Opinion
No. 1 CA-CV 16-0486
04-20-2017
JASON LEE HARRIS, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. MARK CARL BRACHTL, Defendant/Appellee.
COUNSEL Jason Lee Harris, Florence Plaintiff/Appellant Pro Per
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2016-006228
The Honorable Douglas Gerlach, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Jason Lee Harris, Florence
Plaintiff/Appellant Pro Per
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Jon W. Thompson delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Lawrence Winthrop joined. THOMPSON, Judge:
¶1 Jason Lee Harris (Harris) appeals from the trial court's order deeming his motion moot upon dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 In June 2006, Harris filed a "Motion for a Court Ordered Officer for Special Appointment to Serve Process of Summons." The motion requested that the trial court appoint someone to serve summons and complaint on Mark Carl Brachtl (Brachtl), the defendant in this matter. The trial court noted that in a related complaint, Harris explained that Brachtl represents the state in a pending federal court case, but the complaint otherwise failed to state facts sufficient to support a claim against Brachtl. Finding the complaint insufficient, the trial court, on its own motion—relying on federal court decisions to do so—dismissed Harris's complaint. The court then dismissed Harris's motion request as moot. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21(A)1) (2016) and -2101(A) (2016).
Brachtl is an assistant attorney general.
The trial court relied on federal authority such as Guthrie v. Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1991) and Erie City Retirees Ass'n v. City of Erie, 838 F. Supp. 1048, 1050 (W.D. Pa. 1993), for the proposition that it could dismiss Harris's complaint on its own motion.
Absent material changes material to this decision, we cite a statute's current version.
DISCUSSION
¶3 On appeal, as in the subject complaint, Harris alleges that Brachtl violated his First Amendment rights and his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights under the United States Constitution. We surmise that Harris attempts to support these allegations with his claim that Brachtl did not serve a summons upon a defendant in another civil matter in which Harris is also a party. In his opening brief, Harris contended that Brachtl's failure to serve the summons entitles him to $ 7 billion in punitive damages. In a subsequent "Motion to (Good Faith) Settle the Appeal," he offered to settle this claim for $1.5 million. We deem Harris to aver that the trial court abused its discretion by considering his motion request moot upon dismissing his complaint. We review the trial court's motion to dismiss for an abuse of discretion. Workman v. Verde Wellness Ctr, Inc., 240 Ariz. 597, 601, ¶ 10, 382 P.3d 812, 816 (App. 2016) (citation omitted).
Brachtl did not submit an answering brief. Nor has he responded to Harris's "Motion to (Good Faith) Settle the Appeal" or Harris's subsequent "Motion for Settlement Conference." We deny both motions. We also deny Harris's "Motion to Inquire from the Docket" requesting this court provide him with a copy of a memorandum we routinely submit to the superior court directing that court to prepare and transmit records and filings to this court for examination and review on appeal. We do however note that our court's clerk nonetheless previously responded to his request. We have also considered Harris's "Motion of Acknowledgment" expressing that he understands that Brachtl did not submit an answering brief. This motion merits no response.
¶4 Arizona's pleading requirements are established by the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 8(a)(2). This rule "mirrors its federal counterpart," but articulates the pleading requirements differently. Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 218 Ariz. 417, 419, ¶ 8, 189 P.3d 344, 346 (2008) (citations omitted).
Arizona has not yet adopted the more heightened federal pleading standard set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and implicitly not the even more demanding standard set forth in Aschroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). See generally Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 218 Ariz. 417, 189 P.3d 344 (2008). --------
¶5 "Under Rule 8, Arizona follows a notice pleading standard, the purpose of which is to give the opponent fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim and indicate generally the type of litigation involved." Id. at ¶ 6 (internal quotation omitted). A court's determination of the pleading's sufficiency will be considered "look[ing] only to the pleading itself and consider[ing] the well-pled factual allegations contain therein." (citations omitted). Id. at ¶ 7. "[M]ere conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Id.
¶6 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Harris's complaint against Brachtl fails to state a claim. Harris's complaint does not comply with Arizona's notice pleading standard. The complaint provides no basis or authority imposing a duty on the Attorney General's Office, or its individual attorneys, to assist a prisoner with serving a summons in a civil case.
¶7 We additionally consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing Harris's complaint on its own motion. The defendant in this matter, Brachtl, did not file a motion to dismiss Harris's complaint. Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12, states that where a pleading fails to comply with pleading requirements, in a responsive pleading, "a party may" move to dismiss the action for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12, unlike the federal cases noted supra note 2, does not state that a trial court may dismiss an action on its own motion. See generally Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12. No other Arizona authority expressly allows the trial court to, on its own motion, dismiss a case pursuant to Rule 12.
¶8 Nonetheless, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Harris's complaint. See, e.g., Hedlund v. Ford Mktg. Co., 129 Ariz. 176, 178, 629 P.2d 1012, 1014 (App. 1981) (recognizing that Arizona court's may turn to federal courts for direction where, as here, the state's rules are patterned after federal rules).
CONCLUSION
¶9 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Harris's complaint and its subsequent finding that Harris's motion request is moot.