Opinion
97-CV-2088 (JBS).
April 13, 1999
Robert A. Petruzzelli, Esquire, Jacobs, Schwalbe Petruzzelli, P.C., Cherry Hill, N.J., for Plaintiff.
Faith S. Hochberg, United States Attorney, By: Peter G. O'Malley, Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorney's Office, Newark, New Jersey, for Defendant.
OPINION
This matter comes before this court pursuant to section 205(g) of the Social Security Act ("Act"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner"), denying plaintiff's claim for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Act. For the reasons stated below, the court will affirm the Commissioner's decision.
I. Background Procedural History
Plaintiff, Annie Hickman, applied for disability insurance benefits on March 30, 1994, alleging disability as of September 9, 1993, due to impingement syndrome of the left shoulder and depression. (R. 69.) This application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (R. 91-95, 107-109.)
Plaintiff then requested a hearing which was held on October 10, 1995, before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Alan M. Neff. (R. 110-111, 35-67.) In his decision dated March 19, 1996, the ALJ found that plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act on September 9, 1993, the date plaintiff stated she became unable to work, and continued to meet them through the date of the decision. (R. 20.) The ALJ also found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 9, 1993. (R. 21.) The plaintiff was found to have impairments, but not an impairment or combination of impairments listed in or equal to on of those listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Regulation No. 4. (R. Id.) Although the ALJ determined that plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work as a cook, he concluded that she is capable of performing her past relevant work as a food service manager because her impairments do not prevent her from meeting the exertional demands of this occupation. (R. Id.) Therefore, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff is not entitled to a period of disability or disability insurance benefits. (R. 22.)
The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review on March 5, 1997. (R. 5-6.)
Plaintiff timely filed this action in the United States District Court on April 25, 1997, claiming that the Commissioner's finding that she is not entitled to disability insurance benefits was not based on substantial evidence.
B. Personal and Medical History
Mrs. Hickman was born on June 4, 1936 and is 59 years old. (R. 38.) She has been married for 40 years and currently resides with her husband and son. (Id.)
In September, 1973, plaintiff was employed as a cook at the Cherry Hill Board of Education. (R. 41, 63.) She remained in that position until approximately 1987 when she was promoted to food service manager. (R. 41.) In that position, her duties included responsibility for the daily operation of the cafeteria, ordering food, keeping an accurate inventory of the commodities, supervising the work schedule of the employees, and ensuring that the stock of the refrigerators and freezers remained in order. (R. 42.)
Plaintiff testified that on September 9, 1993, she ceased work at the Board of Education and did not seek further employment due to an onset of pain. (R. 43.) According to plaintiff, she was unable to sit, stand, twist, bend, or reach without experiencing pain. (R. Id.)
While explaining the pain, plaintiff indicated that she had undergone two back surgeries. (R. Id.) The first surgery was performed in July, 1992 by Dr. Barry Gleimer, and the second in December, 1993, by Dr. Robert Ponzio. (R. 43.) Plaintiff further testified that she underwent surgery on her left shoulder on July 7, 1994 and her right shoulder on October 2, 1991. (R. 44-45.) Plaintiff continued to work following each of these surgeries until September, 1993 when the Board of Education informed her that she could no longer perform the job. (R. 47.)
Following her employment with the Board, plaintiff testified that she spent her days watching television, crocheting, reading, and taking small walks around the neighborhood. (R. 45.) Plaintiff claims that her walks were becoming shorter as a result of pain in her back. (R. Id.) She claims that the pain is located in the area where the pedicle screws and rods were surgically inserted in December, 1993. (R. 53.) Plaintiff stated that the pain radiates down both of her legs and is constant for most of the day. (R. Id.) She testified that she is able to stand for about one hour and sit for about two hours without interruption (R. 54-55.)
Plaintiff further testified that she experiences pain in her shoulder and occasionally endures stomach problems. (R. 55-57.) Plaintiff stated that she has carpel tunnel syndrome in both hands and experiences numbness in the toes of her left foot due to a fracture. (R. 59-61.) As a result, plaintiff testified that she has become disinterested in social activities and is no longer capable of crocheting. (R. 62-63.) However, plaintiff testified that three weeks prior to the hearing, she and her husband drove approximately 600 miles to visit friends in Tennessee. (R. 64.) She was informed by her doctor that this trip would be possible so long as she took breaks during the travel. (R. 64-65.)
In addition to the physical complaints, plaintiff also testified that she experiences episodes of depression on a regular basis. (R. 58.) She indicated that she is currently taking medications for the depression. (R. 58.) A summary of the relevant medical findings follows:
1. Dr. Barry Gleimer, D.O.
On October 2, 1991, plaintiff underwent surgery following a diagnosis of impingement syndrome of the right shoulder. (R. 198-200.) Dr. Gleimer performed the surgery and continued to see plaintiff for follow-up evaluations through January 11, 1992. (R. 213-228.) These evaluations indicate that plaintiff experienced improvement in her shoulder following the surgery, but began to experience lower back pain. (R. Id.) In July 1992, Dr. Gleimer and plaintiff agreed that back surgery would be the best option to alleviate the lower back pain. (R. 220.) Subsequently, plaintiff underwent a laminectomy and diskectomy on July 17, 1992. (R. Id.) Following the surgery, Dr. Gleimer reported that plaintiff returned to work and was doing well with her back and shoulder. (R. 223-228.)
2. Dr. John J. Manning, M.D.
Dr. Manning performed two MRI studies on plaintiff's lumbar spine on December 5, 1991 and May 22, 1992. (R. 211, 231.) The latter report concluded that there was L5-S1 disc bulging with a small central disc herniation. (R. 231.)
3. Dr. Jerome M. Horowitz, D.O.
Plaintiff reported to Dr. Horowitz when she began to experience chest pains. On October 22, 1993, Dr. Horowitz reported that plaintiff is stable from a cardiovascular point of view. (R. 299.) He found that plaintiff did not have any cardiac symptoms, nor shortness of breath. (R. Id.) Dr. Horowitz concluded that plaintiff's chest pains could have been gastrointestinal in nature since she had a past history of peptic ulcer disease. (R. 300.) Dr. Horowitz continued to see plaintiff through July, 1994 when he determined that she could undergo surgery on her left shoulder. (R. 432.)
4. Dr. Robert Ponzio, D.O.
Plaintiff underwent a second back surgery on January 7, 1993, performed by Dr. Ponzio. (R. 309-310.) The purpose of the surgery was a revision of plaintiff's prior laminectomy and diskectomy. (R. Id.) Dr. Ponzio continued to treat plaintiff on follow up evaluations through November 17, 1994. (R. 317-324.) In November 1994, Dr. Ponzio reported that plaintiff had plateaued in her benefits. (R. 323.) He concluded that although plaintiff still had some lower back symptoms, they were tolerable and she was functional. (R. Id.)
On July 7, 1994 Dr. Ponzio performed surgery on plaintiff's left shoulder as the result of a torn rotator cuff. (R. 458-459.) Following the surgery, Dr. Ponzio noted that plaintiff experienced mild to no pain in the shoulder and instructed her to return for follow up evaluations. (R. 459.) In a report dated January 3, 1995, Dr. Ponzio noted that plaintiff does not exhibit any evidence of muscle disruption nor neurological problems. (R. 506.)
5. Dr. Edward Tobe, D.O., P.A.
Dr. Tobe performed a psychiatric evaluation of plaintiff on October 15, 1993. During the interview, Dr. Tobe noted that there was no bizarre psychomotor activity. (R. 297.) He found that plaintiff's thoughts during the interview were coherent without evidence of delusions or hallucinations. (R. 297-298.) He found no evidence of psychotic disorder, nor gross impairment of reality testing. (R. 298.) Although there was evidence of a loss of self-esteem, Dr. Tobe determined that plaintiff's judgment can be skewed by the pressures of her depression. (R. Id.) Dr. Tobe concluded that plaintiff suffers from reactive anxiety and depression associated with her two surgeries. (R. Id.) He further determined that this estimate of disability is based on objective medical findings and does not materially impair the ordinary pursuits of her life. (R. Id.)
6. Dr. Gary Rosenberg, D.O.
Dr. Rosenberg also treated plaintiff for depression from 1992 through 1994. In his May 11, 1994 report, Dr. Rosenberg concluded that although plaintiff is impaired, she is able to work with these impairments until her physical problems become too great. (R. 417.) Dr. Rosenberg determined that with the proper psychiatric care, plaintiff could continue with her work. (R. Id.)
7. Dr. Amondo Monteil
On April 5, 1995, Dr. Monteil conducted plaintiff's disability examination. (R. 521-523.) Dr. Monteil's findings upon physical and neurological examination were basically unremarkable. (R. Id.) He diagnosed plaintiff with status post laminectomy bilaterally and determined that plaintiff has no significant neurological impairment. (R. 523.)
8. Dr. Warren Werbitt, M.D.
Plaintiff was first seen by Dr. Werbitt in Kennedy Memorial Hospital in October, 1991. (R. 468.) Plaintiff was diagnosed with peptic ulcer disease and erosive gastritis and continued to treat with Dr. Werbitt on a monthly basis through 1994. (R. 468-505.) On November 26, 1994, plaintiff underwent a hepatobiliary scan with ejection fraction which was normal. (R. 471.) Plaintiff also underwent CT scans on the abdomen in December, 1994 which revealed that her liver, gallbladder, spleen, and pancreas were normal. (R. 470.)
II. Discussion "Disability" Defined and Burdens of Proof
The Social Security Act defines "disability" for purposes of plaintiff's entitlement to benefits as the inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). Under this definition, a claimant qualifies as disabled "only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).The Commissioner has promulgated regulations for determining disability applicable to Disability Insurance cases. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1501-404.1599. Under these regulations, substantial gainful activity is defined as "work that — (a) involves doing significant and productive physical or mental duties; and (b) is done (or intended) for pay or profit." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1510. Importantly, this definition presupposes a regular, continuing, and sustained ability to perform such work. Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 775, 778 (3d Cir. 1987).
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that determine disability by application of a five-step sequential analysis codified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The Commissioner evaluates each case according to a five-step process until a finding of "disabled" or "not disabled" is obtained. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). This five-step process is summarized as follows:
1. If the claimant currently is engaged in substantial gainful employment, he will be found "not disabled."
2. If the claimant does not suffer from a "severe impairment," he will be found "not disabled."
3. If the severe impairment meets or equals a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 and has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months, the claimant will be found "disabled."
4. If the claimant can still perform work he has done in the past ("past relevant work") despite the severe impairment, he will be found "not disabled."
5. Finally, the Commissioner will consider the claimant's ability to perform work ("residual functional capacity"), age, education and past work experience to determine whether or not he is capable of performing other work which exists in the national economy. If he is incapable, a finding of disability will be entered. On the other hand, if the claimant can perform other work, he will be found not to be disabled.20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f).
This analysis involves a shifting burden of proof. Wallace v. Secretary of Health Human Servs., 722 F.2d 1150, 1153 (3d Cir. 1983). In the first four steps of the analysis, the burden is on the claimant to prove every element of her claim by a preponderance of the evidence. In the final step, however, the Commissioner bears the burden of proving that work is available for the petitioner: "Once a claimant has proved that he is unable to perform his former job, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there is some other kind of substantial gainful employment he is able to perform." Kangas, 823 F.2d at 777. See Olsen v. Schweiker, 703 F.2d 751, 753 (3d Cir. 1983).
B. Standard of Review
A reviewing court must uphold the Commissioner's factual decisions if they are supported by "substantial evidence." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992),cert. denied, 507 U.S. 924 (1993). "Substantial evidence" means more than "a mere scintilla." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). "It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. The inquiry is not whether the reviewing court would have made the same determination, but, rather, whether the Commissioner's conclusion was reasonable. See Brown, 845 F.2d at 1213. Thus, substantial evidence may be slightly less than a preponderance. See Hanusiewicz v. Bowen, 678 F. Supp. 474, 476 (D.N.J. 1988).
The reviewing court, however, does have a duty to review the evidence in its totality. See Daring v. Heckler, 727 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir. 1984). In order to do so, "a court must `take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.'" Schonewolf v. Callahan, 972 F. Supp. 277, 284 (D.N.J. 1997) (quoting Willbanks v. Secretary of Health Human Servs., 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951)). The Commissioner has a corresponding duty to facilitate the court's review: "[w]here the [Commissioner] is faced with conflicting evidence, he must adequately explain in the record his reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence." Ogden v. Bowen, 677 F. Supp. 273, 278 (M.D.Pa. 1987) (citing Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1986)). As the Third Circuit has held, access to the Commissioner's reasoning is indeed essential to a meaningful court review:
Unless the [Commissioner] has analyzed all evidence and has sufficiently explained the weight he has given to obviously probative exhibits, to say that his decision is supported by substantial evidence approaches an abdication of the court's duty to scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether the conclusions reached are rational.Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1978). Nevertheless, the district court is not "empowered to weigh the evidence or substitute its conclusions for those of the fact-finder." Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182.
Some types of evidence will not be "substantial." For example,
[a] single piece of evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the [Commissioner] ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence. Nor is evidence substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence — particularly certain types of evidence (e.g. that offered by treating physicians) — or if it really constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion.Wallace, 722 F.2d at 1153 (citing Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)).
The Third Circuit has long held that "[a] court considering a claim for disability benefits must give greater weight to the findings of a treating physician." Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1067 (3d Cir. 1993). See Kane v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 1130, 1135 (3d Cir. 1985). This is particularly true "`when the opinion reflects an expert judgment based on a continuing observation of the patient's condition over a prolonged period of time.'" Rocco v. Heckler, 826 F.2d 1348, 1350 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 217 (3d Cir. 1984)).
The ALJ cannot reject a treating physician's testimony in the absence of contradictory medical evidence. See Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 128-29 (3d Cir. 1991). However, an ALJ can reject the opinion of a treating physician if he or she explains on the record the reasons for doing so. See Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 41 (3d Cir. 1989); Brewster, 786 F.2d at 585. Moreover, apart from the substantial evidence inquiry, a reviewing court is entitled to satisfy itself that the Commissioner arrived at her decision by application of the proper legal standards.Friedberg v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 445, 447 (3d Cir. 1983); Curtin v. Harris, 508 F. Supp. 791, 793 (D.N.J. 1981).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff challenges the Commissioner's decision denying her a period of disability insurance benefits, claiming that the decision was not based on substantial evidence. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that the ALJ ignored her mental disorder in arriving at his determination that the plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (Pl. Br. 11-12.) In addition, plaintiff also argues that the ALJ improperly discounted plaintiff's testimony regarding her pain and impermissibly dismissed the opinion of a treating physician. (Pl. Br. 12-18.)
For the following reasons, this court disagrees with Mrs. Hickman's contentions and finds that the ALJ's determination is based on substantial evidence. The court will therefore affirm the Secretary's decision.
A. Whether the ALJ Correctly Evaluated the Plaintiff's
Mental Disorder
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step three of the sequential analysis by failing to recognize that plaintiff's mental disorder meets or equals a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. part 404 Subpart P, Appendix 1, Listing 12.04. (Pl. Br. 11.) Plaintiff alleges that reports provided by Dr. Rosenberg and Dr. Tobe provide sufficient evidence that plaintiff's depression is severe enough to meet the listing and establish disability. (R. Id.)However, contrary to plaintiff's argument, the ALJ correctly determined that the medical evidence of record was insufficient to establish that plaintiff's mental disorder met or was equal to any symptoms provided in the listing. In making this determination, the ALJ accorded significant weight to the findings of Dr. Gary Rosenberg, who has provided psychiatric care for plaintiff since August, 1992. (R. 416.) The ALJ noted that as of May 9, 1994, Dr. Rosenberg found that plaintiff was alert, and oriented to time, place, and person. (R. 18, 426.) Plaintiff's thought processes were organized with no looseness of association. (Id.) Her insight and judgment were good and she did not suffer from suicidal or paranoid ideations or hallucinations. (Id.) Significantly, Dr. Rosenberg concluded that despite plaintiff's mental impairments, she could continue to work. (R. 19, 427.) The ALJ properly concluded that the symptoms exhibited by plaintiff, as found by Dr. Rosenberg, were insufficient to meet or equal the criteria provided in section 12.04.
The ALJ also properly discounted the findings of Dr. Edward Tobe. Dr. Tobe cannot be considered a treating physician in this case as he met with the plaintiff only two times in a two year period. He failed to perform any diagnostic tests on plaintiff and based his reports on the findings of other physicians. Accordingly, the ALJ properly determined that the findings of Dr. Tobe were not credible and not entitled to significant weight. (R. 20.)
B. Whether the ALJ Properly Evaluated the Plaintiff's
Subjective Complaints of Pain
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly discounted plaintiff's testimony of disabling pain which was supported by the medical evidence. (Pl. Br. 13-17.) Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ failed to consider plaintiff's "whole testimony", and instead considered only the parts of the testimony which supported his position. (Id at 17.)When evaluating the existence of a disability, subjective complaints of pain "do not in themselves constitute disability." Green v. Schweiker, 749 F.2d 1066, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984). They must be accompanied by medical signs and laboratory findings which show that the claimant has a medical impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged. See Bittel v. Richardson, 441 F.2d 1193, 1195 (3d Cir. 1971).
However, even if a medically determinable impairment exists which can reasonably be expected to produce pain, the intensity and persistence of symptoms must also be evaluated in order to determine how they might limit a claimant's ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1) 1995). When a claimant's subjective complaints of pain indicate a greater severity of impairment than the objective medical evidence supports, the ALJ can give weight to factors such as physician's reports and claimant's daily activities. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) (1995).
Here, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff's symptoms are not of such intensity, frequency and duration as to preclude substantial gainful activity. (R. 19.) Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, the ALJ relied on plaintiff's own testimony and medical evidence in the record to support this conclusion. (R. Id.)
The ALJ relied on the findings of Dr. Ponzio, who concluded that plaintiff was functional and required no further treatment. (R. 317-234.) The ALJ also relied on the findings of Dr. Monteil, who reported that plaintiff's cervical spine and paraspinal musculature reveled no evidence of pain or tenderness. He also found that plaintiff's range of motion was intact and had full motor functions in her upper and lower extremities. (R. 521-523.) The ALJ properly determined that this medical evidence contradicts plaintiff's subjective allegations of disabling pain which prevent her from gainful employment.
The ALJ also determined that plaintiff's own testimony contradicts her allegations of disabling pain. Although plaintiff asserts that she is unable to work, she testified and reported to her physicians that she is able to conduct a full array of daily activities. (R. Id.) On January 3, 1995, plaintiff reported to Dr. Ponzio that she travels, walks, reads, crochets, and gardens. (R. 507.) In addition, plaintiff testified that three weeks prior to the hearing, she drove to Tennessee with her husband and is capable of driving alone. (R. 64.)
These findings by the ALJ are appropriate and supported by substantial evidence, and justify the determination that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of at least sedentary work which would include her past relevant work as a food service manager. This court declines to substitute its own determination of credibility for that of the ALJ, given that the ALJ had the opportunity to observe the plaintiff first-hand. See Wier v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 955, 962 (3d Cir. 1984) (recognizing that great deference is given to ALJ's determination of credibility). It is within the ALJ's discretion "`to evaluate the credibility of a claimant and to arrive at an independent judgment, in light of medical findings and other evidence, regarding the true extent of the pain alleged by the claimant.'" Brown v. Schweiker, 562 F. Supp. 284, 287 (E.D.Pa. 1983) (quoting Bolton v. Secretary of Health Human Servs., 504 F. Supp. 288, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)). The ALJ properly considered all of the evidence in the record, including plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain. There is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform at least sedentary work.
C. Whether the ALJ Correctly Evaluated the Findings of
Plaintiff's Treating Physician
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider the reports of various treating physicians, including Dr. Manning, Dr. Gleimer, Dr. Rosenberg, and Dr. Tobe. Plaintiff alleges that these reports support the claim that plaintiff is completely disabled and is incapable of performing work-related activities.The Social Security Administration regulations regarding the evaluation of evidence from treating physicians are found in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. Generally, the regulations provide that the opinion of a treating physician will be given controlling weight if it is "well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record." Id and 416.927(d)(2) (1995).
The ALJ is not bound to accept the opinion of a treating physician without weighing it against the other medical evidence of record. Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 115 n. 5 (3d Cir. 1983). Although the diagnosis of a treating physician is considered as to whether a claimant is "disabled," the ALJ has the final responsibility to determine claimants' residual functional capacity to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2).
Here, the ALJ properly determined that the findings of Dr. Manning and Dr. Gleimer were contradicted by other medical evidence in the record. Specifically, the ALJ relied in large part on the findings of Dr. Ponzio and Dr. Monteil.
Dr. Ponzio has continually treated plaintiff since performing her second back surgery in 1993. Significantly, the ALJ noted that in November, 1994, Dr. Ponzio determined that plaintiff had plateaued in her recovery and concluded that although plaintiff still exhibited some lower back symptoms, they were tolerable and she was functional. (R. 18, 323.) Following surgery on plaintiff's left shoulder, Dr. Ponzio determined that plaintiff was experiencing mild to no pain. (R. 459.) He concluded that no further treatments were necessary. (R. 18, 323.)
The ALJ also noted that Dr. Monteil's examination of plaintiff was basically unremarkable. (R. 18, 521-523.) Dr. Monteil found that plaintiff's cervical spine and paraspinal musculature revealed no evidence of pain or tenderness. (R. Id.) Plaintiff's range of motion and straight leg raises on either side were intact. (R. Id.)
Furthermore, contrary to plaintiff's argument, the ALJ specifically considered the reports of Dr. Rosenberg and Dr. Tobe. The ALJ relied on Dr. Rosenberg's conclusion that despite plaintiff's mental impairment, she could continue to work. (R. 19, 427.) As discussed above, the ALJ properly discounted the findings of Dr. Tobe since he is not plaintiff's treating physician, and his conclusions were contradicted by other significant evidence in the record.
Here, the ALJ determined that the findings that plaintiff was incapable of returning to her previous employment were contradicted by other substantial evidence in the record. It is the final responsibility of the ALJ to resolve material conflicts in the evidence and determine plaintiff's residual functional capacity to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2) (1995); Perales, 402 U.S. at 399. The court must uphold the decision of the ALJ unless it is not supported by substantial evidence. Here, the evidence in the record reviewed as a whole support's the ALJ's decision and this court cannot say that it lacked substantial evidence.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, this court finds that the Commissioner's determination that Mrs. Hickman is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence. This court affirms the Commissioner's final decision denying plaintiff's claim for a period of Social Security Disability and Disability Insurance Benefits.
The accompanying order is entered.
ORDER
This matter having come before the court upon plaintiff Annie Hickman's application to review the final decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services denying plaintiff's application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act; and this court having considered the entire record and all submissions on behalf of the parties; and for the reasons stated in the Opinion of today's date; and for good cause shown;
It is this day of April, 1999, hereby ORDERED that the plaintiff's appeal be, and hereby is, DENIED and the final decision of the Secretary be, and hereby is, AFFIRMED.