Opinion
No. 2 CA-CV 2014-0016
10-10-2014
JEFFERY J. HARRIS, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. THE COUNTY OF COCHISE, ARIZONA, AND COUNTY ASSESSOR, PHILIP S. LEIENDECKER, Defendants/Appellees.
COUNSEL Jeffery J. Harris, Bisbee In Propria Persona Edward G. Rheinheimer, Cochise County Attorney By Elda E. Orduno, Deputy County Attorney, Bisbee Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(c).
Appeal from the Superior Court in Cochise County
No. CV201300707
The Honorable John F. Kelliher, Jr., Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Jeffery J. Harris, Bisbee
In Propria Persona
Edward G. Rheinheimer, Cochise County Attorney
By Elda E. Orduno, Deputy County Attorney, Bisbee
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Kelly authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Howard and Judge Vásquez concurred. KELLY, Presiding Judge:
¶1 Jeffery Harris appeals from the trial court's dismissal of the complaint he filed in the superior court challenging the Cochise County Assessor's denial of his disability-based property tax exemption. The trial court concluded it lacked jurisdiction based on Harris's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Harris appealed, asserting A.R.S. § 42-16201 permitted him to appeal directly to the superior court. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's order dismissing Harris's complaint.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 The record supports the following procedural history. In January 2013, Harris filed his fifth annual request for an individual property tax exemption based on a disability pursuant to A.R.S. § 42-11111. Subsection A of that statute provides in pertinent part that "[t]he property of . . . persons with disabilities who are residents of this state is exempt from taxation to the extent allowed by article IX, sections 2, 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, Constitution of Arizona, and subject to the conditions and limitations prescribed by this section."
¶3 The Cochise County Assessor ("the Assessor") denied the application in July, stating Harris had "publicly demonstrated and disclosed the qualification and ability to be engaged in substantial gainful activity" and thus had not shown a total and permanent disability. In response to two letters from Harris, the Assessor explained its decision and informed Harris that if he wished to appeal the decision, he must file either a "Taxpayer Notice of Claim" with the Assessor's office or a complaint in the superior or tax court pursuant to A.R.S. § 42-11005(A).
Article IX, § 2.2(A) of our constitution provides that persons who have been "medically certified as totally and permanently disabled" are exempt from taxation of property in a specified amount. To qualify for the exemption, a claimant must be "certified as totally and permanently disabled" and "unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity, for pay or profit." Ariz. Admin. Code R15-4-116.
In his letter responding to the Assessor's denial of his exemption, Harris stated he found § 42-11005 "inapplicabl[e]" to his claim.
¶4 Harris filed a complaint in October, which he characterized as a "statutory special action (complaint)" over which the trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to § 42-16201(A). In his complaint, Harris sought review of the Assessor's "refusal to accept as valid, for 2013, Harris'[s] well-established exemption for property as a disabled person." The Assessor filed a motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, asserting Harris had failed to exhaust mandatory administrative remedies, thereby depriving the court of jurisdiction. Harris opposed the motion, stating he had "opted to appeal directly to [the trial court] under § 42-16201(A), thereby bypassing the administrative appeals process provided by [A.R.S.] § 42-16254." In November, the trial court granted the Assessor's motion and dismissed Harris's complaint with prejudice. Harris timely appealed.
We assume without deciding that a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Ariz. R. Civ. P., was properly filed despite Harris's characterization of his complaint as a statutory special action.
Although Harris asserts the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction permitted him to bypass administrative remedies, "'the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, but rather is a procedural prerequisite to judicial review of an agency determination.'" Moulton v. Napolitano, 205 Ariz. 506, n.2, 73 P.3d 637, 642 n.2 (App. 2003), quoting Medina v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp., 185 Ariz. 414, 417, 916 P.2d 1130 (App. 1995).
Discussion
¶5 "[W]e review de novo [Harris's] challenge to the judgment based on [his] analysis of the superior court's jurisdiction and the doctrine of the exhaustion of remedies," see Moulton v. Napolitano, 205 Ariz. 506, ¶ 1, 73 P.3d 637, 640 (App. 2003), as well as issues of statutory construction, which are questions of law, Cochise County v. Kirschner, 171 Ariz. 258, 260, 830 P.2d 470, 473 (App. 1992). We will affirm the court's ruling if correct for any reason. Church of Isaiah 58 Project of Ariz., Inc. v. La Paz County, 233 Ariz. 460, ¶ 9, 314 P.3d 806, 809 (App. 2013).
¶6 "When a statute or regulation provides a hearing and review process to litigants before an administrative agency, the failure to pursue that process generally precludes judicial review." Medina v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp., 185 Ariz. 414, 417, 916 P.2d 1130, 1133 (App. 1995). The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is jurisdictional, Moulton, 205 Ariz. 506, ¶ 9, 73 P.3d at 642, and "[a] party's failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprives the superior court of authority to hear the party's claim," Hamilton v. State, 186 Ariz. 590, 593, 925 P.2d 731, 734 (App. 1996). The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating the existence of jurisdiction. Swichtenberg v. Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 82, 828 P.2d 1218, 1223 (App. 1991).
¶7 Harris asserts he was permitted to seek judicial review of the Assessor's actions in the superior court pursuant to § 42-16201. When considering this claim, our primary task is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent with respect to the relevant statutes. See DeVries v. State, 221 Ariz. 201, ¶ 6, 211 P.3d 1185, 1188 (App. 2009). We first look to the plain language of the statutes, which is the most reliable indicator of their meaning. Nordstrom, Inc. v. Maricopa County, 207 Ariz. 553, ¶ 10, 88 P.3d 1165, 1168 (App. 2004). If the language is clear, courts must "'apply it without resorting to other methods of statutory interpretation.'" Bilke v. State, 206 Ariz. 462, ¶ 11, 80 P.3d 269, 271 (2003), quoting Hayes v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 268, 872 P.2d 668, 672 (1994). We assign each word in the statute its "'usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.'" Id., quoting State v. Korzep, 165 Ariz. 490, 493, 799 P.2d 831, 834 (1990).
Direct Appeal Pursuant to A.R.S. § 42-16201
¶8 Section 42-16201(A) provides that
A property owner who is dissatisfied with the valuation or classification of the property as determined by the county assessor may appeal directly to the court as provided by this article on or before December 15 regardless of whether the person has exhausted the administrative remedies under this chapter . . . .Harris urges that this provision allowed him to "lawfully bypass[] the administrative appeals process provided by § 42-16254." The Assessor contends that § 42-16201 applies only "when a taxpayer is dissatisfied with the 'valuation' or 'classification' of property as determined by a county assessor." We agree with the Assessor that the statute does not apply to Harris's claim because Harris has not challenged either the "valuation" or "classification" of his property.
¶9 Harris's appeal sought relief from the Assessor's denial of his exemption from taxation based on a disability as provided by article IX, § 2.2 of the Arizona Constitution and § 42-11111. This exemption applies to persons who are "totally and permanently disabled" such that they are "unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity, for pay or profit, by reason of any physical or mental impairment," Ariz. Admin. Code R15-4-116, and whose income does not exceed certain limits, § 42-11111(E).
The exemption from taxation for a qualifying disabled person is three thousand dollars unless the person's total assessment exceeds twenty thousand dollars, in which case there is no exemption. § 42-11111(B).
¶10 The reason given for the Assessor's denial was that Harris had "publicly demonstrated and disclosed the qualification and ability to be engaged in substantial gainful activity without reservation"—a determination based on Harris's alleged physical and mental capabilities. In his complaint and on appeal, Harris has not explained how an exemption from taxation for a person who is disabled pertains to either the valuation or classification of his property, and we can find no indication that the terms were meant to include such an exemption.
¶11 In the property tax context, "'[v]aluation' means the full cash value or limited property value that is determined for real or personal property." A.R.S. § 42-11001(17). "'Assessed valuation' means the value derived by applying the applicable percentage . . . to the full cash value or limited property value of the property, as applicable." § 42-11001(1). Harris's challenge is not to the valuation of the property itself; rather his challenge concerns the disability status of the property owner.
Whether the full cash value or the limited property value is used as the basis for the assessed valuation depends upon criteria in A.R.S. §§ 42-13301 and 42-13304, which are not relevant here.
¶12 Similarly, the "classification" of property refers to the categorization of real property in order to fairly assign an assessment percentage to determine the "assessed valuation." See A.R.S. §§ 42-12010, 42-12001 through 42-12009; see also Stewart Title & Trust v. Pima County, 156 Ariz. 236, 237-38, 751 P.2d 552, 553-54 (App. 1987) (explaining "classification" is percentage used to calculate assessed valuation of property to which tax rate is applied to determine amount of taxes owed by taxpayer). These classifications include producing mines, § 42-12001(1), property used for agricultural purposes, § 42-12002, and property used to operate railroads, § 42-12005. The property's physical description or use determines its classification. Harris's challenge is not based on the property's description or use, but, as noted above, on the disability status of the property owner.
¶13 We agree with the Assessor that Harris's complaint did not challenge the "valuation or classification of the property," as those terms have been defined by our legislature. Therefore, § 42-16201 does not permit Harris to file a direct appeal in the superior court.
Our decision is limited to the arguments presented by Harris. We do not address the Assessor's argument that Harris was required to exhaust administrative remedies, or whether Harris's complaint could have been filed in the superior court pursuant to an alternative statutory basis.
Due Process
¶14 Harris next argues "[t]he trial court exceeded the constitutional limitations upon its power in disposing of the instant cause without affording [him] the opportunity for a hearing" and that the "court had a duty to consider—on the merits—Harris'[s] cause before depriving him of property." But Harris did not request a hearing in his response or file a separate document with the clerk requesting oral argument as required by the local rules of court procedure. See Cochise Cnty. Super. Ct. Loc. R. P. 2(d). And we generally will not consider issues that have not been raised in the trial court. See McDowell Mtn. Ranch Land Coal. v. Vizcaino, 190 Ariz. 1, 5, 945 P.2d 312, 316 (1997); Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 152 Ariz. 490, 503, 733 P.2d 1073, 1086 (1987) (appellate courts generally will not consider issues not raised in the trial court).
That rule provides that
Requests for oral argument may be made in the following words and fashion: (Oral Argument Requested), placed beneath the title of the motion, answering memorandum or memorandum in reply, or by separate document filed with the clerk. If oral argument is not requested, the court shall decide the matter without it being called on the calendar.
¶15 Further, Harris has provided no authority for the proposition that trial courts are required to hold a hearing on every motion filed—even in the absence of such a request by any party. Cf. Moulton, 205 Ariz. 506, ¶ 8, 73 P.3d at 641-42 (court has discretion to determine necessity of hearing on jurisdiction); see also Polanco v. Indus. Comm'n, 214 Ariz. 489, n.2, 154 P.3d 391, 393 n.2 (App. 2007) (appellant's failure to develop and support argument waives issue on appeal). Because Harris has not established that he requested a hearing, or that a hearing was otherwise required, we do not consider the issue further.
Harris's request pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-408 for a change of venue is moot in light of our decision here that the trial court properly dismissed Harris's complaint with prejudice.
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Disposition
¶16 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's order dismissing Harris's complaint with prejudice.
(Emphasis added.)