Opinion
41034.
DECIDED JANUARY 19, 1965. REHEARING DENIED FEBRUARY 4, 1965.
Workmen's compensation. Franklin Superior Court. Before Judge Skelton.
William O. Carter, for plaintiff in error.
Woodruff, Savell, Lane Williams, John M. Williams, contra.
The judgment of the trial court affirming the award of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation is reversed with direction to remand the case to the board for the making of additional findings of fact as to what medical expenses the defendants are liable for, whether the claimant's dismissal was for the purpose of avoiding the payment of compensation and, if so, to how much compensation he is entitled under the law and the facts and all other issues involved.
DECIDED JANUARY 19, 1965 — REHEARING DENIED FEBRUARY 4, 1965.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the superior court affirming the award of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation in favor of the claimant for medical expenses incurred as a result of an accidental injury sustained on October 22, 1962.
Following are substantially the findings of fact of the deputy director: That the claimant sustained a low back strain while lifting yarn on October 22, 1962; that the following day he went to Dr. W. W. Harris for treatment and reported the incident to his foreman; that he continued working while being treated by Dr. Harris and he was dismissed from Candlewick Yarn Mills (his employer and co-defendant) after Dr. Harris had dismissed him as able to return to his regular employment; that Dr. Harris found, as a result of his first examination of the claimant, muscle spasms in the lower back, which he diagnosed as a low back strain; that he treated the claimant on several occasions and asked that he be put on light work for a short period; that he dismissed the claimant on November 14, 1962, to return to his normal work, at which time it was his opinion that there was no muscle spasm, the back was normal and there was no permanent disability; that Dr. James J. McDonald first saw the claimant on November 26, 1962, at which time he found muscle spasm in the lumbo-sacral region, and at that time diagnosed his condition as a back strain and a possible herniated disc; that he admitted him to the hospital on that date, keeping him there until December 12, 1962, and had seen him a number of times since that time, during which time he was treating him with conservative treatments; that Dr. McDonald's opinion was that he had made some improvement, although he continued to complain of pain, that he was not a strongly built man and could not handle heavy manual work, but was able to hold down a job in a mill or plant; that the claimant was laid off by his employer during the latter part of November after he had been dismissed by Dr. Harris, having been reprimanded by his employer on two previous occasions prior to said dismissal and injury; that the claimant sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment on October 22, 1962, when he strained his back while lifting yarn; that he did not lose any time as a result of this injury in that he continued to work until he was laid off for other reasons; that the employer and/or insurer were liable for certain medical expenses incurred for the injury sustained on October 22, 1962, up until November 14, 1962, the date he was dismissed by Dr. Harris; that there were not sufficient grounds to warrant penalties and attorney's fees. The deputy director's award authorized and directed the defendants to pay all reasonable and necessary medical expense incurred as a result of said injury between the dates of October 22, 1962, and November 14, 1962, and denied compensation, penalties and attorney's fees to the claimant. On appeal, the full board adopted the deputy director's findings of fact, but amended the next to last finding by deleting the words italicized hereinabove. The board's award merely authorized and directed the defendants "to pay all reasonable and necessary medical expenses incurred as a result of the accident and injury sustained on October 22, 1962, when presented with either itemized statement or paid receipt, within the limits of the Act." The claimant's appeal from the full board's award was based upon all the grounds provided in Code § 114-710 (Ga. L. 1920, p. 198; 1931, pp. 7, 43) with the exception of (2) (procurement by fraud).
The finding that it was Dr. Harris' opinion when he dismissed the claimant to return to his normal work on November 14, 1962, that the claimant had no muscle spasm, that his back was normal and that there was no permanent disability was not a finding that the above was a fact. It was merely a finding that such was the opinion of Dr. Harris. There was evidence that Dr. Harris told the claimant at that time that he couldn't find anything else wrong and that he had to have somebody that knew something about the back. This seems to indicate that the doctor's opinion was that, as far as he himself could determine, the claimant was recovered, but that he realized that there was a possibility that a doctor specializing in such matters might reach a different conclusion. Furthermore, the fact that the full board's amended finding and award omitted the limitation of November 14, 1962, the date of the claimant's "dismissal" by Dr. Harris, raises the inference that the board was of the opinion that the claimant's complaints and treatment subsequently to that date at least may have been causally related to the original injury. Without going into specific testimony, it is sufficient to state that there was evidence which might have authorized either finding. The board ought to have made a specific finding of fact and award, specifying what "reasonable and necessary" medical expenses were incurred as a result of the October 22nd accidental injury. This was a factual issue which should have been adjudicated by the board, especially up to the time of hearing, rather than being left to the parties to be resolved.
Although the award of the full board did not specifically award or deny compensation to the claimant, as did the award of the deputy director, the board's adoption of the deputy director's finding — that the claimant lost no time as a result of the injury in that he continued to work until he was laid off for other reasons — indicates their opinion that no compensation was justified. The only finding of fact upon which this conclusion is based is that the claimant had been reprimanded by his employer on two previous occasions prior to his sustaining the injury on October 22nd. The only evidence in the record concerning these "other reasons" is that the claimant had been reprimanded by his employer on June 22, 1962, in regard to the way he was doing his work and that, following that, he had another reprimand and was laid off a week due to a "misunderstanding" arising out of his employer's having asked him to do something that wasn't his job, which task he had not refused to do. This evidence was not sufficient to authorize the finding that the claimant was dismissed because his work was unsatisfactory, rather than for the purpose of avoiding paying the claimant compensation for his injury. The employer's act of permitting the claimant to work some 3 or 4 months after the reprimands amounts to an approval of the quality of his labors, especially in the absence of any evidence of its dissatisfaction with him shortly before it dismissed him.
Accordingly, the board must make the following additional findings of fact: firstly, as to what reasonable and necessary medical expenses must be paid for by the defendants and, secondly, whether the claimant's dismissal by his employer was for the purpose of avoiding payment of compensation and, if such be the case, to how much compensation the claimant is entitled under the law and the facts, and to decide all of the issues raised in the case.
The judgment of the trial court affirming the award of the board is reversed with direction that the case be remanded to the board for further findings of fact and award in accordance with the above holdings.
Judgment reversed. Jordan and Russell, JJ., concur.