Opinion
No. 1D19-1604
02-04-2021
Shuron HESTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Shuron Hester, pro se, Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Barbara Debelius, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Shuron Hester, pro se, Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Barbara Debelius, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Per Curiam.
The appellant appeals from a March 2019 trial court order prohibiting him from filing further pro se pleadings. We affirm the order on appeal.
We previously affirmed the appellant's convictions for capital sexual battery and lewd and lascivious molestation. See Hester v. State , 149 So. 3d 4 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). The appellant proceeded to file six more appeals in this court, none of which had merit. The trial court, meanwhile, repeatedly had warned the appellant against additional frivolous filings. The trial court later dismissed another of the appellant's postconviction motions, and in its order, the trial court directed the appellant to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. The appellant responded to the show cause order and appealed the dismissal of his latest postconviction motion at the same time. A month later, the trial court rendered the sanction order now on review.
The appellant argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order because his appeal of a previous order was pending at the time. It is true that "[w]hen the jurisdiction of the appellate court attaches, it is exclusive as to the subject covered by the appeal." Willey v. W.J. Hoggson Corp. , 89 Fla. 446, 105 So. 126, 128 (1925). Conversely, though, that jurisdiction is not exclusive as to those matters not covered by the appeal. See Crichlow v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. , 113 Fla. 668, 152 So. 849, 850 (1933) (rejecting argument that lower court loses jurisdiction over matters not "covered by the appeal"); Schultz v. Schickedanz , 884 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ("[A] trial court is divested of jurisdiction upon notice of appeal except with regard to those matters which do not interfere with the power and authority of the appellate court or the rights of a party to the appeal which are under consideration by the appellate court." (quoting Palma Sola Harbour Condo., Inc. v. Huber , 374 So. 2d 1135, 1138 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) ).
Courts have "the inherent authority to limit abuses of the judicial process by pro se litigants whose frivolous or excessive filings interfere with the timely administration of justice." Flowers v. State , 278 So. 3d 899, 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) ; cf. Attwood v. Singletary , 661 So. 2d 1216, 1217 (Fla. 1995). Such a matter is "independent and collateral," and the trial court did not lose jurisdiction to address its outstanding show-cause order simply because the appellant had already appealed the denial of his postconviction motion. Cf. Amlan, Inc. v. Detroit Diesel Corp. , 651 So. 2d 701, 706 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (noting that a trial court retains jurisdiction to consider sanctions for discovery abuses and violations of court orders because such a matter is "independent and collateral").
As to the merits of the order on appeal, in 2017, the trial court cautioned the appellant that continued successive pro se filings could subject him to sanctions. The appellant was clearly on notice that he could not file successive or frivolous claims, yet he continued to do so. The appellant failed to show the trial court acted outside of its discretion to prohibit future pro se filings. See Edwards v. State , 192 So. 3d 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (affirming trial court order prohibiting appellant from future pro se filings where appellant failed to provide any grounds to find his multitude of filings were not an abuse of process and a waste of judicial resources).
AFFIRMED . The Court warns the appellant that any of his future filings that it determines to be frivolous may result in the imposition of sanctions, including a prohibition against any further pro se filings in this Court and a referral to the appropriate institution for disciplinary procedures as provided in section 944.279, Florida Statutes (2019).
Roberts, Nordby, and Tanenbaum, JJ., concur.