Opinion
No. CV01 0278005-S
July 27, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#129)
In the early morning hours of May 4, 2000, the plaintiff, Katie Harrison ("the plaintiff" or "Harrison"), sustained serious injuries as a passenger involved in an automobile accident on I-384 in Manchester. Harrison has brought this action in four counts against Bryan McPherson ("McPherson") and John Franta ("Franta") and their landlord, Chunja Lee ("Lee").
In her amended complaint, Harrison alleges that the one-car collision in which she sustained injuries "arose in consequence of the intoxication and carelessness" of the operator of the vehicle, Crystal Woodtke ("Woodtke"). The plaintiff further alleges that prior to the collision, Woodtke, Harrison and a friend had attended a party held in the first-floor apartment of a three-family house at 370 Valley Street in the town of Willimantic ("the premises"). The party was hosted by McPherson and Franta ("the party"). McPherson and Franta were tenants in the premises — the first floor of 370 Valley Street — under a lease with Lee.
In the first and second counts, the plaintiff claims that the collision and her injuries were a result of the negligence and recklessness of McPherson and Franta because, inter alia, they provided alcoholic beverages to Woodtke, a minor, in violation of General Statutes § 30-86 and they provided alcoholic beverages to Woodtke when they knew or should have known she was intoxicated.
The plaintiff alleges the following in paragraph nineteen of the first count: "(a.) They provided alcoholic beverages to minors, including Woodtke, in violation of Section 30-86 of the Connecticut General statutes, Revision of 1958, as amended; (b.) They provided alcoholic beverages to Woodtke when they knew, or in the exercise of due care should have known, that she was intoxicated; (c.) They allowed Woodtke to operate her motor vehicle in an intoxicated condition; (d.) They allowed Woodtke to continue to consume alcoholic beverages after she displayed signs of inebriation; (e.) They failed to warn Woodtke or the plaintiff of Woodtke's inebriated state; (f.) They failed to check Woodtke for signs of inebriation before she left the premises; (g.) They caused or allowed the party to continue for an unreasonable length of time; (h.) They failed to procure a ride home for Crysta L. Woodtke; (i.) They failed to properly. supervise and control the party and its attendees; (j.) They failed to provide proper police or other security personnel and protection in connection with the party; (k.) They failed to properly monitor the consumption of alcoholic beverages by Woodtke or other guests at the party; (l.) They failed to warn, or attempt to warn, Woodtke's parents, the police, or other appropriate persons or agencies of Woodtke's intoxicated state; and (m.) They failed to warn Woodtke and others of the dangers of driving while intoxicated."
In the third and fourth counts, respectively, the plaintiff claims that the collision and her injuries were a result of the negligence and recklessness of Lee. The plaintiff claims that Lee was in control of the premises "by virtue of her ownership." She claims that Lee was negligent in that she should have known that McPherson and Franta were hosting improperly supervised "beer parties," should have taken steps to prohibit such activities upon the premises and should have coordinated with officials about monitoring and controlling improper and dangerous activities at the premises. Additionally, in the fourth count, Harrison alleges that Lee failed to prevent the use of the premises to provide alcoholic beverages to a minor and failed to evict McPherson and Franta from the premises.
Lee has moved for summary judgment on the third and fourth counts. Lee maintains that Harrison cannot establish that she owed any duty to Harrison. Harrison has filed her opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Practice Book § 17-49. "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hertz Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 245 Conn. 374, 381, 713 A.2d 820 (1998). "The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to judgment as a matter of law . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 209, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000). "[T]he party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schilberg Integrated Metals Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 263 Conn. 245, 252, 819 A.2d 773 (2003).
"A `material fact' is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case . . . The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mountaindale Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Zappone, 59 Conn.App. 311, 315, 757 A.2d 608, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 947, 762 A.2d 903 (2000). "The purpose of the complaint is to limit the issues to be decided at the trial of a case and is calculated to prevent surprise." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marchetti v. Ramirez, 40 Conn.App. 740, 747, 673 A.2d 567 (1996), aff'd, 240 Conn. 49, 688 A.2d 1325 (1997).
There is no dispute that on May 4, 2000, Harrison was a passenger in an automobile operated by Woodtke on I-384 in Manchester. The automobile left the traveled portion of the highway and struck two trees resulting in fatal injuries to Woodtke and serious injuries to Harrison. There is no dispute that on May 4, 2000, Woodtke was a minor. Finally, it is alleged in the complaint and has been admitted by Lee that the collision arose in consequence of the intoxication of Woodtke and that Woodtke was operating her vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug or both.
In addition to those facts, the allegations of the complaint that are germane to the motion for summary judgment are the following: Number 370 Valley Street in Willimantic is a three-family house located near the Eastern Connecticut State University. McPherson and Franta were tenants in the first floor apartment of the premises. From approximately 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 2000, and continuing into the early morning hours of May 4, 2000, McPherson and Franta held and/or hosted a party at the premises. At some time between approximately 10:30 p.m. on the evening of May 3, 2000, and the collision of 1:37 a.m. on the morning of May 4, 2000, while Woodtke was a guest at the party, she was sold, purveyed and/or furnished alcoholic liquor while she was intoxicated. At the time of the party and the accident, Lee owned the premises at number 370 Valley Street in Willimantic. It is alleged that Lee was in control of the premises by virtue of her ownership of the same. Franta and McPherson were occupying and in possession of the premises pursuant to a lease with Lee.
The specific allegations of negligence on the part of Lee in paragraph twenty-two of the third count are as follows: "(a.) She knew, or in the exercise of due care should have known, that the defendants McPherson and Franta were hosting improperly supervised `beer parties' and should have taken reasonable and timely steps to prohibit such activities upon the premises; (b.) She failed to reasonably and properly monitor and inspect the premises for unreasonable activity such as the party herein; (c.) She failed to properly and timely inquire of the defendants McPherson and Franta, or of others, if they were engaged in activities such as the party in question at the premises; and (d.) She failed to coordinate with the police or other appropriate officials concerning improper and dangerous activities at the premises and regarding taking reasonable steps to monitor, control and/or prohibit the same."
The above allegations are included in the recklessness count, the fourth count, in addition to the following: "(e.) She failed to prevent the use of the premises to provide alcoholic beverages to minors, including Crystal L. Woodtke and/or in violation of Section 30-86 of the Connecticut General Statutes, Revision of 1958, as amended; (f.) She failed to timely and properly evict or attempt to evict the defendants McPherson and Franta from the premises when she knew, or should have known of their activities as referred to herein."
The plaintiff's cause of action "invokes the well established proposition that a tortfeasor is liable for all damages proximately caused by its negligence." First Federal Savings Loan Assn. of Rochester v. Charter Appraisal Co., 247 Conn. 597, 604, 724 A.2d 497 (1999). The elements of a negligence cause of action are duty, breach, proximate cause and injury. RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 384, 650 A.2d 153 (1994). "To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct legally caused the injuries . . . [L]egal cause is a hybrid construct, the result of balancing philosophic, pragmatic and moral approaches to causation. The first component of legal cause is causation in fact. Causation in fact is the purest legal application of . . . legal cause. The test for cause in fact is, simply, would the injury have occurred were it not for the actor's conduct." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Paige v. St. Andrew's Roman Catholic Church Corp., 250 Conn. 14, 24-25, 734 A.2d 85 (1999). "Because actual causation, in theory, is virtually limitless, the legal construct of proximate cause serves to establish how far down the causal continuum tortfeasors will be held liable for the consequences of their actions . . . The fundamental inquiry of proximate cause is whether the harm that occurred was within the scope of foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligent conduct In negligence cases such as the present one, in which a tortfeasor's conduct is not the direct cause of the harm, the question of legal causation is practically indistinguishable from an analysis of the extent of the tortfeasor's duty to the plaintiff." (Citations omitted.) First Federal Savings Loan Assn. of Rochester v. Charter Appraisal Co., supra, 247 Conn. 604.
"A causal relation between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the plaintiff's injuries is a fundamental element without which a plaintiff has no case . . . If the chain of causation of the damage, when traced from the beginning to the end, includes an act or omission which, even if wrongful or negligent, is or becomes of no consequence in the results or so trivial as to be a mere incident of the operating cause, it is not such a factor as will impose liability for those results." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ward v. Greene, 267 Conn. 539, 546-47, 839 A.2d 1259 (2004), quoting Grody v. Tulin, 170 Conn. 443, 448-49, 365 A.2d 1076 (1976).
Connecticut jurisprudence pertaining to the liability of persons for the torts of intoxicated minors provides the most direct analytic framework for deciding this motion. This is because the claims against Lee are expressly and inextricably interwoven with the provision of alcohol to Woodtke, a minor, and the claim that the collision "arose in consequence of [Woodtke's] intoxication and carelessness."
In their briefs and arguments to the court, the parties have framed the issue of Lee's duty to Harrison in the context of her status as owner and landlord of the premises on which alcohol was provided to the minor Woodtke. A determination of her duty as such to Harrison would necessitate consideration of a panoply of issues including control, forseeability and public policy, as well as proximate cause. See, e.g., Stokes v. Lyddy, 75 Conn.App. 252, 260, 815 A.2d 263 (2003); Spencer v. Nesto, 46 Conn.Sup. 566, 575, 764 A.2d 224, 27 Conn. L. Rptr. 212 (2000); Wilcox v. Renaissance Management Co., Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 000443595 (April 19, 2002, Thompson, J.) ( 32 Conn. L. Rptr. 3); see also Monk v. Temple George Associates, LLC, 82 Conn.App. 660, 846 A.2d 933, cert. granted, 270 Conn. 903 (2004).
"At common law it was the general rule that no tort cause of action lay against one who furnished whether by sale or gift, intoxicating liquor to a person who thereby voluntarily became intoxicated and in consequence of his intoxication injured the person or property either of himself or of another. The reason generally given for the rule was that the proximate cause of the intoxication was not the furnishing of the liquor, but the consumption of it by the purchaser or donee. The rule was based on the obvious fact that one could not become intoxicated by reason of liquor furnished him if he did not drink it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ely v. Murphy, 207 Conn. 88, 93, 540 A.2d 54 (1988). Our Supreme Court in Ely noted, however, that "[t]he proposition that intoxication results from the voluntary conduct of the person who consumes intoxicating liquor assumes a knowing and intelligent exercise of choice, and for that reason is more applicable to adults than to minors." Id.
The Ely case involved a situation in which parental social hosts actually provided alcohol to minors at a graduation "keg" party for a fee of $3. Ely v. Murphy, supra, 207 Conn. 90. "As a result, one of the minor guests, who was intoxicated, struck and killed another guest while driving his vehicle after leaving the party . . . The court concluded that `a social host or other purveyor of alcohol will be liable, to the minor served or to innocent third parties thereafter injured, if a court or a jury finds, as a matter of fact, a proximate cause relationship between the service of alcohol and the damages ensuing from the minor's consumption of the alcohol.'" (Citation omitted.) Rangel v. Parkhurst, 64 Conn.App. 372, 378-79, 779 A.2d 1277 (2001), quoting Ely v. Murphy, supra, 97.
"The Ely court created a limited exception to the common-law rule that no cause of action in negligence arises from the furnishing of alcohol to intoxicated adults by holding that the consumption of alcohol by a minor does not `constitute the intervening act necessary to break the chain of proximate causation and does not, as a matter of law, insulate one who provides alcohol to minors from liability for ensuing injury.' . . . In breaking with the common-law rule, the exception created by the Ely court left in place the requirement that the host actually purvey or supply the alcohol consumed. It did not, however, carve out an exception for adults who were not social hosts and who did not purvey the alcohol." (Citation omitted.) Rangel v. Parkhurst, supra, 64 Conn.App. 379, quoting Ely v. Murphy, supra, 207 Conn. 97.
In Bohan v. Last, 236 Conn. 670, 674 A.2d 839 (1996), "the patrons of a bar bought alcohol for a minor who was present at the bar. The alcohol purveyed by the patrons caused the minor to become intoxicated. Bohan v. Last, supra,. The minor subsequently drove a car, while still intoxicated, resulting in a collision and the death of his passenger. Id." Rangel v. Parkhurst, supra, 64 Conn.App. 380. Our Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle of Ely by stating that "[i]n appropriate circumstances, adults have a duty to refrain from negligently or intentionally supplying alcohol to minors, whether such adults act as social hosts in their homes or as purveyors in a bar, because minors are presumed not to have the capacity to understand fully the risks associated with intoxication." Bohan v. Last, supra, 681. The court in Bohan held further that, "unless the purveyors of alcohol knew or had reason to know that the person to whom they supplied alcohol was a minor, they have no common law duty to third party victims of the minor's intoxication." Id.
In Rangel v. Parkhurst, supra, 64 Conn.App. 374, the plaintiffs sought to recover for personal injuries they sustained in a motor vehicle accident involving the defendants' twenty-year-old son. The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the defendants were negligent in that they had stored and made alcoholic beverages available to their son and had assisted him in acquiring and maintaining an automobile when they knew or had reason to know that he would operate that vehicle while he was impaired or intoxicated. Rangel v. Parkhurst, supra, 374-75. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Id., 376. Our Appellate Court affirmed based on the trial court's determination that, as a matter of law, the defendant parents were not purveyors or servers of alcohol because they had not served alcohol to their under drinking age son; id., 381; and that, as a matter of law, parents who know of and acquiesce in their minor child's storage of alcoholic beverages in their home are not liable for damages caused by the intoxicated minor. Id., 383-84. In Rangel, the defendants did not substantially assist or encourage their son "in his negligent conduct by buying, providing or serving intoxicants to him, by enabling him to obtain more intoxicating liquor when they knew that he was drunk or by allowing him to enter an automobile to drive when they knew or should have known that he was intoxicated." Id., 383.
In this case, the negligent and reckless conduct claimed as to Lee is significantly attenuated and more remote than that of the defendants in the above-cited cases. Even if we assume arguendo that Lee knew that her tenants, McPherson and Franta, were holding beer parties, that fact is of no consequence. What is of consequence is that Harrison does not allege that Lee supplied or purveyed beer to Woodtke; nor is it alleged that Lee provided substantial assistance to Woodtke in the procurement of alcohol; nor is it alleged that Lee knew that her tenants were serving alcohol to a minor, specifically Woodtke, or that Lee was even at the party on the premises. Lee's knowledge of and/or acquiescence in her tenants' alleged beer parties may be a fact issue which is genuinely in dispute; however, that fact is not a material fact. Only when a person is a social host or other purveyor of alcohol to a minor can such a person be held liable for the tortious conduct of the intoxicated minor. The plaintiff's claims of negligence and recklessness are unenforceable, as a matter of law, because anything Lee is alleged to have done or not done was not the proximate cause of the collision and Harrison's injuries. "A causal relation between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the plaintiff's injuries is a fundamental element without which a plaintiff has no case." Ward v. Greene, supra, 267 Conn. 546-47.
Accordingly, the defendant Chunja Lee's motion for summary judgment is granted. Judgment shall enter in favor of the defendant Chunja Lee on the third and fourth counts of the complaint.
BY THE COURT
Tanzer, Judge