Opinion
03-21-00148-CV
03-31-2022
Richard Helmer, Appellant v. Rusco Operating, LLC, Appellee
FROM THE 345TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1-GN-20-004724, THE HONORABLE JESSICA MANGRUM, JUDGE PRESIDING
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Kelly
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Chari L. Kelly, Justice
In this interlocutory appeal, Richard Helmer contends that the trial court erred in denying his special appearance in a suit brought by Rusco Operating, LLC (Rusco) for unpaid invoices incurred by Helmer Guidance, LLC. The sole basis for Rusco's assertion of personal jurisdiction over Helmer in his individual capacity was that Helmer Guidance was acting as the alter ego of Helmer. Because we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support an alter ego finding, we reverse the trial court's order and remand for the trial court to consider Rusco's request for additional jurisdictional discovery.
BACKGROUND LAW
A Texas court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the exercise of personal jurisdiction is authorized by the Texas long-arm statute and is consistent with federal and state constitutional guarantees of due process. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex. 2007). The broad language of the Texas long-arm statute allows Texas courts to exercise personal jurisdiction "as far as the federal constitutional requirements of due process will permit." BMC Software, Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002)
The Texas long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who "does business in the state" or
(1) contracts by mail or otherwise with a Texas resident and either party is to perform the contract in whole or in part in this state; (2) commits a tort in whole or in part in this state; or (3) recruits Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary located in this state, for employment inside or outside this state.Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 17.042.
"The Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations." Tabacinic v. Frazier, 372 S.W.3d 658, 663 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.) (citing federal cases, including Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S 462, 471-72 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980)). The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant comports with federal due process when "(1) the nonresident defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, and (2) asserting jurisdiction complies with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Moncrief Oil Int'l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 150 (Tex. 2013); see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The constitutional touchstone of personal jurisdiction is whether the defendant's contacts with the forum demonstrate that the "defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tex. 2005) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
BACKGROUND
Helmer, a resident of Louisiana, is the sole member and manager of Helmer Guidance, a Louisiana limited liability company with its principal place of business in Lafayette Parish, Louisiana. In February 2017, Helmer Guidance entered into a Master Service Agreement (the Agreement) with Rusco, a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in Travis County, Texas. Under the Agreement, Rusco would provide contract labor to Helmer Guidance, and in exchange, Helmer Guidance would pay Rusco for that labor within 30 days of receipt of invoice.
In September 2020, Rusco filed suit in Travis County against Helmer Guidance and Helmer. According to the allegations in its original petition, Rusco performed its obligations under the Agreement and then, between July 31, 2018, and April 16, 2019, sent Helmer Guidance a series of invoices totaling $597,158.81. Rusco further alleges that Helmer Guidance initially paid some of the outstanding balance on the invoices but in March 2019 stopped making payments. According to Rusco, more than $342,000 remains unpaid.
With respect to Helmer, Rusco alleges that he is also a member and manager of Helmer Directional Drilling, Inc. and that "based on information and belief," Helmer misdirected funds for work completed by Helmer Guidance and used these funds "for his direct personal benefit, including to pay himself and others through Helmer Directional Drilling." Rusco also alleges that "[t]here has been unity between" Helmer Guidance and Helmer, "such that [their] separateness . . . has ceased" and that "holding only Helmer Guidance responsible for the [debt] owed to Rusco would result in injustice." Rusco's causes of actions against Helmer Guidance and Helmer include claims for breach of contract, suit on sworn account, and quantum meruit. Rusco also asserts claims against Helmer, individually, for misrepresentation, fraudulent inducement, and tortious interference with contract.
After Helmer Guidance failed to appear, the trial court rendered a default judgment against the company. Helmer then filed a special appearance, asserting that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him in his individual capacity. See Tex. R. App. P. 120a. In his special appearance, Helmer argued that the trial court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over him because he is a resident of Louisiana, and not Texas; he has not engaged in business or committed a tort in Texas; and he has no substantial connection with Texas arising from any actual contact with, or purposefully directed toward, Texas. In support of his special appearance, Helmer attached his affidavit, verifying the facts presented in his special appearance and stating that Helmer Guidance is a Louisiana limited liability company and that he has not "personally entered into any agreement with any Texas resident to be performed in Texas or anywhere else."
After Rusco filed a response to Helmer's special appearance, the trial court conducted a non-evidentiary hearing. See id. R. 120a(3) ("The court shall determine the special appearance on the basis of the pleadings, any stipulations made by and between the parties, such affidavits and attachments as may be filed by the parties, the results of the discovery process, and any oral testimony."). In its response, and at the hearing, Rusco did not dispute that the Agreement was between Rusco and Helmer Guidance, and not Helmer. In addition, Rusco did not dispute that Helmer lacks sufficient contacts with Texas to support personal jurisdiction over him in his individual capacity. Instead, Rusco argued that, despite Helmer's lack of contacts with Texas, he is subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas because (1) there is no dispute that the trial court may properly exercise specific jurisdiction over Helmer Guidance, an entity which does business in Texas, and (2) Helmer Guidance is the alter ego of Helmer. See Davey v. Shaw, 225 S.W.3d 843, 854 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) ("Under the alter ego theory, personal jurisdiction may be established by imputing the jurisdictional contacts of a corporate entity to its owners or parent corporation."); see BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 798 ("Personal jurisdiction may exist over a nonresident defendant if the relationship between the foreign corporation and its parent corporation that does business in Texas is one that would allow the court to impute the parent corporation's 'doing business' to the subsidiary.").
The trial court later signed an order denying Helmer's special appearance, and this appeal followed. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(7). In two issues, Helmer argues that the trial court erred in denying his special appearance because Rusco's alter ego theory was the sole basis for its assertion of personal jurisdiction over Helmer and because the trial court's implied finding that there is an alter ego relationship between Helmer and Helmer Guidance is not supported by sufficient evidence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 120a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure allows a nonresident defendant to enter a special appearance in a Texas court for the limited purpose of challenging the court's jurisdiction "over the person or property of the defendant." Tex.R.Civ.P. 120. Ordinarily, a nonresident defendant has the burden to negate all bases for personal jurisdiction properly pleaded by the plaintiff. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 794. However, when the plaintiff relies on the existence of an alter ego relationship to impute a corporation's contacts with Texas to an individual, the plaintiff must present evidence demonstrating that such a relationship exists. Atiq v. CoTechno Grp., Inc., No. 03-13-00762-CV, 2015 Tex.App. LEXIS 11318, at *26 (Tex. App.-Austin Nov. 4, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Washington DC Party Shuttle, LLC v. IGuide Tours, LLC, 406 S.W.3d 723, 739 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied)).
Whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction is a question of law. Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. v. Bell, 549 S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex. 2018). However, the trial court frequently must resolve questions of fact before deciding the jurisdiction question. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 794. When, as in this case, the trial court does not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, all relevant facts that are necessary to support the judgment and are supported by the evidence are implied. Id. at 795. When the appellate record includes the reporter's record and clerk's record, these implied findings are not conclusive and may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency. Id. Once we determine that the trial court's findings are supported by sufficient evidence, or if the material facts are undisputed, we review the trial court's ruling on a special appearance de novo. Baker Hughes Inc. v. Brooks, 405 S.W.3d 246, 249 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied).
ANALYSIS
Hearsay Challenge
In his first issue, Helmer asserts the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of alter ego because the only evidence presented by Rusco in support of its alter ego theory was inadmissible hearsay. To its special-appearance response, Rusco attached the unsworn declaration of Elizabeth Gazette, an employee of Rusco's parent company, Workrise Technologies, Inc. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 132.001 (providing that "an unsworn declaration may be used in lieu of a written sworn declaration, verification, certification, oath, or affidavit required by statute or required by a rule, order, or requirement adopted as provided by law"); Tex. R. Civ. Proc. 120a(3) (providing that "[t]he court shall determine the special appearance on the basis of," among other things, "affidavits and attachments as may be filed by the parties"). In her declaration, Gazette states that in her role as "Credit Lead" she is responsible for collecting debts for Rusco and that she is familiar with Rusco's business processes and with the debt owed by Helmer Guidance. Gazette goes on to recount phone conversations that she had about Helmer Guidance's debt with an individual named Ryan Comeaux, whom Gazette identifies as an "employee, owner, and manager of Helmer Guidance." Gazette also attached to her declaration a copy of the Agreement, which purports to be signed by "Ryan Comeaux," in his capacity as "Manager/Owner" of Helmer Guidance.
On appeal, Helmer asserts that those portions of Gazette's declaration in which she recites statements allegedly made to her by Comeaux are hearsay and that "Rusco's entire assertion of jurisdiction over Helmer is based upon these hearsay statements." Thus, Helmer reasons, "Rusco failed to provide admissible evidence to satisfy its burden to prove alter ego." Assuming without deciding that Helmer has adequately preserved this evidentiary issue, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to exclude the objected-to portions of Gazette's declaration. See Brookshire Bros., Ltd., v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 27 (Tex. 2014) (noting that appellate courts evaluate trial court's admission of evidence under abuse-of-discretion standard).
In its appellate brief, Rusco asserts that Helmer has failed to preserve this evidentiary issue for appeal because, although Helmer's attorney objected to the admission of this evidence as hearsay at the special-appearance hearing, he failed to obtain a ruling from the trial court on the objection. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 (providing that to preserve complaint for appellate review, the record must show that trial court ruled or refused to rule "on the request, objection, or motion").
Texas Rule of Evidence 802 prohibits the admission of hearsay except as provided by statute or other rule prescribed by statutory authority. See Tex. R. Evid. R. 802. Hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the current trial or hearing, that a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. Id. R. 801(d). In response to Helmer's hearsay objection, Rusco's attorney argued to the trial court that Comeaux's statements within Gazette's declaration are not hearsay because they are admissions by a party opponent under Rule 801(e)(2). Under this Rule, a statement is not hearsay if it is "offered against an opposing party" and "made by the party's agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while it existed." Id. R. 801(e)(2)(D).
The Agreement attached to Gazette's declaration, which was also attached to Rusco's original petition, identifies Ryan Comeaux as an owner and manager of Helmer Guidance. Based on this evidence, along with Gazette's declaration about the nature of her conversations with Comeaux, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Comeaux was an "agent or employee" of Helmer Guidance at the time the alleged statements were made to Gazette and that those statements concerned "a matter within the scope of [his] relationship" with Helmer Guidance. See id. Consequently, assuming that Helmer's objection to those portions of Gazette's declaration has been adequately preserved for appeal, we conclude that the trial court could have reasonably determined that under Rule 801(e)(2), the evidence was an admission by a party opponent and not hearsay. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Having rejected Helmer's argument that Rusco's alter ego evidence was not properly before the trial court and should not be considered on appeal, we turn to his second issue. In this issue, Helmer argues that even if the trial court properly considered Gazette's declaration, including the objected-to portions, the evidence is legally insufficient to support an alter ego finding. See BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795 (examining implied findings on special appearance for factual and legal sufficiency).
Under our legal sufficiency standard of review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005). If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, the legal-sufficiency challenge fails. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002).
Under Texas law, a corporation is presumed to be a separate entity from its officers and shareholders. Washington DC Party Shuttle, 406 S.W.3d at 738-39. As a result, personal jurisdiction over an individual cannot be based on jurisdiction over a corporation or, as in this case, a limited liability company with which the individual is associated unless the corporation or company is the alter ego of the individual. Tabacinic, 372 S.W.3d at 669; see Rockton, LLC v. Paris, No. 09-16-00070-CV, 2016 Tex.App. LEXIS 11393, at *8 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Oct. 20, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that Texas intermediate appellate courts and other jurisdictions have applied to limited liability companies same state law principles for piercing corporate veil as they have to corporations) (citing, e.g., Shook v. Walden, 368 S.W.3d 604, 614, 621 (Tex. App.-Austin 2012, pet. denied)).
As previously discussed, a plaintiff who relies on the existence of an alter ego relationship to impute a corporation's contacts with Texas to an individual must present evidence demonstrating that such a relationship exists. See Atiq, 2015 Tex.App. LEXIS 11318, at *26. To determine whether this burden has been met, a court looks to the total dealings of the corporation and the individual, Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tex. 1990), including the degree to which corporate and individual property have been kept separately; the amount of financial interest, ownership, and control the individual maintains over the corporation; and whether the individual has used the corporation for personal purposes, Watamar Holding, S.A. v. SFM Holdings, S.A., 583 S.W.3d 318, 333 (Tex. App-Houston [14th Dist] 2019, no pet.); Booth v. Kontomitras, 485 S.W.3d 461, 482 (Tex. App-Beaumont 2016, no pet.). Courts may also consider evidence of (1) the payment of alleged corporate debits with personal check or other commingling of funds; (2) representations that the individual will financially back the corporation; (3) the diversion of company profits to the individual for his personal use; (4) inadequate capitalization; and (5) other failures to keep corporate and personal assets separate. Atiq, 2015 Tex.App. LEXIS 11318, at *26-27 (citing Crithfield v. Boothe, 343 S.W.3d 274, 284-85 (Tex. App-Dallas 2011, no pet), overruled in part by Steward Health Care Sys., LLC v. Saidara, 633 S.W.3d 120 (Tex. App. -Dallas 2021, no pet.)). Ultimately, for a court to find personal jurisdiction based on a theory of alter ego, the evidence must show that there is such unity between the corporation and the individual that the separateness of the corporation has ceased and that holding only the corporation liable would result in an injustice. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 798; Hoffman v. Dandurand, 180 S.W.3d 340, 347 (Tex. App-Dallas 2005, no pet.) (quoting Mancorp, 802 S.W.2d at 228). "Mere ownership or control of a company is not a sufficient basis for ignoring the corporate fiction." Penhollow Custom Homes, LLC v. Kim, 320 S.W.3d 366, 373 (Tex. App -El Paso 2010, no pet.).
Relevant to the issue of alter ego, Gazette states in her declaration:
From my correspondence with Helmer Guidance in trying to collect amounts owed to Rusco, I learned that Richard Helmer owns, governs, and manages both Helmer Guidance and a related entity, Helmer Directional Drilling, Inc. ("Helmer Directional"), using the same staff and office.
[W]hen I asked Mr. Comeaux about why Rusco was not receiving payment for its services, Mr. Comeaux told me that Richard Helmer managed all of the funds that came in for jobs performed by Helmer Guidance or Helmer Directional. He indicated that Richard Helmer's practice was to allocate funds received for work performed by Helmer Guidance as he saw fit, based on his own personal wishes. Mr. Comeaux informed me that Richard Helmer did not properly allocate funds that were paid for work done by Helmer Guidance to vendors-like Rusco-who did that underlying work for Helmer Guidance. Instead, he said that Richard Helmer disproportionately allocated those funds according to personal preferences, including to pay expenses of Helmer Directional. On several occasions, Mr. Comeaux said that, when funds arrived for work done by Helmer Guidance, vendors who had more recently performed work and billed Helmer Directional were being paid instead of vendors like Rusco who still had not been paid for previous work for Helmer Guidance.
This undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's alter ego finding, demonstrates that Helmer owns and manages two business entities, Helmer Guidance and Helmer Directional; that Helmer alone controlled, "based on his own personal wishes," how funds belonging to Helmer Guidance would be allocated; and that "[o]n several occasions," Helmer withdrew funds from Helmer Guidance for purposes unrelated to Helmer Guidance, specifically, to pay expenses for Helmer Directional. Rusco argues that this evidence is sufficient to support a finding of alter ego as to Helmer because it demonstrates "[a] failure to observe corporate formalities, a lack of capitalization and ability to pay creditors, and Helmer's misdirection of corporate assets for his own personal benefit and to the detriment of [Helmer Guidance]." For several reasons, we disagree.
Much of the argument and evidence presented by Rusco concerns the relationship between Helmer Guidance and Helmer Directional. For example, Rusco emphasizes that Helmer Guidance and Helmer Directional operate out of the same office and that Helmer used funds from Helmer Guidance to pay for Helmer Directional's expenses. Rusco does not assert, however, that Helmer Guidance operated as the alter ego of Helmer Directional and has not named Helmer Directional as a defendant in this suit. Cf. PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 175-76 (Tex. 2007) (discussing whether parent company and subsidiary should be treated as one for purposes of personal jurisdiction).
Rusco also argues that the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of alter ego because it shows that Helmer "and his representatives and agents induced Rusco to pay independent contractors to perform work for Helmer Guidance" and then "fraudulently stripped Helmer Guidance of its rightful assets." Because of due process considerations, veil-piercing for purposes of establishing liability is distinct from veil piercing for jurisdictional purposes. Id. at 176. Consequently, fraud, which is vital to piercing the corporate veil under the Business Organizations Code, Section 21.223, has no place in assessing veil piercing for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction. Id. at 175. Therefore, to the extent Rusco seeks to impute jurisdiction by relying on a theory that Helmer used Helmer Guidance to defraud Rusco, such reliance is misplaced.
First, Rusco does not explain what formalities were not observed by Helmer Guidance, and even if it had, the failure to comply with corporate formalities is no longer a factor in considering whether an alter ego exists. Penhollow Custom Homes, 320 S.W.3d at 372; Morris v. Powell, 150 S.W.3d 212, 220 (Tex. App-San Antonio 20014, no pet.). Second, contrary to Rusco's suggestion, we cannot infer from Helmer's transfer of funds or from Helmer Guidance's failure to pay Rusco that Helmer Guidance is inadequately capitalized, and there was no evidence presented as to Helmer Guidance's financial status. See Zhao v. iComposite, LLC, No. 14-20-00605-CV, 2022 Tex.App. LEXIS 355, at *15 (Tex. App-Houston [14th Dist] Jan. 20, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("Inadequate capitalization for alter ego purposes, requires proof of a corporation's capital, other assets, debts, and liabilities.") (citing Endsley Elec, Inc. v. Altech, Inc., 378 S.W.3d 15, 25 (Tex. App - Texarkana 2012, no pet.)).
Finally, because a member of a limited liability company may be entitled to receive a distribution of company funds, see Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 101.203 ("Sharing of Distributions"), the fact that "on several occasions," Helmer withdrew funds from Helmer Guidance and used the funds for purposes unrelated to Helmer Guidance is insufficient, standing alone, to show that Helmer Guidance was operated as a "mere tool or business conduit." See Penhollow Custom Homes, 320 S.W.3d at 373 (evidence that shareholder took owner's draws as opposed to salary was not sufficient to prove alter ego); Morris, 150 S.W.3d at 220 (same); see also Karaa v. Aramoonie, No. 05-17-00571-CV, 2018 Tex.App. LEXIS 1973, at *12 (Tex. App-Dallas Mar. 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("[T]aking a draw does not establish such unity between owner and company that the separateness of the corporation ceases to exist."). As previously discussed, in analyzing whether an alter ego relationship exists, a court must look to the total dealings of the corporation and the individual. See Watamar Holding, S.A., 583 S.W.3d at 333. Without additional evidence of the dealings between Helmer and Helmer Guidance, we cannot conclude from the fact that Helmer withdrew funds that he "diverted] company profits" or "fail[ed] to keep corporate and personal assets separate," see Crithfield, 343 S.W.3d at 284-85, such that "the separateness [of Helmer Guidance] has ceased," see Hoffman, 180 S.W.3d at 347.
In sum, the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's implied finding that an alter ego relationship exists, such that Helmer Guidance's jurisdictional contacts may be imputed to Helmer. Because this was the sole basis for Rusco's assertion of personal jurisdiction over Helmer, the trial court erred in denying Helmer's special appearance.
In its original petition, Rusco alleges that Helmer engaged in tortious conduct, including fraud. We recognize that even without piercing the corporate veil, a corporate officer may be subject to specific jurisdiction as to tortious and fraudulent acts for which he may be held individually liable. See Atiq v. CoTechno Grp., Inc., No. 03-13-00762-CV, 2015 Tex.App. LEXIS 11318, at *19 (Tex. App-Austin Nov. 4, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Niehaus v. Cedar Bridge, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Tex. App-Austin 2006, no pet.) (explaining that officer's actions performed in his corporate capacity may subject him to personal jurisdiction and liability in his individual capacity if his actions were tortious or fraudulent). Rusco does not contend, and has not pleaded any facts or presented any evidence suggesting, that Helmer's tortious and fraudulent actions occurred in Texas or that they otherwise demonstrate purposeful availment by Helmer individually. See Atiq, 2015 Tex.App. LEXIS 11318, at *26 (explaining that corporate officer's fraudulent and tortious activities will support exercise of specific jurisdiction only when "(1) corporate officer's contacts with the forum demonstrate purposeful availment, and (2) the cause of action arises from or relates to these contacts"). Consequently, we cannot conclude that Rusco's allegations that Helmer engaged in tortious and fraudulent conduct are sufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Helmer.
Remand and Jurisdictional Discovery
In its response to Helmer's special appearance, Rusco alternatively requested that the trial court allow additional time for discovery on its alter ego theory. See Barron v. Vanier, 190 S.W.3d 841, 849-50 (Tex. App-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (explaining that courts should allow additional time for discovery when "the movant makes a good-faith showing, provides a colorable basis for, or makes a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction, or provides a reason to believe that discovery would reveal sufficient minimum contacts"). Because the trial court determined that, based on the evidence before it, Rusco had met its burden to establish its alter ego claim, the court did not reach this request.
By conditional cross-point, Rusco suggests that we remand the cause to the trial court so that it may now consider its request for additional discovery. A trial court has discretion to allow additional time for jurisdictional discovery. See Lamar v. Ponco, 305 S.W.3d 130, 139 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). Under the circumstances presented, we agree that it is appropriate to remand to the trial court to consider whether to allow jurisdictional discovery. See LG Chem, Ltd. v. Turner, No. 14-19-00326-CV, 2021 Tex.App. LEXIS 4200, at *17 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 27, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reversing denial of special appearance and remanding cause for trial court to consider whether to allow appellee to obtain jurisdictional discovery).
CONCLUSION
Because we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Helmer's special appearance, we reverse the trial court's order. We remand the case to the trial court to consider whether to allow Rusco to conduct jurisdictional discovery.
Reversed and Remanded.