule 8 of the Fed.R.Civ.P. requires a “short and plain statement” of a claim, showing that “the pleader is entitled to relief.” Whitfield v. Johnson, 763 Fed.Appx. 106, 107 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)). Each statement must be “simple, concise, and direct,' and must give ‘fair notice of the claims asserted.” Whitfield, 763 Fed.Appx. at 107 (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)). A pleading must also contain “a demand for the relief sought[.]” Id. “A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 8 if it is ‘so confused, ambiguous, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.'” Id.
Moreover, Rule 10 of the Fed.R.Civ.P. provides that “[a] party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b). Rule 10's purpose is to “provide an easy mode of identification for referring to a particular paragraph in a prior pleading[.]” Clervrain v. Robbins, 22-CV-1248, 2022 WL 17517312, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2022) (Stewart, M.J.) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3170384 (N.D.N.Y. May 1, 2023) (D'Agostino, J.). A complaint that does not comply with these Rules “presents far too heavy a burden in terms of defendants' duty to shape a comprehensive defense and provides no meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of [the plaintiff's] claims,” and may properly be dismissed by the court. Gonzales v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (McAvoy, C.J.).
“In reviewing a complaint . . . the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Courts are “obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (reading the plaintiff's pro se complaint “broadly, as we must” and holding that the complaint sufficiently raised a cognizable claim). “[E]xtreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and [the] parties . . . have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983).
IV. ANALYSIS
In addressing the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint, the court must construe his pleadings liberally. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Having reviewed Plaintiff's Complaint with this principle in mind, I recommend that it be dismissed.
To the extent that the Complaint is construed as asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants, it fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Defendants are state actors or that their actions are “fairly attributable to the state.” Roark v. New York, 23-CV-1237, 2023 WL 8827185, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2023) (Lovric, M.J.) (citing White v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 369 Fed.Appx. 225, 226 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[P]rivate actors and institutions, such as the hospitals . . . named as defendants in [plaintiff's] complaint, are generally not proper § 1983 defendants because they do not act under color of state law.”); Guillory v. Benedict, 21-CV-0073, 2021 WL 707076, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2021) (Baxter, M.J.) (recommending dismissal of the plaintiff's § 1983 claims against private medical institution St. Joseph's Hospital), report and recommendation adopted by, 2021 WL 706644 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2021) (Sharpe, J.); Guillory v. Crouse Hosp., 21-CV-1177, 2021 WL 5605260, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2021) (Baxter, M.J.) (“it remains well settled in this Circuit that a private hospital, and its employees, are not deemed state actors solely because the state has granted them authority to practice medicine within its borders.”), report and recommendation adopted by, 2021 WL 5585926 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2021) (Hurd, J.)) (recommending dismissal of the § 1983 claims against Samaritan Hospital, a private medical institution, because the complaint failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting how its actions are “fairly attributable to the state.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 125512 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2024) (Hurd, J.); see Ellis Medicine, https://www.ellismedicine.org/pages/community-report.aspx (last visited July 25, 2024) (“[E]very three years not-for-profit hospitals such as Ellis Medicine are required by the IRS regulations to develop and make available to the public a Community Health Needs Assessment and Implementation Strategy.”).
Plaintiff cannot bring a claim against a private person or entity under § 1983 and he does not allege in his Complaint that a state actor or actors compelled Defendants' conduct, that they engaged in a conspiracy, or that Defendants were performing actions that are typically performed by the state. Holyoke v. S.S.I., 23-CV-1557, 2024 WL 3063679, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. June 20, 2024) (D'Agostino, J.) (citing Doe v. Rosenberg, 996 F.Supp. 343, 349-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd, 166 F.3d 507 (2d Cir. 1999); Elisens v. Auburn Cmty. Hosp., 19-CV-1236, 2021 WL 1027915, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2021) (finding that a private physician was not acting under color of law when they involuntarily committed a patient to a psychiatric unit)) (“private hospitals and doctors are not state actors for purposes of § 1983 liability when engaging in their role under New York's civil commitment scheme.”). “Private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful, is generally beyond the reach of § 1983.” Revill v. Pratz, 24-CV-2782, 2024 WL 1908587, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2024) (citing American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50, (1999); cf. Brentwood Academy v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (“[S]tate action may be found if, though only if, there is such a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.'”)). The Complaint fails to allege how the actions of seemingly private parties-the hospital and its staff members-are attributable to the state. Revill, 2024 WL 1908587, at *4.
As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed.
V. OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND
Generally, a court should not dismiss claims contained in a complaint filed by a pro se litigant without granting leave to amend at least once “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”). An opportunity to amend is not required, however, where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Cortec Indus. Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Of course, where a plaintiff is unable to allege any fact sufficient to support its claim, a complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.”). Stated differently, “[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.” Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993); accord, Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.).
See also Carris v. First Student, Inc., 132 F.Supp.3d 321, 340-41 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (Suddaby, C.J.) (explaining that the standard set forth in Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999)-that the Court should grant leave to amend “unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would be successful in stating a claim”-is likely not an accurate recitation of the governing law after Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)), rev'd on other grounds, 682 Fed.Appx. 30.
Although I have serious doubts about whether Plaintiff can replead to assert actionable claims, given that this is the Court's first review of Plaintiff's pleading and that Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, out of an abundance of caution, I recommend that he be permitted to replead the Complaint.
If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he should note that the law in this circuit clearly provides that “‘complaints relying on the civil rights statutes are insufficient unless they contain some specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of rights, instead of a litany of general conclusions that shock but have no meaning.'” Hunt v. Budd, 895 F.Supp. 35, 38 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (McAvoy, J.) (quoting Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1987)); accord Pourzancvakil v. Humphry, 94-CV-1594, 1995 WL 316935, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. May 22, 1995) (Pooler, J.). Therefore, in any amended complaint, Plaintiff must clearly set forth facts that give rise to the claims, including the dates, times, and places of the alleged underlying acts, and each individual who committed each alleged wrongful act. In addition, the revised pleading should allege facts demonstrating the specific involvement of any of the named defendants in the constitutional deprivations alleged in sufficient detail to establish that they were tangibly connected to those deprivations. Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986). Finally, Plaintiff is informed that any such amended complaint will replace the existing Complaint, and must be a wholly integrated and complete pleading that does not rely upon or incorporate by reference any pleading or document previously filed with the Court. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is well established that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.”).
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff's amended application to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 6) is GRANTED; and it is further respectfully
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file a copy of this order, report, and recommendation on the docket of this case and serve a copy upon the parties in accordance with the local rules.
The Clerk shall also provide Plaintiff with copies of all unreported decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)).
If you are proceeding pro se and served with this report, recommendation, and order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date that the report, recommendation, and order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).