Opinion
Case No. CV 01-01866 DDP (SHx)
November 11, 2001
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter comes before the Court on the defendant Leroy
Baca's ("Baca") motion to dismiss the plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), or in the alternative, for a more definite statement. After reviewing and considering the materials submitted by the parties, and hearing oral argument, the Court adopts the following Order.
I. Background
The plaintiff in this case, Anthony L. Hart ("Hart"), alleges that he was ordered to be released from pre-trial custody by a Los Angeles Superior Court judge "on or about August 17, 2001" and was released "on or about August 18 or 19, 2001." (FAC, ¶ 10.) On August 2, 2001, the plaintiff filed a FAC, alleging four causes of action. First, that the defendants violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Second, that there was a conspiracy between the defendants to engage in the wrongful conduct. Third, that the plaintiff is entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants on the grounds that they maintained an unconstitutional policy. Finally, the plaintiff seeks a finding that the defendants' conduct violated the preliminary injunction issued in Vanke v. Block, Case No. CV 98-4111 DDP (Shx), and a finding of contempt and an award of damages.
The defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that the dates that, the plaintiff alleges he was over-detained had not occurred at the time the instant motion was filed (August 16, 2001). See Emrich v. Touche Ross Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1198 28 (9th Cir. 1988).
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
The defendant moves the court to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate when it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the allegations set forth in the complaint. Newman v. Universal Pictures, 813 F.2d 1519, 1521-22 (9th Cir. 1987). The court must view all allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-movant and must accept all material allegations — as well as any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them — as true. North Star Int'l v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983)
B. Analysis
The defendant moves the Court to dismiss the plaintiff's FAC on a number of grounds.
1. Motion for a More Definite Statement
The defendant contends that the FAC is subject to dismissal for vagueness or, in the alternative, moves the Court to order the plaintiff to file a more definite statement. The FAC fails to identify the specific date on which the plaintiff was ordered released and the date of his release. The defendant contends that it is impossible for the plaintiff to have been over-detained on the dates alleged (on or about August 17-19) because these dates in fact post-date the filing date of the instant motion. The defendant argues that the plaintiff's refusal to aver the specific date that the plaintiff was ordered released and the actual release date prejudices the defendant's ability to respond to the allegations.
The plaintiff opposes the defendant's motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) on the grounds that the operative pleading is not unintelligible. However, courts have granted motions for a more definite statement when a complaint is too vague or ambiguous for a party to frame a responsive pleading. See Kelly v. L.L. Cool J, 145 F.R.D. 32, 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (granting motion because "complaint is too ambiguous to reasonably enable defendant to answer"). "The purpose of a motion for a more definite statement is to enable the moving party to frame a responsive pleading." United States v. Scandia Mfg. Co., 101 F. Supp. 583, 584 (D.N.J. 1952). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(f) makes averments of time and place material for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the pleading. Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(f)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 provides:
If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleadings. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within 10 days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.
The FAC is too ambiguous to reasonably enable the defendant to frame a responsive answer. The plaintiff alleges that he was illegally over-detained by the defendants. Therefore, the specific dates that he was ordered released and actually released are critical elements of his claim. The Court grants the defendant's motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). The dates that the plaintiff was ordered to be released and was in fact released are within the knowledge of the plaintiff. The Court orders the plaintiff to provide a more definite statement specifying the full name of the plaintiff and the precise dates he or she was ordered released and actually released, within 10 days from the date of this Order.
2. Sheriff Baca's Liability: Individual Capacity
The defendant contends that Sheriff Baca cannot be liable in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because there are no allegations of any personal involvement on the Sheriff's part, or that Sheriff Baca had any direct contact with the plaintiff, or that Sheriff Baca had any actual knowledge of the plaintiff's incarceration. Therefore, the defendant contends, all individual capacity claims against Sheriff Baca must be dismissed as a matter of law.
In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that respondeat superior may not serve as the basis for imposing § 1983 liability. Supervisory officials may not be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior, but only for their own wrongful behavior. See 1B Martin A. Schwartz John E. Kirklin, Section 1983 Litigation: Claims and Defenses (3d ed. 1997). When dealing with the liability of supervisory officials, the question is whether their own action or inaction subjected the claimant to the deprivation of federally protected rights. Id. Supervisors may be liable under § 1983 for their own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of subordinates; for acquiescence in the constitutional injuries complained of; or for conduct showing a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others, if such conduct led to the injury complained of. Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991).
The plaintiff contends that Sheriff Baca may be held liable for failing to provide proper supervision over the Sheriff's Department. In short, because Sheriff Baca runs the Sheriff's Department, the plaintiff contends that he exerts sufficient supervision over the issues of this case to sustain the plaintiff's cause of action under § 1983. The plaintiff contends that he may be able to show a sufficient causal link between Baca's conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation at issue. The plaintiff cites Fitzpatrick v. Gates, 2001 WL 630534 (C.D. Cal. 2001), where the court concluded that, while the City Council defendants did not have de jure supervisory responsibility over the police department which could give rise to a § 1983 claim:
[I]t is possible that one or more of them became involved in police department matters to such an extent that they may be said to have exercised de facto supervision or control over one or more issues that have some bearing on this case. What the Court can say is that the allegations of the complaint are sufficiently broad that the Court cannot dismiss these allegations on immunity grounds at this time.
Fitzpatrick v. Gates at *16 (internal citation omitted)
In Larez, the plaintiffs alleged that the chief of police was responsible, in his individual capacity, for their constitutional deprivations because he condoned, ratified, and encouraged the excessive use of force. The court found that:
[The plaintiffs'] expert witness testified that, had he been in Chief Gates's shoes, he would have disciplined the individual officers and would have established new procedures for averting the reoccurrence of similar excesses in the future. Yet, neither step was taken by Gates. Instead, he signed a letter informing Jessie Larez that none of his many complaints would be sustained, thereby ratifying the investigation into the Larezes' complaint.
Larez, 946 F.2d at 63.
In this case, there are no allegations that Sheriff Baca ratified a continuing course of conduct involving the over-detention of inmates after the entry of the preliminary injunction, thus leading to the over-detention of the plaintiff in the instant case. Nor does the plaintiff allege that Sheriff Baca "set in motion a series of acts by others" which he knew or should have known "would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury." Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992). The Court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims against Sheriff Baca in his individual capacity.
a. Sheriff Baca's Liability: Official Capacity
The plaintiff contends that an official capacity claim has been adequately pled. The Court agrees. Official capacity suits are generally another way of pleading an action against an entity of which the officer is an agent. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. The Supreme Court has noted that Monell rendered official-capacity suits against local officers unnecessary because under Monell, local government units can be sued directly for damages and injunctive or declaratory relief. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985). In this case, the plaintiff has sued Sheriff Baca in his individual and official capacity but has not named the local government unit directly as a defendant.
4. Conspiracy
The defendant contends that the FAC sets forth conclusory statements that are insufficient to state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983. Count Two of the FAC alleges that "there was an agreement or understanding between or among all defendants to engage in the conduct alleged herein to be wrongful, and that there was the commission of an overt act in furtherance of said conspiracy." (FAC ¶ 12.) To state a claim for conspiracy to violate one's constitutional rights under § 1983, the plaintiff, must state specific facts to support the existence of the claimed conspiracy. Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989).
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a heightened pleading standard for claims under § 1983 where subjective intent is an element of the plaintiff's constitutional tort. Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir. 1991). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must state in their complaint nonconclusory allegations setting forth evidence of unlawful intent. Id. The Ninth Circuit has held it was proper to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) where a conspiracy claim filed under the Civil Rights Act consisted of only conclusory allegations. Uston v. Airport Casino, Inc., 564 F.2d 1216, 1217 (9th Cir. 1977)
The plaintiff argues that the conspiracy claim is adequately pled. In order to establish a cause of action for conspiracy under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege: (1) the existence of an express or implied agreement among the defendant officers to deprive him of his constitutional rights, and (2) an actual deprivation of those rights resulting from that agreement. Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1512 (9th Cir. 1991). A plaintiff must plead that there was an agreement or a meeting of minds to violate his or her constitutional rights. See Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989). A formal agreement is not necessary; an agreement may be inferred from the defendants' acts pursuant to the scheme, or other circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Clevenger, 733 F.2d 1356, 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
The plaintiff's cause of action for conspiracy provides no specific facts to support the existence of the claimed conspiracy. The plaintiff alleges no facts to support the existence of any agreement or meeting of the minds, whether the agreement be explicit or inferred from conduct, to support the existence of the conspiracy. The Court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for conspiracy under § 1983.
5. Declaratory Relief
The defendant contends that Count Three does not state a cognizable claim for declaratory relief. The plaintiff seeks declaratory relief from an alleged "policy, practice, procedure, and custom of detaining and retaining criminal defendants in County custody after criminal charges have been dismissed, in order to `process' them out of custody." (FAC, ¶ 13.)
The defendant "contends that Count Three should be dismissed because the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law: his claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for past wrongs allegedly caused by defendants. Equitable relief is only available where plaintiffs can show both a likelihood of substantial and immediate injury and the madequacy of remedies at law. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974).
In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the plaintiff sought equitable relief against the LAPD to prevent future choke holds. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). The Court dismissed the plaintiff's claims for equitable relief, holding that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law because "the legality of the violence to which [the plaintiff] claims he was once subjected is at issue in his suit for damages and can be determined there." Id. at 111. Similarly, the defendant contends in this case that any claims of past injury can be adequately remedied by an action for damages. The plaintiff contends that he has no adequate remedy at law because damages "cannot adequately compensate for losing days of one's life." (Pl's Opp. at 21.)
Second, the defendant contends that the plaintiff lacks standing because the plaintiff has not alleged that he will be subjected to the same alleged wrongful conduct in the future. The equitable remedy is unavailable absent a showing of irreparable injury, a requirement that cannot be met where there is no showing of any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again — a likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111. In Lyons, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's claims for equitable relief on the grounds that he lacked standing to bring the claims because he could not show that he faced a real and immediate threat of again being illegally choked. Id. In Holmes v. Fisher, the Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff lacked standing to bring an equitable relief action based on delays in holding probable cause hearings because the plaintiff could not prove that he would likely be arrested and held for an extended period of time in the future. 854 F.2d 229, 232 (7th Cir. 1988).
In this case, the defendant contends that the plaintiff also lacks standing because he cannot credibly allege that he will be subjected to the alleged wrongful conduct at issue again in the future. The plaintiff does not respond to the defendant's citation of the Lyons line of cases. The plaintiff contends that he has standing to seek injunctive relief by virtue of standing to seek damages. The Ninth Circuit has rejected this argument. See Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pac. Co., 976 F.2d 1303, 1308 (9th Cir. 1992) (plaintiff lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because the plaintiff failed to show "a very significant possibility" of future harm).
The plaintiff also contends that he has standing to assert these claims because he claims there is a "strong (indeed, proven) likelihood of recurrence" and because the unconstitutional policy complained of in Vanke v. Block continues. The plaintiff contends that he has standing to seek declaratory relief because he can prove this happened to him previously and therefore is entitled to the inference that it likely will happen again. Specifically, the plaintiff contends:
Because plaintiff may be able to prove that there is a credible threat that Black men and/or minority group members, or poor people who can't afford to post bail in criminal cases, each or all are targets of LASD acts to over-detain them, as in this case there is documentary evidence that this is a regular occurrence there is a plausible claim for declaratory relief.
(Pl's Opp. at 26.)
The plaintiff's assertions fail to establish the type of individualized showing necessary to demonstrate that there is "a very significant possibility" that the future harm to the plaintiff will ensue. Nelsen v. King County, 895 F.2d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir. 1990). Past exposure to harm is largely irrelevant when analyzing claims of standing for injunctive relief that are predicated upon threats of future harm. Id. Both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have repeatedly found a lack of standing where the litigant's claim relies upon a chain of speculative contingencies. Id.
In addition, the plaintiff contends that declaratory relief is appropriate because this is a recurring situation which is elusive of relief. (Pl's Opp. at 26.) The plaintiff appears to argue that this case is governed by the mootness exception known as the "capable of repetition, but evading review" doctrine. See Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969) (internal quotation and citation omitted). A court may exercise jurisdiction over a case that would otherwise be moot if the case is "capable of repetition yet evading review." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt'l Serv., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000). This exception applies when: (1) the duration of the challenged action is too short to allow full litigation before it ceases and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the plaintiffs will be subjected to it again. Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993) There must be a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975). As discussed above, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that there exists a reasonable expectation that the plaintiff in this case will be subjected to the same action again.
The Ninth Circuit has explained that the standards for evaluating the threat of future harm under the standing and mootness doctrines are similar, although the "capable of repetition but evading review" doctrine is an exception only to the mootness doctrine and it is not transferable to the standing context. Nelson, 895 F.2d at 1294. This exception governs cases in which the plaintiff possesses standing, but then loses it due to an intervening event. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (197k) (claim held capable of repetition but evading review where plaintiff satisfied the challenged durational residency requirement during the course of litigation). Since the plaintiff lacked standing to bring an action for injunctive relief, the plaintiff's invocation of this exception is not warranted.
The burden of showing a likelihood of recurrence is firmly on the plaintiff. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-02. The plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the requisite threat of future harm actually exists. The plaintiff fails to allege that he faces a credible threat of recurring injury, i.e., that he will be re-arrested and subject to illegal over-detention by the defendant. The Court therefore finds that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action for equitable relief because he has failed to show a real and immediate threat of future injury from the alleged unconstitutional conduct at issue (over-detention of inmates after court-ordered release).
a. Duplicative Relief
The defendant argues that it is appropriate for the Court to abstain from addressing Count Three because it seeks duplicative relief of that sought in another lawsuit, Vanke v. Block (seeking equitable relief regarding release procedures at the Los Angeles County Jail). The defendants further contend that the Court should dismiss the plaintiff's action for injunctive relief to the extent that it replicates the litigation in Vanke, in which the propriety of the ongoing existence of the preliminary injunction is being litigated.
Because the Court finds that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action for equitable relief, the Court need not reach the question of whether abstention in favor of the Vanke action is proper.
6. Preliminary Injunction Violations
Count Four of the FAC alleges that the defendants' actions eere "committed in violation of and in contempt of this court's preliminary injunction in Vanke v. Block, and therefore constitute a federally-actionable wrong, plaintiff was damaged by those wrongs and plaintiff therefore is entitled to have both damages and a finding of contempt against each defendant." (FAC ¶ 14.) The defendant contends that the plaintiff is improperly seeking to enforce the injunction issued in Vanke v. Block by means of a separate cause of action in a separate civil proceeding. The defendant contends that the proper procedure would be an Application for Order to Show Cause before the Court which issued the injunction. The defendant contends that there is no need to add this additional claim to the FAC where the same relief could be sought (and has already been sought) through an Application for an Order to Show Cause in the Vanke case directly. To the extent that Count Four seeks damages, the defendant argues that it is improper because it is an inappropriate attempt to conjure up an additional claim for damages regarding a previously issued preliminary injunction. The defendant points out that plaintiff's counsel has already moved for contempt sanctions in Vanke based on the same allegations contained in the plaintiff's FAC, and that this motion was denied by the Court on April 26, 2001.
The plaintiff contends that the defendant's alleged violation of the Vanke preliminary injunction may properly give rise to a separate § 1983 claim. The plaintiff cites no law in support of this theory and the Court declines to accept it.
Injunctions are enforced by the district court's civil contempt power. In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 142 F.3d 1416, 1424 (11th Cir. 1998). A plaintiff seeking to obtain the defendant's compliance with the provisions of an injunctive order moves the court to issue an order requiring the defendant to show cause why he should not be held in contempt and sanctioned for his noncompliance. Id.
Count Four of the FAC also seeks damages for alleged violations by the defendant of Vanke preliminary injunction. The Court finds that the appropriate remedy for violations of this Court's preliminary injunction is a motion to hold the defendant in contempt in the Vanke case directly. The Court therefore grants the motion to dismiss Count Four for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court adopts the following order: (1) the Court grants the defendant's Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement and orders the plaintiff to provide a more definite statement specifying the full name of the plaintiff and the precise dates he or she was ordered released and actually released; (2) the Court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims against Sheriff Baca in his individual capacity with leave to amend; (3) the Court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's conspiracy claim with leave to amend; (4) the Court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief without leave to amend; and (5) the Court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for damages and a finding of contempt based on the defendant's alleged violation of the Vanke preliminary damages without leave to amend. The Court grants the plaintiff thirty (30) days from the date of this Order to comply with the terms of the Court's Order.