Opinion
1:22-CV-00105-SPB-RAL
12-05-2022
JIHAAD AMORE HARRISON, Plaintiff v. SECRETARY GEORGE LITTLE, LONNIE OLIVER, SCI-ALBION SUPERINTENDENT; SKINNER, SCI-ALBION CAPTAIN; S. A. SMITH, SCI-ALBION CORRECTIONS OFFICER; MS. KEENER, AREA COORDINATOR; PATRICIA THOMPSON, SCI-ALBION DEPUTY; CARL JONES, SCI ALBION; KURT SUESSER, CCPM; MAJ JASON ZILLMAN, CHCA; MIKE EDWARDS, HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATOR; DR. CRAIG RUSH, CHIEF PSYCHIATRIST; DR. SUSAN EVANS, C. GRIDDINGS, GRIEVANCE COORDINATOR; DHU KOHLER, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER; C/O CRUM, C.O. DANIEL NOLEN, SGT MALUK, DR. LUCAS, Defendants
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
IN RE: ECF NO. 50
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction (ECF No. 50) be denied.
II. REPORT
A. Plaintiff's Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Jihaad Amore Harrison is an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Albion (“SCI-Albion”) and a prolific filer of motions for equitable relief. Herpending motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) or a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 50) is one of seven such motions she has filed in this action. See ECF Nos. 4, 15, 20, 25, 33, 34, 50, 51. In this motion, she alleges that prison officials have confiscated her legal documents and denied her access to hygienic products, the psych department, and the ability to “adequately transition into woman/female,” and that they are verbally harassing her, and have “offer[ed] privileges to inmates who do something to her.” Id. As relief, she seeks a transfer to a “facility that treats mental health and knows how to handle and deal with LGBTQ+ inmates,” and an order “forc[ing] Defendants to pay court fees for copies of all documents for this civil action.” Id.
Plaintiff has informed the Court that she identifies as female and uses the pronouns “she/her/hers.”
B. Legal Standard
A temporary restraining order is assessed under the same standards as a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Alves v. Main, 747 Fed.Appx. 111, 112 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 285 (3d Cir. 2018)). However,
[t]he court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). The party seeking preliminary injunctive relief has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the issuance of an injunction will not result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997); Opticians Ass'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990).
As the moving party, Young bears the burden of producing evidence to support the first two factors. See Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the movant must provide facts that clearly support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the movant if preliminary relief is denied. See United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1990); Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989); ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (it is not enough to merely show irreparable harm: the plaintiff has the burden of showing immediate irreparable injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm and which cannot be redressed with money damages). Absent support for either of the first two factors, a court must deny the request for a preliminary injunction. See Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653 (3d Cir. 1994); Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000).
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, the grant of injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)).
Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Preliminary injunctive relief is “not a tool for prisoners to use to regulate ‘in every way, every day, the terms and conditions of plaintiff's confinement simply because they are “in court” . . .'”. Stiel v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2017 WL 2656646, at *4 (D.N.J. June 19, 2017) (quoting Muhammad v. Director of Corrections, 2009 WL 161075, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Jan. 22, 2009)). Thus, where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 (1979).
C. Discussion
1. Harrison's allegations do not support a likelihood of success on the merits. Harrison's allegations are insufficient to meet her heavy burden of demonstrating that she is likely to succeed on the merits of her claims. While Harrison “need not prove [her] case with airtight certainty, the moving party nevertheless bears a heavy burden on a motion for a preliminary injunction of establishing a reasonable probability of success on the merits.” Burton v. Wetzel, 2017 WL 4284345, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 27, 2017) (internal citations, quotations, and additions omitted). This burden is “particularly heavy” where the requested injunction “is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but . . . at providing mandatory relief,” such as the transfer requested in the instant motion. Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980).
Harrison's amended complaint asserts that Defendants have violated her constitutional rights by acting with deliberate indifference to her medical and mental health needs, including denying her access to adequate care for gender dysmorphia, subjecting her to unconstitutional living conditions by confiscating certain hygienic items and denying her access to “female commissary items,” failing to protect her from other staff and inmates, who she asserts have threatened and bullied her due to her status as a transgender, denying her equal treatment and access to grievances, harassing her, and retaliating against her. ECF No. 49. For relief, Harrison seeks an injunction ordering Defendants to place her in protective custody, provide her with mental health treatment, and stop “bullying her;” as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Id.
Harrison's instant motion reiterates many of these claims, including that prison officials are denying her access to hygienic products, verbally harassing her, retaliating against her, and denying her access to proper psychiatric care for her gender dysmorphia. ECF No. 50. These conclusory, bare allegations are insufficient to satisfy her heavy burden of a likelihood of success on the merits of any of her constitutional claims. See Young v. Medden, 241 Fed.Appx. 45, 47 (3d Cir. 2007) (upholding the denial of a temporary restraining order where prisoner provided no evidence, outside of his allegations, to support his claim of wrongdoing). Harrison has yet to allege any facts to support the plausibility of these claims. And the often varying and evolving nature of her claims strongly evince manipulation and contrivance to secure secondary gain.
2. Harrison's allegations do not support a probability of irreparable harm absent injunctive relief.
Harrison's allegations also fail to demonstrate “the probability of irreparable harm if relief is not granted.” Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989). As noted above, a party seeking a mandatory injunction that seeks to alter (rather than preserve) the status quo bears a “particularly heavy” burden. Punnett, 621 F.2d at 582. See also Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, not to decide the issues on their merits.”). A request for mandatory injunctive relief, such as Harrison's demand for an emergency transfer, must be viewed with exacting scrutiny and extreme caution. Burton, 2017 WL 4284345, at *6.
Harrison has failed to meet her burden. While Harrison states that her life is in danger, she does not provide any explanation or evidence to support this assertion or to infer that she faces imminent, irreparable harm. See Young, 241 Fed.Appx. at 47; Hammonds v. Alleghany County Bureau of Corrections, 2019 WL 3843085, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2019) (citing Young). Moreover, she has not alleged any facts to support a finding that prison personnel are failing to protect her from any actual or perceived threat. Synthes, Inc. v. Gregoris, 228 F.Supp.3d 421, 440 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“Any irreparable harm must be imminent.”); Burton, 2017 WL 4284345, at *9 (declining to grant preliminary relief in the absence of evidence “that there is an imminent risk of irreparable injury”) (emphasis in original). The Court also notes that the record demonstrates that Harrison is, in fact, receiving mental health treatment and will soon begin the evaluation process for gender dysmorphia.Nothing in Harrison's submissions supports that this current course of treatment places her at risk of imminent irreparable harm.
Harrison's amended complaint (ECF No. 49) acknowledges that she is receiving mental health services and that psychiatry has approved her to begin the evaluation process for gender dysmorphia, which takes about a year, and that her initial evaluation “can happen in the next few months.” ECF No. 49; see also ECF No. 49-1, p. 6. Harrison's receipt of mental health care also was discussed on the record during the status conference on November 1, 2022. ECF No. 40.
Furthermore, to the extent Harrison alleges that her personal property has been wrongfully confiscated or believes her mental health services fall below professional standards, she does not allege facts to support that any resulting injury cannot be addressed by monetary damages. Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). See also ECRI, 809 F.2d at 226 (preliminary relief may only issue where the injury is of a “peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it”); Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989) (plaintiff must allege an injury that cannot ultimately be “redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following trial”); Alston v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 2015 WL 136334, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2015). Harrison's amended complaint specifically includes a request for monetary damages to compensate her for her injuries. ECF No. 49. This request suggests that such damages “may be adequate redress, yet another factor which weighs against extraordinary injunctive relief.” Burton, 2017 WL 4284345, at *9 (noting that, where an inmate-plaintiff is alleging that damages may be an adequate remedy, a preliminary injunction is often not appropriate”).
III. CONLCUSION
Harrison's failure to allege facts to support a likelihood of success on the merits of her claims and an imminent risk of irreparable harm is fatal to her motion. Therefore, it is recommended that Harrison's motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction (ECF No. 50) be denied.
IV. NOTICE
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).