Opinion
CV 03 0194387
November 18, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Before the court is the plaintiff's application to confirm an arbitration award, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-417, and the defendant's motion to vacate arbitration award, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418.
I. FACTS
Pursuant to an employment agreement, the plaintiff, Emmett Harty, began to work for the defendant, Cantor Fitzgerald Co., on June 28, 1996. The parties established a method for calculating the plaintiff's bonus provided under the agreement and, in or about April, 1998, the defendant paid the 1996 and 1997 bonuses together. As part of this bonus payment, at the defendant's request, the plaintiff signed a release of claims, prepared by the defendant, for the late payment and for violations under the Connecticut Wage Statute, General Statutes § 31-72. A disagreement thereafter arose as to the defendant's revised method of calculation for the 1998 bonus. On December 31, 1998, at least in part as a result of this dispute, the defendant ordered that the plaintiff stay at home and have no contact with the defendant's clients or customers. During the following year, the plaintiff's requests to return to work were refused, he remained at home, and he was paid only his salary and no bonus.
The plaintiff's term of employment ended on December 31, 1999. The employment agreement provided that upon its expiration he was to remain as employee at will but the plaintiff fired him, by letter, dated December 31, 1999.
The plaintiff filed an arbitration claim, in accordance with the contract terms, before the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) arbitration panel to recoup the compensation he claimed the defendant owed him. The panel consisted of three arbitrators. In the arbitration proceeding, the plaintiff asserted the following: the defendant breached the employment agreement between the parties; civil theft from the plaintiff of Cantor Fitzgerald Limited Partnership (CFLP) grant units (partnership interests); and that the defendant failed to pay him the bonuses due and owing for 1998 and 1999. Trial of this matter began on December 4, 2000, and ended on September 18, 2002. On February 10, 2003, the parties presented final arguments, and on March 18, 2003, after sixteen days of trial and the submission of post-trial briefs by both parties, the arbitration panel found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded him $3,101,057.01. The panel issued a NASD Dispute Resolution Award which provided that: "After considering the pleadings, the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the Panel has decided in full and final resolution of the issues submitted for determination as follows: 1. Respondent is liable for and shall pay to Claimant the sum of $1,157,393.22 as compensatory damages, plus pre-award interest in the amount of $364,606.69, and post-award interest at the rate of 9% accruing from February 11, 2003 to date of payment. 2. Respondent is liable for and shall pay to Claimant the sum of $1,157,393.22 as additional damages pursuant to the Connecticut Wage Statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. section 31-72. 3. Respondent is liable for and shall pay to Claimant the sum of $382,556.00 as attorneys fees. The Panel awarded attorneys fees pursuant to the Connecticut Wage Statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. section 31-72. 4. Respondent is liable for and shall pay to Claimant the sum of $39,107.88 as costs. The Panel awarded costs pursuant to the Connecticut Wage Statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. section 31-72. 5. All other requests for relief are denied."
The plaintiff then filed an application to confirm the arbitration award with this court pursuant to General Statutes § 52-417 and the defendant moved to vacate the arbitration award pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418(a)(4).
Section 52-417 provides that a party may apply to the Superior Court to confirm an award within a year after the award. "The court or judge shall grant such an order confirming the award unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected as prescribed in sections 52-418 and 52-419." General Statutes § 52-417.
General Statutes § 52-418 provides that
[u]pon the application of any party to an arbitration the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides . . . any judge thereof, shall make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects: (1) If the award has been procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) if there has been evident partiality or corruption on the part of any arbitrator; (3) if the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other action by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
The defendant asserts two central grounds in its application to vacate the arbitration award: the NASD arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law and evidence by awarding the plaintiff the 1999 bonus and by awarding him damages under the Connecticut wage statute.
By joint stipulation, both parties agree that $802,638.64 of this award is "unchallenged." The unchallenged portion of the arbitration award includes the plaintiff's 1998 bonus and pre-award interest thereon, the value of the CFLP grant units and pre-award interest on those units. The "challenged" portion that the defendant is asking the court to vacate amounts to $2,298,408.28, and includes the 1999 bonus and pre-award interest thereon, and the entire amount of damages set forth in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the award, i.e., double wages, attorneys fees, and costs awarded under the Connecticut wage statute, General Statutes § 31-72. (Joint Stipulation Re Partial Satisfaction of Award.)
II. APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Connecticut law, the standard of review of arbitration awards that are challenged pursuant to § 52-418(a)(4) follows the federal standard. "[W]hen arbitration is consensual rather than statutorily imposed, judicial review is limited in scope . . . If the parties mutually agree to submit their dispute to arbitration, the resulting award is not reviewable for errors of law or fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford v. Board of Mediation Arbitration, CT Page 12955 211 Conn. 7, 14, 557 A.2d 1236 (1989). "It is true that arbitration is a favored procedure in this state . . . But it is also true that arbitration is intended to avoid the formalities, the delay, the expense and the vexation of ordinary litigation." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Waterbury Teachers Assn. v. Waterbury, 164 Conn. 426, 434, 324 A.2d 267 (1973). The scope of review for arbitration awards is exceedingly narrow. Garrity v. McCaskey, 223 Conn. 1, 8-9, 612 A.2d 742 (1992).
The Federal Arbitration Act sets forth explicitly the grounds upon which an arbitration award may be vacated. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). "The showing required to avoid summary confirmation of an arbitration award is high . . . and a party moving to vacate the award has the burden of proof . . . Moreover, [a]rbitration awards are subject to very limited review in order to avoid undermining the twin goals of arbitration, namely, settling disputes efficiently and avoiding long and expensive litigation . . . The court's function in confirming or vacating an arbitration award is severely limited . . . In addition to statutory grounds not present in this appeal, a district court may vacate arbitration awards when the arbitrators acted in manifest disregard of the law." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Houdstermaatschappij v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1997).
The Second Circuit recognizes the judicial doctrine that "an arbital decision may be vacated if' it is shown to be in manifest disregard of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., Ltd., 304 F.3d 200, 208 (2nd Cir. 2002). "Our standard of review under this judicially created doctrine is severely limited." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. A court must apply the two-prong test "for ascertaining whether an arbitrator has manifestly disregarded the law [, which] has both an objective and a subjective component. We first consider whether the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitrator [was] well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable. We then look to the knowledge actually possessed by the arbitrator. The arbitrator must appreciate the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decide to ignore or pay no attention to it. Both of these prongs must be met before a court may find that there has been a manifest disregard of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., Ltd., supra, 304 F.3d 210. The Second Circuit has recently explained that, "Our reluctance over the years to find manifest disregard is a reflection of the fact that it is a doctrine of last resort — its use is limited only to those exceedingly rare instances where some egregious impropriety on the part of the arbitrators is apparent, but where none of the provisions of the FAA apply. It should be remembered that arbitrators are hired by parties to reach a result that conforms to industry norms and to the arbitrator's notions of fairness. To interfere with this process would frustrate the intent of the parties, and thwart the usefulness of arbitration, making it the commencement, not the end, of litigation." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Duferco International Steel Trading v. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 389 (2d Cir. 2003). Notwithstanding, "[i]t is difficult to apply this standard of review when arbitrators give no explanation for their decision . . . However, since arbitrators are not required to provide an explanation for their decision, United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960), a reviewing court must still perform the difficult task of evaluating the conduct and conclusions of the arbitrators." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Houdstermaatschappij v. Standard Microsytems Corp., supra, 103 F.3d 12.
"Generally, any challenge to an award pursuant to General Statutes [§ 52-418(a)(4)] on the ground that the arbitrators exceeded or imperfectly performed their powers is properly limited to a comparison of the award with the submission . . . If the award conforms to the submission, the arbitrators have not exceeded their powers." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Exley v. Connecticut Yankee Greyhound Racing Inc., 59 Conn. App. 224, 228, 755 A.2d 990, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 939, 761 A.2d 763 (2000). "The arbitration clause in a contract constitutes the written submission to arbitration . . . If the parties have agreed in the underlying contract that their disputes shall be resolved by arbitration, the arbitration clause in the contract is a written submission to arbitration." Id., 229. "Every reasonable presumption and intendment will be made in favor of the award and of the arbitrator's acts and proceedings. Hence, the burden rests on the party challenging the award to produce evidence sufficient to show that it does not conform to the submission." Bic Pen Corporation v. Local No. 134, 183 Conn. 579, 440 A.2d 774 (1981).
To determine whether the award conforms with the submission, the court must first determine whether the award is restricted or unrestricted. In determining whether a submission is unrestricted, the court must look to the authority of the arbitration panel. "The authority of the arbitrator to adjudicate the controversy is limited only if the agreement contains express language restricting the breadth of issues, reserving explicit rights, or conditioning the award on court review. In the absence of such qualifications, an agreement is unrestricted." Industrial Risk Insurance v. Hartford Steam Boiler I. I., 258 Conn. 101, 109, 779 A.2d 737 (2001).
Section 9 of the employment agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant provides for arbitration between the parties. The agreement provides that " any disputes, differences or controversies arising under this Agreement shall be settled and finally determined by arbitration before a panel of three arbitrators in New York, New York, according to the rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. now in force and hereafter adopted." (Emphasis added.) However, the agreement also contains language which provides that " the arbitrators are not authorized or entitled to include as part of any award rendered by them, special, exemplary or punitive damages or amounts in the nature of special, exemplary or punitive damages regardless of the nature or form of the claim or grievance that has been submitted to arbitration." (Emphasis added.)
Section 9 provides in its entirety:
Subject to the provisions of Sections 8 and 10, any disputes, differences or controversies arising under this Agreement shall be settled and finally determined by arbitration before a panel of three arbitrators in New York, New York, according to the rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. now in force and hereafter adopted. The arbitrators shall make their award in accordance with and based upon all provisions of this Agreement and judgment upon any award rendered by the arbitrators shall be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. However, it is understood and agreed that the arbitrators are not authorized or entitled to include as part of any award rendered by them, special, exemplary or punitive damages or amounts in the nature of special, exemplary or punitive damages regardless of the nature or form of the claim or grievance that has been submitted to arbitration, except that the arbitrators shall be authorized and entitled to include as part of any award rendered by them in favor of CF Liquidated Damages (as herein defined) provided for in this Agreement. CT Page 12965
Clearly the language of the agreement is typical of an unrestricted submission, i.e. it requires that all disputes be submitted to arbitration and that arbitration shall be the source of final relief. However, it also contains language prohibiting awards of punitive damages. The parties have provided no specific authority on whether language proscribing the award of punitive damages by the arbitrators would change this apparent unrestricted submission to a "restricted" one under Connecticut law. The arbitrators were presented with this issue. After they heard the opposing positions of the parties, and having not been provided with well defined, explicit and clearly applicable law, they rendered their decision. The court, therefore, will review the entirety of the challenged portions of the panel's decision under the manifest disregard of the law standard. "[A]n award that manifests egregious or patently irrational application of the law is an award that should be set aside pursuant to § 52-418(a)(4) because the arbitrator has `exceeded [his] powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.' We emphasize, however, that the `manifest disregard of the law' ground for vacating an arbitration award is narrow and should be reserved for circumstances of an arbitrator's extraordinary lack of fidelity to established legal principles." Saturn Construction Co. v. Premier Roofing Co., 238 Conn. 293, 304, 680 A.2d 1274 (1996).
The Connecticut Supreme Court has adopted the test established by the Second Circuit and other federal courts in interpreting the federal equivalent of § 52-418(a)(4). See Saturn Construction Co. v. Premier Roofing Co., supra, 238 Conn. 293. "Judicial inquiry under the `manifest disregard standard' is therefore extremely limited. The governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitrators must be well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable. We are not at liberty to set aside an arbitration panel's award because of an arguable difference regarding the meaning or applicability of laws urged upon it." (Emphasis added.) Garrity v. McCaskey, supra, 223 Conn. 9.
III. APPLICATION OF THE CONNECTICUT WAGE STATUTE
The defendant argues that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law when they awarded the plaintiff double damages and costs and fees pursuant to the Connecticut Wage Statute, General Statutes § 31-71 et seq. "The arbitrators' manifest disregard for the law is perhaps most apparent in their award of double wages and attorney fees pursuant to the Connecticut wage statute." (Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Opposition, April 16, 2003 at page 9.) The court finds the defendant's arguments unpersuasive and far short of what is required to satisfy its burden. The double damage provisions under the wage statute are not punitive as defined under the provisions of the General Statutes and the defendant's arguments do not satisfy the requirement that the law to support their position is well defined, explicit and clearly applicable.
Section 31-72 provides: "[W]hen any employer fails to pay an employee wages . . . or fails to compensate an employee . . . or where an employee of a lab or organization representing an employee institutes an action to enforce an arbitration award which requires an employer to make an employee whole or to make payments to an employee welfare fund, such employee or labor organization may recover, in a civil action, twice the full amount of such wages, with costs and such reasonable attorneys fees as may be allowed by the court, and any agreement between him and his employer for payment of wages other than as specified in said sections shall be no defense to such action." The language of the statute does not state that the recoverable damages are punitive. When the legislature intends to provide for "punitive damages," statutes, such as CUIPA (General Statutes § 42-110g), use the term "punitive damages."
See, e.g., General Statutes §§ 4d-39(c), 16-8d(b), 19a-550(e), 20-417i(d), 29-8a(b), 31-51q, 31-290a(b), 35-53(b), 36a-618, 46a-98(c), 52-240b.
As to the statute's legislative history, in discussing the amendment that added the provision for double damages, Senator Nancy Johnson remarked, "[t]he penalty for non-payment of wages is set forth in Section 31-72. An unpaid employee must bring suit in court and if he or she wins, he or she recovers wages and credit costs. Section 31-72 should be amended to require an employer who fails to pay wages as provided by law shall be liable to the employee in the amount of their unpaid wages and in addition an equal amount of liquidated damages . . . The payment of earned wages is a basic gut-level right that should be assured by clear, strong state statutes." Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Labor and Industrial Relations, 1978 Sess., p. 154. The legislative history reveals that the legislators did not refer to the double damages recoverable under § 31-72 as punitive, but as liquidated damages.
Several Connecticut court decisions have explained that, § 31-72 damages are remedial in nature, thus suggesting that they are not punitive. "Section 31-72 provides for double damages and attorneys fees in unpaid wage cases . . . In upholding the award of double damages, we note that the United States Supreme Court has enunciated its strong position on double damages in wage cases. `It constitutes a Congressional recognition that failure to pay the statutory minimum on time may be so detrimental to maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being of workers and to the free flow of commerce, that double payment must be paid in the event of delay in order to insure restoration of the worker to that minimum standard of well-being.' Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L.Ed. 1296 (1945)." (Emphasis added.) Petronella v. Venture Partners, Ltd., 60 Conn. App. 205, 215-16, 782 A.2d 97 (2000), appeal dismissed, 258 Conn. 453, 782 A.2d 97 (2001).
In a case similar to the applications at bar, in Lathuras v. Shoreline Dental Care, LLC, 65 Conn. App. 509, 783 A.2d 83, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 936, 785 A.2d 321 (2001), the Appellate Court upheld the trial court's denial of an application to vacate an arbitration award of double damages under § 31-72. The court explained that "Section 31-72 authorizes the award of double damages and attorneys fees under the circumstances where an employer has failed to pay an employee wages . . . [Courts] are not at a liberty to set aside an [arbitrator's] award because of an arguable difference regarding the meaning or applicability of laws urged upon it . . . We cannot say that the issue before the arbitrator was so well defined and explicit as to come to only one logical conclusion, or that the interpretation adopted by the arbitrator was so egregious as to border on the irrational." (Citations omitted; emphasis added, internal quotation marks omitted.) Lathuras v. Shoreline Dental Care, LLC, supra, 65 Conn. App. 514.
In Shortt v. New Milford Police Department., 212 Conn. 294, 562 A.2d 7 (1989), the Connecticut Supreme Court construed § 31-72 as a statute allowing for the collection of wages coexistent with the submission of wage disputes to grievance procedures specified in collective bargaining agreements. The court did not decide that the double damages provided for in § 31-72 were not punitive, but included an excerpt of Senator Johnson's remarks reinforcing that § 31-72 provided a penalty for employers who did not comply with its provisions. Id., 309 n. 13. The court stated that, "[Section 31-72] does not embody substantive standards to determine the amount of wages that are payable but provides penalties in order to deter employers from deferring wage payments once they have accrued. Section 31-72 is, therefore, a remedial statute rather than one creating independent substantive rights." (Emphasis added.) Id., 309.
The purpose of the wage collection statutes "is remedial to prevent the employer from taking advantage of the legal agreement that exists between the employer and the employee." Mytych v. May Department Stores Co., 260 Conn. 152, 160, 793 A.2d 1068 (2002). "[T]he wage statutes, as a whole, do not provide substantive rights regarding how a wage is earned; rather, they provide remedial protections for those cases in which the employer-employee wage agreement is violated." Id., 162. " The legislative history of these statutes [including § 31-72] confirms their remedial purpose. With respect to the wage collection statute, our legislature has stated clearly that its purpose is to protect employees." (Emphasis added.) Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, 73 Conn. App. 39, 48, 806 A.2d 1105, cert. granted, 262 Conn. 92, 812 A.2d 862 (2002).
The Connecticut Supreme Court has used the terms punitive and exemplary interchangeably. "This court has recently restated our long-standing rules governing the award of punitive damages: Punitive damages are awarded when the evidence shows a reckless indifference to the rights of others or unintentional and wanton violation of those rights . . . If awarded, they are restricted to cost of litigation less taxable costs of the action being tried and not that of any former trial . . . Further, for an award of punitive damages it is essential that evidence of the cost of the litigation of the case being tried must be offered." (Emphasis added, internal quotation marks omitted.) Alaimo v. Royer, 188 Conn. 36, 42, 448 A.2d 207 (1982).
It is clear that "punitive damages" are limited to costs of litigation, attorneys fees, quite different from the double damages provision of the wage statute, § 31-72. The purpose of the double damages provision of § 31-72 is to protect employees and to provide them with an enhanced remedy to compensate them for the delay in receiving their wages. While § 31-72 may provide the sting of a penalty to employers who unlawfully withhold pay, it does not clearly provide that double damages are punitive.
The defendant's second argument is that the arbitration panel disregarded the law in awarding the 1999 bonus to the plaintiff because a bonus is not a "wage" pursuant to the provisions of the wage statute. Plaintiff counters that his bonuses, which he is entitled to receive under the parties' employment agreement, are wages, distinct from a windfall derived from the labors of others.
Defendant accepted the Arbitration Panel's determination and Award of the 1998 bonus to the plaintiff. Furthermore, the plaintiff's presentation to the panel claimed that the bonus was part of his compensation under the Employment Agreement and for services rendered in 1998 based on his active management of the research database and the salespersons and traders whose revenues formed the pool from which his bonus was derived.
Subsection § 31-71a(3) defines wages as "compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, whether the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, commission or other basis of calculation . . ." The Connecticut Supreme Court has stated that "[o]ur examination of the plain language of the statutes reveals that the term `wages' has been defined broadly . . . Although the statute lists certain nonexclusive factors that may assist in the computation of an employee's wage, it fails to set forth a specific formula by which wages must be calculated or determined. Rather, it merely requires that wages be paid as compensation to an employee for services rendered. The determination of the proper amount to be tendered purposely is left vague by the reference to `or other basis of calculation' contained in § 31-71a(3)." (Citation omitted.) Mytych v. May Department Stores Co., supra, 260 Conn. 159.
"The Connecticut Appellate court has not yet decided the issue of whether a bonus constitutes wages under said statute when it is given in exchange for additional services. However, the Connecticut Superior Court . . . has ruled that when a bonus is earned in exchange for additional services, it qualifies as wages under C.G.S. § 31-71a." Mislow v. Continuing Care of South Windsor, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 00 0443654 (April 2, 2001, Jones, J.). Thus, the defendant has failed to satisfy its burden that the Panel, in its decision, manifestly disregarded established legal principles.
In addition, the defendant's refusal to permit the plaintiff to work and forcing him to stay at home in 1999 established the basis for estopping the defendant from their claim that the plaintiff did not earn his 1999 bonus.
Defendant's third argument in support of its position that the wage statute damages portion of the arbitration award should be vacated or modified is that the NASD panel acted in disregard of the law when determining that an arbitration is a "civil action" under § 31-72. This argument was made to, and rejected by, the Panel. There is not clear legal authority to support this proposition. The Appellate Court, in Lathuras v. Shoreline Dental Care, LLC, supra, 65 Conn. App. 509, impliedly holds to the contrary. In Lathuras, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court's decision to confirm an arbitration award of double damages and attorneys fees under the Wage Statute, thus apparently confirming that an arbitration proceeding, as distinct from post-arbitration proceedings, is a civil action for the purposes of the Wage Statute.
The defendant has failed to satisfy its burden that the Panel manifestly disregarded established legal principles. Applicable law was presented by both sides and the applicable law is not clearly "established."
IV. 1999 BONUS AMOUNTS
Having decided that the arbitrators did not exceed their authority in awarding damages under the Connecticut wage statute, what remains of the arbitration agreement was unrestricted in scope. The NASD arbitration panel had to decide whether Harty was entitled to his 1999 bonus.
The defendant argues that the plaintiff was required to be employed in 1999, by the terms of the agreement, in order to receive his 1999 bonus. The plaintiff was not an employee on February 15, 2000, the date the bonus was payable. However, the defendant prevented the plaintiff from completing all the tasks provided in the contract by insisting that he stay home and not contact clients or customers, by firing him on December 31, 1999, by preventing him from actively managing his division, and preventing him from being an employee on the date bonuses were payable. The plaintiff presented the Panel with law confirming that a party to a contract whose actions prohibit or impede the performance by the other party of his obligations under the contract may not use the non-performance to justify its own breach. See Simon v. Electrospace Corp., 320 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1971); Bass v. Sevits, 78 App.Div.2d 926 (3d Dept. 1980). In addition, the plaintiff provided authority that where a discharge was to avoid payment to an employee of amounts attributable to past services, the claim is valid even though the contract term that he be an employee when the bonus was payable had not been met. Butler v. Cadbury Beverages, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16098 (D.Conn. 1999); Cook v. Alexander and Alexander, 40 Conn. Sup. 246 (1985).
The defendant has not born its burden of proving the award did not conform to the arbitration agreement. "Voluntary arbitration is a method by which parties freely determine that their disputes will be resolved, at least in the first instance, not by public officials such as judges or administrators, but by arbitrators. Our legal system encourages that determination by ordinarily giving great deference to the initial decision to arbitrate . . . and to both the factual and legal determination of the arbitrators . . . Indeed, the arbital process only becomes part of the public process of civil litigation if either party seeks judicial review of the arbitrator's decision, and even then it is the exception, as in the present case, rather than the rule, that the scope of review of that decision requires a de novo determination by the court; and even in the present case, we give deference to the arbitrator's factual determinations." Groton v. United Steelworkers of America, 254 Conn. 35, 51, 757 A.2d 501 (2000). In accordance with the holding of the Supreme Court, the court gives deference to the arbitrators' determinations.
The defendant has failed to satisfy its burden that the Panel manifestly disregarded established legal principles. Applicable law was presented by both sides and the applicable law is not clearly "established."
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the plaintiff's motion to confirm the arbitration award and denies the defendant's motion to vacate. The entire amount of the arbitration award is confirmed. The court cannot say that "the issue before the arbitrator was so well defined and explicit as to come to only one logical conclusion" different from the award actually rendered. Lathuras v. Shoreline Dental Care, LLC, supra, 65 Conn. App. 509.
HILLER JUDGE.