Opinion
Civil Action No. 19-1463
08-17-2020
ADAM HEASTER, Individually and For Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. EQT CORPORATION, Defendant.
District Judge David Stewart Cercone
Re: ECF Nos. 56, 70, 84 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Adam Heaster ("Heaster") brings this putative class and collective action against Defendant EQT Corporation ("EQT") under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act ("PMWA"), 43 Pa. C.S. § 33.104 et seq., to recover overtime wages allegedly due from his work as a landman in Western Pennsylvania. Intervenor-Defendant EQT Production Company ("EQT Production") and EQT have each filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration, and EQT has filed a Motion to Dismiss Heaster's individual claims. ECF Nos. 56, 70, 84.
Upon review of the various motions, briefs, and exhibits thereto, the Court finds that Heaster consented to arbitrate any dispute arising out of his work on behalf of EQT Production. Heaster further agreed to delegate to an arbitrator questions related to the scope of the Arbitration Agreement and because EQT is a third-party beneficiary of the agreement, Heaster has delegated the issue of whether his claims against EQT are subject to the agreement. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court grant the Motions to Compel Arbitration. It is further recommended that the Court stay this action pending completion of arbitration to resolve any remaining claims, including those of the just named opt-in plaintiff, Clayton Kleevic.
The Court notes that while this litigation has been pending since November 2019, Mr. Kleevic opted in as a putative class member on August 7, 2020, the same day Heaster filed his final brief in opposition to the pending Motions to Compel Arbitration of his individual claims.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Heaster initiated this action against EQT to recover overtime wages on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated employees for alleged FLSA violations during the period October 2016 through April 2018. ECF No. 1. EQT filed its Answer and denied that it ever employed Heaster or any putative class member. ECF No. 11. On January 21, 2020, the Court conducted an initial case management conference, and the parties agreed to phased class certification discovery and to mediation in accordance with this Court's Alternative Dispute Resolution Policies and Procedures. ECF Nos. 16, 17, 19. On January 28, 2020, the Court entered the jointly proposed Case Management Order regarding the timing of conditional class certification discovery and related motions. ECF Nos. 23 and 24.
Shortly after the initial case management conference, Heaster filed his First Amended Complaint to add a PMWA claim. ECF No. 22. EQT filed its Answer to the amended complaint and again denied an employment relationship with Heaster or with any putative class member. ECF No. 27. EQT asserted that Heaster was employed by Mason Dixon Energy, LLC d/b/a Percheron Energy, LLC and/or Percheron Professional Services, LLC ("Percheron"). Id. ¶ 5. Days later, Heaster filed a "Motion to Certify Class and Authorize Notice to Putative Class Members" and demanded that EQT respond to the motion three months earlier than the date reflected in the Court's scheduling order. ECF No. 31. The Court issued an order confirming the original deadlines previously agreed to by the parties and set forth in the Case Management Order. ECF No. 32.
EQT Production filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss, ECF Nos. 33, and identified itself as the proper defendant, "incorrectly captioned as EQT Corporation." ECF No. 33. EQT Production represents that it entered into a master services agreement with Percheron and that any work performed by Heaster for Percheron was in furtherance of that agreement and not on behalf EQT. ECF No. 34 at 2-3. To that end, EQT Production presents a "Pre-Assignment Acknowledgment and Arbitration Agreement" (the "Arbitration Agreement") between Heaster and Percheron, for "any work" performed on an EQT Production project. ECF No. 38-1.
The Arbitration Agreement, dated March 22, 2018, bears Heaster's electronic signature and delegates to Percheron sole responsibility for ensuring appropriate compensation in accordance with applicable state and federal laws. The Agreement requires arbitration of "any dispute" "with [Percheron] and/or [EQT Production]." Id. Arbitration is to be conducted in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") and governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. The terms also specify that selected arbitrators have exclusive authority to resolve any disputes of any kind, including enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement. Id. Heaster waived the right to proceed in a collective action as to "any claim arising from any dispute," and agreed to "waive any right to litigate such disputes in a court of law, ... including in each case for disputes involving ... wages, hours, benefits, and other terms and conditions of my employment with employer." Id. Heaster also agreed to comply with " EQT Corporation's Code of Business Conduct and Ethics" if Percheron lacked a code of its own. Id. (emphasis added).
EQT Production argued that Heaster's wage claims fall within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement and thus are required to be litigated in final binding arbitration. ECF Nos. 33 and 34. EQT Production further contended that EQT is a third-party beneficiary to the Arbitration Agreement based on its close relationship with EQT Production. In this regard, EQT Production states that Heaster's joint-employer theory of liability is necessarily dependent on the relationship between EQT and EQT Production. ECF No. 34 at 14-17.
Heaster responded to the Motion to Compel Arbitration with a Motion to Strike disputing EQT Production's standing to file a Motion to Compel Arbitration. ECF No. 48. Heaster stated that "EQT Production is a separate legal entity from EQT, its parent company," and was not named by Heaster as a defendant. Id. at 9. Heaster claimed that he was not suing EQT as a joint employer with Percheron or EQT Production, but as Heaster's "true employer for purposes of the FLSA." ECF No. 47; ECF No. 48 at 2.
The Court granted the Motion to Strike because as a non-party, EQT Production lacked standing to compel arbitration. The Court agreed, however, that at least a portion of Heaster's claims for the period October 2016 through April 2018 may be subject to the March 22, 2018 Arbitration Agreement. As a result, the Court granted EQT Production leave to file a motion for permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to protect any interest it might have in the litigation, and further granted EQT leave to file a Motion to Compel Arbitration on its own behalf as an alleged third-party beneficiary. ECF No. 52. EQT filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss, ECF No. 56, and EQT Production Company filed a Motion to Intervene, ECF No. 54.
Heaster opposed the Motion to Intervene and argued that neither Percheron nor EQT Production is relevant to his lawsuit against EQT, and neither has an interest in its resolution or litigation. ECF No. 62. Heaster advanced this argument despite his claim for wages arising out of hours worked for Percheron and EQT Production for at least the period March 22, 2018 through April 30, 2018. ECF No. 22 ¶ 11. To avoid arbitration and a potential stay or dismissal of this action, Heaster requested leave to file a second amended complaint abandoning any individual claim for unpaid wages arising after date he executed the Arbitration Agreement. Id. at 2-3; see also ECF No. 63, Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint. The Court granted Heaster leave to file the proposed Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 66, and granted EQT Production's Motion to Intervene, ECF No. 67.
Heaster filed his Second Amended Complaint and "expressly limits his individual claims to those arising prior to March 22, 2018." ECF No. 73 ¶ 13.
In the interim, EQT filed a Motion to Stay Discovery, ECF No. 59, pending resolution of the Motion to Compel Arbitration and Heaster filed a Motion for Equitable Tolling of the statute of limitations as of February 24, 2020, the date he filed his Motion to Certify Class. ECF No. 64. The Court directed counsel "to discuss and attempt to reach an agreement on Plaintiff's Motion for Tolling" and, absent agreement, ordered EQT to file a response to Heaster's motion. ECF No. 68. The parties failed to reach agreement, and the Court issued an order tolling the statute of limitations for the period February 25, 2020, through the date the pending Motions to Compel Arbitration are resolved. ECF No. 83. The Court also granted a stay of discovery but directed limited discovery as to the disputed authenticity of the Arbitration Agreement, and the relationship between Heaster, EQT Production, and EQT. ECF No. 82.
Limited discovery is complete, and the parties have filed supplemental briefs in support and in opposition to the motions to compel arbitration. ECF Nos. 104 and 106. The pending Motions to Compel Arbitration are ripe for consideration.
B. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 based on claims arising under federal law and supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
In Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764 (3d Cir. 2016), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained the review to be employed by district courts regarding an agreement to arbitrate:
when it is apparent, based on "the face of a complaint, and documents relied upon in the complaint," that certain of a party's claims "are subject to an enforceable arbitration clause, a motion to compel arbitration should be considered under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard without discovery's delay." Somerset, 832 F.Supp.2d at 482. But if the complaint and its supporting documents are unclear regarding the agreement to arbitrate, or if the plaintiff has responded to a motion to compel arbitration with additional facts sufficient to place the agreement to arbitrate in issue, then "the parties should be entitled to discovery on the question of arbitrability before a court entertains further briefing on [the] question." Id. After limited discovery, the court may entertain a renewed motion to compel arbitration, this time judging the motion under a summary judgment standard. In the event that summary judgment is not warranted because "the party opposing arbitration can demonstrate, by means of citations to the record," that there is "a genuine dispute as to the enforceability of the arbitration clause," the "court may then proceed summarily to a trial regarding 'the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same,' as Section 4 of the FAA envisions." Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4).Id. at 776.
The parties here disagree as to the applicable standard of review. Heaster contends that the summary judgment standard should apply because the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint do not reflect an agreement to arbitrate his claims against EQT. ECF No. 91 at 2-3. EQT contends that the motion to dismiss standard applies because through the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff now concedes that he signed the Arbitration Agreement and no further factual development is necessary. ECF No. 98 at 2-3.
While Heaster no longer challenges authenticity of the Arbitration Agreement, he disputes its application to EQT as a putative third-party beneficiary and to claims predating execution of the Arbitration Agreement. ECF No. 75, ECF No. 106 at 5-11.
Having permitted limited discovery on the question of arbitrability and the relationship between the parties, the Court will apply the summary judgment standard to the pending motions to compel arbitration. Sanford v. Bracewell & Guiliani, LLP, 618 F. App'x 114, 117 (3d Cir. 2015) (where a motion to compel arbitration "is not based on a complaint with the requisite clarity to establish arbitrability," or "the opposing party has come forth with reliable evidence that is more than a naked assertion ... that it did not intend to be bound by the arbitration agreement, even though on the face of the pleadings it appears that it did," then "resort to discovery and Rule 56 is proper.").
In accordance with Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an agreement to arbitrate may be found as a matter of law only when there are no genuine disputes of material facts regarding formation of the agreement when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Davis v. Cintas Corp., No. 18-CV-01200, 2019 WL 2223486, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May 23, 2019) (citing Aliments Krispy Kernels, Inc. v. Nichols Farms, 851 F.3d 283, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2017)).
C. DISCUSSION
EQT and EQT Production ask the Court to confirm that Heaster's claims are subject to arbitration. "Arbitration under the [FAA] is a matter of consent, not coercion." Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989); see also, Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416, 203 L.Ed.2d 636 (2019) ("Consent is essential under the FAA"). Thus, before an unwilling party can be compelled to arbitrate, the Court must make determinations on the gateway issues of whether: "(1) a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, and (2) the particular dispute falls within the scope of that agreement." Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
Turning first to the existence of a valid contract, Heaster has abandoned his previous arguments concerning authenticity and concedes he signed the Arbitration Agreement at issue. ECF No. 73 ¶ 12 ("On March 22, 2018, Heaster executed a Pre-Assignment Agreement with non-party Percheron that may apply prospectively to non-party EQT Production."). Thus, the Court need not resolve the validity of the Arbitration Agreement. That leaves only whether the Arbitration Agreement applies to EQT as a third-party beneficiary and, if so, whether the Court should determine if the Agreement applies to claims predating its execution.
Typically, courts decide whether a claim falls under the scope of an arbitration agreement. Under the Federal Arbitration Act however, "parties may agree to have an arbitrator decide not only the merits of a particular dispute but also gateway questions of arbitrability, such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy." Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524 529 (2019). An "agreement to arbitrate a gateway issue is simply an additional, antecedent agreement the party seeking arbitration asks the federal court to enforce, and the FAA operates on this additional arbitration agreement just as it does on any other." Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 70 (2010). In Henry Schein, the United States Supreme Court clarified that there are no exceptions to this delegation rule. It applies "even if the court thinks that the argument that the arbitration agreement applies to a particular dispute is wholly groundless." Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 529. If the Court finds that the parties delegated arbitrability, the Court cannot consider any other issue before referring the matter to arbitration.
"[C]ourts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence that they did so." Id. at 531 (internal quotation and citation omitted. The Arbitration Agreement at issue broadly and expressly delegates all gateway issues to the arbitrator(s) through the grant of exclusive authority to resolve "any disputes of any kind," including the enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement. ECF No. 38-1. The Arbitration Agreement further incorporates the AAA rules, which independently delegate threshold issues to arbitrators. Id.
In a non-precedential but persuasive opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that the inclusion of the AAA rules in an arbitration agreement requires gateway issues to be resolved by the appointed arbitrators. Richardson v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., No. 18-3393, 2020 WL 2028523, at *3 (3d Cir. Apr. 28, 2020). In the same case, the Third Circuit vacated the district court's order denying a nonsignatory's motion to compel arbitration. In vacating this portion of the decision, the Third Circuit declined to leave the issue of third-party rights to the arbitrators absent the development of the record pursuant to Guidotti as to the movant's status as a third-party beneficiary to the agreement. Id.
The record here is sufficiently developed. Heaster concedes that he was employed by Percheron to work as a landman on EQT Production projects. Heaster likewise concedes that EQT Production is wholly owned by EQT and he does not dispute EQT's contention that EQT Production is charged with responsibility for the execution of agreements with drilling and production entities such as Percheron. The parties do not dispute the terms of the Arbitration Agreement, and thus Heaster must concede he is required to comply with "EQT Corporation's Code of Business Conduct and Ethics" if Percheron lacks its own. ECF No. 38-1 (emphasis added).
Whether these facts are enough to render EQT a third-party beneficiary able to compel arbitration under the agreement must be examined by reference to state law. Heaster asserts that Texas law applies to the resolution of this issue. ECF No. 75 at 2-3. EQT and EQT Production look to the law of Pennsylvania. ECF No. 71 at 12-15, 18-19.
The United States Supreme Court recently reiterated that resolution of a third party's motion to compel arbitration is governed by state law:
The "traditional principles of state law" that apply under Chapter 1 [of the FAA] include doctrines that authorize the enforcement of a contract by a nonsignatory. For example, we have recognized that arbitration agreements may be enforced by nonsignatories through assumption, piercing the corporate veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party beneficiary theories, waiver and estoppel.GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, No. 18-1048, 2020 WL 2814297, at *4 (U.S. June 1, 2020) (internal citations and quote marks omitted).
When an issue rests on a determination of state law, the Court begins with the choice of law principles of the forum state, here Pennsylvania, to determine which state's law applies. Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 389 (3d Cir. 2007) (applying the rule of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) to federal question cases).
Pennsylvania choice of law principles require the Court to first determine whether a true conflict exists as to each issue. See Santana v. A.L. Recovery, LLC, No. 18-16, (W.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2018) (quoting Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 603 (3d Cir. 2002))("Under the FAA, '[a] federal court must generally look to the relevant state law on the formation of contracts to determine whether there is a valid arbitration agreement.'").
If there is a conflict between Pennsylvania and Texas state law, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2) directs the Court to consider the following contacts: (1) the place of contracting; (2) the place of negotiation of the contract; (3) the place of performance; (4) the location of the subject matter of the contract; and (5) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties. See Hammersmith v. TIG Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 220, 233 (3d Cir. 2007). However, "[i]f two jurisdictions' laws are the same, then there is no conflict at all, and a choice of law analysis is unnecessary." Id. at 230.
The record does not reflect Heaster's state of residency, nor the state in which he executed the Arbitration Agreement. That said, the work at issue was performed in Pennsylvania, and Heaster asserts a claim under the PMWA. There are no allegations that Heaster participated in the negotiation of the form Arbitration Agreement or that he executed the agreement in Texas and, as such, Heaster seeks to apply Texas law solely because it is Percheron's place of business.
Under Pennsylvania law "alternative equitable estoppel" or "reverse estoppel" allows "non-signatories to an arbitration agreement [to] enforce such an agreement when there is an obvious and close nexus between the non-signatories and the contract or the contracting parties." Noye v. Johnson & Johnson Servs. Inc., 765 F. App'x 746, 745-48 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Dodds v. Pulte Home Corp., 909 A.2d 348, 351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006)). The Third Circuit in Noye specified that there need only be a "close nexus" between either (i) the nonsignatory and a signatory, or (ii) the nonsignatory and the contract. Id. at 746, n.6 & 7 (rejecting the conjunctive test previously set forth in E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2001), and its progeny, and instead adopting the single factor test).
In Dodds, a home purchaser seeking to avoid arbitration named a homebuilder's parent corporation as a defendant. The parent corporation was not a party to the arbitration agreement but sought its enforcement, contending that the corporate relationship was sufficient to establish the required "obvious and close nexus between the non-signatories and the contract or the contracting parties." Dodds, 909 A.2d at 351. The Court found the interests of the parent corporation identical to those of its subsidiary and directed arbitration. Id. at 352.
Under Texas law, however, "there is a presumption against conferring third-party-beneficiary status on noncontracting parties." S. Tex. Water Auth. v. Lomas, 223 S.W.3d 304, 306 (Tex. 2007). Third-party beneficiary status therefore is extended when the party requesting enforcement of the arbitration agreement establishes, "(1) the parties to the contract intended to secure a benefit to it and (2) entered into the contract directly for its benefit." ConocoPhillips Co. v. Graham, No. 01-11-00503-CV, 2012 WL 1059084, at *6 (Tex. App. Mar. 29, 2012) (citing In re Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 195 S.W.3d 672, 677 (Tex. 2006)). "It is not enough that the third party would benefit—whether directly or indirectly—from the parties' performance, or that the parties knew that the third party would benefit." First Bank v. Brumitt, 519 S.W.3d 95, 102 (Tex. 2017) (citations omitted). "[T]he contracting parties' intent to 'confer a direct benefit to a third party must be clearly and fully spelled out or enforcement by the third party must be denied.'" Jody James Farms, JV v. Altman Grp., Inc., 547 S.W.3d 624, 635 (Tex. 2018). Thus, a party has been found to qualify as a third-party beneficiary to an arbitration agreement when,
[t]he arbitration agreement between the employees and the staffing company (JVIC) in ConocoPhillips, named "subcontractors, contractors, clients, vendors, facility owners ... and each of their subsidiaries, affiliates, parents, employees, agents" .... 2012 WL 1059084, at *7.In re Citgo Petroleum Corp., 248 S.W.3d 769, 773 (Tex. App. 2008). In Berryman v. Newalta Envtl. Servs., No. 18-793, 2018 WL 5723290, at *2, (W.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2018), this Court applied Texas law in an FLSA case and determined that a third party was a beneficiary because the arbitration agreement specifically extended to work performed both for the named company "or on behalf of any client of the Company."
The Berryman contract called for the application of Texas law. Berryman, 2018 WL 5723290, at *5.
An apparent conflict exists here because Pennsylvania extends third-party beneficiary status to nonsignatories who are "closely related" to a signatory or to the contract at issue, without regard to whether the contract states they are intended beneficiaries. A "true" conflict in law exists if "both jurisdictions' interests would be impaired by the application of the other's laws." Hammersmith v. TIG Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 220, 230 (3d Cir. 2007). Here, neither party has identified a Texas or Pennsylvania state interest that would be impaired by recognizing EQT as a third-party beneficiary to the Arbitration Agreement. In such instances, the conflict of law analysis results in an "unprovided for" situation in which the court "should apply the traditional, lex locus contractus rule." Id. This requires the application of "the law of the place of the wrong." Garcia v. Plaza Oldsmobile Ltd., 421 F.3d 216, 219 (3d Cir. 2005).
Heaster's wage claims against EQT arise out of his employment with Percheron at worksites in Pennsylvania, subject, inter alia, to Pennsylvania wage laws. Thus, as the place of the alleged wrong, the Court will apply Pennsylvania law to determine whether EQT qualifies as a third-party beneficiary of the Arbitration Agreement. To that end, Heaster does not dispute that regardless of employer status for purposes of the FLSA, any work allegedly performed for EQT occurred through contracts agreed to by EQT's wholly owned subsidiary. Nor does Heaster dispute that the Arbitration Agreement expressly provides that it applies to "any controversy, claim, or dispute arising out of or relating to my work in connection with [EQT Production]." And Heaster does not dispute that EQT has an apparent direct connection to the Arbitration Agreement given that the agreement requires Heaster to abide by EQT's ethics and business code. This provision admits of no purpose other than to confirm the parties' understanding that the work and the Arbitration Agreement are "closely related" to EQT. Finally, as in Dodds, Heaster does not deny the direct corporate relationship between EQT and EQT Production. Taken together, and solely for purposes of arbitration, these factors establish an "obvious and close nexus between the non-signator[y] and the contract" for EQT to qualify as a third-party beneficiary to the Arbitration Agreement under Pennsylvania law. Noye, 765 F. App'x at 744.
Heaster alternatively argues that his recently amended claims pre-date his signature on the agreement and so fall outside the scope of the "pre-assignment" agreement. EQT responds that the issue of retroactive application of the agreement is within the Arbitration Agreement's broad delegation of disputes to arbitration.
The Court adopts the reasoning of Baker v. New Prospect Company, No. 19-63, 2019 WL 3252744 *1 (W.D. Pa. Jul. 19, 2019), where the district court determined that pursuant to Henry Schein, the issue of whether claims against the defendant arising prior to execution of the agreement is subject to arbitration:
Following binding Supreme Court precedent, which this Court must, "if a valid agreement exists, and if the agreement delegates the arbitrability issue to an arbitrator," as in this case, this Court "may not decide the arbitrability issue," Henry Schein, 139 S.Ct. at 530, and the matter must be referred to arbitration.Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court refer Heaster's individual claims to arbitration and stay this action pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 3 pending the conclusion of arbitration proceedings. Id. at *2, citing Lloyd v. HOVENSA, LLC, 369 F.3d 263, 270 (3d Cir. 2004) ("Rather than dismiss the case, the court will stay the action pending arbitration. This approach promotes greater judicial efficiency and effectuates the FAA's intent by requiring timely arbitration without allowing a lengthy appeal process at the outset.").
In addition, with respect to class action claims, the Court finds that a stay will protect the interests of Clayton Kleevic, who has belatedly opted-in to this litigation to assert a claim against EQT.
D. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Motions to Compel Arbitration filed by Intervenor-Defendant EQT Production Company and Defendant EQT Corporation, ECF Nos. 56 and 70 be granted, and that the Motion to Dismiss filed by EQT Corporation, ECF No. 84, be granted only to the extent that this matter is referred to arbitration, and denied in all other respects. It is further recommended that Heaster's remaining individual claims, if any, as well as any collective and class action claims be stayed pending completion of arbitration proceedings.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties may file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may respond to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/_________
MAUREEN P. KELLY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Dated: August 17, 2020 cc: The Honorable David Stewart Cercone
United States District Judge
All counsel of record by Notice of Electronic Filing