Opinion
66407-7-I
04-16-2012
ANGELA HARRIS, Appellant, v. PROVIDENCE EVERETT MEDICAL CENTER, Respondent.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Ellington, J.
Angela Harris sued her former employer alleging discrimination based on gender. Her suit was dismissed, and Harris appealed. While the appeal was pending, Harris filed a second suit arising from the same facts, this time alleging wrongful termination and breach of contract. The second complaint is barred by res judicata. We affirm its dismissal. We remand for findings on the court's award of sanctions.
FACTS
Angela Harris worked as a nurse at Providence Everett Medical Center for approximately three years. She took maternity leave between October and December of 2006. Eight months later, Providence terminated her employment. Harris filed a lawsuit alleging gender discrimination in violation of the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), chapter 49.60 RCW. Her complaint was predicated upon her allegation that her pregnancy and maternity leave were substantial factors in her termination.
Providence moved to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6), claiming that it was a religious organization and therefore exempt from suit under the WLAD. In response, Harris did not challenge Providence's claim of exemption. Instead, she argued Providence was estopped from asserting an exemption because in its equal employment opportunity policy, Providence had assured its employees that it would not discriminate on any basis prohibited by state law. Harris also asserted that she had cognizable alternative claims of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, outrage, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
See RCW 49.60.040(11).
Clerk's Papers at 30.
The court treated the CR 12 motion as one for summary judgment, granted the motion, and dismissed. Harris filed a motion for reconsideration asking the court to vacate the order of dismissal and grant "leave to file a motion to amend the complaint to set forth claims for violation of public policy, equitable estoppel and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress." The court declined to reconsider.
Clerk's Papers at 38.
Harris appealed, again making her estoppel argument and, for the first time, challenged the merits of Providence's claim of exemption as a religious organization. She also contended the trial court should have granted her leave to amend her complaint to add the alternative causes of action.
In an unpublished opinion, we affirmed. We declined to decide whether Providence is exempt because Harris did not challenge the claim of exemption below and because the facts necessary to resolve the issue were not fully developed in the record. We concluded that Harris had not established the elements of estoppel. Finally, because Harris never moved to amend, we held the trial court committed no error regarding any amendment.
Harris v. Providence Everett Medical Center, noted at 161 Wn.App. 1039 (2011), 2011 WL 1843450.
"Without a formal motion to amend . . . the trial court had nothing to grant." Harris, 2011 WL 1843450 at *5.
While Harris's appeal was pending, she filed a new lawsuit. Relying on the same factual background, Harris alleged wrongful termination in violation of public policy and breach of promise to comply with employee policies. Providence moved to dismiss and for CR 11 sanctions. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and awarded sanctions of $5,604.82. Harris appeals.
RES JUDICATA
"'Filing two separate lawsuits based on the same event-claim splitting-is precluded in Washington.'" The doctrine of res judicata, which ensures finality of court decisions, bars litigation of claims that either were, or should have been, litigated in a former action. The general doctrine is that res judicata applies "'not only to points upon which the court was actually required . . . to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties . . . might have brought forward at the time.'"
Ensley v. Pitcher, 152 Wn.App. 891, 898, 222 P.3d 99 (2009) (quoting Landry v. Luscher, 95 Wn.App. 779, 780, 976 P.2d 1274 (1999)), review denied, 168 Wn.2d 1028, 230 P.3d 1060 (2010).
Pederson v. Potter, 103 Wn.App. 62, 67, 11 P.3d 833 (2000).
Loveridge v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 125 Wn.2d 759, 763, 887 P.2d 898 (1995).
Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151 Wn.2d 853, 865, 93 P.3d 108 (2004) (quoting Schoeman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 106 Wn.2d 855, 859, 726 P.2d 1 (1986))
Application of the doctrine requires identity of (1) persons and parties, (2) causes of actions, (3) subject matter, and (4) the quality of persons for or against whom the claim is made in the prior judgment and subsequent action. "The party asserting the defense of res judicata bears the burden of proof." Whether res judicata bars an action is a question of law we review de novo.
Loveridge, 125 Wn.2d at 763.
Ensley, 152 Wn.App. at 902 (citing Hisle, 151 Wn.2d at 865).
Lynn v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 130 Wn.App. 829, 837, 125 P.3d 202 (2005).
Harris contends that res judicata does not bar her second lawsuit because the two complaints do not assert identical causes of action. In order to determine whether causes of action are identical, we may consider
(1) whether the rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by the prosecution of the second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the suits involved infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.
Pederson, 103 Wn.App. at 72.
These four factors are analytical tools; it is not necessary that all four be present to bar the claim. The third and fourth factors are easily met here, because the relevant factual inquiry is the same (whether pregnancy or parental leave were factors in Harris's termination) and the same right is involved (to be free from discriminatory treatment in employment). The second factor is also established, because the same evidence would, had trial occurred, have been presented in both actions.
Kuhlman v. Thomas, 78 Wn.App. 115, 122, 897 P.2d 365 (1995) ("there is no specific test for determining identity of causes of action"); see also Philip A. Trautman, Claim and Issue Preclusion in Civil Litigation in Washington, 60 Wash. L.Rev. 805, 816 (1985).
According to Harris, however, the causes of action are not identical because the first judgment established only that Providence was exempt under the WLAD, and any right associated with that determination would not be impaired by pursuit of her present claims.
The premise of this argument is flawed. Providence's successful defense was indeed based on its assertion of exemption from the statute. But Harris's claim, then and now, is based upon the circumstances of her employment, pregnancy, parental leave, and subsequent termination. The same transactional nucleus of facts supports both lawsuits. Both complaints assert "background facts" that are identical in all material respects, and Harris acknowledged in her first appeal that the amendments she proposed were "only legal variations of the same facts."
Clerk's Papers at 2-3, 24-25.
Clerk's Papers at 73.
The causes of action are identical for purposes of res judicata.
Harris argues application of res judicata is unjust because she was not permitted to amend her complaint and so had no opportunity to litigate all of her claims in the first lawsuit. But, as we observed in resolving her first appeal, Harris made no motion to amend her complaint. Nor did she provide the court with her proposed amendment.Her claim that she was wrongly denied the opportunity to litigate her nonstatutory claims is not supported by the record. In sum, the trial court properly dismissed Harris's complaint as barred by res judicata.
See CR 15(a) ("a copy of the proposed amended pleading, denominated 'proposed' and unsigned, shall be attached to the motion"); Hook v. Lincoln County Noxious Weed Control Bd., Wn.App., 269 P.3d 1056, 1063 (2012) (use of the word "shall" in CR 15(a) is presumptively imperative; both the opposing party and the court have a legitimate need to see the proposed amended pleading in order to evaluate a motion to amend a complaint).
Because we conclude that res judicata bars the claims Harris raised in her 2010 complaint, we need not address Providence's alternative argument that dismissal was also appropriate on the merits
SANCTIONS
Harris also challenges the court's imposition of sanctions, contending her complaint was neither baseless nor interposed for an improper purpose. She also contends the order awarding sanctions is insufficient because it includes no findings supporting the sanctions. On that issue, she is correct.
Harris has preserved her claim of error by designating the court's November 12 order of dismissal and granting Providence's request for sanctions. Although the court entered a later order specifying the amount of the award, in this appeal, Harris challenges the decision to grant sanctions, not the amount awarded.
The determination of a violation of CR 11 is within the sound discretion of the trial court, but the court must create an adequate record for review by identifying the sanctionable conduct and explaining its reasons for imposing sanctions. Nothing in the record articulates the basis for imposing sanctions here, and we are unable thus to review the court's determination. We therefore remand for entry of the necessary findings. We also deny Providence's request for attorney fees on appeal.
Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp, 122 Wn.2d 299, 338, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993).
Biggs v. Vail, 124 Wn.2d 193, 201, 876 P.2d 448 (1994); Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 119 Wn.2d 210, 220, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992).
Providence contends that record establishes the basis for the sanctions, citing to its own pleadings below in support of its request. But we are aware of no authority that excuses the obligation to make express findings in support of CR 11 sanctions where the record provides a basis to speculate as to the court's reasons.
Biggs, 124 Wn.2d at 201-02.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.