Opinion
Civil No. 1:20-CV-1584
09-03-2020
KENNETH HARRIS, Petitioner, v. YORK HOSPITAL, et al., Respondents.
(Judge Mariani)
( ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Statement of Facts and of the Case
Kenneth Harris is a persistent pro se litigant. This case is Harris' third filing and his second federal habeas corpus petition in the past three weeks. See Harris v. Jauregui, Civil No. 1:20-CV-1469; Harris v. Frey, 1:20-CV-1504. This second a pro se state prisoner habeas corpus petition, like Harris' prior habeas corpus petition, demands a great deal of the reader. This petition is far from a model of clarity, but this confusion may be a product of Harris' circumstances, since it appears that Harris is awaiting trial in the Court of Common Pleas of York County on rape and sexual assault charges. Commonwealth v. Harris, CP-67-CR-0004733-2019.
To the extent that it can be understood, this petition names a local hospital and hospital administrator as respondents. The petition appears to complain that the hospital collected some of the evidence which forms the basis of these sexual assault charges, and in Harris' view, collected that evidence ineptly. On the basis of these allegations it appears that Harris attempts to litigate some evidentiary issues in this state case in federal court prior to his state trial.
This petition is fundamentally wrong on several levels. First, it names improper respondents. Second, these efforts to litigate Harris' pending state case in federal court, in our view do not constitute full and proper exhaustion of these legal claims in state court. One of the statutory prerequisites to a state prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief in federal court is that the prisoner must "exhaust[] the remedies available in the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Therefore, the instant case presents a model of an unexhausted petition, since the petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus review of a state case which has not yet been fully adjudicated at trial. Third, the relief sought, which would effectively direct evidentiary decisions in a pending state case, is improper.
In light of the fact that this is undeniably an improper and unexhausted federal habeas corpus petition, the question before this Court is how best to address what is currently a premature and flawed petition. For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that this petition be dismissed.
II. Discussion
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts provides in pertinent part: "If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner." Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Court. Thus, we have a legal obligation to conduct a threshold evaluation of this petition. Having done so we find the petition is flawed in at least three ways.
At the outset, this petition names inappropriate respondents, a local hospital and hospital administrator. On this score:
In a federal habeas corpus proceeding like that commenced by the Petitioner, it is well settled that the warden of the institution where the inmate is currently incarcerated is the only proper respondent. Rumsfield v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-35 (2004); Yi v. Maugans, 24 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Kennedy, 851 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1988). Indeed, as the United States Supreme Court has aptly observed: "The federal habeas corpus statute straightforwardly provides that the proper respondent to a habeas petition is 'the person who has custody over [the petitioner]. 28 U.S.C. § 2242, see also § 2243....' [T]hese provisions contemplate a proceeding against some person who has the immediate custody of the party detained, with the power to produce the body of such party before the court or judge, that he may be liberated if no sufficient reason is shown to the contrary." Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 433-436 (2004)(emphasis in original)(citations omitted).Robinson v. Holder, No. 1:10-CV-1635, 2010 WL 11647321, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:10-CV-1635, 2010 WL 11647289 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2010). In this case it is absolutely clear that Harris is not being held in custody at the hospital and his jailer is not a hospital administrator. Therefore, Harris brings this petition against the wrong respondents.
Beyond naming inappropriate respondents, the petition is flawed in several other ways. In order to obtain federal habeas corpus relief, a state prisoner seeking to invoke the power of this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus must satisfy the standards prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which provides in part as follows
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in [sic] behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a) and (b).
(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that--
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State;
. . . .
(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.
As this statutory text implies, state prisoners must meet exacting substantive and procedural benchmarks in order to obtain habeas corpus relief. At the outset, a petition must satisfy exacting substantive standards to warrant relief. Federal courts may "entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in [sic] behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). By limiting habeas relief to state conduct which violates "the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States," section 2254 places a high threshold on the courts. Typically, habeas relief will only be granted to state prisoners in those instances where the conduct of state proceedings led to a "fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice" or was completely inconsistent with rudimentary demands of fair procedure. See, e.g., Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354 (1994). Thus, claimed violations of state law, standing alone, will not entitle a petitioner to section 2254 relief, absent a showing that those violations are so great as to be of a constitutional dimension. See Priester v. Vaughan, 382 F.3d 394, 401-02 (3d Cir. 2004).
Furthermore, state prisoners seeking relief under section 2254 must also satisfy specific, and precise, procedural standards. Among these procedural prerequisites is a requirement that the petitioner "has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State" before seeking relief in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Section 2254's exhaustion requirement calls for total exhaustion of all available state remedies. Thus, a habeas petitioner "shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). In instances where a state prisoner has failed to exhaust the legal remedies available to him in the state courts, federal courts typically will refuse to entertain a petition for habeas corpus. See Whitney v. Horn, 280 F.3d. 240, 250 (3d Cir. 2002).
This statutory exhaustion requirement is rooted in principles of comity and reflects the fundamental idea that the state should be given the initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of the petitioner's constitutional rights. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). As the Supreme Court has aptly observed: "a rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule" is necessary in our dual system of government to prevent a federal district court from upsetting a state court decision without first providing the state courts the opportunity to correct a constitutional violation. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982). Requiring exhaustion of claims in state court also promotes the important goal of ensuring that a complete factual record is created to aid the federal courts in their review of a section 2254 petition. Walker v. Vaughn, 53 F.3d 609, 614 (3d Cir. 1995). A petitioner seeking to invoke the writ of habeas corpus, therefore, bears the burden of showing that all of the claims alleged have been "fairly presented" to the state courts, and the claims brought in federal court must be the "substantial equivalent" of those presented to the state courts. Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, 959 F.2d 1227, 1231 (3d Cir. 1992); Santana v. Fenton, 685 F.2d 71, 73-74 (3d Cir. 1982). A petitioner cannot avoid this responsibility merely by suggesting that he is unlikely to succeed in seeking state relief, since it is well-settled that a claim of "likely futility on the merits does not excuse failure to exhaust a claim in state court." Parker v. Kelchner, 429 F.3d 58, 63 (3d Cir. 2005).
When presented with a plainly unexhausted petition, like the instant petition, the court has several courses available to it. First, the court can dismiss the petition without prejudice, so that the petitioner can either return to state court and totally exhaust his claims, or proceed in federal court on a petition which raises only wholly exhausted issues. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). This total exhaustion approach facilitates the important goals of federalism and comity that are essential to the exhaustion rule, and allows for complete legal and factual development of these cases in the state legal system before petitions are presented in federal court.
However, because strict compliance with this total exhaustion rule can create procedural dilemmas for some petitioners, the courts have adopted another procedure which may be employed in a limited number of cases, a "stay and abeyance" procedure in which the federal habeas petition is stayed pending exhaustion of state remedies by the petitioner. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). Yet, while granting a stay and abeyance is an available procedure, it is not a preferred course of action in these cases. Because a "stay and abeyance" procedure, if used too frequently, can undermine the policies favoring prompt and orderly resolution of state habeas petitions, the Supreme Court has held that:
[S]tay and abeyance should be available only in limited circumstances. Because granting a stay effectively excuses a petitioner's failure to present his claims first to the state courts, stay and abeyance is only appropriate when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner's failure to exhaust his claims first in state court. Moreover, even if a petitioner had good cause for that failure, the district court would abuse its discretion if it were to grant him a stay when his unexhausted claims are plainly meritless.Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. at 277. Therefore, in order to qualify for a stay and abeyance, a petitioner should "satisf[y] the three requirements for a stay as laid out in Rhines: good cause, potentially meritorious claims, and a lack of intentionally dilatory litigation tactics." Heleva v. Brooks, 581 F.3d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 2009).
In this case, it is evident that the exhaustion doctrine applies since this federal habeas petition clearly contains legal claims which have not been exhausted in state court. Indeed, this federal pleading is the very model of an unexhausted petition which the court ordinarily should dismiss without prejudice so the petitioner can return to state court and totally exhaust these claims. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). Further, in this case, we recommend dismissal of this action, in lieu of any stay and abeyance, because we find that this petition fails to "satisf[y] the three requirements for a stay as laid out [by the Supreme Court] in Rhines: good cause, potentially meritorious claims, and a lack of intentionally dilatory litigation tactics." Heleva v. Brooks, 581 F.3d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 2009).
Nor can Harris avoid this outcome by arguing that exhaustion of these state remedies on his part should be excused due to the futility of exhausting those state remedies. Because of the strong policies favoring exhaustion of state remedies, petitioners who seek to be excused from this requirement must make an exacting showing to forego this exhaustion requirement. Lee v. Stickman, 357 F.3d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Cristin v. Brennan, 281 F.3d 404, 411 (3d Cir. 2002) (refusing to excuse exhaustion in the face of 27-month delay). As a practical matter, the exhaustion requirement will only be excused in extreme cases where "inexcusable or inordinate delay by the state in processing claims for relief may render the state remedy effectively unavailable." Wojtczak v. Fulcomer, 800 F.2d 353, 354 (3d Cir. 1986)
Here, the state court docket in Harris' pending state case reveal that the state courts have consistently endeavored to promptly address this case. Moreover, the docket indicates that this case is now scheduled for trial in state court. Therefore, we cannot say that "inexcusable or inordinate delay by the state in processing claims for relief may render the state remedy effectively unavailable," Wojtczak v. Fulcomer, 800 F.2d 353, 354 (3d Cir. 1986), and the petitioner has not provided sufficient justification or excuse for this failure to exhaust his state legal remedies which would warrant foregoing the exhaustion requirement that is plainly prescribed by law. Therefore, the failure to exhaust these state remedies should not be excused, and his petition for writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed.
Nor can Harris avoid this full and proper exhaustion requirement by arguing that, as a state pre-trial detainee, he is entitled somehow to avoid the statutory exhaustion requirements of section 2254 by simply casting his petition as a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. These efforts are ultimately unavailing since it is clear that section 2241 imposes its own exhaustion requirements upon state prisoners who seek to avoid the exhaustion mandated by statute under section 2254. As this court has previously noted:
It is under this section [2241] that district courts have jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus before judgment is rendered in a state court proceeding. See Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 442 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1975); see also Paladino v. King, 247 F. App'x 393, 394-95 (3d Cir. 2007) (challenges to pretrial incarceration are properly pursued in a § 2241 petition) (nonprecedential). Although a petitioner is authorized to seek pre-conviction habeas relief, he still is required to exhaust state
court remedies before filing a federal habeas petition. It is well-settled in the area of post-conviction habeas relief that, as mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), a petitioner seeking federal habeas relief must demonstrate that he or she "has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 847 (1999); Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, Delaware Cty., Pa., 959 F.2d 1227, 1234 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 1089 (1993). Although 28 U.S.C. § 2243(c)(3) does not set forth an exhaustion requirement for petitioners seeking pre-conviction habeas relief, an exhaustion requirement has developed through decisional law. See Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 1986) ("The state court exhaustion requirement is mandated by statute under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and has developed through decisional law . . . as to claims brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.") (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1973)); see also Moore, 515 F.2d at 442 ("although there is a distinction in the statutory language of §§ 2254 and 2241, there is no distinction insofar as the exhaustion requirement is concerned."). "The exhaustion requirement ensures that state courts have the first opportunity to review federal constitutional challenges to state convictions and preserves the role of state courts in protecting federally guaranteed rights." Caswell v. Ryan, 953 F.2d 853, 857 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 944 (1992). To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must demonstrate that the claim raised in the federal petition was "fairly presented" to the state courts. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). "This requires that the claim brought in federal court be the substantial equivalent of that presented to the state courts. Both the legal theory and the facts supporting a federal claim must have been submitted to the state courts." Lesko v. Owens, 881 F.2d 44, 50 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990) (internal citations omitted). Where state court remedies are unexhausted, as recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1981), "principles of federalism and comity require district courts to abstain from enjoining pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances." Port Auth. Police Benevolent Assoc., Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J. Police Dep't, 973 F.2d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 1992). It is only when the circumstances demonstrate that a petitioner faces the threat of suffering irreparable harm that federal court intervention will be justified. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965).Green v. Piazza, 1:11-CV-1456, 2011 WL 3739356 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2011).
Thus, in this case, whether cast as a petition under section 2241 or section 2254, it is evident that the petitioner must fully and properly exhaust his state remedies before seeking relief in federal court. In this case, the petitioner simply has not met the requirement of full and proper exhaustion of his state remedies prior to proceeding in federal court. Moreover, he has provided no justification or excuse for this wholesale failure to exhaust his state legal remedies which would warrant foregoing the exhaustion requirement that is plainly prescribed by law. Therefore, the failure to fully and properly exhaust these state remedies should not be excused, and his petition for writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed.
Finally, beyond naming improper respondents and this failure to exhaust existing state remedies, we note another fatal flaw in this petition. In this petition, Harris invites us to intervene in a pending state criminal prosecution. This we cannot do. To the extent that this petition invites us to enjoin and dismiss a state criminal case, this pro se pleading runs afoul of another settled tenet of federal law, the Younger abstention doctrine. The Younger abstention doctrine is inspired by basic considerations of comity that are fundamental to our federal system of government. As defined by the courts: "Younger abstention is a legal doctrine granting federal courts discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a claim when resolution of that claim would interfere with an ongoing state proceeding. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) ('[W]e have concluded that the judgment of the District Court, enjoining appellant Younger from prosecuting under these California statutes, must be reversed as a violation of the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances.')." Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 2009).
This doctrine, which is informed by principles of comity, is also guided by these same principles in its application. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed:
"A federal district court has discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a particular claim where resolution of that claim in federal court would offend principles of comity by interfering with an ongoing state proceeding." Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). . . . . [T]he Younger doctrine allows a district court to abstain, but that discretion can properly be exercised only when (1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims. Matusow v. Trans-County Title Agency, LLC, 545 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2008).Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d at 131.
Once these three legal requirements for Younger abstention are met, the decision to abstain rests in the sound discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Lui v. Commission on Adult Entertainment Establishments, 369 F.3d 319, 325 (3d Cir. 2004). Moreover, applying these standards, federal courts frequently abstain from hearing matters which necessarily interfere with on-going state criminal cases. Id.; Zahl v. Harper, 282 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2002).
In this case, Harris' pro se petition reveals that all of the legal prerequisites for Younger abstention are present here with respect to those claims that seek to enjoin this pending state criminal case. First, it is evident that there are state proceedings in this case. Second, it is also apparent that those proceedings afford Harris a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues raised in this petition in this state case. See Sullivan v. Linebaugh, 362 F. App'x 248, 249-50 (3d Cir. 2010). Finally, it is clear that the state proceedings implicate important state interests, since these matters involve state criminal law enforcement, an issue of paramount importance to the state. See, e.g., Lui, 369 F.3d 319; Zahl v. Harper, 282 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2002). Since the legal requirements for Younger abstention are fully met here, the decision to abstain rests in the sound discretion of this Court. Lui, 369 F.3d at 325. However, given the important state interest in enforcement of its criminal laws, and recognizing that the state courts are prepared to fully address the merits of these matters, we believe that the proper exercise of this discretion weighs in favor of abstention and dismissal of this federal case at the present time. Lui, 369 F.3d 319; Zahl v. Harper, 282 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2002).
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, upon consideration of this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition be DENIED, and that a certificate of appealability should not issue. The Petitioner is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 3rd day of September 2020.
S/Martin C . Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge