Opinion
# 2019-049-004 Claim No. 132201 Motion No. M-93117
02-05-2019
Alejandro Henriquez, Pro Se Letitia James, New York State Attorney General By: Elizabeth A. Gavin, Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Case information
UID: | 2019-049-004 |
Claimant(s): | ALEJANDRO HENRIQUEZ |
Claimant short name: | HENRIQUEZ |
Footnote (claimant name) : | |
Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
Footnote (defendant name) : | |
Third-party claimant(s): | |
Third-party defendant(s): | |
Claim number(s): | 132201 |
Motion number(s): | M-93117 |
Cross-motion number(s): | |
Judge: | DAVID A. WEINSTEIN |
Claimant’s attorney: | Alejandro Henriquez, Pro Se |
Defendant’s attorney: | Letitia James, New York State Attorney General By: Elizabeth A. Gavin, Assistant Attorney General |
Third-party defendant’s attorney: | |
Signature date: | February 5, 2019 |
City: | Albany |
Comments: | |
Official citation: | |
Appellate results: | |
See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
This claim, filed on October 29, 2018 by claimant pro se Alejandro Henriquez, is before me on a motion by defendant State of New York for dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), on the ground that it is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. Specifically, defendant contends that this matter “relates” to a prior Court of Claims action for lost property, specifically claimant’s criminal trial transcript.
Before the motion can be addressed, some background is in order: Henriquez filed the prior claim (No. 118923) with the Court of Claims on September 10, 2010, alleging that Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) staff at Green Haven Correctional Facility negligently failed to secure his personal property upon his removal from his cell into protective custody on February 10, 2010 (Gavin Aff, Ex 2). Following a trial, the Court found that Henriquez had established his claim by a preponderance of the credible evidence, and that one of the items lost was the 3,300 page transcript of Henriquez’s criminal trial. The Court awarded him damages for the transcript based on the amount it would cost claimant to obtain another copy of his original trial transcript at $1.00 per page for photocopying, plus the fee for transcribing the sentencing minutes ($105.60), totaling $3,405.60 (id.).
The current claim (No. 132201) alleges as follows: After the Court’s award, Henriquez learned that the original transcript, which was being maintained by the court reporting staff for the Bronx Hall of Justice (i.e., the Bronx Courthouse), had burned in a fire at an offsite storage facility (Claim, Ex 2).
According to a letter from the senior court reporter for the Bronx Hall of Justice dated July 23, 2018, appended to the present claim, at claimant’s request court reporting staff retrieved the transcript from the storage facility to make it available to claimant for photocopying (id). However, on January 14, 2013, the boxes were sent back to storage, where they ultimately met their demise in the 2015 fire that destroyed all of the transcripts being stored at this facility (id). To have the court reporting staff recreate an original transcript would cost $14,190.00 (id).
Due to the incineration of his original criminal trial transcript, claimant now seeks damages – less the amount previously awarded for photocopying – of $10,360.38, to cover the cost of reproducing an original transcript.
Defendant argues that the claim must be dismissed, on the ground that claimant “seeks to relitigate the same exact claim as was already decided” (Gavin Aff ¶ 5). In opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss, claimant contends that the transactions that comprises his current claim have not been previously litigated nor were they part of his 2010 claim (Reply of Alejandro Henriquez, dated December 3, 2018 [“Henriquez Reply”] at 2). According to claimant, the 2010 claim did not concern the destruction of the original criminal trial transcript by fire, and the cost needed to “re-transcrib[e]” it (id. at 3).
At the time the 2010 claim was filed, claimant states that he had been advised by the Bronx County Court that the original transcript was available for photocopying (id.). As claimant explains, it was not until the litigation had progressed, and unbeknownst to him, that his original transcript - the document from which the photocopy was to be made – had been destroyed by the 2015 fire (id). The prior trial concerned the loss of claimant’s copy of his criminal trial transcript due to the failures of the staff at the Green Haven Correctional Facility (id. at 2-3). The matter now at issue in this claim did not happen until 2015, after the initial claim was filed (id. at 3). Thus, claimant contends that he has never had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this matter and recover the cost of recreating an original trial transcript (id.).
Discussion
The doctrine of res judicata provides that “a party may not litigate a claim where a judgment on the merits exists from a prior action between the same parties involving the same subject matter” (Matter of Hunter, 4 NY3d 260, 269 [2005]). Under New York law, res judicata analysis utilizes a transactional approach: “‘once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy’” (Haberman v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of City of Long Beach, 119 AD3d 789, 791 [2d Dept 2014], quoting Hunter, 4 NY3d at 269).
In determining whether a series of facts constitutes a transaction under the rule of res judicata, “a court must apply a pragmatic test and analyze how the facts are related as to time, space, origin or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether treating them as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding” (id. [internal quotations omitted]). The doctrine of collateral estoppel is “a narrower species of res judicata [that] precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity, whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same” (Ryan v New York Telephone Co., 62 NY3d 494, 500 [1984]).
The claim before me does not arise out of the same transaction that comprised the 2010 claim. The earlier claim involved the allegedly negligent actions of DOCCS personnel, for which claimant was previously compensated. Now, claimant seeks damages arising from the 2015 fire that occurred at a Bronx County Court off-site storage facility. This issue was not raised in the 2010 claim, nor could it have been, since the acts alleged to have resulted in the destruction of the original transcript only occurred five years later (see O’Brien v City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 358 [1981] [plaintiff’s allegations not barred by res judicata where they describe acts that occurred after the prior lawsuit was commenced]; accord Citizens of Accord Inc. v. Twin Tracks Promotions Inc., 236 AD2d 665, 666 [3d Dept 1997]; Wollman v Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 170 AD2d 673, 676 [2d Dept 1991]). Thus, neither the rule of res judicata nor the doctrine of collateral estoppel can serve as ground to dismiss the claim.
That said, the nature of the cause of action being alleged here is not entirely clear. Hernandez does not have a general entitlement to receive the funds necessary to pay for a new transcript; he must allege and prove a cause of action against the State of New York, and that the State’s negligent or intentional acts caused the transcript’s loss. It is not clear from the record what sort of role the State plays in the Bronx Hall of Justice (a court facility), what its relationship is with the court reporters, or what role defendant played – if any – in the fire that, according to claimant, resulted in the transcript’s destruction.
But none of these issues have been raised by defendant. The claim on its face alleges that an original of Henriquez criminal transcript was lost in a fire, as a result of the “acts or omissions” of defendant State of New York (see Claim ¶ 2). Given the liberal construction that must be afforded pro se pleadings (see Belrose v Belrose, 141 AD3d 780, 781 [3d Dept 2016]; De La Rosa v State of New York, 173 Misc 2d 1007, 1008 [Ct Cl, 1997]), and the absence of any challenge by defendant to the substance of the claim, I cannot say that it is meritless on its face or that the Court lacks jurisdiction over it, as might support a sua sponte dismissal (cf. Erie Blvd. Hydropower, LP v State of New York, 90 AD3d 1292, 1293 [3d Dept 2011] [citing Court of Claims Act § 9] [“subject matter jurisdiction is nonwaivable and may be considered sua sponte”]).
Accordingly, for the aforementioned reasons, it is
ORDERED that motion M-93117 be denied.
The parties shall engage in such discovery as may be warranted, and each shall report to the Court by letter on or before August 30, 2019 as to: (1) whether the case is ready for trial; and (2) whether either party intends to file a motion for summary judgment.
February 5, 2019
Albany , New York
DAVID A. WEINSTEIN
Judge of the Court of Claims Papers Considered: 1. Notice of Motion, dated November 19, 2018, with supporting affirmation of Assistant Attorney General, Elizabeth A. Gavin, Esq., dated November 19, 2018, with exhibits 1-2 annexed thereto; and 2. Reply of Alejandro Henriquez, dated December 3, 2018, with exhibits 1- 4 annexed thereto. 3. Claimant’s letter with attachments to the Court, filed November 28, 2018.