Opinion
A22-0981
08-22-2023
In re the Custody of: E. J. H., v. Laura Christine Rivard, Respondent. Brian Allen Heil, petitioner, Appellant,
Wright County District Court File No. 86-FA-16-3399
Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Hooten, Judge. [*]
ORDER OPINION
Randall J. Slieter Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant-father Brian Allen Heil challenges the custody modification awarding respondent-mother Laura Christine Rivard sole legal and sole physical custody of their minor child and awarding him supervised parenting time. Because the district court acted within its discretion by proceeding with the evidentiary hearing after father voluntarily disconnected from the remote hearing and "mere inspection" of the record reveals no prejudicial error, we affirm.
2. Father and mother are the parents of the nonmarital child E.J.H., who was born in 2012. In 2017, the district court entered a stipulated order and judgment awarding the parties joint legal custody and joint physical custody and establishing parenting time.
3. Mother moved to modify custody in 2020, and the district court ordered the parties to participate in a parenting evaluation. In 2022, based on the evaluator's findings and recommendations, mother moved for temporary sole legal and temporary sole physical custody. The district court granted mother's motion and, after a hearing, ruled mother had made a prima facie showing of endangerment and scheduled an evidentiary hearing. See Geibe v. Geibe, 571 N.W.2d 744, 776 (Minn.App. 1997) (stating that an evidentiary hearing must be held if affidavits establish a prima facie case for modification).
4. At the evidentiary hearing, which was held remotely, father appeared pro se. He refused to state his name for the record and stated that he was "appearing here as a[n] authorized representative of all caps name." Father repeatedly requested "the assessment of any charges against [him]," and asserted that he "d[id] not consent to proceed" and would "withdraw [him]self" if the "assessment of charges" was not produced. The district court explained to father that the hearing would continue if he left, and mother would be allowed to "prove up" her claims in his absence.
5. Father left the remote hearing after mother's first witness was sworn. The district court attempted to reconnect to father with no success. The district court found that father intentionally withdrew from the hearing and determined that it would proceed in default, with mother presenting her evidence. As the hearing proceeded, the district court monitored who was connected, and noted that father did not reestablish a connection.
6. Mother testified, as well as the parenting time evaluator and the psychologist who had evaluated E.J.H. The district court filed an order and entered an associated judgment modifying custody to grant mother sole legal and sole physical custody and father supervised parenting time. In the order, the district court also concluded that proceeding in father's absence was proper because father, when he was present, was advised that the hearing would continue and mother's presentation of evidence would be unchallenged if he withdrew.
7. Father argues in this pro se appeal that the district court should not have proceeded in his absence because his "confusion . . ., as a self-represented party, should not have been met with the punishment of default." He also disputes the district court's best-interest and endangerment findings, as well as its reliance on the testimony of the parenting time evaluator and child psychologist.
8. As a general matter, the district court has broad discretion to control its calendar. See Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 412 (Minn. 1982) (addressing a request to extend the time for discovery). And, if a party fails to appear for a final hearing, the family-court rules specifically authorize "striking of the nonappearing party's pleadings and the hearing of the matter as a default, . . . as the court finds appropriate, without further notice to the defaulting party." Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 307(a).
9. When father indicated that he would withdraw from the hearing if not presented with the "assessment of the charges," the district court explained to him that there were no charges because this was a civil matter and that, if he left, the hearing would continue and mother would present her evidence. Because pro se parties are held to the same standards as attorneys, father's lack of representation is not a viable excuse for failing to participate in the hearing. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn.App. 2001); see also Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc., 400 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn. 1987) ("While an appellant acting pro se is usually accorded some leeway in attempting to comply with court rules, he is still not relieved of the burden of, at least, adequately communicating to the court what it is he wants accomplished and by whom."). On this record, the district court was within its discretion to continue in default when father intentionally left the hearing.
10. Father also disputes the district court's best-interest finding, endangerment finding, and reliance on the testimony presented at trial. Initially, we note that the record, as constituted, supports the district court's determinations on these matters. Additionally, as a general rule, appellate courts will only consider issues presented to and considered by the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). And this is especially true when the issue rests on disputed facts. Id. Here, father disputes the facts underlying the district court's decisions on these matters. But because he voluntarily left the hearing, he forfeited his right to present evidence on these matters, and he cannot now complain about the district court's reliance on the evidence that was presented. See Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk, 668 N.W.2d 235, 243 (Minn.App. 2003) ("On appeal, a party cannot complain about a district court's failure to rule in her favor when one of the reasons it did not do so is because that party failed to provide the district court with the evidence that would allow the district court to fully address the question."), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2003).
11. Moreover, even if we were to consider father's arguments, "mere inspection" reveals no obvious prejudicial error in the district court's order. Louden v. Louden, 22 N.W.2d 164, 166 (Minn. 1946) ("An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or authorities in appellant's brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.").
12. We review custody modifications for an abuse of discretion. Sharp v. Bilbro, 614 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn.App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2000). "A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record." Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). When reviewing whether the findings of fact are supported by the evidence, we defer to the district court's credibility determinations. Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008).
13. The district court made extensive findings addressing all 12 statutory best-interest factors and the endangerment standard. See Minn. Stat. §§ 518.17, subd. 1 (best-interest factors), .18(d)(iv) (endangerment standard) (2022). These findings were based on the testimony of mother and her witnesses, whom the district court found credible. We defer to that credibility determination. Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at 284. And our review of the record confirms that the testimony and evidence presented supports the district court's determination that the endangerment standard was met and modifying custody was in the child's best interest. See In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021) (discussing, in detail, the clear-error standard appellate courts use to review a district court's findings of fact and stating-among other things-that "an appellate court need not go into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the findings of the [district] court").
Mother moved this court to strike large portions of father's reply brief. We will strike documents parties submit that are not part of the record on appeal. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01; Mitterhauser v. Mitterhauser, 399 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Minn.App. 1987). Because father submitted no additional documents, we deny mother's motion as unnecessary. Cf. Am. Fed'n of State, County, & Mun. Emps., Council No. 14 v. County of Scott, 530 N.W.2d 218, 222 (Minn.App. 1995) (granting motion to strike additional documents filed and denying motion to strike associated reply brief), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 1995).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed.
2. Mother's motion to strike is denied.
3. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
[*]Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.