Opinion
C/A 0:21-3646-JD-PJG
11-07-2022
Gussie Henry Hilton, Jr., Petitioner, v. Warden, Broad River Correctional Institution, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner Gussie Henry Hilton, Jr., a self-represented state prisoner, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on Respondent's motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 26.) Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Petitioner of the summary judgment and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Respondent's motion. (ECF No. 27.) Petitioner filed a response in opposition (ECF No. 29), and Respondent replied (ECF No. 31). Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the record in this case, the court recommends that Respondent's motion be granted and the Petition denied.
Petitioner also filed a sur-reply. (ECF No. 33.) The court observes that the Local Rules make no provision for sur-reply memoranda and Petitioner did not seek leave of the court to file a sur-reply. Accordingly, the sur-reply was not considered in the court's recommendation. However, consideration of the sur-reply would not have changed the court's recommendation.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is an inmate in the Broad River Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections. In March 2016, Petitioner was indicted in the Charleston County Court of General Sessions for criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first degree, criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, and three counts of kidnapping. A public defender was appointed to represent Petitioner on the charges. Petitioner pled guilty as charged on May 18, 2017. The State agreed not to request a life sentence and the State did not make a sentencing recommendation during the plea proceeding. The plea court heard mitigation evidence from Petitioner before handing down the sentence. The plea court sentenced Petitioner to a term of life imprisonment for criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first degree, a consecutive term of thirty-years' imprisonment for criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, and concurrent terms of thirty-years' imprisonment for each kidnapping charge.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal after he pled guilty, but the appeal was dismissed by the South Carolina Court of Appeals for Petitioner's failure to comply with South Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 203(d)(1)(B)(iv), which requires appeals from guilty pleas to be accompanied by an explanation showing that there is a reviewable appellate issue in the case.
In May 2018, Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) in the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas. The PCR court held an evidentiary hearing on the application on March 19, 2019 in which Petitioner was represented by counsel. The PCR court issued an order of dismissal on July 15, 2019, denying the PCR application on the only claim raised by Petitioner-that his guilty plea was entered involuntarily because of trial counsel's ineffectiveness.
Petitioner appealed the PCR court's order of dismissal through counsel by filing a Johnson petition for a writ of certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court. The Johnson petition sought reversal of the PCR court's finding that Petitioner's guilty plea was entered voluntarily. Petitioner filed a pro se response to the Johnson petition. The South Carolina Supreme Court transferred the petition to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, which denied the petition and dismissed the appeal.
Johnson v. State, 364 S.E.2d 201 (S.C. 1988) (applying the factors in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), to post-conviction appeals). Anders requires that counsel who seeks to withdraw after finding the “case to be wholly frivolous” following a “conscientious examination” must submit a brief referencing anything in the record that arguably could support an appeal; furnish a copy of that brief to the defendant; and after providing the defendant with an opportunity to respond, the reviewing court must conduct a full examination of the proceedings to determine if further review is merited. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
FEDERAL HABEAS ISSUES
The Petition for a writ of habeas corpus raises the following issues, quoted verbatim:
Ground One: False Kidnapping
Supporting Facts: The State of S.C. cannot prove I had a weapon and they cannot prove these people was kidnapped.
Ground Two: False Statement
Supporting Facts: The cop who wrote the report up had change my saying and put her ownt saying. The victim who wrote a statement lied and said she was there when the suppose crime had happen. She also lied about going to my Grandma butt naked. In the cop report they said they was looking for a man who was wearing blue but when they had arrest me I on black.
Ground Three: The lack of evidence.
Supporting Facts: The State of S.C. did not enough evidence to proceed in giving me a life sentence. What evidence they did have should or could carry 30 year's but in my case they shoulda have given me a 15 unviolent.
Ground Four: Ineffective Council
Supporting Facts: My council at my sentence did not do his job to it's full abilities. The area's he shoud have done he did not. He wasn't willing to fight to his full abilities.(Pet., ECF No. 1 at 5-10) (errors in original).
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence of the nonmoving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248.
The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a petition filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Habeas Corpus Standard of Review
In accordance with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), claims adjudicated on the merits in a state court proceeding cannot be a basis for federal habeas corpus relief unless the decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as decided by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or the decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). When reviewing a state court's application of federal law, “a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000); see also White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014) (describing an “unreasonable application” as “objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong” and that “even clear error will not suffice”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011); Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2005); McHone v. Polk, 392 F.3d 691 (4th Cir. 2004). Moreover, state court factual determinations are presumed to be correct and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
“A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)); see also White, 572 U.S. at 419-20 (stating that “ ‘[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement' ”) (alteration in original) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103). Under the AEDPA, a state court's decision “must be granted a deference and latitude that are not in operation” when the case is being considered on direct review. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101. “If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.” Id. Section 2254(d) codifies the view that habeas corpus is a “ ‘guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.” Id. at 102-03 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
C. Exhaustion Requirements
A habeas corpus petitioner may obtain relief in federal court only after he has exhausted his state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). “To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a habeas petitioner must present his claims to the state's highest court.” Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Barnette, 644 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2011); see also In re Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal and Post-Conviction Relief Cases, 471 S.E.2d 454, 454 (S.C. 1990) (holding that “when the claim has been presented to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and relief has been denied, the litigant shall be deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies.”). To exhaust his available state court remedies, a petitioner must “fairly present[] to the state court both the operative facts and the controlling legal principles associated with each claim.” Longworth v. Ozmint, 377 F.3d 437, 448 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, a federal court may consider only those issues which have been properly presented to the state appellate courts with jurisdiction to decide them. Generally, a federal habeas court should not review the merits of claims that would be found to be procedurally defaulted (or barred) under independent and adequate state procedural rules. Lawrence v. Branker, 517 F.3d 700, 714 (4th Cir. 2008); Longworth, 377 F.3d at 447-48; see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). For a procedurally defaulted claim to be properly considered by a federal habeas court, the petitioner must “demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
D. Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment
1. Grounds One, Two, and Three
Respondent argues that Petitioner waived Grounds One, Two, and Three by pleading guilty. The court agrees. Petitioner's Grounds One, Two, and Three concern the sufficiency and reliability of the evidence the State had against him. Petitioner could have challenged that evidence at trial, but he instead pled guilty to the charged offenses. Therefore, Petitioner waived any right to challenge that evidence. As the United Supreme Court explains:
Respondent also argues that Petitioner's Grounds One, Two, and Three are procedurally barred from federal habeas review because Petitioner did not raise these claims in state court. See State v. Dunbar, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693-94 (S.C. 2003) (“In order for an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge. Issues not raised and ruled upon in the trial court will not be considered on appeal.”). However, the application of procedural bar here would assume that Petitioner could have raised these claims in state court. Because Petitioner waived his right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence when he pled guilty, Petitioner's claims were not cognizable in any state court proceeding. See State v. Rice, 737 S.E.2d 485, 485 (S.C. 2013) (“[A] guilty plea constitutes a waiver of nonjurisdictional defects and claims of violations of constitutional rights.”). Thus, the question of whether Petitioner waived his right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at all is logically antecedent (albeit similar) to the question of whether such claims are procedurally barred from federal habeas review.
[A] counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case. In most cases, factual guilt is a sufficient basis for the State's imposition of punishment. A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction if factual guilt is validly established.Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 (1975); see also Fields v. Att'y Gen. of State of Md., 956 F.2d 1290, 1294 (4th Cir. 1992) (“It is well-established that a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea forecloses federal collateral review of allegations of antecedent constitutional deprivations.”). Therefore, Petitioner cannot now seek to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence the State had against him by raising these claims in a federal habeas proceeding. Petitioner's Grounds One, Two, and Three fail as a matter of law.
2. Ground Four
In Ground Four, Petitioner claims that plea counsel's infectiveness rendered his guilty plea involuntary. Respondent argues that Petitioner fails to show that the PCR court's decision rejecting this claim is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court agrees.
Respondent argues that Petitioner's Ground Four is so vague that the court should find the claim either abandoned or procedurally barred because it is not clear if Petitioner is raising the same involuntary guilty plea claim based on ineffective assistance of counsel that was ruled upon by the PCR court. In light of the court's duty to liberally construe pro se pleadings, the court construes Ground Four as raising the same issue that Petitioner raised to the PCR court. However, to the extent Petitioner purports to raise a different claim, it would be procedurally barred because of Petitioner's failure to raise the claim to the PCR court. See generally McCray v. State, 455 S.E.2d 686, n.1 (S.C. 1995) (stating issues not raised in a petition for a writ of certiorari from the denial of a petitioner's PCR application are not preserved for appellate review); see also Lawrence, 517 F.3d at 714.
A defendant has a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show, pursuant to the two-prong test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), that (1) his counsel was deficient in his representation and (2) he was prejudiced as a result. Id. at 687; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (stating that “the Strickland test provides sufficient guidance for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims”).
To satisfy the first prong of Strickland, a petitioner must show that plea counsel's errors were so serious that his performance was below the objective standard of reasonableness guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. With regard to the second prong of Strickland, a petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In the context of a guilty plea, a habeas petitioner must show “ ‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.' ” Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 189 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
The United States Supreme Court has cautioned federal habeas courts to “guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d).” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. The Court observed that while “ ‘[s]urmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task[,]' . . . [establishing that a state court's application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult.” Id. (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010)). The Court instructed that the standards created under Strickland and § 2254(d) are both “ ‘highly deferential,' and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly' so.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, when a federal habeas court reviews a state court's determination regarding an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “[t]he question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard.” Id.
The Supreme Court has held that a decision containing a reasoned explanation is not required from the state court. As stated above, if no explanation accompanies the state court's decision, a federal habeas petitioner must show that there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief. In the case at bar, this court has the benefit of the PCR court's written opinion, certiorari review of which was denied by the South Carolina Court of Appeals, which may provide reasons or theories that the appellate court could have relied upon in summarily denying Petitioner's petition. See Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1194-97 (2018) (holding that a federal habeas court should “look through” the unexplained decision to the last related state court decision that provides a relevant rationale, and presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning, unless the State can rebut the presumption). Therefore, the court turns to the question whether the PCR court's order unreasonably misapplied federal law or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Having reviewed the PCR court's order pursuant to the § 2254 standard, the court finds for the reasons that follow that the state court did not unreasonably misapply the Strickland test in determining that no Sixth Amendment violation occurred.
At Petitioner's PCR hearing, Petitioner's plea counsel testified that Petitioner faced very serious charges, including that-all in one day-he raped his six-year-old niece at his house, kidnapped a neighbor and her thirteen year-old daughter at knife point, and raped the daughter when the mother escaped and ran for help. (App. at 62-65, ECF No. 25-1 at 64-67.) Plea counsel testified that the evidence against Petitioner included witness statements from the mother and daughter, Petitioner's confessions and statements as to each incident, the fact that Petitioner was caught on the scene and the six-year-old niece was found in Petitioner's bedroom, and forensic evidence from both incidents. (Id.)
Plea counsel testified his strategy was to have Petitioner evaluated by a mental health professional, but the results of that evaluation were that Petitioner was competent to stand trial and criminally liable. (App. at 66-67, ECF No. 25-1 at 68-69.) Thus, plea counsel testified that he focused on negotiating a plea deal and building a mitigation case for sentencing because Petitioner had no insanity defense. (Id.) Plea counsel further testified that the State did not offer a plea deal other than to not make a recommendation of life imprisonment, so plea counsel advised Petitioner that his best option to receive less than a life sentence was to accept responsibility, ask for forgiveness, and rely on mitigation evidence during sentencing. (App. at 67-68, 76, 80, ECF No. 25-1 at 69-70, 78, 82.) Plea counsel testified that the mental health evaluation did produce some good mitigation evidence, but the solicitor ultimately used the evaluation against Petitioner at sentencing because the report suggested Petitioner may reoffend if he had the opportunity. (App. at 69-70, ECF No. 25-1 at 71-72.) Plea counsel testified that Petitioner ultimately made the decision to plead guilty despite knowing that he could go to trial if he wanted. (App. at 80-81, ECF No. 25-1 at 82-83.)
Petitioner testified that plea counsel discussed with him the mental health evaluation and the sentences he faced, but that plea counsel did not discuss anything about his case with him. (App. at 83-84, ECF No. 25-1 at 85-86.) Petitioner testified that he told plea counsel that he wanted to go to trial, but plea counsel advised against that because Petitioner faced a life sentence, and plea counsel discussed with Petitioner the plea process and the lack of offers from the State. (App. at 85-86, ECF No. 25-1 at 88-89.) Petitioner testified that he pled guilty despite wanting a trial because plea counsel was not on Petitioner's side, and that he lied to the plea court during the plea colloquy about being guilty and being satisfied with plea counsel's services. (App. at 89, ECF No. 25-1 at 91.)
The PCR court found that Petitioner entered his guilty plea freely and voluntarily and that plea counsel was not deficient in his representation. The PCR court found Petitioner's testimony was not credible because Petitioner admitted to lying during the plea colloquy. Thus, the PCR court found that plea counsel advised Petitioner on the merits of pleading guilty versus going to trial, and that Petitioner ultimately made the decision to plead guilty. (App. at 105, ECF No. 25-1 at 107.)
The court concludes that the PCR court's decision is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or an unreasonable determination of the facts. Notably, as Respondent points out, Petitioner fails to identify any specific error in the PCR court's decision that would entitle him to federal habeas relief. Regardless, ample evidence submitted at the PCR hearing supports the PCR court's finding that plea counsel ably advised Petitioner of the consequences of either pleading guilty or going to trial and that Petitioner freely and voluntarily made that decision. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 56 (“The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is ‘whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.' ”) (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)). Petitioner points to no evidence that the PCR court's finding is incorrect. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (“In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”); see also Sargent v. Waters, 71 F.3d 158, 160 (4th Cir. 1995) (providing that the facts underlying guilty pleas are entitled to deference under § 2254(d), even though the matter is a question of federal law) (quoting Marshall v. Longberger, 459 U.S. 422, 431 (1982)). Petitioner's own testimony supports the PCR court's decision. Petitioner testified at the PCR hearing that plea counsel advised him on the merits of going to trial versus pleading guilty, and Petitioner testified during the plea colloquy that he agreed with the State's recitation of the facts, that he was guilty of the offenses charged, and that he understood he was giving up his right to a jury trial. (App. at 8-11, ECF No. 25-1 at 10-13.)
Though Petitioner testified that he had no choice but to plead guilty, the PCR court found that testimony was not credible because that testimony conflicted with his statements under oath during the plea colloquy. See Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783, 850 (4th Cir. 2011) (“We must be ‘especially' deferential to the state PCR court's findings on witness credibility, and we will not overturn the court's credibility judgments unless its error is ‘stark and clear.' ”) (quoting Sharpe v. Bell, 593 F.3d 372, 378 (4th Cir. 2010)). Thus, Petitioner's conclusory and self-serving allegations are not sufficient to show that the PCR court's decision is unreasonable. See Christian v. Ballard, 792 F.3d 427, 444 (4th Cir. 2015) (stating that federal habeas courts should strictly adhere to the Strickland standard when reviewing the validity of state court guilty plea and “subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics” about the plea process are subject to dismissal) (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977) and Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 125 (2011)). Therefore, Petitioner fails to meet his burden of showing that he is entitled to relief under § 2254(d).
Also, Petitioner's testimony at the PCR hearing was notably conflicting and inconsistent. For example, Petitioner testified that plea counsel “never really discussed my case with me” and that plea counsel advised him on the merits of going to trial versus pleading guilty. (App. at 84, 86, 89, ECF No. 25-1 at 86, 88, 91.)
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the court recommends Respondent's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 26) be granted and the Petition be denied.
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).