Summary
affirming dismissal with prejudice because claim had no arguable basis in law and deficiency was not remediable
Summary of this case from Harrell v. BrinsonOpinion
NO. 01-15-00686-CV
06-02-2016
WILLIAM HARRIS, Appellant v. ANIKA BELL-GRAY, Appellee
On Appeal from the 405th District Court Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 15-CV-0165-A
MEMORANDUM OPINION
William Harris, an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his claims against appellee, Anika Bell-Gray, pursuant to Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 14. In two issues, he argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his claims "with prejudice" without allowing him an opportunity to amend his pleadings. We affirm.
Background
Harris filed a "wrongful death and survival action" in forma pauperis pursuant to Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapters 71 and 74, alleging negligence arising out of the death of his mother, Clara Richardson. Harris alleged that Richardson was injured when she fell at the home of his sister, Althea Thomas. He stated that Richardson was treated in the hospital for two to three weeks and then continued to receive physical therapy after being released from the hospital. Harris asserted that Richardson died two months later. He stated in his original petition that, despite the wishes of himself and his other siblings, Thomas prevented the performance of an autopsy following Richardson's death.
Harris alleged that Bell-Gray was Richardson's primary-care physician and that Bell-Gray failed to order an autopsy following Richardson's death. Harris asserted general causes of action for negligence and "deliberate indifference to medical needs" against all of the defendants, including Bell-Gray, but he did not identify any specific actions taken by Bell-Gray other than the failure to order an autopsy. Nothing in Harris's pleadings indicates that Bell-Gray treated Richardson following her fall or at the time of her death.
Bell-Gray filed a motion to dismiss Harris's claims against her pursuant to Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 14. She argued that Harris's affidavit of indigence was false, as his "deposits over the preceding six months show that he has a source of income and [that he] is not indigent." Bell-Gray further asserted that Harris failed to file an affidavit of previous filings as required by Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 14.004.
Bell-Gray also argued that Harris's claims against her were frivolous because they lacked an arguable basis in law. Bell-Gray stated that Harris's claims of wrongful death and negligence against her focused on her failure to order an autopsy of Richardson, but Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapters 71 and 74 require that the claims arise from an injury that causes an individual's death or from health care services that proximately caused an injury or the death of a claimant. She stated, "Because [Harris] only complains of actions taken by [Bell-Gray] after his mother's death, he has failed to state a claim with an arguable basis in law under Chapters 71 or 74. . . ."
Harris subsequently filed an unsworn declaration of previous suits pursuant to Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 14.004. He also filed a document asking to amend his petition, but the record does not contain a ruling on this request or an amended petition.
The trial court granted Bell-Gray's motion, dismissing Harris's claims against Bell-Gray "with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to comply with Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code." The trial court severed Harris's claims against Bell-Gray into a separate cause of action, making the dismissal order a final judgment.
Dismissal Pursuant to Chapter 14
In his two issues on appeal, Harris argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his case without allowing him the opportunity to amend his pleadings and that the trial court erred in dismissing his suit with prejudice.
Harris cited Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) in his first issue on appeal. However, because the trial court's dismissal order was rendered in a Texas state court pursuant to Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 14, and not pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we construe this as a challenge to the application of Chapter 14. --------
A. Standard of Review
Because Harris filed this lawsuit as an indigent inmate, this lawsuit is governed by Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 14, which provides, in relevant part:
(a) A court may dismiss a claim, either before or after service of process, if the court finds that:
. . . .
(2) the claim is frivolous or malicious . . . .
(b) In determining whether a claim is frivolous or malicious, the court may consider whether:
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003 (West 2002).(1) the claim's realistic chance of ultimate success is slight;
(2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or in fact;
(3) it is clear that the party cannot prove facts in support of the claim; or
(4) the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed by the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative facts.
We review a dismissal under Chapter 14 for an abuse of discretion. Hamilton v. Pechacek, 319 S.W.3d 801, 809 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts unreasonably or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Leachman v. Dretke, 261 S.W.3d 297, 303 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.).
The trial court may dismiss an inmate's claim under Chapter 14 if it finds the claim to be frivolous or malicious. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(a)(2); Comeaux v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 193 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). A claim is frivolous if it has no basis in law or fact. Comeaux, 193 S.W.3d at 86. A claim is considered to have no arguable basis in law when either the legal theory on which it is based is indisputably meritless or the factual allegations on which it is based are wholly incredible or irrational. Nabelek v. District Att'y of Harris Cty., 290 S.W.3d 222, 228 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
We review de novo whether the plaintiff's claims have no basis in law such that dismissal on that ground is authorized. See Retzlaff v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice, 94 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). In conducting our review, we take as true the allegations in the plaintiff's petition. Scott v. Gallagher, 209 S.W.3d 262, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). We examine the claims asserted and the relief requested to determine whether the petition stated a cause of action that could authorize relief. Hamilton v. Williams, 298 S.W.3d 334, 339 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied).
B. Analysis
Harris complains that the trial court erred in dismissing his suit with prejudice and without allowing him the opportunity to amend his pleadings. Generally, a claim falling within the scope of Chapter 14 may be dismissed without providing notice of the motion to dismiss or an opportunity to respond to the motion. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(a) (stating that trial court may dismiss inmate's claims before service of process); Hughes v. Massey, 65 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001, no pet.) (holding that inmate had no right to notice of motion to dismiss or opportunity to amend). Thus, the trial court's dismissal of Harris's case without allowing him to amend his pleadings is not, by itself, an abuse of discretion.
However, a dismissal with prejudice, like the dismissal rendered here, is a ruling on the merits and is therefore improper if the dismissal is based on procedural defects that Harris could remedy. See Garrett v. Williams, 250 S.W.3d 154, 160 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.); Hickman v. Adams, 35 S.W.3d 120, 125 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (holding that dismissal under section 14.004 is not dismissal on merits and thus trial court abuses its discretion if it dismisses with prejudice claim where procedural defect can be remedied). A dismissal with prejudice is proper if it is based on the conclusion that the inmate's claim has no arguable basis in law. See Nabelek, 290 S.W.3d at 233. Therefore, we must determine whether the trial court could have dismissed Harris's claims against Bell-Gray on the ground that they had no arguable basis in law.
Harris filed suit pursuant to Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapters 71 and 74, alleging causes of action for negligence and "deliberate indifference to medical needs." He identified Bell-Gray as Richardson's primary-care doctor. Harris did not allege any facts indicating that Bell-Gray treated Richardson after her fall or in the months leading up to her death. He asserted only that Bell-Gray failed to order an autopsy following Richardson's death. He further alleged that his sister, Thomas, prevented the performance of an autopsy against the wishes of her other siblings.
In actions filed under Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 71, Texas's Wrongful Death Statute, the plaintiff must prove that the alleged negligence proximately caused the death. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.002(a) (West 2008) ("An action for actual damages arising from an injury that causes an individual's death may be brought if liability exists under this section."); Kramer v. Lewisville Mem'l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 404 (Tex. 1993); Christus St. Mary Hosp. v. O'Banion, 227 S.W.3d 868, 874 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007, pet. denied). Harris did not allege any negligence by Bell-Gray that caused Richardson's death—he alleged only that Bell-Gray failed to order an autopsy. Thus, he failed to plead a cause of action that could authorize relief under Chapter 71. See O'Banion, 227 S.W.3d at 874.
Similarly, a healthcare provider like Bell-Gray may be held liable pursuant to Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 74 when the provider's treatment, lack of treatment, or a departure from accepted standards of medical care or administrative services directly related to health care proximately caused an injury to the claimant. Bioderm Skin Care, LLC v. Sok, 426 S.W.3d 753, 758 (Tex. 2014); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(13) (West Supp. 2015) (defining "health care liability claim" as "a cause of action against a health care provider or physician for treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care, or health care, or safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care, which proximately results in injury to or death of a claimant . . . ."). Harris did not identify any applicable standards that would have authorized or required Bell-Gray to order an autopsy under the circumstances of this case, nor did he identify any injury resulting from the alleged failure. His pleadings alleged, instead, that Thomas, his sister, prevented an autopsy from being performed. Thus, Harris failed to plead a cause of action that could authorize relief pursuant to Chapter 74. See Sok, 426 S.W.3d at 758.
We conclude that Harris's petition failed stated a cause of action that could authorize relief and that this failure is not a procedural defect that could be remedied by amending his pleading. See Hamilton, 298 S.W.3d at 339; Retzlaff, 94 S.W.3d at 653; see also Garrett, 250 S.W.3d at 160 (stating that dismissal with prejudice is ruling on merits and is therefore improper if trial court's dismissal is based on procedural defects that plaintiff could remedy). The trial court did not err in concluding that Harris's claims against Bell-Gray had no arguable basis in law and in dismissing them as frivolous. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(a)(2); Nabelek, 290 S.W.3d at 228; Comeaux, 193 S.W.3d at 86. Because Harris's claims had no arguable basis in law, the trial court's dismissal with prejudice was proper. See Nabelek, 290 S.W.3d at 233.
We overrule Harris's issues on appeal.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Evelyn V. Keyes
Justice Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Brown, and Huddle.