Opinion
SC13-04.
Decided March 21, 2005.
Each of the captioned claimants brought a small claim against the managing agent, White Oaks Group, LLC., and the principals of their former landlord, Denny 5 LLC., for the return of the portion of the security deposit furnished by them in the sum of $1,350.00 each pursuant to leases for the rental of the first and second floor apartments at 5 Denny Street, Ossining, New York. The other half of the security deposit on each apartment, also retained by defendants, was paid by the Village of Ossining Section 8 Housing Agency. Pursuant to the authority granted to the court under UJCA § 1814 (c), the corporate owner of the property has been substituted for its principals as co-defendant, and, pursuant to stipulation, the separate claims were consolidated for a joint trial.
Findings of Fact
The facts as to the condition of both apartments at the inception and at the end of the tenancies of approximately 1½ years were sharply disputed. There were questions as to whether a rug covered up existing deep scratches on an alleged newly refinished floor in the first floor apartment at the inception of the tenancy and the source and time of inception of leaks from the first floor bathroom ceiling, whether windows were painted shut by the defendants, the causes of peeling or removal of paint, alleged gauges in and around the window and door frames, and a missing interior door, the condition of the tub in the first floor bathroom and the kitchen counter top in the first floor apartment, the time of inception of nails in the walls and whether there was unusual flaking of the surrounding plaster which made the condition of the wall worse when one of the claimants removed several of the nails. The defendants presented graphic photos of the condition of the apartments after they were vacated . Because of the lateness of the hour, claimants' proffer of proof by video was rejected by the court. Christopher Marconi, a principal of defendants, heatedly faulted claimants for allegedly throwing garbage onto the street and for leaving debris under the stoop upon their removal from the premises.
Claimant Tara Hayes forcefully denied the vast majority of Mr. Marconi's angrily-stated claims, but acknowledged that some screening needed replacement because of damage caused by her cat, that on the last day of her tenancy a can of juice had exploded in the refrigerator, and that she placed debris under the front stoop because there was no Village garbage pick-up on that day.
The interior condition of the stove in her kitchen and an apparently broken baseboard cover in her sister's apartment remained unexplained; however, Tara volunteered that a missing stove top grill was inadvertently removed and subsequently returned. Mr. Marconi's testimony, on the other hand, was mostly bombastic and not nearly as candid as that of the claimants. Contrary to his oral testimony, it was ascertained by the court that the broken edging on the first floor kitchen counter top was not part of the new $1,100.00 counter top that he had installed in the second floor kitchen, and when questioned by the court about the apparently crumbling condition of the concrete front stoop next to which claimants left a broken carton containing debris on their moving date, he claimed that the stoop was part of the adjoining property over which he had no control. This was controverted by Tara Hughes' credible testimony that it was the same stairway that she was required to use each day in order to gain entrance to her second floor apartment.
Similarly, the testimony of his purported contractor was embarrassingly lame until he was coached by Mr. Marconi, and the bills presented for thousands of dollars were so broad and insufficiently itemized as to require the court to engage in a guessing game as to the cost of repair or replacement of the several defects for which claimants had acknowledged responsibility.
Although Mr. Marconi speculated that Section 8 would not have approved the apartments for occupancy unless they were in pristine condition, claimants offered conclusive written evidence to the contrary. Their ongoing specific complaints regarding the condition of their apartments and the exterior maintenance of the building were simply ignored. They also presented notices of non-compliance from the Village of Ossining Section 8 Office continuing through at least the first six months of their tenancies. Such notices cited some of the same defects which defendants now disingenuously attribute to reckless destruction by claimants. Finally, it appeared from the defendants' meticulously taken photos that the formerly grand old structure of Victorian vintage had been renovated "on the cheap," and that, despite its new veneer, is as substandard in this century as it would have been in the 19th century if it were then in its present impaired condition.
The Applicable Law
In this consolidated small claims case, pursuant to UJCA § 1804, the court is required to "do substantial justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive law . . ."
Tenants' security deposits are governed by G.O.L § 7-103 which provides, in pertinent part, that the deposit "shall continue to be the money of the person making such deposit or advance and shall be held in trust by the [landlord]" until a disposition is made as provided in G.O.L § 7-105.
These provisions create a rebuttable presumption that the deposit belongs to the tenant. In any event, a party pleading an affirmative defense has the burden of proving that defense. Marion v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 105 Misc2d 927, 430, NYS2d 486 (NY Co. 1980); modified 80 AD2d 303; 439 NYS2d 6 (1st Dept. 1980); Besunder v. Coughlin, 102 Misc2d 41; 422 NYS2d 564 (Nassau Co. 1979).
Despite the relaxation of the rules of evidence in small claims, whether as to a claim or an affirmative defense, the party having the burden of proof has the burden of convincing the court by a preponderance of the credible evidence that he or she should prevail. This is so as a matter of "substantive law" and was not intended to be changed or eroded by the "substantial justice" rubric which allows the relaxation of the rules of evidence. Additionally, as applied to the present case, "substantial justice," as alluded to in UJCA § 1804 relaxes the rules of proof only to the extent of allowing hearsay evidence and proof of repairs or services by a receipted itemized bill or by two itemized estimates.
Conclusion
The court finds and concludes that defendants had the burden of proving their affirmative defenses by a preponderance of the credible evidence. They did not sustain this burden — not by weight, nor credibility, nor proof of damages, even by the liberal evidentiary standards allowing such proof by a sufficiently itemized paid bill. This decision does not purport to bind the defendants with respect to any subsequent claim that may be made by the Village of Ossining Section 8 Agency for the return of its portion of the security deposit which has been retained by defendants. Accordingly, the Court Clerk is hereby directed to enter separate judgments in favor of claimants in the amounts of $1,350.00 together with interest from July 31, 2004 and their disbursements of $15.00 each incurred in the filing of their claims.