Opinion
5-22-0061
04-26-2023
JEFFERY HENDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, et al., (Safeway Scaffolding, Safeway Services, LLC, Defendants-Appellants).
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Third Judicial Circuit, Madison County, Illinois Appeal No. 5-22-0061WC Circuit No. 2021-MR-000501 Honorable Ronald J. Foster, Judge, Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hoffman, Hutchinson, Cavanagh, and Barberis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
HOLDRIDGE PRESIDING JUSTICE.
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review the circuit court's order remanding the matter to the arbitrator for further proceedings addressing vocational rehabilitation.
¶ 2 The claimant, effery Henderson, filed a claim for benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2018)) against the respondent, Safeway Scaffolding, Safeway Services, LLC (employer), for a back injury he sustained on October 26, 2018, while working for the employer. After conducting a hearing, an arbitrator found that the claimant had sustained an accident arising of and in the course of his employment that necessitated some of the medical treatments he received. However, the arbitrator found that the claimant's current condition of ill-being was not causally related to the work accident. The arbitrator credited the opinions of the employer's medical expert that the claimant could return to work without restrictions and that no further medical treatment was necessary. The arbitrator therefore denied the claimant's claim for prospective medical treatment and awarded medical expenses from the date of the accident through October 14, 2019, the date that the claimant's treating physician had released him from care with restrictions.
¶ 3 The arbitrator awarded the claimant temporary total disability (TTD) benefits from November 14, 2018, (the date his treating physician took him off work), through July 8, 2019, (the date that the claimant could have returned to work a light-duty position offered by the employer but did not do so). The arbitrator found that the claimant's refusal to return to work the light-duty assignment after July 8, 2019, precluded the award of further TTD or maintenance benefits after that date. Based upon these factual findings, the arbitrator concluded that the claimant was not entitled to vocational rehabilitation.
¶ 4 The claimant appealed the arbitrator's decision to the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission), a majority of which affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision with modifications. The Commission affirmed the arbitrator's decision to deny TTD benefits after the claimant refused to work a job within his restrictions. It noted that the claimant was released to work with restrictions on May 19, 2019, and had sought work with other employers beginning in June 2019. Nevertheless, he refused to work the light-duty position offered by the employer. The Commission rejected the claimant's argument that he could not work the lightduty position. It found that the claimant never intended to return to work for the employer.
¶ 5 Based on these findings, the Commission affirmed the arbitrator's denial of maintenance benefits and vocational rehabilitation. Citing our decision in Euclid Beverage v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm 'n, 2019 IL App (2d) 180090WC, the Commission stated that "[Rehabilitation is neither mandatory for the employer nor appropriate if an injured employee does not intend, although capable, to return to work."
¶ 6 Commissioner Parker dissented. He disagreed with the majority's decision to terminate TTD benefits after July 8, 2019, and with its denial of vocational rehabilitation and maintenance benefits. He disputed the majority's finding that the claimant refused to return to a light-duty position on July 8, 2019. Commissioner Parker concluded that the evidence showed that the employer did not want to bring the claimant back to a light-duty position. Accordingly, Commissioner Parker would have extended the claimant's TTD benefits through October 14, 2019, the day the claimant's doctor released him from care with restrictions. Commissioner Parker also disagreed with the Commission's finding the claimant could return to work full duty without restrictions. He would have awarded maintenance benefits accordingly.
¶ 7 The claimant sought judicial review of the Commission's decision in the circuit court of Madison County. The circuit court reversed the Commission's decision in part. The court found that the Commission's decision on TTD benefits and its denial of vocational rehabilitation and maintenance were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Although the circuit court acknowledged that an employer may deny a claimant TTD benefits when the claimant refuses to accept a job within his work restrictions, it found that, in this case, the claimant had not refused to work the light-duty job offered by the employer. The court ordered that TTD benefits should have been paid from the date the claimant was taken off work through October 14, 2019, when the claimant reached maximum medical improvement. The circuit court held that the Commission's finding that the claimant could return to work full duty was "clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence." It ordered that maintenance benefits should have been paid from October 14, 2019, through the date of the arbitration hearing.
¶ 8 At the conclusion of its written Order, the circuit court stated,
"it appears from the record that the original Decision was under section 19(b) and, therefore, this case should be remanded back to the Arbitrator consistent with this Order and for further proceedings for a determination of additional amounts for TTD benefits, maintenance compensation for permanent disability and for vocational rehabilitation, if any, pursuant to Thomas v. Industrial Commission, 78 Ill.2d 327 (1980)." (Emphasis added.)
¶ 9 The employer filed a notice of appeal from the circuit court's order. In its briefs on appeal, the employer argues that Commission's award of TTD benefits only through July 8, 2018, and its denial of vocational rehabilitation and maintenance was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 10 Before addressing the issues raised by the employer, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to decide this appeal. The employer argues that we do. In his brief on appeal, the claimant did not argue that we lack jurisdiction. During oral argument, the claimant's counsel suggested that we might not have jurisdiction. However, he asked us to address the merits of the issues raised by the employer "in the interest of judicial economy." Although neither party argues that a lack of jurisdiction precludes our review, we have an independent obligation to consider our jurisdiction and to dismiss this appeal if our jurisdiction is lacking. St. Elizabeth S Hospital v. Workers' Compensation Comm 'n, 371 Ill.App.3d 882, 883 (2007). Unless an exception is provided by statute or supreme court rule, which is not the case here, our jurisdiction is limited to the review of final judgments. Wood Dale Electric v. Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2013 IL App (1st) 113394WC, ¶ 8. An order of the circuit court which reverses a decision of the Commission and remands the matter to the Commission for further substantive proceedings is interlocutory and not appealable. A.O. Smith Corp. v. Industrial Comm 'n, 109 Ill.2d 52, 54 (1985); Williams v. Industrial Comm 'n, 336 Ill.App.3d 513, 516 (2003). In determining whether a decision of the Commission is final, the question to be decided is whether administrative involvement in the case has been terminated or the Commission has ordered further administrative proceedings. Supreme Catering v. Workers' Compensation Comm 'n, 2012 IL App (1st) 111220WC, ¶ 8; International Paper Co. v. Industrial Comm 'n, 99 Ill.2d 458, 46566 (1984).
¶ 11 In this case, the circuit court found that the Commission's denial of vocational rehabilitation, which was based entirely on its finding that the claimant did not intend to return to work, was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The circuit court then remanded the matter to the arbitrator "for further proceedings for a determination of additional amounts for TTD benefits, maintenance compensation for permanent disability and for vocational rehabilitation, if any, pursuant to Thomas v. Industrial Commission, 78 Ill.2d 327 (1980)." (Emphasis added.) An order providing for vocational rehabilitation is not final until the parties have agreed upon (or the Commission has determined) a rehabilitation plan outlining the rehabilitation services to be performed and the amounts due for such services, among other things. Supreme Catering, 2012 IL App (1st) 111220WC. Here, the Commission remanded and directed the arbitrator to decide whether vocational rehabilitation should be awarded and, if so, to award it to the claimant. It did without specifying a vocational rehabilitation plan. Further administrative proceedings are required to decide the issue and to develop an appropriate vocational rehabilitation plan, if necessary. Thus, the circuit court's order is interlocutory and is not appealable. Id.
¶ 12 The employer argues that, in its remand order, the circuit court did not order the arbitrator to address vocational rehabilitation in the 19(b) proceeding that is currently under review. Rather, the court was merely stating that, after the current 19(b) proceeding is concluded, the matter will be remanded to the Commission for permanency proceedings, which would include the award of additional benefits, if any. In other words, the employer argues that the circuit court was merely stating that any additional benefits that might accrue after the date of the Commission's initial decision could be determined during a subsequent permanency proceeding pursuant to Thomas. As the employer correctly notes, the fact that permanent disability will be determined later, upon remand, does not divest the Commission or the courts of jurisdiction to consider the temporary 19(b) award, since that has been finally determined. Supreme Catering, 2012 IL App (1st) 111220WC, ¶ 10.
¶ 13 We disagree with the employer's interpretation of the circuit court's remand order. Although the circuit court mentioned Thomas in its remand order, it directed the arbitrator to determine on remand whether the claimant is entitled to vocational rehabilitation in the first instance. As the employer conceded during oral argument, this is not a matter that may be decided during a permanency proceeding pursuant to Thomas. This is not a case in which the Commission has already awarded vocational rehabilitation and the circuit court has remanded the matter to determine whether additional compensable benefits accrued after the Commission issued its temporary 19(b) award. Rather, the circuit court has directed the arbitrator to make findings on substantive issues in the existing 19(b) proceeding before issuing its temporary award. Thomas is therefore inapposite. The fact that the circuit court referenced Thomas in its remand order does not make its order final and reviewable. See Bechtel Group, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 305 Ill.App.3d 769, 772 (1999) (ruling that "Thomas does not permit carte blanche judicial review of nonfinal decisions."). Only final determinations of the Commission are appealable, and neither the Commission nor the circuit court can declare a nonfinal order to be reviewable. Id.
¶ 14 The employer notes that the Commission's order in this case was final because it denied vocational rehabilitation. Thus, unlike the situation in Supreme Catering, the circuit court in this case had jurisdiction to review the Commission's decision on vocational rehabilitation. The employer maintains that, because we review the Commission's decision rather than the circuit court's decision, we have jurisdiction to review the Commission's final order denying vocational rehabilitation.
¶ 15 We agree that the Commission's initial decision was a final order, and that the circuit court therefore had jurisdiction to review it. However, the question at issue is not whether the circuit court had jurisdiction, but whether we have jurisdiction to decide this appeal. Contrary to the employer's suggestion, the fact that the Commission's order was final and appealable when it reached the circuit court does not decide that issue. As noted above, the circuit court has ordered the arbitrator to conduct further proceedings and to make additional substantive findings on remand. That renders the circuit court's order interlocutory, and it deprives us of jurisdiction to review either the circuit court's order or the Commission's initial order.
¶ 16 CONCLUSION
¶ 17 For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
¶ 18 Appeal dismissed.