Opinion
Case No. 01CV2003-BTM(NLS).
September 1, 2004
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On March 12, 2004, Defendants Tyler and Ciccati filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that they were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical and safety needs and are entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS summary judgment and DISMISSES the case [doc. no. 34].
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On November 1, 2001, Plaintiff Hickman filed a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging constitutional violations. On October 30, 2003, Hickman, upon receiving leave from the Court, amended his complaint to include a negligence claim. Hickman alleges that Defendants violated his rights by failing to provide him with a low bunk in prison as required by his medical chrono due to his physical condition.The facts in this case are, for the most part, undisputed. On January 11, 2001, Hickman entered the Richard J. Donovan State Correctional Facility Reception Center ("RFD") after violating his parole. At this time, the staff physician provided Hickman with a medical chrono requiring him to be housed in a low prison bunk due a seizure disorder. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. B.)
From January 11, 2001 to March 8, 2001, Hickman was housed in a low bunk until he was transferred to RDJ's minimum security unit. When Hickman arrived at the minimum facility on March 8, 2001, he first spoke to Correctional Officer Tyler about receiving a low bunk due to his medical condition and showed him the medical chrono. Since all the low bunks were full and Tyler was unauthorized to make bed moves, Tyler sent Hickman to speak with Sergeant Ciccati. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. D.) Sgt. Ciccati asked Hickman if he could spend the night on an upper bunk. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. E.)
Defendants allege that Hickman spent one night, from February 5, 2001 to February 6, 2001 in a high bunk in the gym, but was on a low bunk the rest of the time.
On March 20, 2001 around 5 a.m., Hickman fell out of the top bunk and injured his back, hip, right leg, arm, and neck. Hickman, who was unable to get up from the floor, was taken to the medical infirmary by correctional officers and medical assistants. When Hickman returned to RFD, he was placed on a lower bunk. Hickman alleges that he is still seeing doctors for pain in the lower and mid section of his back, hip, and right ankle, and has trouble standing for long periods of time due to the fall.
Prior to the fall, neither Tyler or Ciccati attempted to move Hickman to a lower bunk. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. D, E.) In his complaint and opposition, but not in a sworn declaration, Hickman alleges that he spoke to the officers on more than one occasion about his medical condition and that lower bunks were available. Both Tyler and Ciccati, in sworn declarations, allege that Hickman never followed up with them about a lower bunk after his initial request.
On May 24, 2004, this Court issued a Klingele-Rand notice informing Hickman that he needed to submit evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) to show that a genuine dispute of fact exists. On August 19, 2004, this Court issued a second order warning Hickman what would happen to his case if he did not submit supporting evidence.
DISCUSSION
Summary Judgment is appropriate when there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and the right to judgment as a matter of law.Jablon v. Dean Witter Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). Evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).However, the nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment merely by demonstrating "that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Mastsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), or by merely alleging or speculating as to a factual dispute, Nelson v. Pima Cmty. College, 83 F.3d 1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1996). Factual disputes must be supported by submitted evidence. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 701 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that the nonmoving party "cannot rely on the mere possibility of a factual dispute as to intent to avert summary judgment. Nor can it expect the district court to draw inferences favorable to it when they are wholly unsupported."); see also LeBlanc v. Salem (In re Mailman Steam Cleaning Corp.), 196 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1999) (when evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court does "not give credence to empty rhetoric, . . . but credit[s] only those assertions that are supported by materials of evidentiary quality.")
Defendants now move for summary judgment on three grounds: (1) Hickman has failed to allege a specific act which constitutes a violation; (2) Defendants' conduct does not amount to deliberate indifference; and (3) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
I. Specific Allegations of Constitutional Violations
Defendants first allege that Hickman has failed to sufficiently state a claim. Generally, vague and conclusory allegations of civil rights violations by official personnel are not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). "`It [is] incumbent upon [plaintiff] to allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in which support plaintiff's claim.'" Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing Powell v. Workmen's Comp. Bd. of N.Y., 327 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1964)) (brackets in original). Pro se complaints however, are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
The Court finds that Hickman has alleged specific facts. Hickman alleges that he showed both Tyler and Ciccati his medical chrono requiring him to be housed on a lower bunk, asked to be moved on several occasions, and that neither officer made an effort to assign him to a such bunk. As a result of this "dereliction of responsibility," Hickman fell off the top bunk and was injured. These allegations sufficiently state a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation.
II. Qualified Immunity
The entitlement to qualified immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). The defense of "qualified immunity" protects "government officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). This standard "`gives ample room for mistaken judgments' by protecting `all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (per curiam) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 (1986)); Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 909 (9th Cir. 2001); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) ("The concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct.").
A. Constitutional Violation
Before determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, a court must first consider whether a constitutional right would be violated viewing the facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Jeffers, 267 F.3d at 909 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). "If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Haynie v. County of Los Angeles, 339 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003).
Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials must take reasonable measures to protect inmates from serious risks to their health and safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-4 (1993). To state an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim, an inmate must allege facts sufficient to show that: (1) the conditions presented a substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) the defendant possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind or has acted with "deliberate indifference" to inmate health or safety.Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994).
A substantial risk of serious harm exists only when a "prison official's act or omission . . . result[s] in denial of `the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.'" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling, 509 U.S. at 33-4 (discussing prisoners' Eighth Amendment right to be free from life-threatening conditions). When a claim is based on a failure to prevent harm, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 834 (citingHelling, 509 U.S. at 35).
Deliberate indifference is a "state of mind more blameworthy than negligence. . . . [And] routinely equated with . . . recklessness." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835-6. A prison official cannot be found liable under the "deliberate indifference" standard "unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must draw that inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-5 (1976). Prison officials will not be found deliberately indifferent, so long as the facts show "they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. Accidental or inadvertent failure to provide adequate care will not suffice for section 1983 purposes. See Gamble v. Estelle, 554 F.2d 653, 654 (5th Cir. 1977).
Hickman, who suffers from seizures, has shown that by being placed in an upper bunk, his personal safety was in jeopardy. Indeed, judging from the medical chrono which required Hickman to be housed in a lower bunk, RDF's medical staff believed Hickman's condition to be serious. By disregarding the medical chrono, Defendants created a substantial risk of serious harm to Hickman's personal safety.
In regards to Defendant Tyler, the Court finds that his conduct did not amount to deliberate indifference. Tyler clearly knew of Hickman's medical condition since he read the medical chrono. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. D, E.) Once Hickman notified Tyler of his condition, Tyler checked to see whether any lower bunks were available. When he determined that none were, he immediately sent Hickman to Ciccati, his supervisor. Tyler's actions, even though they did not avert harm, were a reasonable response given that no lower bunks were currently available in the prison and Tyler was not authorized to make bed moves. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. D.)
The Court also finds that there is no dispute of fact as to whether Defendant Ciccati acted with deliberate indifference. While Hickman alleges in his unsworn complaint and opposition that he asked the officers on more than one occasion to be moved, he has not set out any specific facts, in sworn testimony or otherwise, that contradict the facts asserted by Defendants, in spite of two court orders directing him to do so. See Nelson, 83 F.3d at 1081-82 ("mere allegation and speculation do not create a factual dispute for the purposes of summary judgment.") Based on the evidence presented, Hickman only once approached Ciccati about sleeping on a lower bunk and Ciccati failed to follow up with the move. (Ciccati Decl. ¶ 3.) While this conduct may show a lack of due care, it does not amount to deliberate disregard. See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 835 (deliberate indifference requires "more than ordinary lack of care for the prisoner's interests or safety.")
B. Clearly Established Right
If a dispute of fact exists as to whether a constitutional violation occurred, a court must then consider whether "the right was clearly established," Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, or whether the state of law at the time gives officials "fair warning" that their conduct is unconstitutional. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002). "This inquiry . . . must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202; Graves v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 846 (9th Cir. 2003). To be "clearly established," the "right must be established at more than an abstract level." Cruz v. Kauai City, 279 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002). The relevant inquiry must focus on "what the officer reasonably understood his powers and responsibilities to be, when he acted, under clearly established standards."Saucier, 533 U.S. at 208; Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach, 329 F.3d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 341 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2003).
"A reasonable prison official understanding that he cannot recklessly disregard a substantial risk of serious harm, could know all of the facts yet mistakenly, but reasonably, perceive that the exposure [to that risk] in [the] given situation was not that high." Estate of Ford v. Ramirez, 301 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). Thus, regardless of whether there may exist a genuine issue of material fact as to the official's subjective state of mind, he may be entitled to qualified immunity if the law governing his conduct did not put him on notice that his actions or omissions are in violation of the Constitution. Id. at 1049-50; Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
The Court finds that neither Tyler or Ciccati were put on notice that their failure to provide Hickman with a lower bunk was a constitutional violation. Given that all the lower bunks were currently occupied in the prison and he could not authorize a bed move, Tyler reasonably decided to inform Ciccati, his superior, of Hickman's medical condition. Ciccati asked Hickman if he could stay in an upper bunk temporarily and then failed to follow up with a bed move. While the act of placing in Hickman in an upper bunk in spite of his medical chrono created a risk, this risk was not obviously or immediately life-threatening to Hickman's health or personal safety. Given that no lower bunks were available, a reasonable officer could have assumed that Hickman would have been safe on an upper bunk at least temporarily. Thus, the Court finds that even if a constitutional violation occurred, officers Tyler and Ciccati are entitled to qualified immunity.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because courts have already determined that prison officials' involvement with prisoner medical needs do not constitute a constitutional violation. However, Gamble v. Estelle, 554 F.2d 653, 654 (5th Cir. 1997), only holds that based on the facts alleged, there was no evidence that the prison guard exhibited "deliberate indifference" to the plaintiff's needs by interfering with the prison doctor's performance. It does not follow that the act of assigning a certain bunk to a prisoner in spite of medical conditions will never amount to a constitutional violation. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 ("[A] general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though `the very action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful.'").
III. Negligence Claim
Defendants also ask the Court to dismiss Hickman's negligence claim if it grants summary judgment as to the Eighth Amendment claim. A federal court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where it has dismissed the federal claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Generally, "if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well." United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1966); see also Reynolds v. County of San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 1996) (dismissing state tort claims when civil rights claims dismissed on summary judgment), rev'd on other grounds, Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). Since this motion resolves the underlying federal claim before trial and the negligence claim has not yet been developed, the Court dismisses Hickman's claim without prejudice. Hickman may seek to file this claim in state court.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment in regards to the Eighth Amendment claim and DISMISSES Hickman's negligence claim without prejudice [doc. no. 34]. The Court orders the Clerk of the Court to terminate this case.