Opinion
1:22-CV-00269-SPB
05-31-2023
ALLEN EUGENE HARRIS, Plaintiff v. WARDEN SCI ALBION, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF ERIE COUNTY, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN RE: ECF NO. 15
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Petitioner Allen Eugene Harris (“Harris” or “Petitioner”), an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Albion, filed this pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on November 9, 2022. See ECF No. 4. The Respondents have filed a motion to dismiss the petition. See ECF No. 15.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Upon review, it is respectfully recommended that the motion to dismiss be GRANTED and that the Petition be DENIED because the Petitioner has failed to file the petition within the statute of limitations and, in the alternative, because Harris has failed to exhaust his state remedies.
I. Statute of Limitations for Habeas Petitions
A. Statute of Limitations
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a one-year limitations period for state prisoners seeking federal habeas review. It is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and it provides:
(1) A I-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of -
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this section.28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). See also Hall v. Estock, 2023 WL 3322044, at *2-3 (W.D. Pa. May 9, 2023).
The one-year statute of limitations prescribed by § 2244(d)(1) must be applied on a claim-by-claim basis. Hall, 2023 WL 3322044, at *3 (citing Fielder v. Varner, 379 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 2004), cert denied, 543 U.S. 1067 (2005)). In analyzing whether a petition for writ of habeas corpus has been timely filed, a federal court undertakes a three-part inquiry. First, the court must determine the “trigger date” for the one-year limitations period pursuant to section 2244(d)(1). Second, the court must determine whether any “properly filed” applications for post-conviction or collateral relief were pending during the limitations period that would toll the statute pursuant to section 2244(d)(2). Third, the court must determine whether any other exception or equitable tolling should be applied based on the facts presented.
B. Exhaustion of State Remedies
“A district court may only grant a habeas petition of the petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies as to each federal claim raised in the petition.” Brooks v. Brooks, 2007 WL 761863, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32, (1991); Slutzker v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 379 (3d Cir.2004)). This means a petitioner must give “the state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal courts ... by invoking one complete round of the state's established appellate review process,” including petitioning for discretionary appeal. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-845 (1999); Slutzker, 393 F.3d at 380 (citing Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675, 681 (3d Cir. 1996)). The burden is on the petitioner to establish that all available state remedies have been exhausted. Parker v. Kelchner, 429 F.3d 58, 62 (3d Cir. 2005).
Exhaustion is excused for reason of futility if “there is an absence of available State corrective process,” such as when an appeal or petition for review would be procedurally barred as untimely, or “circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii); Slutzker, 393 F.3d at 380 (citing Doctor, 96 F.3d at 681). “However, if exhaustion is futile because the petitioner failed to satisfy a state procedural requirement, then the petitioner has procedurally defaulted and the exhaustion requirement is not excused.” Brooks, 2007 WL 761863, at *3 (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729 730; Slutzker, 393 F.3d at 380-381)). A federal court cannot entertain a habeas petition where the petitioner has procedurally defaulted because the procedural default “rests on independent and adequate state procedural grounds.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-730; Slutzker, 393 F.3d at 380-381.
A procedural default may be excused only where the petitioner demonstrates “cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrates that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-50; Slutzker, 393 F.3d at 380-381. To establish “cause,” a petitioner must “show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's [or petitioner's] efforts to comply with the State's procedural rules.” Murray v. Carrier, MM U.S. 478, 488 (1986). Actual prejudice requires a petitioner to establish that an error caused him “actual and substantial disadvantage.” Id. at 494 (citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,170 (1982)). An exception based on a miscarriage of justice is available only in “an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Id. at 478, 496.
III. Discussion and Analysis
A. Harris' Petition is Time-Barred.
Harris pleaded guilty before the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County on March 3, 2019, and that Court sentenced him on May 28, 2019. The “trigger date” for the commencement of the AEDPA statute of limitations was the date Harris' judgment of sentence became final pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), and the one-year (365-day) statute of limitations began to run the next day. See Pinson v. Coleman, 2023 WL 2705234 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2023). Harris did not appeal or collaterally attack his conviction. Thus, his conviction and sentence became final on May 28, 2019, and his “trigger date” for AEDPA purposes was May 29, 2019. This means that Harris was required to file any petition for habeas corpus relief on or before May 29, 2020. See, e.g., Smith. District Attorney of Chester Cnty., 2023 WL 2190211, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2023). Harris filed his petition on November 9, 2022. Because Harris did not seek post conviction relief, he is not entitled to any statutory tolling. See, e.g., Hernandez. Superintendent, SCI Fayette, 2022 WL 2056269, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 7, 2022) (holding that statutory tolling is of “no help” where Petitioner failed to seek post-conviction relief in state court). Thus, Harris' § 2254 petition is time-barred unless he can establish some basis for equitable tolling. Id. (citing Martin v. Adm 'r N.J. State Prison, 23 F.4th 261, 272 (3d Cir. 2022)).
Harris does not dispute this. To file his Petition, Harris used the preprinted AO 241 (modified) form. He answered “no” to the question whether he appealed his judgment of conviction. See ECF No. 4, p. 2. And although he answered “yes” to the question whether he had filed any other “petitions, applications, or motions concerning the judgment of conviction in any state court,” he references the Erie County Court of Common Pleas but provides no other information. An examination of that Court's docket reveals no motion, petition, or other request for post-conviction relief; only “correspondence” received from Harris regarding “credit.” See ECF No. 6-1, p. 5-6 (Common Pleas Court criminal docket). Moreover, Harris acknowledges that he did not appeal the denial of any motion or application to the “highest state court having jurisdiction over the action.” See ECF No. 4, p.5.
The AEDPA's statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645-49 (201). Application of this doctrine, however, occurs “only in the rare situation where [it] is demanded by sound legal principles as well as the interests of justice,” and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 275 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). To invoke equitable tolling, Harris must demonstrate that (1) “he has been pursuing his rights diligently,” and (2) “some extraordinary circumstance” prevented him from timely filing his Section 2254 petition. Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (citation omitted). Finally, the equitable tolling standard is conjunctive, which means a petitioner is required to establish both elements before tolling is permitted. Sistrunk v. Rozum, 674 F.3d 181, 190 (3d Cir. 2012).
Here, Harris has failed to established either element. Notably, he has not argued for equitable tolling or even replied to Respondent's assertion that his petition is time-barred. Nor has he demonstrated that he diligently pursued his claims or shown that extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. Equitable tolling simply does not apply here.
In sum, Harris' federal habeas petition is barred by the AEDPA's statute of limitations and no basis exists for tolling that limitations period. His § 2254 petition, therefore, must be dismissed.
B. Harris' Petition is Unexhausted and Procedurally Defaulted.
Harris also completely failed to exhaust any of his habeas claims in state court. This presents an additional and independent reason to deny his § 2254 petition. See 28 U.S. § 2254(b)(1)(A). As noted, Harris did not appeal his conviction or judgment of sentence to the state appellate courts. Those courts “were entitled to have an opportunity to determine” the issues presented in Harris' habeas petition. See, e.g., Brooks, 2007 WL 761863, at *7. Thus, the claims presented in the instant § 2254 petition are unexhausted.
“When a claim is not exhausted because it has not been ‘fairly presented' to the state courts, but state procedural rules bar the applicant from seeking further relief in state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied because there is ‘an absence of available State corrective process.'” McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)). Instead, the claim is deemed to be procedurally defaulted, and a federal court may not consider it unless the petitioner “establishes ‘cause and prejudice' or a ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice' to excuse his or her default.” Id. (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 740)). Harris, however, makes no effort to satisfy the heavy burden of demonstrating cause and prejudice; nor does he identify any miscarriage of justice that would transpire if the Court failed to consider her defaulted claims.
C. The Petition could be denied on the merits.
Finally, should the Court reach the merits of Harris' petition, it should be denied because it fails to present an issue subject to federal habeas review. As grounds for relief, Harris appears to contend that the state court incorrectly awarded him credit for time served in the wrong case. See ECF No. 4, p. 3-4. Although a federal court may consider a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner “on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States, ” a prisoner's contention “of error in state collateral proceedings [is] not cognizable on federal habeas review, because “the federal role in reviewing an application for habeas corpus is limited to evaluating what occurred in the state ... proceeding that actually led to the petitioner's conviction.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 954 (3d Cir. 1998) (“what occurred in the petitioner's collateral proceeding does not enter into the habeas calculation”). Additionally, a state court's computation of a state prison sentence, including the award of any credit for time-served, is a matter of state law that is not cognizable under § 2254. See Woods v. Phelps, 2008 WL 4449621, at *6 (D. Del. Sept. 30,2008) (“a state prisoner's right to credit for time served before sentencing is a matter of state law”); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-8 (1991) (“it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”).
Thus, Harris' claim should be denied because it does not present an issue cognizable on federal habeas review.
IV. Conclusion
Harris's petition is untimely. In addition, having failed to raise his claim on direct appeal or in state postconviction proceedings, Harris may not do so now, for the first time, through a federal habeas petition. See, e.g., Pflugler v. Superintendent of SCI Muncy, 2022 WL 4237482, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 14, 2022), certificate of appealability denied 2023 WL 2625607 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2023). And, in any event, his petition presents an issue that is not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding.
Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the Petition for Habeas Corpus (ECF No 4) be DENIED.
V. Notice Regarding Objections
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. 72((b)(2), and Local Rule 72(D)(2), the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72(D)(2).