Opinion
C.A. No.: N14C-09-034 FSS
11-17-2015
CHRISTOPHER HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MATTHEW HAZZARD, DETECTIVE KECIA ROSADO, DETECTIVE BRIAN CONKEY, Defendants.
ORDER
Upon Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment - DENIED; Upon Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment - DENIED; Upon Defendants' Motion to Strike - DENIED.
1. Essentially, this is a civil claim for damages stemming from an allegedly, unreasonably prolonged nine and one half hour detention of Plaintiff by Defendants (collectively "the Police"). Plaintiff was at a murder scene. He took the victim, his friend, to the hospital, but the friend was DOA. When the Police arrived, Plaintiff was distraught and, admittedly, he gave them a hard time. So, he was arrested and taken in handcuffs to police headquarters. As soon as he settled-down, the Police lost interest in the arrest and started questioning him as a potential witness.
2. At this point, Plaintiff concedes his arrest was lawful and that he initially agreed to speak with the Police. His current complaint is that they held him for nine and a half hours in a locked, interrogation room, while handcuffed off-and-on, and eventually his detention became against his will and unlawful.
3. Relevant discovery is done. It appears for present purposes that Plaintiff arrived at headquarters a few minutes after midnight. Three other potential witnesses also arrived around then. Plaintiff was not processed for the arrest. Instead, he was led to a locked interview room and handcuffed to a wall. Apparently, Plaintiff was interviewed off-and-on from 3:00 a.m. until 4:28 a.m. Then, he waited for an evidence technician to come on duty and collect evidence from him, sometime after dawn. After the evidence technician finished with him, Plaintiff was released around 9:30 a.m. Meanwhile, the interrogating officer finished her shift around 6:30 a.m. and left, presumably to go home.
4. The Police justify keeping Plaintiff as they did, arguing the initial delay was associated with the investigating officer's having to question the four witnesses in turn, with Plaintiff being interviewed last. The post-interview delay was arguably justified by the time it took for an Evidence Detection Unit officer to come to work. Further, although Plaintiff eventually asked how long he had to wait, Plaintiff never asked to be released. He never gave the Police reason to speed things up.
5. The touchstone for deciding whether Plaintiff has a cause of action is whether the Police behaved reasonably. Both sides have their points. Perhaps, if Plaintiff had not arrived in lawful custody and had he protested his detention, the court would rule for him as a matter of law. Conversely, if Plaintiff's detention had been little more than two hours, the court might rule that it was lawful. As to the latter, Delaware has a 2-hour detention statute. That law, in effect, creates an all-but conclusive presumption that a detention falling under the 2-hour rule is reasonable and lawful. The law, however, does not mean a longer detention is automatically unreasonable and unlawful.
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009) ("This inquiry turns on the "'objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.'") (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999)); see also,, Sekscinski v. Harris, C.A. No. 05C-05-004 RBY, 2006 WL 509541, at *5 (Del. Super. Jan. 18, 2006) ("[T]he court must determine 'whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation confronted.") (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)).
11 Del. C. § 1902(c): "The total period of detention provided for by this section shall not exceed 2 hours. . . ."
See Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230, 1241 (Del. 2000) (affirming trial court's decision that Defendant's 12-hour detention was not unreasonable based on "finding of sufficient reasonable suspicion for initial detention under section 1902" and "sufficient probable cause to effect an arrest within two hours of the section 1902 detention"). --------
6. The highly unusual fact pattern in this case does not lend itself to summary judgment. Plaintiff arrived at police headquarters under arrest for a criminal offense. Shortly after arriving at headquarters, as mentioned, his status changed to that of a witness. The court cannot determine, as a matter of law based on clear facts, when Plaintiff's status changed. More importantly, the court cannot find as a matter of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, that the Police were either not indifferent to Plaintiff's rights or, worse, they were not "sweating him," or otherwise mistreating him.
7. Even though discovery is done, there is a further question about the evidence detection process. For example, it is unclear whether EDU officers responded to the murder scene and, therefore, were arguably available to process Plaintiff sooner, before his interview or soon afterwards. Similarly, it is unclear why another EDU officer was not made available to process Plaintiff. It remains to be seen whether Defendants' reliance on the evidence detection process is reasonable, pretextual, or otherwise. In the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it might appear that he could have been processed while waiting to be interviewed, and, therefore, he would have been released five hours earlier. Similarly, the evidence about whether Plaintiff asked to be released sooner, or otherwise protested being held, is unclear. All of these unknowns have a potential bearing on whether the Police acted reasonably, and the extent, if any, to which Plaintiff is entitled to damages.
8. Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff was held in a police station, in a locked room, handcuffed for almost three hours before being interviewed as a witness. After the interview was finished, he was unjustifiably held against his will for another five or six hours.
9. It may be that the Police, for good reason, could not begin Plaintiff's interview or processing sooner. And it may be that the time it took between the interview's conclusion and the evidence processing was reasonable under the circumstances. Moreover, the precise terms of Plaintiff's confinement and his interaction with the police during that time may be relevant. In hindsight, it looks like it was a wild night, the Police had their hands full, and Plaintiff was not upset that the Police were focused on other things besides him. The truth remains for Plaintiff to prove at trial. All of this needs to be presented to a jury, so it can decide what probably happened and whether Plaintiff is entitled to damages.
10. Lastly, the court hears but rejects Plaintiff's belated protest over the decision not to go through with arresting and processing him through "Turnkey." That decision was not abusive, as a matter of law. Again, Plaintiff's claim turns on how he was treated as a witness.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED; Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED; and Defendants' Motion to Strike is DENIED.
Plaintiff SHALL respond to Defendants' pending Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Plaintiff's Alleged Physical Injuries and Defendants' Alleged Failure to Provide Medical Care within ten days of this order's date, or the court may deem the motion unopposed.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Date: November 17, 2015
s/ Fred S. Silverman
Judge cc: Prothonotary (Civil)
Daniel C. Herr, Esquire
Daniel F. McAllister, Esquire