Opinion
No. COA12–1544.
2013-07-2
Peter HESS, Plaintiff v. Barbara HERMANN–HESS, Defendant.
F.B. Jackson & Associates Law Firm, PLLC, by Angela S. Beeker and Frank B. Jackson, for plaintiff-appellee. Donald H. Barton, P.C., by Donald H. Barton, for defendant-appellant.
Appeal by defendant from order entered 29 June 2012 by Judge Peter Knight in Henderson County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 April 2013. F.B. Jackson & Associates Law Firm, PLLC, by Angela S. Beeker and Frank B. Jackson, for plaintiff-appellee. Donald H. Barton, P.C., by Donald H. Barton, for defendant-appellant.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Barbara Hermann–Hess (“defendant”) appeals from the trial court's order modifying Peter Hess's (“plaintiff”) child support obligation. We affirm.
I. Background
Plaintiff and defendant were married on 17 December 1999. The parties separated on 1 June 2007. During their marriage, they adopted a minor child. On 5 February 2008, the trial court entered a consent order for joint custody and child support (“the 2008 consent order”). Under the terms of the order, plaintiff was required to pay $2,000.00 per month in child support.
On 15 November 2010, plaintiff filed a motion, and subsequently an amended motion, to modify the 2008 consent order. The trial court held a hearing and found, inter alia, that based on the parties' current income and circumstances, there was a difference of fifteen percent or more between plaintiff's child support obligation under the 2008 consent order and the amount of child support which would be owed under the application of the Child Support Guidelines (“the Guidelines”). On 29 June 2012, the trial court entered an order concluding that there had been a significant change of circumstances warranting a reduction in plaintiff's basic child support obligation from $2,000.00 per month to $437.00 per month. Defendant appeals.
II. Standard of Review
“ ‘Child support orders entered by a trial court are accorded substantial deference by appellate courts and our review is limited to a determination of whether there was a clear abuse of discretion.’ “ Head v. Mosier, 197 N.C.App. 328, 332, 677 S.E.2d 191, 195 (2009) (quoting Mason v. Erwin, 157 N.C.App. 284, 287, 579 S.E.2d 120, 122 (2003)). “Under this standard of review, the trial court's ruling will be overturned only upon a showing that it was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” Ludlam v. Miller, ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 739 S.E.2d 555, 558 (2013) (quoting Spicer v. Spicer, 168 N.C.App. 283, 287, 607 S.E.2d 678, 682 (2005)). “The trial court must, however, make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to allow the reviewing court to determine whether a judgment, and the legal conclusions that underlie it, represent a correct application of the law.” Id.
III. Modification of Consent Order
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by modifying the 2008 consent order because it was a contract that was not subject to modification by court order. We disagree.
Although defendant is correct in asserting that, generally, consent orders are not modifiable under principles of contract law, the sole exception to this rule is the area of domestic relations law, where all alimony and child support agreements approved by the court are treated as court-ordered judgments. See Crane v. Green, 114 N.C.App. 105, 106, 441 S.E.2d 144, 145 (1994). Moreover, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50–13.7(a) (2011) specifically states that “an order of a court of this State for support of a minor child may be modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances by either party or anyone interested ....“ (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court did not err in modifying the 2008 consent order. This argument is overruled.
IV. Substantial Change in Circumstances
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by concluding that there was a substantial change in circumstances which justified the modification of child support. We disagree. A. Fifteen–Percent Presumption
Child support obligations are governed by the Guidelines, which were established pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50–13.4(c1) (2011). “Child support set consistent with the ... Guidelines is conclusively presumed to be in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child and commensurate with the relative abilities of each parent to pay support.” State v. McGuire, 174 N.C.App. 347, 350, 620 S.E.2d 899, 902 (2005) (quoting Buncombe County ex rel. Blair v. Jackson, 138 N.C.App. 284, 287, 531 S.E.2d 240, 243 (2000)). The Guidelines provide:
In a proceeding to modify the amount of child support payable under a child support order that was entered at least three years before the pending motion to modify was filed, a difference of 15% or more between the amount of child support payable under the existing order and the amount of child support resulting from application of the guidelines based on the parents' current incomes and circumstances shall be presumed to constitute a substantial change of circumstances warranting modification of the existing child support order.
Johnston Cnty. ex rel. Bugge v. Bugge, ––– N.C.App. ––––, 722 S.E.2d 512, 514–15 (2012) (quoting N.C. Child Support Guidelines 2011 Ann. R. N.C. 41, 46). When the moving party has presented evidence that satisfies the requirements of the fifteen-percent presumption, it is unnecessary to show a change of circumstances by other means. Head, 197 N.C.App. at 333–34, 677 S.E.2d at 196 (citing Garrison v. Connor, 122 N.C.App. 702, 706, 471 S.E.2d 644, 647,disc. rev. denied, 344 N.C. 436, 476 S.E.2d 116 (1996)). “Absent a request by a party for deviation, when the court enters an order for child support determined pursuant to the Guidelines, specific findings regarding the child's reasonable needs and the parents' ability to provide support generally are not required.” Id. at 334,677 S.E.2d at 196 (2009) (citing Brooker v. Brooker, 133 N.C.App. 285, 289, 515 S.E.2d 234, 237 (1999)). The fifteen-percent presumption applies even if the previous court order was not made pursuant to the Guidelines. See Lewis v. Lewis, 181 N.C.App. 114, 120, 638 S.E.2d 628, 632 (2007) (“Neither the language of the fifteen percent provision in the Child Support Guidelines, nor this Court's application of the same, suggests that the existing child support order must have been based on the Child Support Guidelines before the provision can be employed.”).
In the instant case, the trial court made the appropriate findings of fact to sufficiently support modification of the 2008 consent order. Specifically, the trial court found that over three years had passed since the entry of the 2008 consent order. Moreover, the court found that plaintiff had a monthly income of $8,821.00 at the time of the hearing and that defendant had a monthly income of $2,786.00, which resulted in a child support obligation of $437.00 per month under the Guidelines. From these findings, the trial court determined that there was a difference of fifteen percent or more between the amount of child support payable under the 2008 consent order, $2,000.00, and the amount of child support resulting from the application of the Guidelines to the parties' current incomes and circumstances, $437.00. Since all elements of the fifteen-percent presumption were met, the trial court appropriately found that a substantial change of circumstances had occurred and that modification was warranted. This argument is overruled. B. Worksheet
Defendant also argues that the trial court's failure to attach the worksheet used to determine the amount of child support due was prejudicial error. Defendant argues that the failure to attach the worksheet leaves this Court without the information it needs to determine whether the amount of support was properly calculated. This Court recently rejected a similar argument:
Specifically, Defendant argues that this Court does not have the necessary record evidence “to assess the [t]rial [c]ourt's findings of fact and conclusions of law related to the proper level of support for each parent.” ... Defendant includes the relevant worksheet in the record[, and so o]ur review of the order is in no way prejudiced. This argument is without merit.
Ludlam, ––– N.C.App. at ––––, 739 S.E.2d at 564. In the instant case, the record also contains the worksheet that the trial court relied on and thus, our review of the trial court's order was not prejudiced. This argument is overruled.
V. Conclusion
In accordance with the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it reduced plaintiff's child support obligation from $2,000.00 per month to $437.00 per month, retroactive to the filing of plaintiff's motion on 17 February 2012. The order of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed. Judges STEELMAN and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).