Summary
holding that the former wife's communications with the court administrator and State Attorney expressing her concerns about the couple's children and alleging that the former husband had committed fraud did not constitute stalking, even if they caused the former husband to suffer unnecessary anxiety
Summary of this case from Washington v. BrownOpinion
No. 1D19-919
01-15-2020
Jennifer Lee HART, Former Wife, Appellant, v. Stanley H. GRIFFIS, III, Former Husband, Appellee.
Robert Bauer and Maria Youngblood of Bauer Law Group, P.A., Gainesville, and Abigail Beebe of The Law Office of Abigail Beebe, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Appellant. Stanley H. Griffis, III, pro se, Appellee.
Robert Bauer and Maria Youngblood of Bauer Law Group, P.A., Gainesville, and Abigail Beebe of The Law Office of Abigail Beebe, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Appellant.
Stanley H. Griffis, III, pro se, Appellee.
B.L. Thomas, J.
Jennifer Lee Hart challenges an injunction against domestic violence issued by the trial court. We reverse.
Facts
Former Wife and Former Husband were married and had five minor children in common. They were divorced in May 2013, but shared parental responsibility. In the summer of 2018, the parties agreed on the children attending school in Gilchrist County, but in August 2018, Former Wife objected to the arrangement. The family court ordered the children remain enrolled in Gilchrist County.
Former Husband later filed a Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence, claiming Former Wife committed or threatened to commit domestic violence. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the petition for injunction. The trial court held that Former Husband was a victim of domestic violence or had reasonable cause to believe he was in imminent danger of becoming a victim by Former Wife. The trial court found that Former Wife's past conduct was intentional and willful with the purpose of causing Former Husband to be removed as a judge or face legal reprimands that could affect his ability to continue in office.
Analysis
"A trial court has broad discretion to grant an injunction, and we review an order imposing a permanent injunction for a clear abuse of that discretion. But the question of whether the evidence is legally sufficient to justify imposing an injunction is a question of law that we review de novo." Pickett v. Copeland , 236 So. 3d 1142, 1143-44 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (internal citations omitted).
Any person who is a victim of domestic violence or has reasonable cause to believe he or she is in imminent danger of becoming the victim of any act of domestic violence has standing to file a petition for an injunction for protection against domestic violence. § 741.30(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2019). Domestic violence is "any assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death of one family or household member by another family or household member." § 741.28(2), Fla. Stat. (2003).
Former Husband's petition alleged past incidents of assault and stalking. However, the alleged incidents of assault and verbal abuse occurred more than four years before Former Husband filed his petition, and are, therefore, too removed in time to support the injunction. See Curl v. Roberts o/b/o E.C. , 279 So. 3d 765, 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (holding "[i]ncidents remote in time by as little as a year are insufficient to support entry of a new injunction, absent allegations of current violence or imminent danger that satisfy the statute").
Former Husband alleged Former Wife contacted the court administrator and the State Attorney in 2018 to have him investigated and prosecuted, which constituted stalking. Stalking is defined as the "willful[ ], malicious[ ], and repeated[ ] follow[ing], harass[ing], or cyberstalk[ing of] another person." § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2019). Section 784.048(1)(a) defines "harass" as "engag[ing] in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose ." (emphasis added). In addition, "[a]n injunction against domestic violence requires malicious harassment that consists at the very least of some threat of imminent violence, which excludes mere uncivil behavior that causes distress or annoyance." Wills v. Jones , 213 So. 3d 982, 984-85 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (citing Young v. Young , 96 So. 3d 478, 479 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) ).
Here, Former Husband testified that he had suffered severe emotional distress as he had lost sleep over the potential impact Former Wife's actions might have on his career. However, the record demonstrates that Former Wife had a legitimate purpose as her communications related to her concerns over the children's unlawful enrollment at a particular school or were otherwise reports to authorities. See Wills , 213 So. 3d at 985 ("[E]ven ‘unfounded reports to authorities or requests for judicial relief, even if repeated or for malicious purposes, do not support the entry of an injunction against domestic or other violence.’ "); see § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. The court administrator testified that Former Wife's communications with him and the Chief Judge were to report her allegations that the children were not lawfully enrolled in a particular school. Similarly, the record demonstrated that Former Wife contacted the State Attorney in his official capacity to report Former Husband's alleged fraud. These communications do not constitute stalking, although such actions could cause Former Husband to suffer unnecessary anxiety. See § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat.
We do not condone these communications by the Former Wife, but we hold that the evidence does not support the injunction. Accordingly, we reverse the imposition of the injunction. We also reverse the trial court's supplemental judgment requiring Former Wife to undergo a mental health evaluation.
REVERSED .
Wolf, J., concurs; Makar, J., dissents with opinion.
Makar, J., dissenting.
In this domestic injunction case, the former husband sought to restrain his former wife, who has a long history of mental illness, violence and threats against the former husband when they were married (sometimes in the presence of their five children), and her ongoing outlandish behavior. The record reflects that the former husband has been under siege for many years by the former wife and that the tipping point was her campaign to destroy his professional reputation and career (he was a Florida circuit court judge at the time) with false claims that he committed fraud in sending their children to a Gilchrist County school versus one in Levy County. She was also held in contempt of court during the proceedings below because she was unmanageable despite having legal counsel; the trial judge ordered a mental health evaluation in support of the injunction. Under these circumstances, no abuse of discretion is shown in the trial court's protective order as to the statutory stalking/harassment claim, which was based on recent conduct that had no legitimate purpose and imposed substantial emotional distress.
An official investigation by the state attorney established that the Gilchrist County school board had no concerns about the children's enrollment and that their attendance was consistent with the school board's policies, which "accept out of county students for a variety of reasons and circumstances."