Opinion
August 12, 1985
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Walsh, J.).
Order reversed, on the law, with costs, motion granted and complaint dismissed.
Plaintiff's employment, pursuant to oral agreement, was not for a specific term and was, prima facie, a hiring at will ( see, Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121; Parker v Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 159). Under certain circumstances, an action for breach of such an employment contract may be maintained, notwithstanding the indefinite term ( see, Weiner v McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458). However, unlike Weiner, we are not confronted with a situation where (1) a plaintiff was induced to leave his prior employment with the assurance that defendant would not fire him without cause, (2) such an assurance was incorporated into the employment application, and (3) employment was subject to the provisions in a handbook which stated that dismissal would be for just and sufficient cause only ( Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., supra, p 460). Plaintiff's bald allegations that defendant Westair promised not to fire him except upon just cause, and that he relied upon that promise, are insufficient to bring this case within the limits of Weiner ( see, Patrowich v. Chemical Bank, 98 A.D.2d 318, 323, affd 63 N.Y.2d 541; Utas v. Power Auth., 96 A.D.2d 940; Toshiba Am. v Simmons, 104 A.D.2d 649; Gould v. Community Health Plan, 99 A.D.2d 479).
Plaintiff did not allege that an employment manual provided that termination would be for just and sufficient cause only and he did not produce such a manual. Nor did he allege consideration additional to the ordinary services incident to employment which could support a limitation on the employer's right to terminate an employment of indefinite duration ( see, Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 464, supra; Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 304; Heaman v. Rowell Co., 236 App. Div. 34, revd on other grounds 261 N.Y. 229).
Turning to plaintiff's claim of age discrimination, he merely alleged that he was "born on December 28, 1930" and that his dismissal from employment was based upon age discrimination in violation of Executive Law § 296. Defendants, in their motion for summary judgment, made factual assertions claiming cause for plaintiff's dismissal, as supported by documentary evidence. In addition, they asserted that 6 of 22 employees were about plaintiff's age or older. Without more, plaintiff's unsubstantiated allegation of discrimination was insufficient to defeat defendants' motion ( see, Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562; Krupp v. Aetna Life Cas. Co., 103 A.D.2d 252, 261-262).
We have considered plaintiff's remaining claim and find it to be without merit ( see, Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 300-302, supra). Thompson, J.P., Bracken, Brown and Rubin, JJ., concur.