Opinion
No. 4:20-CV-233-FL
01-06-2021
MICHAEL WAYNE HILL, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL WAYNE REVELLS, Defendant.
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis [DE-1] and for frivolity review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff has demonstrated appropriate evidence of inability to pay the required court costs, and the application to proceed in forma pauperis is allowed. However, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court shall dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks money damages from a defendant immune from such recovery. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii); see Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining Congress enacted predecessor statute 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) "to prevent abuse of the judicial system by parties who bear none of the ordinary financial disincentives to filing meritless claims"). A case is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) ("Examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are 'so nutty,' 'delusional,' or 'wholly fanciful' as to be simply 'unbelievable.'"). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes "fantastic or delusional scenarios." Id. at 327-28.
In determining whether a complaint is frivolous, "a court is not bound, as it usually is when making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the Plaintiff's allegations." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). Rather, the court may find a complaint factually frivolous "when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them." Id. "The word 'frivolous' is inherently elastic and not susceptible to categorical definition . . . . The term's capaciousness directs lower courts to conduct a flexible analysis, in light of the totality of the circumstances, of all factors bearing upon the frivolity of a claim." Nagy v. Fed. Med. Ctr. Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 256-57 (4th Cir. 2004) (some internal quotation marks omitted). In making its frivolity determination, the court may "apply common sense." Nasim v. Warden., Md. House of Correction, 64 F.3d 951, 954 (4th Cir. 1995).
In order to state a claim on which relief may be granted, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions. Id.
In the present case, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and pleadings drafted by a pro se litigant are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). This court is charged with liberally construing a pleading filed by a pro se litigant to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious claim. See id; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Noble v. Barnett, 24 F.3d 582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994). However, the principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not without limits; the district courts are not required "to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
II. ANALYSIS
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff alleges that he is a resident of Florida, and Defendant's work address is 305 East Main Street in Williamston, North Carolina. [DE-1-1] at 1. Plaintiff alleges that his claim is for kidnapping, and a police officer seized his person on October 20, 2013. Id. at 2. The complaint states:
I was sleeping when my mother entered the room, [and] she told me that a Sheriff was here and to go with him. I said no. It was then the officer came into the room and led me out of the room, then the house, and into the police car. . . . I would like to ask that the [F]ourth [A]mendment be upheld. I was kidnapped from asleep in my own home. I fell it could have be[e]n intended to alter my legal obligation to the very recently deceased property owner. I seek relief of consequence in the amount of $38,000,000.Id. at 2-3.
B. Legal Analysis
Reading the complaint liberally, it appears that Plaintiff's claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a cause of action for alleged constitutional violations. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove: "(1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law." Williams v. Studivent, No. 1:09CV414, 2012 WL 1230833, at *4 (M.D.N.C. 12 Apr. 2012) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). To show that a defendant acted under the color of state law, "'[t]he person charged must either be a state actor or have a sufficiently close relationship with state actors such that a court would conclude that the non-state actor is engaged in the state's actions.'" Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615-16 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting DeBauche v. Trani, 191 F.3d 499, 506 (4th Cir. 1999)).
It is recommended that Plaintiff's claims be dismissed because the claims are time-barred. "There is no statute of limitations provided in § 1983; rather, federal courts apply the forum state's 'most analogous' statute of limitations, generally the statute applicable to personal injury actions." Fayemi v. Offerman, 99 F. App'x 480, 481 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985)). "In North Carolina, the statute of limitations for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) is three years." Id. (citing Love v. Alamance Cty. Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 1504, 1506 (4th Cir. 1985)); see Brooks v. Stanley, No. 7:19-CV-195-FL, 2020 WL 2430947, at *4 (E.D.N.C. May 12, 2020) (noting that a three year "statute of limitations applies to all § 1983 claims). Additionally, "[u]nder federal law, a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitation commences 'when the plaintiff possesses sufficient facts about the harm done to him that reasonable inquiry will reveal his cause of action.'" Fayemi, 99 F. App'x at 481 (citing Nasim, 64 F.3d at 955).
The court may raise a statute of limitations defense sua sponte when a complaint is filed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Nasim, 64 F.3d at 953-54); Hall v. Cumberland Cty., No. 5:17-CV-348-FL, 2017 WL 5986468, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 14, 2017), adopted by 2017 WL 5973406 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 1, 2017). --------
Here, it appears that Plaintiff's cause of action accrued more than three years prior to the filing of his proposed complaint. Plaintiff's claims are based on an October 20, 2013 incident in which his mother woke him and a police officer escorted him out of a house and into a police car. Even if those alleged facts are sufficient to state a claim for a constitutional violation by a person acting under color of state law, any cause of action would have accrued more than three years before the filing of Plaintiff's proposed complaint in December 2020. Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed as time barred.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is ALLOWED, and it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on Plaintiff You shall have until January 20, 2021, to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D.N.C.
If you do not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, you will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, your failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline will bar you from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins , 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).
Submitted, this the 6 day of January, 2021.
/s/_________
Robert B. Jones, Jr.
United States Magistrate Judge