Summary
overruling issue based on inadequate briefing
Summary of this case from Austin v. Am. Matar Int'lOpinion
14-21-00425-CV
11-17-2022
DEBRA HARRISON, Appellant v. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC., AS LOAN SERVICE FOR U.S. BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR ABS LOAN TRUST VI, Appellee
On Appeal from Probate Court No. 1 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 404002-401
Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Spain, and Wilson.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Kevin Jewell, Justice
Debra Harrison appeals from the probate court's "Order Allowing Foreclosure of Preferred Debt and Lien" in favor of appellee Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., as Loan Servicer for U.S. Bank Trust National Association, as Trustee for ABS Loan Trust VI. Representing herself, Harrison challenges the order in thirteen issues.
Harrison's issues are listed verbatim in an appendix appearing at the end of this opinion.
Construing her brief liberally, we group Harrison's issues into the following categories: (1) the authority of Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. ("SPS") to seek foreclosure; (2) the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the probate court's order; (3) notice of default; (4) issues relating to Harrison's homestead claim; (5) SPS's compliance with the Estates Code section 355.055; and (6) the timeliness of SPS's preferred debt and lien claim.
We overrule Harrison's appellate issues because she neither adequately briefed them in our court, preserved them in the probate court, nor demonstrated reversible error. We affirm the probate court's order.
See Tex. Est. Code § 355.158(d) (providing that a party interested in an estate may appeal an order authorizing foreclosure of a secured claim against the estate).
Background
On September 26, 2006, Lennar Homes of Texas conveyed a home located in Humble, Texas (the "Property") to Harrison and her husband, Napoleon Harrison. Napoleon signed a balloon note for $22,500.00 payable to Bank of America (the "Note"); both Harrison and Napoleon signed a Deed of Trust conveying the Property to PRLAP, Inc., in trust for the benefit of the bank, creating a lien on the property. The Deed of Trust was recorded in the Harris County real property records.
On January 29, 2011, Napoleon died intestate. Harrison filed an application for letters of administration in the Harris County Probate Court No. 1. Although Harrison was initially appointed the dependent administratrix of Napoleon's estate, she was succeeded by successor administrator Howard M. Reiner.
See Harrison v. Reiner, 607 S.W.3d 450, 454 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied) (Harrison's prior appeal from judgment in favor of, inter alia, Reiner).
See id. at 455.
While the estate proceedings were pending, Bank of America assigned its interest in the Note and Deed of Trust to ABS Loan Trust VI. This assignment was recorded in the Harris County real property records on April 30, 2019. Then, ABS Loan Trust VI assigned its interest in the Note and Deed of Trust to U.S. Bank. This assignment was recorded on September 15, 2020. On November 3, SPS, as the loan servicer for U.S. Bank, filed an Authenticated Claim asserting a preferred debt and lien claim for $22,919.29 in the probate proceedings, advising that the claim is secured by a lien on the property. Reiner allowed the claim, and the probate court signed an order approving the claim as a secured debt and lien against the Property on December 1, 2020.
On June 29, 2021, SPS filed an application for foreclosure of the preferred debt and lien. According to the application, the payoff amount of the Note was $24,432.26, and the loan was past due. Reiner, as the successor dependent administrator of Napoleon's estate, responded with a general denial. On July 6, Harrison, representing herself, responded to the application, raising numerous objections. She filed an amended response on July 15, raising the following objections to the foreclosure application: (1) SPS violated Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 12 by filing its authenticated secured claim fraudulently and with the intent to cause her and her daughter financial injury or mental anguish; (2) SPS lacked standing to foreclose; (3) the Deed of Trust and the application's affidavit contains a legal description of the Property that does not include the Property's improvements; (4) the Special Warranty Deed with Vendor's Lien transferring the Property does not grant a lien on "fixtures" or "improvements"; (5) Harrison's minor daughter's homestead claims are superior to U.S. Bank's lien; (6) because the estate is insolvent, Harrison and her daughter have "absolute title" to all the estate's property; (7) Harrison did not sign the Note and thus the Deed of Trust could not have created a lien on her half of the Property; (8) the Property is her homestead and the homestead of her daughter; (9) foreclosure is barred by limitations; and (10) SPS failed to credit Harrison's payments of $49,747.00. The probate court heard the application on July 22, and Harrison appeared at the hearing and provided testimony.
After the hearing, the probate court signed an order allowing foreclosure of the preferred debt and lien, which permitted SPS to proceed with a foreclosure sale of the Property. Harrison filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled by operation of law, and this appeal timely followed.
The foreclosure sale was scheduled while this appeal was pending. Harrison filed a motion to stay and for a supersedeas bond, which this court granted in part. The probate court signed an order setting security for appeal, and Harrison deposited cash into the court's registry, superseding the order allowing foreclosure until resolution of this appeal.
Analysis
Harrison challenges the probate court's foreclosure order in thirteen issues, many of which are not supported by any discernable argument. As a pro se litigant, Harrison is held to the same standards as a licensed attorney and must comply with all applicable rules of procedure. See Harrison v. Reiner, 607 S.W.3d 450, 457 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied). Nonetheless, we construe her brief liberally to reach her appellate issues on the merits where possible. Id. We remain mindful of these standards as we address Harrison's issues.
A. SPS's Authority to Seek Foreclosure
In Harrison's sixth and eleventh issues, she contends that SPS provided no evidence that it is an assignee of Bank of America and that SPS's claim is "substantively defective" because there is no evidence showing that either the Note or Deed of Trust were transferred to U.S. Bank.
A brief must contain "a clear and concise argument for the contentions made with appropriate citations to authority and the record." Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(i). Harrison provides no argument or authority whatsoever in support of these issues and has inadequately briefed them. We overrule her sixth and eleventh issues. See, e.g., Harrison, 607 S.W.3d at 465-68; In re R.H.W. III, 542 S.W.3d 724, 742 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); San Saba Energy, L.P. v. Crawford, 171 S.W.3d 323, 338 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
Notwithstanding Harrison's failure to adequately brief these complaints, we observe that the record contains an "Assignment of Deed of Trust," which provides that Bank of America assigned the Deed of Trust securing the Note to "ABS Loan Trust VI." The record additionally contains a "Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust," assigning the Deed of Trust from ABS to "U.S. Bank Trust National Association, as Trustee for ABS Loan Trust VI." Both assignments were recorded in the Harris County real property records. Finally, SPS's affidavit attached to its foreclosure application provides that SPS is the "loan servicer for U.S. Bank Trust National Association, as Trustee for ABS Loan Trust VI."
We note, however, that in the probate court, Harrison objected that SPS lacked standing to seek foreclosure. Thus, in an abundance of caution, we briefly address this challenge to the probate court's jurisdiction.
Standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction; it cannot be waived and may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. 1993). However, standing as opposed to capacity are distinct concepts: "A plaintiff has standing when it is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether it is acting with legal authority; a party has capacity when it has the legal authority to act, regardless of whether it has a justiciable interest in the controversy." Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. 1996). SPS has never alleged that it was personally aggrieved; instead, at all times it sought foreclosure on behalf of U.S. Bank. In other words, Harrison's complaint goes to SPS's capacity, rather than its standing. E.g., Vertical N. Am., Inc. v. Vopak Terminal Deer Park, Inc., No. 14-15-01088-CV, 2017 WL 4197027, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] Sept. 21, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ("A challenge to who owns a claim raises the issue of capacity, not standing, and requires compliance with Rule [of Civil Procedure] 93, including the requirement to file a verified pleading.").
"An argument that an opposing party does not have the capacity to participate in a suit can be waived by a party's failure to properly raise the issue in the trial court." Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. v. Sibley, 111 S.W.3d 46, 56 (Tex. 2003); see also Harrison, 607 S.W.3d at 459-60. Harrison did not challenge SPS's legal authority to act on Bank of America's behalf in the probate court by way of a verified pleading. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 93. Thus, she has not preserved any challenge to SPS's capacity to seek foreclosure on appeal. See, e.g., Sixth RMA Partners, 111 S.W.3d at 56; Harrison, 607 S.W.3d at 459-60.
Accordingly, we overrule Harrison's jurisdictional challenge to SPS's authority to seek foreclosure on U.S. Bank's behalf.
B. Harrison's "No Evidence" Issues
In her issues one, two, three, four, five, twelve, and thirteen, Harrison urges that there is no evidence to support the probate court's order approving SPS's application for foreclosure because SPS failed to provide any documentary evidence at the "trial" on its application. We group these issues together and discuss them first.
We note that issues three, four, and five are not supported by any argument or authority. Thus, these issues could be overruled based on inadequate briefing alone. See, e.g., Harrison, 607 S.W.3d at 465-68; In re R.H.W. III, 542 S.W.3d at 742; San Saba Energy, L.P., 171 S.W.3d at 338. But because Harrison presents some argument and authority supporting her similar complaints in issues one, two, and thirteen, we construe her brief liberally to reach the merits of these issues.
1. Standard of Review
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence (i.e., a no-evidence complaint), we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005). We credit favorable evidence if a reasonable fact finder could and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact finder could not. Id. at 807, 827; Harrison, 607 S.W.3d at 462. If there exists more than a scintilla of evidence to support the judgment, we must uphold it. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 807, 827. More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence supporting the finding rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Id.
2. Secured Claims Under the Estates Code
The Estates Code provides specific rules for the treatment of claims secured by property of the estate, such as the Note in today's case. See Tex. Est. Code §§ 355.151-.160. The holder of such a claim may specify whether the secured claim will be treated as a matured secured claim to be paid in the course of the estate's administration or whether the claim will be treated as a preferred debt and lien on the property securing the indebtedness. Id. § 355.151(a). The secured creditor has six months from the date on which letters of administration are granted to present its claim and specify the claim's treatment; if the claim is not presented within that period, it is deemed to be a preferred debt and lien claim. Id. § 355.152. If, as here, the secured claim is treated as a preferred debt and lien claim, the lien remains against the encumbered property and the creditor's recovery is limited to that property. Id. § 355.154(1), (2). If the property securing the allowed claim is not sold or distributed within six months from the issuance of letters of administration, the estate's personal representative must pay all maturities that have accrued on the debt and perform all other terms of the contract. Id. § 355.155(a). If the personal representative defaults in payment or performance, the claimant may seek the court's approval to require the sale of the property or to authorize foreclosure by the claim holder. Id. § 355.155(b).
If the claimant elects to foreclose, it must file an application with the court and serve the application on specific people. Id. §§ 355.156, 355.157. The application must be supported by an affidavit that:
(1) describes the property or part of the property to be sold by foreclosure;
(2) describes the amounts of the claim holder's outstanding debt;
(3) describes the maturities that have accrued on the debt according to the terms of the debt;
(4) describes any other debts secured by a mortgage, lien, or security interest against the property that are known by the claim holder;
(5) contains a statement that the claim holder has no knowledge of the existence of any debt secured by the property other than those described by the application; and
(6) requests permission for the claim holder to foreclose the claim holder's mortgage, lien, or security interest.Id. § 355.156. The application must be personally served on the estate's personal representative and "any person described by the application as having other debts secured by a mortgage, lien, or security interest against the property." Id. § 355.157(a)(1)(A). The clerk must also issue citation by "posting to any other person interested in the estate." Id. § 355.157(a)(1)(B). Any citation issued "must require the person cited to appear and show cause why foreclosure should or should not be permitted." Id. § 355.157(b).
The court must schedule a hearing on the application. Id. § 355.158(a). If the court finds at the hearing that there is a default in payment of maturities that have accrued on a secured debt, "the court shall . . . authorize foreclosure by the claim holder . . . ." Id. § 355.158(c)(3). "A person interested in the estate may appeal an order" authorizing foreclosure. Id. § 355.158(d).
3. Application
The probate court heard SPS's application for foreclosure on July 22, 2021. SPS's application was supported by an affidavit that met most of the requirements established by the Estates Code. The affidavit, signed by SPS's authorized representative: (a) contained the legal description and address of the Property; (b) described the amount of the outstanding debt; (c) detailed the maturities that have accrued on the debt under the Note's terms; (d) described all other liens against the Property known to SPS; and (e) requested permission to foreclose on U.S. Bank's purchase money lien on the Property. See id. § 355.156(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6).Accordingly, the application for foreclosure and the supporting affidavit substantially complied with the Estates Code's requirements.
SPS acknowledges that the affidavit does not strictly comply with section 355.156(5). However, Harrison neither objected to the affidavit or foreclosure application on this basis, nor does she argue on appeal that the affidavit fails to comply with the statute.
Harrison misapprehends the nature of the proceedings in today's case. She relies on cases involving a trial on the merits. Here, however, instead of a trial on the merits, the trial court conducted the requisite hearing on SPS's application. See id. § 355.158(a). Nothing in the Estates Code requires that the supporting documents referenced by Harrison be formally admitted into evidence at the hearing on the application, nor does the Estates Code require a trial on the application. See id. (requiring probate judge to set a "hearing on the application" and providing that "[i]f the court finds at the hearing that there is a default in payment of maturities that have accrued on a debt described by Section 355.155(a) . . ., the court shall . . . authorize foreclosure by the claim holder as provided by Section 355.156" (emphasis added)). Thus, Harrison's cited authority is inapposite.
Cf. Spring Custom Log Homes, Inc. v. Berry, No. 14-00-00138-CV, 2002 WL 31041962, at *2-3 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 12, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) ("Section 306 [former version of these sections of Estates Code] does not require the claimant to support its secured claim with a copy of the instrument creating the lien.").
Because our record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court's order allowing foreclosure of the preferred debt and lien, we overrule Harrison's first, second, third, fourth, fifth, twelfth, and thirteenth issues.
C. Notice of Default
In her seventh issue, Harrison contends that SPS failed to provide evidence showing that it provided her written notice of default under the Deed of Trust securing the Note as required by Property Code section 51.002(d). This provision provides:
In issue eight, Harrison contends that there was likewise no evidence to show that she was provided written notice of default under the Deed of Trust securing the superior lien. However, SPS did not seek foreclosure of the superior lien. Thus, whether Harrison received notice of default of the superior claim has no bearing on this appeal. Further, Harrison did not complain of a lack of this notice in the probate court. We also note that the Third Court of Appeals, in considering the framework for the treatment of secured claims found in the Probate Code (since repealed and replaced by these provisions of the Estates Code), explained that such notice of default, intent to accelerate, and right to cure are inapplicable in that situation:
In his fifth issue, Roper asserts that the trial court erred by granting CitiMortgage's summary-judgment motion [seeking an order establishing its a preferred debt and lien against the property and an order authorizing the property's sale] and denying his no-evidence motion because CitiMortgage failed to prove that it satisfied the conditions precedent to enforcing its claim. Roper contends that the note and deed of trust contain express contractual provisions requiring CitiMortgage to provide notice of default, notice of intent to accelerate with a right to cure, notice of acceleration and notice of grievance and that CitiMortgage has not proved that it complied with those requirements.
The conditions precedent that Roper argues CitiMortgage was required to satisfy are derived from the deed of trust, i.e. the contract between Michael Roper and the Lender (and its successors and assigns). They are all provisions designed to avoid a situation in which nonjudicial foreclosure on real property occurs without notice to the borrower. While CitiMortgage would be required to satisfy these conditions precedent in an ordinary contract dispute, the Texas Legislature has provided a specific framework in the Probate Code for handling secured claims for money that are presented against an estate. See, e.g., Tex. Prob. Code §§ 306, 313. In particular, Subsection 306(e) provides that if the property securing a preferred debt and lien claim has not been sold or distributed within six months from the date letters are granted, then the estate representative shall pay all maturities that have accrued on the debt and perform all terms of the contract securing the debt. Id. § 306(e). If the estate representative defaults on payment or performance, upon application of the claimholder, "the court shall . . . require the sale of the property free of the lien and apply the proceeds to the payment of the whole debt." Id. § 306(e)(2). After the estate representative took no action on its claim and the claim was deemed rejected by operation of law, CitiMortgage sought such a sale in its petition at the same time it sought court approval of its claim. CitiMortgage demonstrated that it had a valid lien on the Property-the requirement for having the claim allowed and approved as a preferred debt and lien. The Property was not sold or distributed within six months from the date letters were granted, and Roper has presented no evidence that the estate representative promptly paid all maturities that had accrued on the debt. Thus, the trial court properly found that sale of the property was required under Section 306. We overrule Roper's fifth issue.Roper v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 03-11-00887-CV, 2013 WL 6465637, at *16 (Tex. App.-Austin Nov. 27, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, the mortgage servicer of the debt shall serve a debtor in default under a deed of trust or other contract lien on real property used as the debtor's residence with written notice by certified mail stating that the debtor is in default under the deed of trust or other contract lien and giving the debtor at least 20 days to cure the default before notice of sale can be given under Subsection(b). . . .Tex. Prop. Code § 51.002(d).
Harrison did not raise her notice complaints in the trial court. She did not suggest in her amended response to SPS's application for foreclosure that she had not been properly notified of any default under the Deed of Trust. She did not complain during the hearing that she was not provided this notice.
Before a complaint may be reviewed on appeal, ordinarily the record must show that the issue was properly presented to the trial court and that the trial court either ruled-or refused to rule-on the issue. Tex.R.App.P. 33.1. "Preservation of error reflects important prudential considerations recognizing that the judicial process benefits greatly when trial courts have the opportunity to first consider and rule on error." Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249, 258 (Tex. 2014). Affording trial courts an opportunity to correct errors conserves judicial resources and prevents an appeal by ambush or otherwise having to order a new trial. See id. We may not stray from our preservation rules because Harrison represented herself in the probate court. See id. Harrison did not preserve this issue by presenting it to the trial court.
Because Harrison failed to preserve her notice complaints for our review, we overrule her seventh and eighth issues.
D. Homestead Issues
In her ninth and tenth issues, Harrison contends that, because she did not sign the Note, no lien properly was created against her homestead, i.e., her half of the Property.
"Homestead properties are afforded special and unique protections under the Texas Constitution." Thomas v. Graham Mortg. Corp., 408 S.W.3d 581, 588 (Tex. App.-Austin 2013, pet. denied). Texas homesteads are generally exempt from "forced sale, for the payment of all debts," except for those debts specifically enumerated in the Texas Constitution, such as encumbrances for purchase money or debts secured by a voluntary lien on the homestead under a written agreement with the consent of each owner and the owner's spouse. See Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 50(a)(1), (6)(A).
Although Harrison did not sign the Note, both she and Napoleon signed the Deed of Trust, which is the document that created the lien on the Property. As well, the Deed of Trust indicates that the indebtedness it secures "were used to pay all or part of the purchase price of the Property." Thus, the debt secured by the Deed of Trust is explicitly exempted under the Texas Constitution from the protections afforded to homesteads. See id. That Harrison did not sign the Note does not change this analysis. See Washington-Jarmon v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., 513 S.W.3d 103, 106 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (where only husband signed note, but husband and wife both signed deed of trust securing the note, reverse mortgagor was entitled to foreclose under the loan documents when husband died); Skelton v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 61 S.W.3d 56, 60-61 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.) ("Skelton argues that the lien is unenforceable because she did not execute any documentation creating it. Although it may be good practice to require that purchase money and vendor's lien transactions be evidenced by documentation signed by the grantees, a vendor's lien is enforceable to secure payment of purchase money even without documentation."); Luczynski v. Sevier, 302 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (where note in question was part of purchase price paid by Luczynskis, mortgagee held "superior title" under a vendor's lien and could assert its superior title even where wife did not sign or acknowledge the instruments); see also Wilmington Tr. N.A. v. Blizzard, 702 Fed.Appx. 214, 216 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (where spouse did not sign note but voluntarily consented to lien by signing deed of trust, Texas Constitution's requirements were met and lender could enforce lien against homestead by foreclosure).
Because Harrison signed the Deed of Trust and the Note provided part of the Property's purchase price, Harrison has not shown that the lien was invalid as to her homestead interest in the Property. We overrule her ninth and tenth issues.
E. Compliance with Estates Code Section 355.005
In her twelfth issue, Harrison contends that there is no evidence to support the trial court's order allowing foreclosure of SPS's preferred debt and lien. As we have discussed above, however, sufficient evidence supports the probate court's order, and to the extent that Harrison repeats her complaint here, we overrule it for the reasons expressed above.
However, in support of this issue, Harrison additionally contends that SPS's affidavit authenticating its claim did not comply with Estates Code section 355.005. This provision provides, "An authorized officer or representative of a corporation or other entity shall make the affidavit required to authenticate a claim of the corporation or entity." Tex. Est. Code § 355.005(a). Although Harrison did not object to SPS's claim on this basis in the trial court, we note that the affidavit attached to SPS's claim complies with this provision: it states that the affiant is a "loan servicer for U.S. Bank Trust National Association, as Trustee for ABS Loan Trust VI," and "has made diligent inquiry and examination of the facts; that the claim described above is just and all legal offsets, payments, and credits known to affiant have been allowed; and that the facts stated in the foregoing claim are true and correct." See id. § 355.005(b) (providing that an affidavit authenticating a claim by a corporation or other entity is sufficient if it states "that the affiant has made diligent inquiry and examination and believes the claim is just and that all legal offsets, payments, and credits made known to the affiant have been allowed").
This issue is thus without merit, and we overrule it.
F. Timeliness of SPS's Secured Debt and Lien Claim
In the body of her brief, but not linked to any specific issue, Harrison argues that Reiner improperly allowed U.S. Bank's claim because it was not timely filed. She urges that, under Estates Code section 308.054, SPS's claim is barred because it was filed nearly three-and-one-half years after Reiner filed notice to persons having claims against Napoleon's estate on July 28, 2017. Section 308.054, however, does not apply to secured claims; instead, it provides that a personal representative may give notice to an unsecured creditor who has a claim for money by certified mail to start the running of a 121-day period, after which the creditor's claim will be barred. See Tex. Est. Code § 308.054. This section is inapplicable to U.S. Bank's secured claim.
SPS filed its claim on behalf of U.S. Bank on November 3, 2020. "A claim may be presented to a personal representative of an estate at any time before the estate is closed if suit on the claim has not been barred by the general statute of limitations." Id. § 355.001. There is no dispute that Napoleon's estate was still open on November 3, 2020. When a series of installments under a note is secured by a lien on real property, the four-year limitations period does not begin to run until the maturity date of the last installment. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.035(e); Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex. 2001). By its own terms, the Note matured on October 1, 2021. Thus, the four-year limitations period would expire on October 1, 2025.
If a note or deed of trust secured by real property contains an optional acceleration clause, the limitations period begins to run when the holder exercises its option to accelerate. Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex. 2001). Our record contains no evidence that the Note was previously accelerated.
Accordingly, there is no basis for Harrison's claim that foreclosure is barred by limitations, and we overrule this argument.
Conclusion
Harrison presents no appellate issues warranting reversal of the trial court's order. Accordingly, we overrule her thirteen appellate issues and affirm the trial court's order.
Appendix
Harrison's Issues Presented
1. Whether Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., hereinafter referred to as "SPS", as loan servicer for U.S. Bank Trust National Association, as Trustee for ABS Loan Trust VI, admitted documents into evidence at trial of its application for foreclosure of preferred debt and lien?
2. Whether SPS'[s] exhibits (CR pps. 10-48; Exhibits A, B, C, D, 1, 2, 3,4) attached to its Application for Foreclosure of Preferred Debt and Lien were admitted into evidence at trial?
3. Whether SPS admitted into evidence a true and correct copy of the claim approved and classified by the court totalling [sic] $24,432.26?
4. Whether SPS admitted into evidence a true and correct copy of the claim approved and classified by the court totalling [sic] $98,185.24?
5. Whether SPS admitted its claim into evidence whereby the court approved and classified the junior lien and the senior lien to be one foreclosure?
6. Whether [SPS] admitted into evidence an authentic claim proving that it is an assignee of Bank of America, N.A.'s Note dated 9/26/2006 and in the original loan amount of $22,500.00 as shown by Instrument No. RP-2020-432385 in the Real Property Records of Harris County, Texas on September 15, 2020? (CR pp. 40-44).
7. Whether SPS admitted evidence pursuant to Tex. Prop. Code § 51.002(d) proving it served Debra Harrison with written notice by certified mail stating she was in default under the Deed of Trust dated September 26, 2006 securing a note in the principal amount of $22,500 and giving her at least 20 days to cure the default?
8. Whether SPS admitted evidence pursuant to Tex. Prop. Code § 51.002(d) proving it served Debra Harrison with written notice by certified mail stating she was in default under the Deed of Trust dated September 26, 2006 securing a note in the principal amount of $120,000 and giving her at least 20 days to cure the default?
9. Whether there is a complete absence of probative evidence admitted in the entire record to show that Debra Harrison signed the Note dated September 26, 2006 having a principal amount of twenty-two thousand five hundred and no/00 dollars payable to U.S. Bank Trust National Association, as Trustee for ABS Loan Trust VI?
10.Whether lack of Debra Harrison's signature on a document purporting to create a lien against a homestead renders the lien invalid?
11.Whether SPS'[s] claim is substantively defective because it failed to admit into evidence documents proving that either the Note or the Deed of Trust were transferred to U.S. Bank Trust National Association, as Trustee for ABS Loan Trust VI/
12.Whether documents were admitted into evidence by SPS to authenticate the claims granted by the Order Allowing Foreclosure of Preferred Debt and Lien signed by the court on July 22, 2021? (CR pps. 141-142).
13.Whether evidence was admitted into evidence by SPS to authenticate the damages granted by the court in the Order Allowing Foreclosure of Preferred Debt and Lien on July 22, 2021? (CR pps. 141-142).