Opinion
No. 08-16904.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a)(2).
Filed October 15, 2010.
Michael James Cronen, Esquire, Zimmerman Cronen LLP, Harris Zimmerman, Esquire, Law Office of Harris Zimmerman, Oakland, CA, for Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee.
Jorge Hevia, Esquire, Attorney at Law, Miami, FL, David E. Newhouse, New-house Associates, San Mateo, CA, for Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 3:05-cv-00432-JSW.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
David John Griffin appeals from the district court's order denying his counter-motion to set aside or enforce a settlement agreement entered into with the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn, Inc. We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Griffin's motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). Only "`extraordinary circumstances' justify relief under [Rule 60(b)(6)]." See Keeling v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union 162, 937 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Sparks, 685 F.2d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir. 1982)). While the repudiation or "complete frustration" of a settlement agreement can constitute grounds to set aside a judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), see Keeling, 937 F.2d at 410, Griffin has not demonstrated that such circumstances exist in this case. Instead, there are simply disagreements over the proper interpretation of the terms of the settlement agreement.
The district court properly reviewed the magistrate's report and recommendation de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
Griffin failed to enunciate a coherent legal argument in his brief to this court as to why the district court's holding that Golden Dawn did not violate any substantive terms of the settlement agreement is incorrect. Griffin has therefore abandoned any such challenge. See Fed.R.App.P. 28(a)(9); Kohler v. Inter-Tel Techs., 244 F.3d 1167, 1182 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Issues raised in a brief which are not supported by argument are deemed abandoned."). To the extent that Griffin raises other issues in his brief, those challenges are waived for the same reason.