Opinion
No. 27544.
November 5, 1928.
CRIMINAL LAW. Overruling motion to set aside plea of guilty will not be disturbed without showing undue influence or persuasion by officers.
Where an indictment charges an offense in plain language, and the defendant pleads guilty thereto, but later moves the court to set the plea of guilty aside and let him plead not guilty, on the ground that he did not understand the effect of the charge and was ignorant of legal proceedings, but makes no showing of any undue influence or persuasion by officers connected with the prosecution, the overruling of the motion will not be disturbed on appeal.
APPEAL from circuit court of Lawrence county; HON. J.Q. LANGSTON, Judge.
J.H. Arrington, for appellant.
Cited: Deloach v. State, 77 Miss. 691.
Rufus Creekmore, Assistant Attorney-General, for the state.
See Mastronada v. State, 60 Miss. 86; Purvis v. State, 71 Miss. 706, 14 So. 268; Fortenberry v. State, 147 Miss. 91, 113 So. 193.
Counsel attempts to bring this case under the rule laid down by the court in Deloach v. State, 77 Miss. 691, in which the supreme court held that the lower court should have permitted the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty. It will be seen from a reading of the decision in that case that it is totally unlike the case at bar. There, in addition to the affidavit offered by the defendant, a number of persons testified that they considered the defendant to be insane or weak-minded and did not understand the import of his plea of guilty.
This case is more like the Fortenberry case, supra, than the Deloach case.
Charley Haywood was indicted on a charge of assault with intent to kill and murder, and entered a plea of guilty to said charge. He was remanded to jail to await sentence upon such plea. Thereafter he made application to the court to withdraw his plea of guilty, and to enter instead a plea of not guilty, and for trial by jury on the merits of the case.
In the application to set aside the plea of guilty, and to enter a plea of not guilty, it was merely alleged that the appellant did not understand the nature and character of the plea, or its import, never having been in court before; and alleged that if Mr. Mason was cut or wounded by the defendant, it was done in necessary self-defense, as the defendant fully believed, and not in resisting an officer or obstructing justice — not knowing and willfully resisting an officer or other authorized person in serving, or attempting to serve any legal writ or process.
The indictment plainly charged the acts and elements constituting the offense, and was not difficult to understand. In setting aside a plea of guilty, and permitting the substitution of a plea of not guilty, the judge exercises a judicial discretion, and unless he is manifestly wrong, this court will not interfere with that discretion. There is no showing in the record that anything constituting matters of fact was misrepresented to the appellant, or that he did not know all of the facts pertaining to the charge, at the time the plea of guilty was entered, that he knew later. In other words, there was no newly-discovered evidence changing the situation between the time when the plea of guilty was made and the filing of the motion. It was merely alleged that he did not understand legal proceedings. This alone will not authorize this court to reverse the trial court in overruling the plea to withdraw the plea of guilty. The judgment of the court below is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.