Opinion
1:19-CV-00210 EAW
2022-01-03
HERMAN S., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
Dennis A. Clary, Lewiston, NY, for Plaintiff. Heetano Shamsoondar, Social Security Administration Office of General Counsel, New York, NY, for Defendant.
Dennis A. Clary, Lewiston, NY, for Plaintiff.
Heetano Shamsoondar, Social Security Administration Office of General Counsel, New York, NY, for Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, Chief Judge
INTRODUCTION
Represented by counsel, Plaintiff Herman S. ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner," or "Defendant") denying his applications for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI"). (Dkt. 1). This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Presently before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. 17; Dkt. 23). For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner's motion (Dkt. 23) is granted, and Plaintiff's motion (Dkt. 17) is denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff protectively filed his applications for DIB and SSI on June 17, 2015. (Dkt. 7 at 17, 109, 118). In his applications, Plaintiff alleged disability beginning April 1, 2006, due to a back injury, head injury, neck injury, and hearing loss in his right ear. (Id. at 17, 110, 119). Plaintiff's applications were initially denied on October 28, 2015. (Id. at 17, 133-40). A video hearing was held before administrative law judge ("ALJ") Elizabeth Ebner on November 9, 2017. (Id. at 17, 58-108). Plaintiff appeared in Buffalo, New York and the ALJ presided over the hearing from Falls Church, Virginia. (Id. ). On February 8, 2018, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Id. at 14-51). Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review; his request was denied on December 18, 2018, making the ALJ's determination the Commissioner's final decision. (Id. at 6-11). This action followed.
When referencing the page number(s) of docket citations in this Decision and Order, the Court will cite to the CM/ECF-generated page numbers that appear in the upper righthand corner of each document.
LEGAL STANDARD
I. District Court Review
"In reviewing a final decision of the [Social Security Administration ("SSA")], this Court is limited to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard." Talavera v. Astrue , 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Act holds that a decision by the Commissioner is "conclusive" if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Moran v. Astrue , 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). It is not the Court's function to "determine de novo whether [the claimant] is disabled." Schaal v. Apfel , 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted); see also Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. , 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that review of the Secretary's decision is not de novo and that the Secretary's findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence). However, "[t]he deferential standard of review for substantial evidence does not apply to the Commissioner's conclusions of law." Byam v. Barnhart , 336 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Townley v. Heckler , 748 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1984) ).
II. Disability Determination
An ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Bowen v. City of New York , 476 U.S. 467, 470-71, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986). At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has an impairment, or combination of impairments, that is "severe" within the meaning of the Act, in that it imposes significant restrictions on the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities. Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the analysis concludes with a finding of "not disabled." If the claimant does have at least one severe impairment, the ALJ continues to step three.
At step three, the ALJ examines whether a claimant's impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 (the "Listings"). Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a Listing and meets the durational requirement (id. §§ 404.1509, 416.909), the claimant is disabled. If not, the ALJ determines the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), which is the ability to perform physical or mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations for the collective impairments. See id. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
The ALJ then proceeds to step four and determines whether the claimant's RFC permits the claimant to perform the requirements of his or her past relevant work. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If the claimant can perform such requirements, then he or she is not disabled. If he or she cannot, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step, wherein the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant is not disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). To do so, the Commissioner must present evidence to demonstrate that the claimant "retains a residual functional capacity to perform alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy" in light of the claimant's age, education, and work experience. Rosa v. Callahan , 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c). DISCUSSION
I. The ALJ's Decision
In determining whether Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. Initially, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Act on March 31, 2012. (Dkt. 7 at 19). At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful work activity since April 1, 2006, the alleged onset date. (Id. at 20).
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of: "cervical and lumbar degenerative disc disease ; right carpal tunnel syndrome ; right cervical radiculopathy ; [and] sensorineural hearing loss." (Id. ). The ALJ further found that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments of hypertension, hyperlipidemia, gastro-esophageal reflux disease, obesity, skin cancer growths, remote traumatic brain injury with possible history of mild neurocognitive disorder, anxiety disorder, affective disorder, substance abuse disorder, and PTSD were non-severe. (Id. at 20-38).
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of any Listing. (Id. at 38). The ALJ particularly considered the criteria of Listings 1.02, 1.04, 2.10, and 11.14 in reaching her conclusion. (Id. ).
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), with the additional limitations that Plaintiff:
can frequently reach, handle, finger, and operate hand and foot controls, occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, and can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds or work at unprotected heights or around dangerous moving mechanical parts. He can tolerate occasional exposure to vibrations and is limited to moderate noise environments. He would further be off-task up to five percent of an eight-hour workday in addition to normal breaks.
(Id. at 38-39).
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was able to perform his past relevant work as a grocery store manager trainee and as a store manager, as this work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by Plaintiff's RFC. (Id. at 47). The ALJ further relied on the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE") to conclude that, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, including the representative occupations of merchandise marker, dispatcher, and motel cleaner. (Id. at 49-50). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Act. (Id. at 50-51).
II. The Commissioner's Determination is Supported by Substantial Evidence and Free from Legal Error
Plaintiff asks the Court to remand this matter to the Commissioner, arguing that (1) the ALJ's decision is "in large part based upon the conclusion of Dr. Santa Maria that Plaintiff was exhibiting symptom magnification in the context of seeking disability benefits," which is "simply not sustainable." (Dkt. 17-1 at 6). Plaintiff further argues that "[t]here may also be an issue of the ALJ failing to develop the record." (Id. at 7). The Court has considered each of these arguments and, for the reasons discussed below, finds them without merit. A. The Step Two Determination
Plaintiff's first argument is that the ALJ, in considering Plaintiff's mental impairments at step two of the sequential evaluation, improperly credited Dr. Santa Maria's statement that he was exhibiting symptom magnification in connection with seeking disability benefits, which led the ALJ to discount Plaintiff's subjective complaints and other treatment records. (See Dkt. 17-1 at 6-7).
At step two of the disability analysis, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has an impairment, or combination of impairments, that is "severe" within the meaning of the Act, in that it imposes significant restrictions on the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). "The following are examples of ‘basic work activities’: ‘walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling ... seeing, hearing, and speaking ... [u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions ... [u]se of judgment ... [r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations.’ " Taylor v. Astrue , 32 F. Supp. 3d 253, 265 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (citations omitted), adopted , 32 F. Supp. 3d 253 (N.D.N.Y. 2012).
"The claimant bears the burden of presenting evidence establishing severity." Id. Step two's "severity" requirement is de minimis and is meant only to screen out the weakest of claims. Dixon v. Shalala , 54 F.3d 1019, 1030 (2d Cir. 1995). However, despite this lenient standard, the " ‘mere presence of a disease or impairment, or establishing that a person has been diagnosed or treated for a disease or impairment’ is not, by itself, sufficient to render a condition ‘severe.’ " Taylor , 32 F. Supp. 3d at 265 (quoting Coleman v. Shalala , 895 F. Supp. 50, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ). Rather, "to be considered severe, an impairment or combination of impairments must cause ‘more than minimal limitations in [a claimant's] ability to perform work-related functions.’ " Windom v. Berryhill , No. 6:17-cv-06720-MAT, 2018 WL 4960491, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2018) (quoting Donahue v. Colvin , No. 6:17-CV-06838(MAT), 2018 WL 2354986, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. May 24, 2018) ) (alteration in original). Further, a severe impairment must persist for at least twelve months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (disability involves impairment "which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months").
The Court first notes that, as evidenced by the ALJ's 14-page discussion on the subject, the ALJ thoroughly discussed and considered Plaintiff's alleged mental impairments at step two of the sequential analysis (see Dkt. 7 at 20-34), and concluded that Plaintiff's "medically determinable mental impairments of a remote traumatic brain injury with possible history of mild neurocognitive disorder, anxiety disorder, affective disorder, substance abuse disorder, and PTSD ... do not cause more than minimal limitation in [his] ability to perform basic mental work activities," and therefore were non-severe (id. at 34). Specifically, while recognizing that the medical evidence showed that Plaintiff had sustained a traumatic brain injury ("TBI") following an accident in 1989, the ALJ discussed the discrepancies in the record relating to Plaintiff's reports of how he sustained his TBI, as well as the effects on his mental functioning. (Id. at 20-34; see also id. at 21 (discussing Plaintiff's report to Dr. Santa Maria that he was in a "coma" with sustained loss of consciousness for two weeks and hospitalized for three months, after which he was discharged into rehabilitative treatment for four to five months, with his report just two months later to IME evaluator, where he reported that he missed only a few months of work and then returned without any problems)).
Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ's consideration of Dr. Santa Maria's 2017 neuropsychological report, including the ALJ's crediting Dr. Santa Maria's opinion that Plaintiff was "exhibiting symptom magnification in the context of seeking disability benefits." (Dkt. 17-1 at 6). In assessing a disability claim, an ALJ must consider and weigh the various medical opinions of record. Pursuant to the Commissioner's regulations:
the ALJ must consider various factors in deciding how much weight to give to any medical opinion in the record, regardless of its source, including: (i) the frequency of examination and the length, nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (ii) the evidence in support of the ... physician's opinion; (iii) the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; (iv) whether the opinion is from a specialist; and (v) other factors brought to the Social Security Administration's attention that tend to support or contradict the opinion.
Pike v. Colvin , No. 14-CV-159-JTC, 2015 WL 1280484, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2015) (quotation and alterations omitted). As explained by the ALJ, Dr. Santa Maria noted the following in his 2017 evaluation: Plaintiff was known to him from a prior evaluation in 2008, when he demonstrated "superior range intelligence" and performed well on effort testing; Plaintiff had a history of TBI in the 1980s, but with an "excellent outcome" with regard to his general intelligence, and good preservation of complex problem-solving and attention; and that there were "various concerns regarding the integrity of [Plaintiff's] performance on quantitative cognitive evaluations," given wide disparities in his testing results, and concluding that "there is evidence of a significant superimposed pattern of embellished cognitive weaknesses and this occurs in the context of current disability seeking." (See id. at 944, 950-52). Dr. Santa Maria concluded:
This evaluation does not find evidence of any cognitive or psychological contraindication to [Plaintiff] handling part time or full time competitive employment in various work roles that he has handled in the past particularly given that there are multiple indications of symptoms exaggeration and also given that even so [Plaintiff] presently demonstrated general intelligence in high average range with overall reading, writing and mathematical abilities consistently in high average to superior ranges and with [Plaintiff] nonetheless having demonstrated good capacity for complex novel problem solving.
(Id. at 951).
The ALJ gave Dr. Santa Maria's opinion "great weight," explaining that "[t]he longitudinal evidence of record documents significant and notable inconsistencies over time regarding the claimant's self-reported symptoms, medical history, and ongoing deficits that conflict with objective testing and his own self-reported activities," citing to specific conflicting evidence in the record. (Id. at 30-31). The ALJ also considered that Dr. Santa Maria was a specialist, who had evaluated Plaintiff on two occasions between 2008 and 2017. (Id. at 31). Dr. Santa Maria's opinion is also consistent with the opinion of Dr. Ransom, the consultative examiner, who examined Plaintiff on October 15, 2015, and opined that he showed "no evidence of limitation" in following and understanding simple directions and instructions, performing simple tasks independently, maintaining attention and concentration for simple tasks, maintaining a simple regular schedule, and learning simple new tasks, and only "mild difficulty" performing complex tasks, relating adequately with others, and appropriately dealing with stress, due to a mild unspecified anxiety disorder. (Id. at 766-69). The ALJ gave Dr. Ransom's opinion "significant weight," including because it was consistent with Dr. Santa Maria's 2017 report, which found that Plaintiff had high intellectual functioning and intact memory and cognitive abilities. (Id. at 33). In other words, the ALJ thoroughly and properly considered Dr. Santa Maria's 2017 opinion of Plaintiff's mental functioning, and he has failed to articulate any error in the ALJ's consideration of that opinion.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's assessment of Dr. Santa Maria's opinion and her finding that Plaintiff's mental impairments were non-severe is "patently ridiculous," citing to Dr. LaBarber's notes, notes from Drs. Uslinov and Rajendran, and a 2015 report offered by Dr. Englert. (Dkt. 17-1 at 6). However, Plaintiff fails to explain why this medical evidence conflicts with Dr. Santa Maria's opinion that disparities in Plaintiff's test scores demonstrated that he was embellishing his mental impairments, citing only to Dr. Englert's opinion that Plaintiff could not perform any type of work. (Id. ). The ALJ thoroughly and properly considered Dr. LaBarber's opinion, including considering that he was a treating source, a mental health specialist, and the consistency of his opinion both internally and with the record as a whole. (Dkt. 7 at 33-32; see also id. at 22-26, 28-29). The ALJ explained that he gave the opinion only "little weight," as it was "not supported by the objective evidence or his own treatment notes, which primarily discuss the claimant's children and only rarely mention the claimant's own mental symptoms." (Id. ). Likewise, the ALJ considered the 2015 opinion offered by Dr. Englert that Plaintiff could not sustain fulltime or parttime work and gave it "very little weight," citing to the aforementioned inconsistencies in the record relating to Plaintiff's symptoms, medical history, and ongoing deficits which conflicted with objective testing and his own activities. (Id. at 30). The ALJ's assessment of these opinions was proper. See, e.g., Coleman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 335 F. Supp. 3d 389, 398 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (ALJ may discount an opinion when it is internally inconsistent); Blasco v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , No. 5:13-cv-576 (GLS), 2014 WL 3778997, at *5 n.9 (N.D.N.Y. July 31, 2014) ("[T]he ALJ's explanation that the restrictive opinion is inconsistent both internally, and with the other evidence of record, is a sufficient basis for discounting the opinion of an ‘other source’ as well as that of an ‘acceptable medical source.’ " (citations omitted)); see also Ramos v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , No. 13-cv-3421 (KBF), 2015 WL 7288658, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2015) ("whether an individual meets the statutory definition of disability is a matter reserved to the Commissioner, and thus ... even a treating physician's view on that question is not afforded any special significance").
In deciding a disability claim, an ALJ is tasked with "weigh[ing] all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that [is] consistent with the record as a whole." Matta v. Astrue , 508 F. App'x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013). While Plaintiff may disagree with the ALJ's conclusion relating to Plaintiff's mental functional limitations, mere disagreement is not a basis for remand. Here, the ALJ thoroughly discussed all the evidence pertaining to Plaintiff's mental impairments and ultimately concluded that any such impairments were non-severe, a conclusion which is supported by both the opinions offered by Dr. Santa Maria, Dr. Ransom, and other evidence in the record, including Plaintiff's reports of his daily activities. (See Dkt. 7 at 35-37).
Finally, the Court notes that any error at step two is rendered harmless when the ALJ finds that a claimant has other severe impairments and proceeds through the later steps of the sequential analysis:
At step two, the ALJ is required to consider whether a claimant's medically determinable impairments are severe. Notably, "[i]t is the claimant's burden to show at step two that she has a severe impairment." A step two error is not reversible and does not necessitate remand where the record is devoid of evidence that the allegedly omitted impairments were severe....
Moreover, "[c]ourts have developed a specialized variant of harmless-error analysis with respect to Step 2 severity errors in social security proceedings.... [W]hen an administrative law judge identifies some severe impairments at Step 2, and then proceeds through [the] sequential evaluation on the basis of [the] combined effects of all impairments, including those erroneously found to be non severe, an error in failing to identify all severe impairments at Step 2 is harmless." "Specifically, when functional effects of impairments erroneously determined to be non-severe at Step 2 are, nonetheless, fully considered and factored into subsequent residual functional capacity assessments, a reviewing court can confidently conclude that the same result would have been reached absent the error."
Guerra v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , No. 1:16-CV-00991 (MAT), 2018 WL 3751292, at *2-3 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2018) (internal citations omitted), aff'd , 778 F. App'x 75 (2d Cir. 2019) ; see also Reices-Colon v. Astrue , 523 F. App'x 796, 798 (2d Cir. 2013) (where ALJ excluded the plaintiff's anxiety disorder and panic disorder from his review, finding harmless error because the ALJ identified other severe impairments and proceeded with the subsequent steps, in which the ALJ specifically considered the plaintiff's anxiety and panic attacks); Panfil v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , No. 16-CV-947-MJR, 2018 WL 4610531 at *4, 2018 LEXIS 165356 at *13 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2018) ("To the extent the ALJ erred in not including occipital neuralgia, myofascial pain, cervicalgia, and personality disorder in his list of severe impairments, the error was harmless because the ALJ proceeded beyond step two and considered these impairments at the remaining steps.").
Here, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff's mental impairments when arriving at the RFC. (See, e.g. , Dkt. 7 at 41 ("As discussed, imaging of his brain has shown evidence of a prior brain injury, however his neuropsychological testing conclusively demonstrated that he has no significant residual functional cognitive deficits related to this."); id. at 43 (discussing Plaintiff's report to new neurologist that he had problems with short-term memory and thought processing, but noting that those complaints were not consistent with Dr. Santa Maria's report)). The ALJ also specifically accounted for any mental impairment in the RFC by permitting Plaintiff to be off-task for up to five percent of an eight-hour workday, in addition to normal breaks. (Id. at 39, 45 (explaining that ALJ considered Plaintiff's subjective complaints of cognitive deficits in finding that he "requires the freedom to be off-task up to five percent of an eight-hour workday in addition to normal breaks")).
In sum, the ALJ thoroughly considered all the evidence in the record pertaining to Plaintiff's mental impairments, but concluded that any such impairments were non-severe in nature. Because Plaintiff has failed to identify any valid reason as to why the ALJ's assessment of the opinion evidence relating to Plaintiff's mental health limitations is improper, remand is not required on this basis.
B. Duty to Develop the Record
Plaintiff's second and final argument is that the ALJ failed to develop the record to obtain a functional capacity evaluation performed by the Physical Therapy Department at Niagara Falls Medical Center. (Dkt. 17-1 at 7). In response, Defendant contends that further development of the record is not necessary, as the ALJ relied on Plaintiff's counsel's statements at the administrative hearing that the record was complete, and the record was sufficiently developed to allow the ALJ to make an informed decision as to disability. (Dkt. 23-1 at 11-12).
"Because a hearing on disability benefits is a non-adversarial proceeding, the ALJ generally has an affirmative obligation to develop the administrative record." Perez v. Chater , 77 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1996). Specifically, the ALJ must "investigate and develop the facts and develop the arguments both for and against the granting of benefits." Vincent v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 651 F.3d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 2011). "The ALJ must ‘make every reasonable effort’ to help the claimant get medical reports from his or her medical sources as long as the claimant has permitted the ALJ to do so." Sotososa v. Colvin , No. 15-CV-854-FPG, 2016 WL 6517788, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2016) (quoting Pratts v. Chater , 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1996) ). "The ALJ's duty to develop the record applies to both pro se and represented parties[.]" Lopez v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , No. 17-CV-1504(KAM), 2018 WL 5634929, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2018). However, the ALJ's duty to develop the record is not limitless. "[W]here there are no obvious gaps in the administrative record, and where the ALJ already possesses a complete medical history, the ALJ is under no obligation to seek additional information...." Rosa v. Callahan , 168 F.3d 72, 79 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In support of his argument that the ALJ failed in her duty to develop the record, Plaintiff offers an October 8, 2015 treatment note from Dr. Anand, which "references a functional capacity evaluation done by the Physical Therapy Dept. at Niagara Falls Memorial Medical Center," indicating that Plaintiff could perform sedentary work. (Dkt 17-1 at 7; see also Dkt. 7 at 801 ("He has had functional capacity evaluation by physical therapy Department in Niagara Falls Memorial and according to the final paperwork, he can do only sedentary work based on the physical constraints.")).
Plaintiff has failed to offer any specific reason as to why this evaluation—which Plaintiff himself has failed to obtain—requires remand, particularly considering the robust record already before the ALJ. See Johnson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , No. 1:16-cv-00831-MAT, 2018 WL 1428251, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2018) ("where the record evidence is sufficient for the ALJ to make a disability determination, the ALJ is not obligated to seek further medical records"); Valoy v. Barnhart , No. 02 Civ. 8955(HB), 2004 WL 439424, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2004) ("While the ALJ must supplement the record through his own initiatives when the record is incomplete or inadequate, this burden does not attach when the record is ample."). The administrative record before the Court is over 950 pages in length. The ALJ considered several medical assessments in reaching her determination that Plaintiff is not disabled, including considering the opinion offered by Samuel Balderman, M.D., who examined Plaintiff and offered an opinion as to his physical functional limitations (see Dkt. 7 at 46-47; 761-64), as well as various opinions from 2004 to 2008 relating to Plaintiff's worker's compensation claim (id. at 45-46). In other words, this is not a case where the record was devoid of opinion evidence relative to Plaintiff's physical functioning.
It is unclear when the physical therapy evaluation was performed, or whether it was performed by an acceptable or non-acceptable medical source. Plaintiff did not identify the evaluation as missing at the administrative hearing (see Dkt. 7 at 61), but the ALJ stated she would hold the record open for two weeks following the hearing to obtain records from Dr. Anand (id. at 72). See, e.g., Metzinger v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , No. 1:18-CV-1465 (WBC), 2019 WL 7194480, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2019) ("An ALJ should not be faulted for failing to develop the record, where ... the ALJ developed the record pursuant to the regulations, kept the record open for additional records, received additional records, and no further assistance was requested from Plaintiff."). Here, the ALJ was not required to seek further information relative to Plaintiff's physical functioning because the record before her was complete, and Plaintiff has failed to offer an adequate explanation as to why the ALJ's failure to obtain the additional evaluation was error. Accordingly, remand is not required on this basis.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 23) is granted, and Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 17) is denied.
SO ORDERED.