Opinion
HHDCV156064617S
12-05-2016
Jonathan A. Harris, Commissioner of Consumer Protection v. Kimmel & Silverman, PC
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Sheila A. Huddleston, Judge.
The petitioner, Jonathan A. Harris, Commissioner of Consumer Protection (commissioner), seeks an order requiring the respondent law firm, Kimmel & Silverman, PC, to comply with an investigative demand issued pursuant to General Statutes § 42-110d(c). The investigative demand is focused on the respondent's entrepreneurial and commercial activities involving advertising, soliciting business, billing, and representations about attorneys fees. Among other information, the investigative demand seeks identifying information about the respondent's clients so that the commissioner's investigators can contact the clients to ask about statements made by the respondent to the clients before the clients engaged the respondent and about any fees paid to the respondent.
The respondent objects generally that the investigation is unwarranted and represents an impermissible intrusion into its relationship with its clients. It further claims that the investigative demand is improper in that it fails to describe the practices the commissioner is investigating. In addition, although it responded to most of the interrogatories in the investigative demand, the respondent objects to the interrogatory that would require it to provide identifying information about its clients.
The court concludes, for the reasons stated below, that the commissioner was authorized to issue its investigative demand under § 42-110d(c) based on a reasonable suspicion that the respondent might have made misleading statements in its advertising or solicitation of clients. It further concludes that the information sought in the disputed interrogatory, as explained and limited by the commissioner's counsel at oral argument, does not seek information that is subject to the attorney-client privilege.
Factual Background
The respondent is a law firm with offices in several states. Its primary office appears to be in Pennsylvania, but it also advertises that it has a " fully staffed" office in Danielson, Connecticut. The respondent provides services to consumers with claims of automobile and motorcycle defects that are covered under the Connecticut Lemon Law and other state and federal automobile warranty or unfair trade practices laws.
In 2013, the Department of Consumer Protection (department) received two complaints regarding the respondent. One complainant stated that when he contacted the respondent's office, he was told that he had a great case but should not go it alone because he would be " slaughtered by corporate attorneys." He further complained that most of the information he was subsequently given about his claim by the respondent was " misleading or not true." A second complainant stated that after he engaged the respondent, the respondent sent him a " Request for Arbitration" form to request arbitration through the department, which he completed. The client also filled out arbitration forms for the Better Business Bureau's " BBB Auto Line" program, in which forum the client's claim was ultimately arbitrated. The BBB Auto Line arbitrator denied the claim. The complainant did not understand that the BBB Auto Line was not a part of the state's Lemon Law arbitration program. After the respondent notified the complainant that his claim had been denied and that it would no longer represent him, the complainant contacted the commissioner's office and was told that its Lemon Law arbitration program was completely separate from the BBB Auto Line.
The commissioner began an investigation of the respondent under the authority of General Statutes § 42-110d. It reviewed the respondent's website and had concerns about certain representations made there. It also determined, from a review of the department's files, that the respondent has never represented a client in the department's Lemon Law arbitration program. The investigative demand, a copy of which was attached to the commissioner's initial brief, focuses primarily, but not exclusively, on the respondent's advertising through its website and on obtaining information to test the accuracy of representations made on that website.
The portions of the respondent's website attached as exhibits to the commissioner's civil investigative demand indicate that the respondent advertises its experience in handling claims under the Connecticut Lemon Law, General Statutes § 42-179 et seq., the federal Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq., and other state and federal consumer protection laws. It further advertises that it provides " cost-free representation" and states that " [i]f . . . we accept your case, you will not pay anything out of pocket, win or lose." It further states that under the Connecticut Lemon Law, " if the consumer prevails, the manufacturer must pay all attorney fees and legal costs on top of what you receive." The commissioner argues that this statement is misleading because the fee-shifting provisions in the Lemon Law are permissive, not mandatory.
In addition to challenging the basis for the investigative demand, the respondent also specifically objects to interrogatory 14, which seeks the following information:
14. Identify each Connecticut consumer since January 2012 who retained Respondent's services regarding a Connecticut Lemon Law issue, but did not proceed through a State of Connecticut Lemon Law arbitration hearing. For each consumer, provide:
a. His or her name, address, and telephone number;
b. A description of how his or her was resolved (i.e., new car, full refund, amount of lump sum settlement); and
c. The amount of any fee Respondent received, whether paid by the consumer, deducted from a settlement, or separately paid by the car manufacturer.
The commissioner argues that the information sought in this interrogatory will allow the commissioner's investigator to contact the respondent's clients to question them about any oral representations the respondent made to them before they engaged the respondent and about whether they paid any fees to the respondent. The commissioner appears to have two principal areas of concern. First, he seeks to investigate whether the respondent has made misleading or disparaging statements to discourage consumers from seeking help through the department's Lemon Law arbitration program. He argues that the legislature designed the department's arbitration program as a forum for Connecticut consumers to obtain prompt resolution of Lemon Law claims without the assistance of an attorney, and that it is contrary to the interests of consumers to be discouraged from using it. Second, he seeks to investigate whether the respondent ever collects fees from clients, despite its advertising of " cost-free" legal services. The commissioner's counsel acknowledged that the commissioner's jurisdiction is limited to the entrepreneurial aspects of the respondent's business and indicated that investigators would ask only about (1) statements made by the respondent before the client hired the respondent, and (2) whether the client paid any fees or costs to the respondent.
The respondent argued, in response, that the questions the commissioner wants to ask its clients will invade the attorney-client relationship and will put some clients at risk of violating confidentiality provisions in settlement agreements. In its reply brief, in an attempt to resolve the potential issues surrounding the confidentiality of settlement agreements, the respondent produced copies of agreements it had entered on behalf of its Lemon Law customers, redacting the clients' and manufacturers' names and all material terms except the award itself. In each case, the redacted documents indicate that the manufacturer agreed to provide a replacement vehicle to the client and to pay the respondent's attorneys fees, which ranged from $1,500 to $3,000 in the documents provided. At oral argument, counsel for the commissioner indicated that he was inclined to accept those documents as responsive to the interrogatory's questions regarding the settlement awards and attorneys fees if they represented all the respondent's Lemon Law clients.
In an affidavit in support of the respondent's objection, a Connecticut attorney in the respondent's Danielson office attested that the firm has never taken any payment from a Connecticut consumer directly; that when negotiating a replacement or repurchase settlement with a manufacturer, the respondent always negotiates payment of its fees separately, and such fees are paid directly by the manufacturer. The respondent argued, in its objection, that the fee-shifting provisions of consumer statutes such as the Lemon Law are intended to even the playing field and ensure that the consumer has the same access to legal representation and experts that the manufacturer does. It distinguishes fee-shifting provisions, in which attorneys fees are considered separately from a plaintiff's recovery, from contingency fee arrangements, in which an attorney's compensation is a percentage of, and taken from, a plaintiff's award or settlement.
Analysis
The commissioner is authorized to investigate suspected violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The " substantive keystone" of CUTPA is General Statutes § 42-110b. Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 190 Conn. 510, 513, 461 A.2d 938 (1983). Section 42-110b(a) provides: " No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." Section 42-110d(c) authorizes the commissioner to serve a written " investigative demand upon any person suspected of using, having used or about to use any method, act or practice declared by section 42-110b to be unlawful or upon any person from whom said commissioner wants assurance that section 42-110b has not, is not or will not be violated." The investigatory powers thus conferred are extremely broad.
Although the respondent argues that the commissioner lacks any reasonable basis for pursuing this investigation, the respondent did not present any analysis of the scope of the court's review of the basis for the commissioner's investigation. The court's own research indicates that judicial review of an administrative agency's duly conferred investigative power is limited to determining that it is not unreasonable.
In Heslin, the Supreme Court cited In re Application of Ajello v. Moffie, 179 Conn. 324, 426 A.2d 295 (1979), for the proposition that " the legislature, when it endows an administrative agency with responsibility for a statute's enforcement, may authorize that body, rather than the trial court, to determine the question of coverage in the preliminary investigation of possibly existing violations . . . An administrative body so empowered may, by virtue of such authority, develop, without interference or delay, a factual basis for the determination of whether particular activities come within its regulatory authority." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, supra, 190 Conn. 514-15. Moffie, in turn, relied on federal cases in which the United States Supreme Court has upheld the authority of federal agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and others to investigate corporations to ensure their compliance with the laws the agencies are charged with administering and enforcing. In re Application of Ajello v. Moffie, supra, 324-27. In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66 S.Ct. 494, 90 L.Ed. 614 (1946), the Supreme Court upheld the authority of the wage and hour division of the Department of Labor to subpoena the records of a publishing company and, in so doing, rejected a claim that the investigation was an improper constructive search under the fourth amendment. " It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, within the power of Congress to command . . . The requirement of 'probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation' literally applicable in the case of a warrant is satisfied, in that of an order for production, by the court's determination that the investigation is authorized by Congress, is for a purpose Congress can order, and the documents sought are relevant to the inquiry." Id., 209. Four years later, in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 70 S.Ct. 357, 94 L.Ed. 401, 46 F.T.C. 1436 (1950), the court amplified its reasoning as follows: " Even if one were to regard the request for information in this case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest." Id., 652. Acknowledging that a government inquiry into corporate matters could be so sweeping as to be unreasonable, the court nevertheless concluded: " it is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant." Id. See also In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867, 94 S.Ct. 64, 38 L.Ed.2d 86 (1973).
In this case, the inquiry into the respondent's business practices is clearly authorized. Our Supreme Court has stated that, in general, " CUTPA applies to the conduct of attorneys." Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, supra, 190 Conn. 521. " [The statute's] regulation of the conduct of any trade or commerce does not totally exclude all conduct of the profession of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. To the extent that lawyers participate in " trade or commerce, " the commissioner is empowered to investigate suspected violations of CUTPA. Id., 520-21. It can do so, moreover, without infringing upon the judiciary's inherent authority to regulate the conduct of attorneys. Id., 527.
The respondent protests that the complaints that triggered the commissioner's investigation do not involve complaints about the business practices that appear to be the subject of the commissioner's investigation. Even if the court agreed, however, this argument would not preclude the commissioner's investigation. Although the complaints undoubtedly brought the commissioner's attention to the respondent's business, the commissioner then reviewed the respondent's website and had concerns about statements made there. The website is clearly advertising and is squarely within the commissioner's jurisdiction to investigate.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has declined to hold that " CUTPA permits regulation of every aspect of the practice of law . . ." Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, supra, 190 Conn. 520. It has stated, instead, that " only the entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of law are covered by CUTPA." Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17, 34, 699 A.2d 964 (1997). It has also held that " professional negligence that is, malpractice--does not fall under CUTPA." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz, Ribicoff & Kotkin, 247 Conn. 48, 79, 717 A.2d 724 (1998).
In court during the argument on this application, the commissioner's counsel acknowledged that the commissioner does not have jurisdiction to investigate issues of legal malpractice or of the substance of legal advice given. His jurisdiction over lawyers is limited to their business practices. He therefore cannot properly inquire into the advice given by the respondent after it was retained, nor can he properly inquire into the respondent's consultations with its clients, after the respondent was retained, regarding the clients' objectives in the representation, the choice of forum, negotiating strategies, or specific settlements obtained by individual clients.
Two further issues are presented here. First, did the commissioner comply with General Statutes § 42-110d(c) by providing a " description of the method, act or practice under investigation" ? Second, is any or all of the information sought subject to the attorney-client privilege?
The respondent argues that the commissioner did not originally provide a description of the method, act or practice under investigation. It is certainly true that the description provided here was not as specific as that provided in Heslin. See Heslin v. Connectictut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, supra, 190 Conn. 513. The investigative demand in Heslin described the practices under investigation as the unfair or deceptive use of " clinic" and " law clinic" in the law firm's advertising, misrepresentations as to its fees and the fees of other attorneys performing the same services, and referrals by the respondent to an affiliated law firm. Id. In this case, by contrast, the investigative demand merely states that the investigation concerned " the advertising and business practices by Kimmel & Silverman, P.C." While the court agrees that greater specificity is desirable, it cannot conclude that the description here is so vague as to deprive the respondent of any understanding of the scope of the inquiry. Moreover, the description of the investigation is consistent with the limits of the commissioner's jurisdiction over the entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of law. See Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, supra, 243 Conn. 34.
The second issue presented is whether interrogatory 14 requires the disclosure of any information that is subject to the attorney-client privilege. As quoted above, interrogatory 14 concerns the respondent's clients who did not make use of the Lemon Law arbitration program created by General Statutes § 14-181. The commissioner represents that the respondent firm has never represented a party in the state's arbitration program. Consequently, the interrogatory seeks the disclosure of this information as to all of the respondent's Connecticut clients from 2012 to the present. For each such client, the interrogatory seeks the client's name, address, and telephone number, as well as a description of how the client's claim was resolved and a statement of the fee received by the respondent.
" 'Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, the communications relating to that purpose, made in confidence by the client, are at his instance permanently protected from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, except the protection be waived.'" Rienzo v. Santangelo, 160 Conn. 391, 395, 279 A.2d 565 (1971), quoting 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2292 (McNaughton Rev. 1961). " The burden of establishing the applicability of the [attorney-client] privilege rests with the party invoking it." Harrington v. Freedom of Information Commission, 323 Conn. 1, 12, 144 A.3d 405 (2016). " Any privilege there may be is not a blanket one . . . Because the application of the attorney-client privilege tends to prevent the full disclosure of information and the true state of affairs, it is both narrowly applied and strictly construed." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. With these principles in mind, the court turns to analyze the types of information sought by the commissioner in this case.
Client Identity
Connecticut courts have long held that the attorney-client privilege is " strictly construed" to protect only " communications between client and attorney when made in confidence for the purpose of seeking or giving legal advice." Ullmann v. State, 230 Conn. 698, 710-11, 647 A.2d 324 (1994). " The fact that an attorney may not disclose privileged communications between himself and his client does not affect his capacity and his duty to testify as to other matters when called on to do so." State v. Manning, 162 Conn. 112, 120, 291 A.2d 750 (1971), overruled on other grounds by State v. Arroyo, 292 Conn. 558, 973 A.2d 1254 (2009). " An attorney may properly be required to testify by whom he is employed, and in what capacity." Turner's Appeal, 72 Conn. 305, 318, 44 A. 310 (1899). As these cases demonstrate, the identity of a client is not privileged information in the absence of exceptional circumstances, which have not been shown here.
Client Address and Telephone Number
Whether a client's address and telephone number are subject to the attorney-client privilege does not appear to have been addressed in Connecticut, and neither party discussed whether a client's address and telephone number may be subject to the attorney-client privilege even if his or her identity is not. The court's research has discovered that courts around the country vary widely in their views of the confidentiality of a client's address and telephone number. See Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 1047, § § 1-14 (1967). Some courts have taken the position that a client's address, given to a lawyer while consulting the lawyer in a professional capacity, to enable the lawyer to communicate with the client, is a privileged communication. See, e.g., In re Trainer, 146 A.D. 117, 119, 130 N.Y.S. 682 (1911) (holding that " an address given by a client to an attorney while consulting him in a professional capacity on a business matter, for the purpose of enabling him to communicate with her in respect thereto, is a privileged communication . . . subject only to the exception that the court has the right during the pendency of the action to direct the plaintiff's attorney to disclose the clients address, while the relation of attorney and client actually exists"). Others have taken a more nuanced approach, concluding that the attorney-client privilege applies to a client's address " only when the client communicated the address confidentially, and the legal advice sought involves the address." Viveros v. Nationwide Janitorial Ass'n, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 681, 683 (N.D.Ga. 2000); see also In the Matter of Grand Jury Subpoenas Served Upon Field, 408 F.Supp. 1169, 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (client's address was privileged communication because address was at heart of legal advice sought). The latter view is more consistent with Connecticut precedents holding that the privilege applies to communication of facts between attorney and client only when the communication is shown to be " inextricably linked to the giving or receiving of legal advice." Ullmann v. State, supra, 230 Conn. 713. The burden is on the person asserting the privilege to show that the communication is so " inextricably linked." See id., 714; see also State v. Hanna, 150 Conn. 457, 466, 191 A.2d 124 (1963) (" [t]he burden of proving the facts essential to the privilege is on the person asserting it"). In this case, the respondent has not offered any argument or evidence that the addresses or telephone numbers of its clients were provided in confidence for a purpose essential to the giving of legal advice. The addresses and telephone numbers of the respondent's clients are therefore not protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Fee Information
It is well established that fee information, as a general rule, is not protected by the attorney-client privilege. In Maxwell v. Freedom of Information Commission, 260 Conn. 143, 146-50, 794 A.2d 535 (2002), our Supreme Court held that a town's legal bills were not exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act's exception for " communications privileged by the attorney-client relationship." The Maxwell holding is consistent with that of numerous federal courts, which have held that client identity and billing information is generally not subject to the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 247 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Roe v. United States, 475 U.S. 1108, 106 S.Ct. 1515, 89 L.Ed.2d 914 (1986) (" absent special circumstances, client identity and fee information are not privileged"); In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 793 F.2d 69, 71-72 (2d Cir. 1986) (same); Clarke v. American Commerce National Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129 (9th Cir. 1992) (" [o]ur decisions have recognized that the identity of the client, the amount of the fee, the identification of payment by case file name, and the general purpose of the work performed are usually not protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege"). Connecticut trial courts have similarly held that client identity and fee information is not privileged. See, e.g., Resha v. Hawkins, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-12-6027042-S (April 27, 2015, Wilson, J.) , (client bills that do not disclose confidential communications are not privileged); Rehim v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. 323416 (December 5, 1996, Leheny, J.) , (client bills do not constitute communications as required for attorney-client privilege). Here the commissioner seeks only to discover whether in fact the respondent has charged any fees or costs to its clients in Lemon Law cases. That information is not privileged.
Resolution of Clients' Claims
Interrogatory 14 also seeks a " description of how his or her (sic) was resolved (i.e., new car, full refund, amount of lump sum settlement)." The respondent objected to this portion of the interrogatory on the ground of attorney-client privilege and confidentiality. It further argued that many settlement agreements contain confidentiality provisions that the respondent might be breaching or that the client might be induced to breach if questioned by the commissioner's investigator. Its proposed solution, in its reply brief, was to disclose copies of settlement agreements in which the clients' names and the manufacturers' names have been redacted, as have all terms of the agreements other than the precise award to the client and the separately stated payment for attorneys fees. The commissioner's counsel indicated that this approach was acceptable if such redacted agreements were provided for all of the respondent's Connecticut Lemon Law clients. It does not appear, however, that this approach would answer the commissioner's interrogatory as to clients who received no award. In addition, the respondent's counsel indicated that the respondent's search for responsive agreements was ongoing and that there might be additional documents to be produced. The court will address these issues in the order that follows.
Additional Issues
During oral argument, the commissioner's counsel raised issues relating to the adequacy of settlements obtained by the respondent, pointing out that the redacted settlement agreements disclosed with the respondent's reply brief did not show any awards of collateral or incidental damages. Scrutiny of the terms of the settlement agreements, however, appears to this court to intrude into the respondent's attorneys' performance of their professional responsibilities and is beyond the proper jurisdiction of the commissioner. " [I]t is important to note that, although all lawyers are subject to CUTPA, most of the practice of law is not. The 'entrepreneurial' exception is just that, a specific exception from CUTPA immunity for a well-defined set of activities--advertising and bill collection, for example . . . It is not a catch-all provision intended to subject any arguably improper attorney conduct to CUTPA liability . . . Second, . . . [m]any decisions made by attorneys eventually involve personal profit as a factor, but are not considered part of the entrepreneurial aspect of practicing law . . . For example, taking on a new client or discontinuing representation of a current one, settling a case, pursuing an appeal, or hiring expensive experts are all decisions that may be made in the best interest of the client, and still, because the attorney's and client's interests are often aligned together, also properly may be in the attorney's financial interest as long as such actions do not have an adverse effect on the interests of the client. The attorney's financial considerations do not place all of these actions into the category of the entrepreneurial aspects of practicing law." (Citation omitted.) Suffield Development Associates Ltd. Partnership v. National Loan Investors, L.P., 260 Conn. 766, 782-83, 802 A.2d 44 (2002).
The commissioner intends to use the information obtained by this order to contact the respondent's clients. The commissioner's counsel, however, clearly acknowledged that the commissioner's jurisdiction extends only to issues regarding advertising, client solicitation, and fees. It does not extend to discussions of communications between the respondent and client during the course of representation or settlement negotiations. Such communications are at the heart of a lawyer's professional responsibilities.
The court also notes that, although the commissioner appears to be concerned that the respondent may have steered clients away from the department's arbitration program, forum selection is, again, a quintessential professional responsibility, not an entrepreneurial aspect of the respondent's business. It is true that the legislature created the department's arbitration program with the intention that it would be accessible for self-represented parties (although persons represented by counsel can use it). But the legislature also provided for the award of attorneys fees so that consumers who want professional advice can obtain it and can be on an even footing with well-represented manufacturers. The fee-shifting provisions are appropriately used in negotiations to provide incentives for manufacturers to resolve cases promptly rather than risk incurring substantial attorneys fees. It does not seem to serve the interests of Connecticut consumers to discourage law firms from making their services available to clients on terms the legislature has encouraged.
The commissioner's application sought an order that not merely requires the respondent to provide the information requested, but also enjoins the respondent from " engaging in any business in Connecticut" until full compliance is made with the investigative demand. Such an injunction, in the court's view, is neither necessary nor in the interest of the clients currently represented by the respondent. The respondent appears to have cooperated with the investigation, to have raised legitimate concerns regarding the scope of the investigation and the potential for invading the attorney-client relationship in an improper manner, and to be acting in good faith. The court assumes that such cooperation will continue and that the respondent will either comply with the court's order or appeal it, as is its right. In the event of an appeal, the court will consider any duly presented motion for stay.
Conclusion and Orders
The commissioner's investigation is lawfully authorized and its scope is adequately, if sparsely, described as related to the respondent's advertising and business practices. Information regarding the clients' names, addresses, and telephone numbers is not privileged. With respect to any communications by investigators with any of the respondent's clients, the commissioner's counsel indicated that such communications would be limited to questions about (1) statements made by the respondent to induce the client to hire it, and (2) whether the client paid any fees or costs to the respondent. As so limited, the commissioner's investigation does not exceed its jurisdiction over the business of lawyers.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED:
The respondent shall provide the following information to the commissioner, on or before January 17, 2017:
a. The names, addresses, and telephone numbers of all Connecticut Lemon Law clients the respondent has represented from 2012 to the present;
b. As to each client so identified who reached a settlement with the manufacturer or dealer, a redacted copy of each settlement agreement. The client's name, the manufacturer's or dealer's name, and all material terms shall be redacted except the award itself (replacement of the vehicle or refund of the purchase price) and any provision for attorneys fees.
c. As to any client so identified who did not reach a settlement agreement, a statement as to whether the client paid the respondent any fees or costs of any sort, and if so, what fees or costs were paid.