Opinion
NNHCV175038683
11-21-2018
Marcus T. HARVIN v. John R. WILLIAMS et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OZALIS, J.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 17, 2017, the plaintiff, Marcus T. Harvin, filed a four-count complaint against the defendants, John R. Williams and John R. Williams and Associates, LLC (defendants), alleging the following facts. The plaintiff hired the defendants to represent him during a violation of probation hearing held on May 19, 2015, for which the plaintiff alleges Williams was unprepared in violation of the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct. On February 17, 2016, before another hearing on the parole violation, Williams made comments which persuaded the plaintiff that he would not represent the plaintiff zealously. At the hearing, held on February 18, 2016, Williams denied he had made any such comments to the plaintiff, and the sitting judge required the defendant to proceed either with Williams as his counsel or as a self-represented defendant. The plaintiff reluctantly chose the latter, and Williams was appointed as standby counsel while the plaintiff filed a request to be represented by a public defender, which was heard by the court on February 19, 2016. During those proceedings, Williams again denied making such comments to the plaintiff and the court denied his motion. Additionally, the plaintiff alleges Williams failed to inform the plaintiff that Williams was undergoing chemotherapy, which caused the parole violation hearings to end early each day as Williams was required to undergo treatment. The plaintiff was ultimately found to be in violation of his parole and is currently serving time for such violation. The plaintiff alleges that as a result of Williams’ conduct, he has suffered a variety of injuries, including economic losses, emotional distress, and imprisonment. The complaint asserts claims sounding in the violation of CUTPA, in fraud, in the intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. The plaintiff seeks monetary damages as a result of his injuries.
On June 25, 2018, the defendants filed the present motion to dismiss, challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. The plaintiff objected to the motion on July 11, 2018. Argument on the motion was heard on September 19, 2018.
II.
DISCUSSION
"Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). "[R]ipeness is a sine qua non of justiciability ... An issue regarding justiciability ... must be resolved as a threshold matter because it implicates [the] court’s subject matter jurisdiction ... If it becomes apparent to the court that such jurisdiction is lacking, the [cause of action] must be dismissed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., 290 Conn. 767, 812, 967 A.2d 1 (2009). "[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). "It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Financial Consulting, LLC v. Commissioner of Insurance, 315 Conn. 196, 226, 105 A.3d 210 (2015).
The defendants contend that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the present action because the plaintiff’s claims are not yet ripe for adjudication, inasmuch as the complaint’s allegations amount to a claim of malpractice and the plaintiff’s appeals of the underlying criminal conviction are pending. The plaintiff contends that his claims arise out of a breach of contract, not malpractice, and that any ongoing appeals he is pursuing have no relevance to his breach of contract claim.
"Whether [a] plaintiff’s cause of action is one for malpractice [or contract] depends upon the definition of [those terms] and the allegations of the complaint ... Malpractice is commonly defined as the failure of one rendering professional services to exercise that degree of skill and learning commonly applied under all the circumstances in the community by the average prudent reputable member of the profession with the result of injury, loss, or damage to the recipient of those services ... The elements of a breach of contract claim are the formation of an agreement, performance by one party, breach of the agreement by the other party, and damages ... In other words, [a]n action in contract is for the breach of a duty arising out of a contract ... [whereas] an action in tort is for a breach of duty imposed by law." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Meyers v. Livingston, Adler, Pulda, Meiklejohn and Kelly, P.C., 311 Conn. 282, 291, 87 A.3d 534 (2014). Connecticut courts have found a breach of contract could be brought against a defendant attorney where a former client presents "a claim alleging that the defendant attorney violated the specific instructions of his client sounded in breach of contract." (Emphasis added.) Id., 292. By contrast, "Connecticut courts have concluded that claims alleging that the defendant attorney had performed the required tasks but in a deficient manner sounded in tort rather than in contract." (Emphasis added.) Id., 294.
Although the plaintiff argues that his claims are based in breach of contract, not malpractice, the complaint bears the hallmark elements of a malpractice claim. As the plaintiff states in his objection to the present motion, "a plain reading of the complaint makes it clear that this is in fact a civil action essentially seeking monetary damages for: unfulfilled contractual duties; breach of contract; negligence and unfair trade practices; stemming from the incompetent, dishonest and negligent representation of John R. Williams and John R. Williams and Associates." (Emphasis added.) This is a fair summary of the complaint, which alleges that the representation the plaintiff received was inadequate. Contrary to the plaintiff’s argument, however, these claims assert not a breach of contract claim but a malpractice claim, following the distinction made in Meyers, supra, 311 Conn. 294. In other words, the complaint does not allege that the defendants violated any specific contract term or failed to provide legal representation at all, but rather that the defendants provided deficient representation. Specifically, each count of the complaint alleges that the plaintiff’s injuries under the various theories of liability arose out of the acts and omissions of Williams during his representation of the plaintiff. Accordingly, the court will apply the legal standards of a claim sounding in professional malpractice to the complaint.
In Taylor v. Wallace, 184 Conn.App. 43 (2018), the Appellate Court addressed malpractice claims similar to those in the present action, where the plaintiff alleged the defendant attorney breached his contractual duties in representing the plaintiff during a criminal trial. In Taylor, as in the present action, the plaintiff sought damages from malpractice in an underlying criminal conviction still subject to appeal. Id., 48-49. In evaluating whether the plaintiff’s claims were ripe, the court first laid out the elements of a malpractice claim: "In general, the plaintiff in an attorney malpractice action must establish: (1) the existence of an attorney client relationship; (2) the attorney’s wrongful act or omission; (3) causation; and (4) damages ... [T]he plaintiff typically proves that the defendant attorney’s professional negligence caused injury to the plaintiff by presenting evidence of what would have happened in the underlying action had the defendant not been negligent." Id., 48. Applying the reasoning from Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), the Appellate Court asserted that "if success in a tort action [such as malpractice] would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction, the action is to be dismissed unless the underlying conviction has been invalidated." Taylor, supra, 184 Conn.App. 51. The court in Taylor held that to avoid the risk of conflicting judgments as to the sufficiency of a defendant attorney’s representation of a plaintiff, a legal malpractice claim does not become ripe while the conviction in the underlying criminal matter stands. See id., 52 n.5 ("If the malpractice action were to be pursued [while the conviction stands], recovery for the injury would be barred as a collateral attack on a judgment. The action would be hypothetical, and thus nonjusticiable").
Following the rule in Taylor, this court finds that the plaintiff bears the burden to show that his claim of malpractice is ripe by presenting evidence that his parole violation has been overturned. Such evidence would demonstrate that, were it not for the defendants’ conduct, the plaintiff would not have suffered his injuries, or, in other words, that the plaintiff can satisfy the causation requirement of a malpractice claim at trial. No such evidence has been presented to the court. Inasmuch as the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over his claims; Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, supra, 265 Conn. 430 n.12; the plaintiff’s failure to present evidence concerning the ripeness of his claims is fatal to his cause of action. As this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of this matter, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.
The plaintiff argues on page three of his objection that his pending appeals relate to a different criminal matter than the parole violation hearings at issue, and are therefore irrelevant to the present action. Were this to be true, it would make no difference to the disposition of this motion, inasmuch as the plaintiff has not shown that his parole conviction was overturned.
III.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the defendants John R. Williams and John R. Williams and Associates, LLC motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint is granted.