Opinion
C.A. No. 07C-06-301 MMJ.
Submitted: September 10, 2007.
Decided: October 3, 2007.
Upon Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. GRANTED .
Shawn Harrison, Pro Se Litigant.
David H. Williams, Esquire, Morris James LLP, Wilmington, Delaware Attorney for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PROCEDURAL CONTEXT
On June 27, 2007, Shawn Harrison ("Harrison"), filed a defamation action against Hodgson Vocational Technical High School ("Hodgson"). Harrison is pursuing this action pro se. On July 25, 2007, Hodgson filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Superior Court Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On August 2, 2007, Harrison filed a response to Hodgson's 12(b)(6) Motion, and a Rule 50 Motion for Judgement as a Matter of Law. Hodgson filed a response to the Motion for Judgement as a Matter of Law. On September 6, 2007, Harrison filed a Motion to Amend his Original Complaint. The Court heard oral argument on September 10, 2007.
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend
Superior Court Rule 15(a) states that "a party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served." Otherwise, a party may amend by leave of Court or by written consent of the adverse party. Motions to amend are normally granted by the Court unless there is serious prejudice to the opposing party. The Motion to Amend was untimely. The Motion was filed after Hodgson's response and without leave of Court. However, the Court is mindful of the fact that Harrison is pro se. Additionally, the amended complaint does not materially alter the nature or scope of litigation. The Court will consider the amended complaint.
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 15(a).
Id.
McKinney v. Kent County Bd. of Adjustment, 1995 WL 109032, *2 (Del.).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Harrison claims that letters of recommendation issued by Hodgson contain defamatory statements. Harrison argues the letters contain false statements concerning his record as a student-athlete while attending Hodgson Vocational Technical High School. Specifically, Harrison states: (1) his birth date and graduation date are either incorrect or absent; and (2) his athletic accomplishments are not correctly listed. Both documents were issued by Hodgson. Additionally, Harrison's amended complaint states Hodgson made slanderous comments to potential employers by phone.
Harrison claims these intentional misrepresentations will affect his employment opportunities in the future. Harrison seeks damages in the amount of $7,000,000 for loss of employment and damage to his reputation.
Standard of Review: Defamation
Defamation is defined as "that which tends to injure `reputation' in the popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held." Defamation can be pled as either libel or slander. Slander is spoken defamation and requires the pleading of special damages. Libel is written defamation and does not require a pleading of special damages. To establish a claim for defamation the plaintiff must plead: "(1) the defamatory character of the communication; (2) publication; (3) that the communication refers to the plaintiff; (4) the third party's understanding of the communication's defamatory character; and (5) injury."
Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 969 (Del. 1978).
Id. at 971.
Read v. Carpenter, 1995 WL 945544, *2 (Del.Super.).
12(b)(6) Motion for Summary Judgment
Hodgson filed a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court must determine whether Harrison has a viable cause of action. Harrison's claim may not be dismissed "unless it appears to a certainty that under no set of facts which could be proved to support the claim asserted would the plaintiff be entitled to relief." When applying this standard, the Court will accept as true all well-pleaded allegations. The Court also recognizes that some leniency should be granted to a pro se litigant. However, Harrison's claim must, at a minimum, provide the Court with enough information to conduct a meaningful consideration of the merits.ANALYSIS
Hodgson argues the complaint should be dismissed because Harrison failed to state when the defamatory statements were made, who made the defamatory statements and who received or heard the defamatory statements. Harrison's complaint includes allegations of both libel and slander. However, Harrison fails to plead the elements needed to establish a claim for defamation.
The complaint states that Gerald L. Allen made slanderous statements to a potential employer by phone. Harrison does not identify what specifically Allen said or with whom he spoke. Harrison fails to plead the defamatory character of the communication and the third party's understanding of the communication's defamatory character. A defamatory communication is one that "tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him." Both the defamatory character of the communication and the third party's understanding of the communication must be plead to establish a claim for defamation. The Court finds Harrison has failed to state a claim for defamation based on the phone conversation.
Henry v. Delaware Law School of Widener University, Inc., 1998 WL 15897, at *10 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 (1977)).
Harrison acknowledges that the letters of recommendation were issued directly to him by Hodgson. Harrison then submitted the letters in two separate applications for employment. Hodgson did not circulate the letters. Instead, Harrison self-published the allegedly defamatory information. "Self-publication occurs when a plaintiff publishes an allegedly defamatory communication to a third party instead of the defendant publishing it to a third-party." In a minority of jurisdictions self-publication satisfies the publication requirement. Delaware is not one of them. Without publication, Harrison does not have a claim for defamation based on the letters of recommendation.
Gilliland v. St. Joseph's at Providence Creek, 2006 WL 258259, *8 (Del.Super.).
Lynch v. Mellon Bank of Delaware, 1992 WL 51880, *3 (Del.Super).
Id.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the amended complaint cannot be construed as meeting the standards of defamation.THEREFORE, Harrison's Rule 50 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law is DENIED AS MOOT. Defendants' 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED. This action is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.