Opinion
24-CV-3123 (LTS)
07-31-2024
MALCOLM MARCUS HART, Plaintiff, v. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL - CHILD SUPPORT DIVISION, Defendant.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant violated his rights. He sues the “Office of the Attorney General - Child Support Division.” By order dated May 8, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. The Court dismisses the complaint for the reasons set forth below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings his claims using the court's general complaint form, to which he attaches an 18-page typewritten complain and 165 additional pages of attachments. Plaintiff asserts that he is bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and in response to the question on the complaint form asking which of his federal statutory or federal constitutional rights are being violated, Plaintiff writes, “Rule 60. Relief from a Judgment or Order: (b)(5); 42 U.S. Code § 1983/ 28 U.S. Code § 2041/ 31 U.S. Code 3302/ 31 U.S. Code 3113[,] Breach of fiduciary duty by keeping Bill of Exchange that was supposed to be sent to the Treasury.” (ECF 6, at 3.)
The Court quotes from the amended complaint verbatim. All spelling, punctuation, and grammar are as in the original unless otherwise indicated.
In the section of the complaint form to state the facts underlying his claims, Plaintiff writes,
1) August 6th 2015 and October 27th, 2020: The Administrative order was signed by a person “Coram
2) Non Judice” & “deputy clerk” and had no seals.
3) January 24th & August 31st, 2020, I filed several motions (special apperance, writ of habeous, change of venue)
3) November 16th 2022:: Writ of Discovery and Demand to Vacate Support Order Federal Rule (60)(b)
4) March 10th 2023 Filed Demand to Vacate Corman Non Judice & Writ of Discovery
5) February 15, 2024 I [] filed several affidavits, none was rebutted. One being an affidavit rebutting all minimum contacts.(Id. at 4.)
In the section of the complaint form asking him to state the relief he is seeking, Plaintiff asks for termination of his child support case; to “[r]emove all liens connected with said [child support] account”; reimbursement for “all years of wage garnishment with interest”; and damages. (Id. at 5.)
In the “Summary of Events” section of the attached type-written complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he mailed Bronx County Family Court Support Magistrate Joel Serrano a “Notice of Acceptance Honor” and a “Notice of Non-response and Opportunity to Cure.”(Id. at 11.) Serrano, however, “refused to send the confirmation that the accounts for [Plaintiff's Family Court case] has been adjusted and settled, nor a notice of dishonor f[rom] a qualified third party excusing his refusal” in the 10 days that Plaintiff gave Serrano to respond. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that “through [Serrano's] non-response,” Serrano “thereby agree[d] thro[ugh] silence (acquiescence) that the judgment [in Plaintiff's case] has been satisfied, released, or discharged” and that the “agency [Serrano] represents has no capacity to pursue collection on said account and us hereby estopp[ed].” (Id. at 11-12.) Plaintiff makes similar allegations with respect to Bronx Family Court Judge Sarah P. Cooper. (See id. at 14-15.)
In the caption of the complaint form and attached complaint, Plaintiff names the “Office of the Attorney General - Child Support Division” as the sole defendant, but in the body of the attached complaint he lists the “parties” to this action as Robert F.X. Ross, Denetra M. Thompson, Jennifer Seiderman, Joel Serrano, Sophia Hershman, and Sarah P. Cooper. These individuals appear to be judges or support magistrates at the Bronx County Family Court. Plaintiff has previously brought claims in this court against Thompson and Seiderman. See Hart v. Thompson, No. 23-CV-3289 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2023) (dismissing Plaintiff's claims against Seiderman and Thompson under doctrine of judicial immunity and as frivolous).
The remainder of the attached complaint, as well as the other 165 pages of attachments, consists of documents from Plaintiff's state Family Court proceedings, and citations and long quotations from cases, statutes, and other legal authority that appears to have little connection, if any, to any potential claims Plaintiff may be asserting.
DISCUSSION
A. Eleventh Amendment immunity
Plaintiff sues the Child Support Division of the New York State Attorney General's Office. “[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity ....” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009). This immunity shields States from claims for money damages, injunctive relief, and retrospective declaratory relief. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 72-74 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984). “The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. The New York State Attorney General's Office is one such state agency that enjoys immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Levy v. Cohen, 439 Fed.Appx. 30, 32 (2d Cir. 2011). New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate the states' immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977). Plaintiff's claims against the Child Support Division of the New York State Attorney General's Office are therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment and are dismissed.
B. Younger abstention
Plaintiff asks the Court to terminate his state court child support proceedings. (See ECF 6, at 5.) If Plaintiff's child support proceedings are pending in the state court, this Court may not intervene in them. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court of the United States held that a federal court may not enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding in the absence of special circumstances suggesting bad faith, harassment, or irreparable injury that is both serious and immediate. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1973) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. 37). Application of the Younger abstention doctrine has been extended to the three following categories of state court proceedings: (1) state criminal prosecutions; (2) civil enforcement proceedings that are “akin to criminal prosecutions”; and (3) civil proceedings “that implicate a State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.” Sprint Commc'n, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (“Sprint”). Courts have held that pending state child support proceedings involve at least one of the circumstances mentioned in Sprint in which the Younger abstention doctrine should be applied. See Francis v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 22-CV-6860, 2023 WL 5096145, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2023) (“The merits of that appeal -challenging both the Family Court order and Francis's need to exhaust administrative remedies through [the Department of Social Services] - implicate New York's state interest in managing and enforcing child support payments.”); Perso v. Perso, No. 19-CV-2858, 2019 WL 4415399, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2019) (same as to ongoing divorce and child support proceedings); Bowman v. Morris, No. 8:19-CV-0097, 2019 WL 5150196, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2019) (“[T]o the extent that the child support issues are continuing in Family Court, the Court should abstain from interfering with that process.”), report & recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3759174 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2019); Gravagna v. Eisenpress, No. 19-CV-0700 (CM), 2019 WL 1469289, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2019) (“[T]his Court must abstain under Younger from interfering in Plaintiff's ongoing state-court proceedings[] involving . . . child support issues and ‘implicat[ing] a State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.'” (citation and second alteration omitted)); Brock v. City of New York, No. 19-CV-0957, 2019 WL 438356, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2019) (applying Younger abstention to a claim in which the plaintiff asked the federal district court “to enjoin [a New York City official] from continuing to prosecute [the plaintiff's] child support obligations in New York family court” because “actions to enforce child support orders implicate important state interests”).
Plaintiff has not alleged any facts showing bad faith, harassment, or irreparable injury that is both serious and immediate has occurred with respect to his child support proceedings that may be pending in the Bronx County Family Court. Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff asks this Court to intervene in those pending proceedings, the Court dismisses his claims under the Younger abstention doctrine.
C. Rooker-Feldman doctrine
By invoking Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure and requesting that the Court issue an ordering directing that Plaintiff be reimbursed for child support payments he has made, Plaintiff appears to be asking this Court to overturn decisions rendered by the New York State Family Courts.Federal district courts, however, lack authority to review state court orders and judgments. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005); see also Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002) (holding that the statute authorizing original federal jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, “does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments[.]”); Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82, 101 (2d Cir. 2021) (district courts are barred from “hearing cases that in effect are appeals from state court judgments, because the Supreme Court [of the United States] is the only federal court with jurisdiction over such cases.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257)).
Rule 60(b) allows a federal district court to set aside on various grounds a judgment that was rendered in that court. A party can also bring an “independent action” to seek such relief. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(d)(1). Nothing in the rule gives a federal court the authority to review the decisions of a state court.
District court review of claims that complain of injury by state court judgements is barred, under the so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine, when four requirements are met: (1) the plaintiff must have lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state court judgment; (3) the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of the state court judgment; and (4) the state court judgment must have been rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. Dorce, 2 F.4th at 101 (quoting Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005)).
The Rooker Feldman doctrine takes its name from two cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923), and Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983).
A challenge to “the validity or enforcement of [a] child support order itself” constitutes an injury “caused by a state court judgment.” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 404 (2d Cir. 2013); see Davis v. Westchester Cnty. Fam. Ct., No. 16-CV-9487, 2017 WL 4311039, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2017) (“Courts have repeatedly invoked Rooker-Feldman in cases in which plaintiffs challenge family court decrees setting child support arrears.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Here, Plaintiff appears to challenge the validity of his state court proceedings and requests to be reimbursed for money paid to satisfy his child support obligations. Because the Court lacks authority to reconsider the Family Court's determination that Plaintiff owes child support, or the amount owed, Plaintiff's claims seeking to overturn decisions of the Family Court must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In addition, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has instructed federal district courts to abstain from exercising federal question jurisdiction of claims involving domestic relations issues, so long as those claims could be fully and fairly determined in the state courts. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Block, 905 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1990); Deem v. DiMella-Deem, 941 F.3d 618, 621 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that American Airlines remains good law after the Supreme Court's decision in Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992)). For example, a federal district court should abstain from exercising its federal question jurisdiction of claims in which it is “asked to grant a divorce or annulment, determine support payments, or award custody of a child.” Am. Airlines, 905 F.2d at 14 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court must therefore abstain from considering any request by Plaintiff to alter or amend the amount of child support he owes.
D. Leave to amend is denied
District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Because the defects in Plaintiff's complaint cannot be cured with an amendment, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint.
E. Litigation history and warning
Prior to bringing this action, Plaintiff has filed two other actions in this court concerning his state court child support proceedings in which he sought termination of child support obligations and reimbursement of previously made support payments. See Hart v. Shmayenik, ECF 1:23-CV-4779, 7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2024) (dismissing claims against the New York City Department of Social Services, construed as brought against the City of New York, for failure to state claim after Plaintiff was instructed in a previous order that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits this Court from reviewing a Family Court support order and directing that previously made child support payments be refunded to Plaintiff); Hart v. Thompson, ECF 1:23-CV-3289, 8 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2023) (dismissing Plaintiff's claims against two Bronx County Family Court Support Magistrates in which Plaintiff sought termination of a child support order and reimbursement of support payments under Rooker-Feldman doctrine, domestic relations abstention doctrine, and judicial immunity), reconsideration denied, ECF 1:23-CV-3289, 12.
In light of this litigation history, Plaintiff was or should have been aware when he filed this complaint that it lacked merit. See Sledge v. Kooi, 564 F.3d 105, 109-10 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing circumstances where frequent pro se litigant may be charged with knowledge of particular legal requirements). The Court warns Plaintiff that further meritless litigation challenging his state court child support proceedings may result in an order directing him to show cause why he should not be barred from filing new actions related to his child support proceedings in this court with prior permission from the court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
CONCLUSION
The Court dismisses the complaint as barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the Younger abstention doctrine, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
The Court warns Plaintiff that further meritless litigation challenging his state court child support proceedings may result in an order directing him to show cause why he should not be barred from filing new actions related to his child support proceedings in this court with prior permission from the court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in this action.
SO ORDERED.