Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-01119
08-17-2020
RODNEY J. HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. DETECTIVE RAYMOND, et al., Defendants.
(MARIANI, J.)
() REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pro se plaintiff Rodney J. Harris filed this civil rights complaint on July 1, 2020, asserting various claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Stroudsburg Area Regional Police Detectives Raymond and Susinskas and the Stroudsburg Regional Police Chief (collectively, "Defendants"). (Doc. 1). After filing his complaint, Harris filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 6). This matter is now before the Court pursuant to its statutory obligation to screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and dismiss it if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant immune from such relief.
Having screened the complaint, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Harris's complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and that the Clerk of Court be directed to close this case. I. BACKGROUND
In his complaint, Harris alleges that he was arrested, apparently for sexual-conduct related offenses in June 2020, "based on hearsay and revenge by someone he spurned advances from." (Doc. 1, at 2). With Harris's wife as a witness, the alleged victim searched through Harris's house while he slept and may have stolen some of his belongings. (Doc. 1, at 2). Detectives Raymond and Susinskas interviewed Harris on August 19, 2019, despite knowing that Harris was intoxicated and on various medications. (Doc. 1, at 2-3, 5). The alleged victim was homeless, and Harris showed her empathy, compassion, and caring, only to have the victim take advantage of him. (Doc. 1, at 5). When Harris "pass[ed] out," the alleged victim took "saliva samples and possibly urine" from Harris, and "she stated that she would 'get him back' for refusing her sexual advances." (Doc. 1, at 5).
The Court takes judicial notice of the underlying state court records relating to his criminal case, i.e., Commonwealth v. Harris, No. CP-45-CR-0000993-2020 (Monroe C.C.P.). See Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). According to the state court records, Harris was released after posting bond.
Harris seeks restitution and compensation and asserts violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, including his Miranda and due process rights. (Doc. 1, at 3). He seeks "review of unlawful tactics by said officers, township, and all upper echelon levels of supervision of these officers" and "restitution and compensation for violations by police officers identified herewith." (Doc. 1, at 3). II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2), the Court is obligated to screen a civil complaint with respect to actions brought in forma pauperis and to dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court has a similar obligation with respect to actions in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); Banks v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 568 F. Supp. 2d 579, 587-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (summarizing prisoner litigation screening procedures and standards). In this case, because Harris seeks to proceed in forma pauperis and is suing a police officer, both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) apply. In performing its mandatory screening function, a district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010).
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008)] and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court "need not credit a complaint's 'bald assertions' or 'legal conclusions' when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court of the United States held in Twombly, in order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Additionally, a document filed pro se is "to be liberally construed." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Nonetheless, every complaint, including that filed by pro se litigant, is subject to the pleading requirements as articulated in Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a "showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Harris asserts federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for violations of federal constitutional rights. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but instead provides remedies for rights established elsewhere. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). To succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the Defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States Constitution. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995).
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
A "defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable, and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor approved." Baraka, 481 F.3d at 210 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity." Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). III. DISCUSSION
State court records reflect that the criminal proceedings initiated against Harris are still pending. See Commonwealth v. Harris, No. CP-45-CR-0000993-2020 (Monroe C.C.P.). Because the state court criminal proceedings against Harris remain active, the Court first considers whether abstention is required under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See Galloway v. Kane, No. 1:15-CV-01007, 2015 WL 3953112, at *1, 4-5 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2015) (holding Younger abstention required where pro se plaintiff sued various state law enforcement officials for false arrest and malicious prosecution because ruling on those claims would require the Court to intervene in an ongoing state court criminal case). In Younger, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a federal court should abstain from interfering with a pending state criminal proceeding absent extraordinary circumstances. 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971); see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013) (holding Younger abstention doctrine limited to state criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings); ACRA Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki, 748 F.3d 127, 138 (3d Cir. 2014) (same). Abstention is appropriate under Younger only where "the parallel state action falls within one of 'three exceptional categories': (1) 'criminal prosecutions,' (2) 'certain civil enforcement proceedings,' and (3) 'civil proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions." Harmon v. Dep't of Fin., 811 F. App'x 156, 157 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013)).
The Court may raise the issue of Younger abstention sua sponte. O'Neill v. City of Phila., 32 F.3d 785, n.1 (3d Cir. 1994).
As Harris's criminal prosecution falls within an "exceptional category" to which Younger applies, the Court must determine whether three criteria are met: "(1) ongoing state proceedings are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to present federal claims." Dixon v. Kuhn, 257 F. App'x 553, 555 (3d Cir. 2007). However, even if all three of these necessary predicates are present, Younger abstention is not appropriate when "(1) the state proceedings are being undertaken in bad faith or for the purposes of harassment or (2) some other extraordinary circumstances exist . . . such that deference to the state proceeding will present a significant and immediate potential for irreparable harm to the federal interests asserted." Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989).
All three criteria are met in this case, and nothing in Harris's complaint suggests that the application of Younger would otherwise be inappropriate. First, the criminal proceedings against Harris are ongoing in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas. Commonwealth v. Harris, No. CP-45-CR-0000993-2020 (Monroe C.C.P.). Second, the criminal proceedings implicate the Commonwealth's important interest in bringing to justice those who violate its criminal laws. See Rex v. Fisher, No. 12-CV-04045, 2012 WL 3537846, at *2 (E.D. Pa. August 15, 2012); Arndt v. Pennsylvania, No. 3:11-CV-00856, 2011 WL 3876161, at *2 (M.D. Pa. August 31, 2011). Third, the complaint fails to state a claim that Harris has not been and will not be afforded an adequate opportunity to raise his federal claims in state court. See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670-71 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that the federal plaintiff bears the burden of showing that state procedural law barred presentation of federal claims in state court). Finally, the complaint does not allege any exception to the Younger doctrine applies such that it would be inappropriate for this Court to abstain. See Schall, supra.
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Court abstain from exercising federal jurisdiction over Harris's claims and that his complaint be dismissed without prejudice.
Harris should be aware that if he wishes to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement before any judgment of conviction and sentence is entered, the proper mechanism for doing so is by filing a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See, e.g., Cruise v. Donate, No. 4:06-CV-01897, 2006 WL 3885079, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2006) ("[W]hen a prisoner 'is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.'" (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)). He should also know, however, that because he has posted bond and is currently not in custody, any § 2241 petition would be moot. See, e.g., Kamrul-Islam v. Lowe, No. 3:16-CV-02566, 2017 WL 2906340, at *1 (M.D. Pa. July 7, 2017) (dismissing as moot a § 2241 petition where petitioner had been released on bond). IV. LEAVE TO AMEND
If Harris seeks habeas relief after judgment is entered at the state level, he would file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; if he seeks habeas relief before judgment is entered at the state level and is, in fact, in custody, he would do so under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See McLean v. Clark, No. 3:19-CV-00667, 2019 WL 5722006, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2019) ("When judgment against a petitioner in state criminal proceedings has not yet been entered and a petitioner files an application for a writ of habeas corpus while in pretrial detention, jurisdiction for federal habeas review arises under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, not 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because § 2254 requires that the petitioner be 'in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.'" (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3))).
The Court recognizes that pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed with prejudice, unless granting further leave to amend would be futile or result in undue delay. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007); Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2004). Here, Younger directs the Court to abstain entirely from exercising jurisdiction over Harris's claims pertaining to his ongoing criminal proceedings. As such, the undersigned recommends that the Court decline to grant Harris leave to file an amended complaint, as doing so would be futile. V. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that:
1. Harris's complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and
2. The Clerk of Court be directed to CLOSE this case.
BY THE COURT:
Dated: August 17, 2020
/s/ _________
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States Magistrate Judge NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated August 17, 2020. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Dated: August 17, 2020
/s/ _________
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States Magistrate Judge