Opinion
# 2013-015-565 Claim No. 117657
10-03-2013
Claimant's attorney: John Hemphill, Pro Se Defendant's attorney: Honorable Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General By: Glenn C. King, Esquire Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Pro se inmate's wrongful confinement claim was dismissed following trial.
Case information
UID: 2013-015-565 Claimant(s): JOHN HEMPHILL Claimant short name: HEMPHILL Footnote (claimant name) : Defendant(s): THE STATE OF NEW YORK Footnote (defendant name) : Third-party claimant(s): Third-party defendant(s): Claim number(s): 117657 Motion number(s): Cross-motion number(s): Judge: FRANCIS T. COLLINS Claimant's attorney: John Hemphill, Pro Se Honorable Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General Defendant's attorney: By: Glenn C. King, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Third-party defendant's attorney: Signature date: October 3, 2013 City: Saratoga Springs Comments: Official citation: Appellate results: See also (multicaptioned case) Decision
Claimant, a pro se inmate, seeks damages for wrongful confinement and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from his alleged 14-day confinement to his cell pending the disposition of certain disciplinary charges. The claim was tried by remote video conference on August 8, 2013.
Claimant testified that on September 24, 2009 he was stopped by Sergeant Hendry for possessing a Federal Express envelope containing his legal documents. He was confined to his cell and issued a Misbehavior Report in which he was charged with refusing a direct order and interference. The charges were dismissed 14 days later. According to the claimant's testimony, an inmate is permitted to use Federal Express envelopes and he should not have been issued a Misbehavior Report nor been confined to his cell for 14 days.
On cross-examination, claimant agreed that the Misbehavior Report states that he threw a Federal Express envelope at Correction Officer Hendry and that he was charged with refusing a direct order and interference. Claimant testified on re-direct examination that Officer Hendry had no right to stop him for possessing a Federal Express envelope and that, in any event, he gave the envelope to Officer Hendry when requested.
Claimant called Hearing Officer Andrew Thompson Harvey to testify on his behalf. Hearing Officer Harvey testified that claimant was not charged with the possession of a Federal Express envelope but, rather, with refusing a direct order and interference. He was unable to state the reason these charges were classified as tier III offenses, testifying that the Review Officer makes all classification determinations. Hearing Officer Harvey testified that the charges against the claimant were dismissed because the facts set forth in the Misbehavior Report failed to support the charges (see Exhibit 3, Hearing Disposition Sheet).
In order to establish a cause of action for wrongful confinement, claimant must establish that the defendant confined him without his consent, that he was aware of the confinement and that the confinement was not privileged (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]). Establishing that a prison disciplinary confinement was not privileged requires proof that the hearing was not conducted in accordance with applicable statutory and regulatory due process requirements (see Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 220 [1988]; Holloway v State of New York, 285 AD2d 765 [3d Dept 2001]; Johnson v State of New York, UID No. 2008-044-566 [Ct Cl, Schaewe, J., July 24, 2008],) and that the confinement would not have occurred absent the violation (see generally DuBois v State of New York, 25 Misc 3d 1137 [Ct Cl 2009]; Mickens v State of New York, 25 Misc 3d 191 [Ct Cl 2009]; see also Collins v State of New York, 69 AD3d 46, 53 [4th Dept 2009]; Rivera v State of New York, UID No. 2006-028-008 [Ct Cl, Sise, P.J., February 8, 2006]).
An inmate may be confined to his or her "cell or room or housing area because he [or she] represents an immediate threat to the safety, security or order of the facility" (see 7 NYCRR 251-1.6 [a]; Davis v State of New York, 262 AD2d 887 [3d Dept 1999]). Thereafter, a hearing must be commenced within seven days of the confinement and completed within 14 days of the date of the misbehavior report absent authorization for an extension of time (7 NYCRR 251-5.1 [a], [b]).(1)
Here, claimant was confined to his cell on September 24, 2009, the Misbehavior Report was issued on September 25, 2009, the hearing commenced on October 1, 2009 and was completed on October 8, 2009 (see Exhibit 3). The hearing being timely commenced and completed, no violation of the rules governing the timeliness of the hearing occurred.
To the extent the claim rests solely on the contention that claimant was found not guilty of the charges against him and did not represent a threat to the safety and security of the prison and should not, therefore, have been confined to his cell, such contentions form no basis for overcoming defendant's assertion that it is immune from liability for the quasi-judicial discretionary determinations of its correctional facility employees (see Loret v State of New York, 106 AD3d 1159 [3d Dept 2013]; Holloway, 285 AD2d at 765). An inmate's confinement to his or her cell is authorized under 7 NYCRR 251-1.6 (a) whenever a correction officer reasonably believes that a facility rule has been violated by an inmate (Matter of Pettus v West, 28 AD3d 907, 908 [3d Dept 2006]) or the inmate is reasonably perceived to pose a threat to the safety and security of the prison (Davis v State of New York, 262 AD2d at 888). The ultimate determination that no rule violation occurred or that the inmate, in fact, posed no threat to the safety or security of the prison does not divest a disciplinary determination of its discretionary character or otherwise defeat the State's defense of absolute immunity (see e.g. Loret v State of New York, supra; Holloway v State of New York, supra).
Lastly, to the extent the claim may be read to include a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, no such cause of action lies against the State (Lynn v State of New York, 33 AD3d 673, 675 [2d Dept 2006]; Augat v State of New York, 244 AD2d 835, 837 [3d Dept 1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 814 [1998]).
Accordingly, the claim is dismissed.
Let judgment be entered accordingly.
October 3, 2013
Saratoga Springs, New York
FRANCIS T. COLLINS
Judge of the Court of Claims