Opinion
No. 15-17556
11-07-2016
MARK HARRISON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J. DENNERLINE, Arizona Fish and Game Department employee #365; ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF GAME AND FISH, Defendants-Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01060-SPL MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona
Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding Before: LEAVY, GRABER, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Mark Harrison appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims relating to his misdemeanor prosecution. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Harrison's Fourteenth Amendment claims because Harrison was neither denied procedural due process nor subjected to conduct that violated his substantive due process rights. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 834 (1998) ("[T]he cognizable level of executive abuse of power [for a substantive due process violation] is that which shocks the conscience[.]"); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) ("The fundamental requirement of [procedural] due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'").
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Harrison's complaint without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and factors for a district court to consider in determining whether to grant leave to amend); see also Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1191-92 (9th Cir. 2003) (no Fourth Amendment seizure where plaintiff was not charged with a felony, was not arrested, and was only required to appear in court).
Harrison's contentions that the district court's actions prejudiced him are unpersuasive.
We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.