Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-1437, Section: "R"(4)
June 27, 2000
ORDER AND REASON
Before the Court is defendant's motion for summary judgment to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the following reasons, defendant's motion is granted.
I. Background
This suit is the latest chapter of a long running dispute between plaintiff Charles M. Harris and the owners and operators of the Riverside Tavern. Appearing in proper person, plaintiff appears to plead two distinct allegations. (Because plaintiff is appearing in proper person this Court liberally construes his pro se pleadings. See United States v. Riascos, 76 F.3d 93, 94 (5th Cir. 1996)). First, plaintiff complains that the Jefferson parish Department of Inspection and Code Enforcement (the "Department") violated his civil rights by failing to respond satisfactorily to his repeated complaints that the operators and patrons of the Riverside Tavern parked on the sidewalk, blocked a fire hydrant, and dumped shells on a public right-of-way. Second, plaintiff alleges that the Department is responsible for the improper demolition of a building located at 110 Shrewsbury Road ("the Shrewsbury property"), thereby depriving plaintiff of his property without due process.
In an earlier chapter of this dispute, plaintiff prepared and submitted the original and amended petitions for damages on behalf of his grandfather, Ellis L. Marsalis, Sr. against, among others, employees of the Department in the Twenty-Fourth District Court for the Parish of Jefferson, Louisiana. In that state suit, Mr. Marsalis, who was represented by plaintiff, sued for damages he suffered from alleged trespasses, misappropriation of private property (the Shrewsbury property), and the Department's failure to respond to his complaints about these alleged violations. On March 17, 1997, the state court dismissed the suit with prejudice as to all defendants. Plaintiff did not appeal that judgment. Instead, plaintiff filed suit in federal court two years later on May 11, 1999.
Defendant now moves for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for his civil rights violation, and that plaintiff's property destruction claims have been prescribed, plaintiff opposes this motion.
II. Discussion
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ. p. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). Accordingly, a court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party. In other words, "if the evidentiary material of record were reduced to admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmoving party to carry its burden." Beck v. Texas State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 204 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 2000).
Initially, the moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. If the dispositive issue is one for which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554; see also Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Summary judgment is mandated if the nonmovant fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to her case on which she bears the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue exists for trial. See id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54; Rushing v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496, 505 (5th Cir. 1999).
B. Res Judicata
Defendant argues that all of plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata. The Full Faith and Credit Act mandates that Louisiana's "judicial proceedings" "shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States . . . as they have by the law or usage in the courts of such State . . . from which they are taken." 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Interpreting this mandate, the United States Supreme Court has explained:
The Act thus directs all courts to treat a state court judgment with the same respect that it would receive in the courts of the rendering state. Federal courts may not "employ their own rules . . . in determining the effect of state judgments," but must "accept the rules chosen by the State from which the judgment is taken."Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 515 U.S. 367, 116 S.Ct. 873, 877 (1996) (quoting Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481-82, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1898 (1982)). Louisiana state courts, however, must satisfy the applicable Due Process Clause requirements. "A State may not grant preclusive effect in its own courts to a constitutionally infirm judgment, and other state and federal courts are not required to accord full faith and credit to such a judgment. Section 1738 does not suggest otherwise . . . ." Kremer, 456 U.S. at 482, 102 S.Ct. at 1898. But State proceedings "need do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in order to qualify for the full faith and credit guaranteed by federal law." Id. at 481, 102 S.Ct. at 1897-98.
Under Louisiana law, res judicata is governed by Louisiana Revised Statute section 13:4231, which states in pertinent parts:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:
(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those causes of action.
(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.
In the comments following this statute, the Louisiana Legislature explains: "The central inquiry is not whether the second action is based on the same cause or cause of action . . . but whether the second action asserts a cause of action [that] arises out of the transaction or occurrence [that] was the subject matter of the first action." Id. cmt.(a) ("For the purposes of res judicata[,] it would not matter whether the cause of action asserted in the second action was the same as that asserted in the first or different as long as it arose out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first action."). The Legislative intent was to "prevent needless relitigation of the underlying facts and . . . free the defendant from vexatious litigation." Id.
Notwithstanding this general Louisiana rule of res judicata, there are three statutory exceptions, as noted in the opening clause of section 13:4231. First, "[w]hen exceptional circumstances justify relief from the res judicata effect of the judgment." La. R.S. § 13:4232. Second, "[w]hen the judgment dismissed the first action without prejudice." Id. And third, "[w]hen the judgment reserved the right of the plaintiff to bring another action." Id.
Defendant contends that all of plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata because a comparison of the original and amended petitions for damages in the state suit against the federal complaint indicates that both suits arise out of the same transactions and occurrences, Specifically, both the state and federal complaints assert that the Department failed to respond satisfactorily to plaintiff's complaints and that the Department is responsible for the improper demolition of the Shrewsbury property. (Marsalis Compl. ¶¶ 8-9, 15-17; Harris Compl. ¶¶ 1-2, 12.) Defendant also contends that the identities of the parties in the two suits are the same. First, the defendants are the same because plaintiff sued Anthony Giusti, a Department employee, in his official capacity in the state suit, (Marsalis Compl. ¶ 26), and a suit against a government employee in his official capacity "generally represent[s] only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (quoting Monell v. City of New York Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035 n. 55 (1978)) ("It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity."). And second, the identity of the plaintiffs are the same because the plaintiff in the state case, Ellis L. Marsalis, Sr., and the plaintiff in this case, Mr. Harris, are members of the same class. Moreover, defendant emphasizes that plaintiff not only prepared and submitted the original and amended petitions in the prior state proceeding, but also claims in his federal complaint that he had filed suit in state court.
As an initial matter, the Court finds that the three statutory exceptions to the general rule of res judicata are inapposite and that there are no suggestions in the record that the Louisiana state court judgments are not final and valid. Although plaintiff intimates that the state "judges's" patronage of the Riverside Tavern renders the judgment suspect, (Harris Compl. ¶ 7) that suspicion does not render the state court judgment constitutionally infirm.
After comparing the state and federal complaints, the Court is satisfied that both suits arise out of the same transactions and occurrences. Indeed, plaintiff does not suggest otherwise. But the Court does not find that the identity of the state and federal parties is the same. The defendants are the same because Mr. Giusti was sued in state court in his official capacity, which was merely another way of suing the Department. See Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 165-66. The plaintiffs, however, are not the same. Although defendant asserts that Mr. Marsalis and Mr. Harris are members of the same class, the state suit was not a class action, Mr. Harris's preparation of the state suit documents did not make him a party to that case, and a familial relationship does not create an identity of parties. While it is unclear from plaintiff's complaint whether he even has standing to present these claims, it is clear that he was not a party to the state suit. Accordingly, the Court denies defendant's motion for summary judgment.
C. Failure to State a Cause of Action
Addressing the substance of plaintiff's complaint, defendant interprets plaintiff's pleadings as an assertion that the Department's failure to respond to his complaints violated his civil rights, thereby depriving him of equal protection of the law. Accordingly, defendant analyzes this allegation within the framework of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Liberally construing plaintiff's complaint, the Court agrees that plaintiff's civil rights complaint is best characterized as a section 1983 claim.
"In order to recover under [section] 1983, a plaintiff must establish both deprivation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and action by defendant under color of state law." Duriso v. K-Mart No. 4295, Div. of S.S. Kresge Co., 559 F.2d 1274, 1277 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (citing Adickes v. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.CL. 1598 (1970)). Defendant contends that plaintiff has not alleged any section 1983 rights that have been violated because the alleged failure to respond to plaintiff's complaints "does not rise to the level of a constitutional tort." (Mot. Summ. J. at 4).
As defendant correctly points out, the measure of the Department's legal obligations is not any particular citizen's degree of satisfaction. Otherwise, every citizen displeased with a government's actions could sue. Such an assertion does not stana the test of reason and is so well established that no case citation is required. Had plaintiff raised issues other than the degree of his satisfaction, such as allegations of defendant's willful or malicious misconduct, then this Court would be less inclined to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action. See La. R.S. § 9:2798.1 (limiting the Department's liability for discretionary acts, except in cases of "malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct"). But the crux of plaintiff's allegations appear to rest on his dissatisfaction with the Department's exercise of its discretionary authority, and that alone is not a right secured by the federal Constitution or law. Moreover, the Court questions whether plaintiff even has standing to present this claim because plaintiff admitted in oral argument that he does not own the Shrewsbury property. Therefore, the Court grants defendant's motion for summary judgment to dismiss plaintiff's assertion that the Department's failure to respond to his complaints violated his civil rights.
D. Prescription
Defendant also contends that plaintiff's claim under section 1983 for the destruction of the Shrewsbury property without due process of law is prescribed. Again, liberally construing plaintiff's complaint, the Court agrees that this claim is best characterized as a section 1983 action.
State statutes of limitation govern the timeliness of a section 1983 action. See Longoria v. City of Bay City, 779 F.2d 1136, (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Moore v. El Paso County, 660 F.2d 586, 590 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1981); Lavelle v. Listi, 611 F.2d 1129, 1130 (5th Cir. 1980)). "[T]he question of when the cause of action accrues[, however,] is a matter of federal, not state law." Id. (citing Moore, 660 F.2d at 590 n. 4). Under federal law, a section 1983 cause of action "accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action." Id. (citing Lavelle, 611 F.2d at 1131). Accordingly, the limitations period "begins to run when the plaintiff either is or should be aware of both the injury and its connection with the alleged acts of the defendant." Id.
The governing statute of limitation here is article 3492 of the Louisiana Civil Code: "Delictual actions are subject to a liberative prescription of one year. This prescription commences to run from the day injury or damage is sustained." La. C.C. art. 3492. See also Williams v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 740 So.2d 183, 185 (La. 4th Cir. 1999) ("In Louisiana, delictual actions are subject to a liberative prescription of one year, commencing to run the day injury or damage is sustained."). Critically, this article is "strictly construed against prescription, and in favor of the obligation sought to be extinguished." Williams, 740 So.2d at 185.
Defendant contends that plaintiff was aware of the injury and its alleged connection with the Department at least as early as November 5, 1996. As plaintiff filed this federal complaint on May 11, 1999, defendant maintains that plaintiff's claim for the destruction of the property is prescribed by article 3492. The Court agrees with defendant. Plaintiff's Amended Petition for Damages, filed in Louisiana state court on November 5, 1996, not only referenced the destruction of the Shrewsbury property, but also claimed that Department employees were accountable. (Marsalis Compl. ¶ 15-17.) Accordingly, the cause of action accrued no later than November 5, 1996. While article 3492 is strictly construed, plaintiff's federal complaint was unquestionably filed more than a year after plaintiff was aware of the injury and the Department's alleged accountability. Therefore, the Court grants defendant's motion for summary judgment to dismiss plaintiff's claim for the destruction of the Shrewsbury property.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.